
Millionaire

Intelligent contract audit report

Safety status





Main surveyor: know Chuangyu block chain security research team

Version description

Revised conte	nt Time	Revi ser Ver	rsion number
Write a document	20220622	Know that Chuangyu block chain security research team	V1. 0

Document information

Document name	Document vers	ion Report number	Level secrecy
Millionaire Audit	V1. 0	b060cfb0228a4667a4a9aeed43c	Project team
report		1d42	Disclosure

Statement

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Catal ogue

1.	review6-
2.	Code vulnerability analysis8-
2.1	Vulnerability level distribution8-
2.2	Summary of audit results9-
3.	Service security detection11
3.1.	Token function [through]11 -
3.2.	Dividend account setting function [through]12-
3.3.	Transfer function [through]13-
4.	Code basic vulnerability detection18-
4.1.	Compiler version safe [through]18-
4.2.	Redundant code [through]18-
4.3.	Use of secure arithmetic library [through]18-
4.4.	An unrecommended coding method [through]18-
4.5.	Rational use of require/assert [through]19 -
4.6.	Fallback function security [pass]19-
4.7.	Tx.origin authentication [pass]19-
4.8.	Owner access control [through]19 -
4.9.	Gas consumption detection [pass]20-
4.10). Call injection attack [pass]20-
4.11	l. Low-level function security [pass]20-

4.12.	Loophole in the issuance of additional token [through]20-
4.13.	Access control defect detection [pass]21-
4.14.	Numeric overflow detection [pass]21 -
4.15.	Arithmetic accuracy error [pass]22 -
4.16.	Arithmetic accuracy error [pass]22 -
4.17.	Use of insecure interfaces [through]22 -
4.18.	Variable override [pass]23 -
4.19.	Uninitialized storage pointer [through]23 -
4.20.	Return value call validation [pass]23 -
4.21.	Transaction order depends on [through]24
4.22.	Timestamp dependent attack [pass]24-
4.23.	Denial of service attack [through]25 -
4.24.	Fake recharge loophole [through]25 -
4.25.	Reentrant attack detection [pass]25 -
4.26.	Replay attack detection [pass]26-
4.27.	Rearrangement attack detection [pass]26-
5. Ap	pendix A: contract Code27 -
6. Ap	pendix B: security risk rating criteria32-
7. Ap	pendix C: smart contract Audit tool33 -
7.1. N	Manticore33 -
7.2.	Oyente 33 -
7.3. s	ecurify.sh33 -

7.4.	Echidna	- 33 -
7.5.	MAIAN	- 33 -
7.6.	ethersplay	- 34 -
7.7.	ida-evm	- 34 -
	Remix-ide	
7.9.	Special toolkit for blockchain audit	- 34 -

1. Summary

The effective testing time of this report is from Jun 19, 2022 to Jun 22, 2021. Bundle, during this period, the security and standardization of token codes for M i I I i o n an i r e intelligent contracts. Conduct an audit and use it as a statistical basis for the report.

The scope of this intelligent contract security audit does not include external contract calls, and does not include possible occurrence in the future. The new attack method does not include the upgraded or tampered code of the contract (with the development of the project, the intelligent contract may add new pool, new functional modules, new external contract calls, etc.), and does not include front-end security and server security.

In this test, it is known that Chuangyu engineer made a comprehensive analysis of the common loopholes in the intelligent contract (see Chapter 3) and passed the comprehensive evaluation.

The results of this intelligent contract security audit: through

As the testing process is carried out in a non-production environment, and all the codes are up-to-date, the testing process communicates with relevant interfaces and carries out relevant testing operations when the operational risk is controllable, in order to avoid the production operation risk and code safety risk in the testing process

Report information of this audit:

Report number: b060cfb0228a4667a4a9aeed43c71d42

Target information of this audit:

Entry	Description Description
Project name	Millionaire(Mai)
Contract address	0x0DA2e5110F182B49A3C8F420C0F19893E5E10A21
Code type	Token code, BEP-20 intelligent contract code
Code language	Sol i di ty

Contract documents and hash:

Contract docu	ment MD5
Mai Token. so l	0xd4afffb57c041b0591d3658bba93b4b30505c5 5334a95a9053c7bc988f945b70




2. Code vulnerability analysis

2.1 Vulnerability level distribution

The risk of this vulnerability is calculated by level:

安全风险等级个数统计表					
High risk Medium risk Low risk Through					
0	0	0	30		

Risk grade distribution map



2.2 Summary of audit results

Audit project	Audit content	Status	Description
	Token function	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Business	Dividend account setting function	through	After testing, there is no security problem
security	Transfer function	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Compiler version security	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Redundant code	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Use of secure arithmetic libraries	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	An unrecommended coding method	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	require/assert Of Reasonable use	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	fallback Function security	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	tx. orgin Authentication	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	owner Authority control	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	gas Consumption detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	call Injection attack	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Low-level function security	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Coding	Additional issuance token loopholes	through	After testing, there is no security problem
security	Access control defect detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Numerical overflow detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Arithmetic accuracy error	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Misuse Random number detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Use of unsafe interfaces	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Variable coverage	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Uninitialized storage pointer	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Return value invokes verification	through	After testing, there is no security problem
	Transaction order dependence	through	After testing, there is no security problem

Timestamp dependent attack	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Denial of service attack	through	After testing, there is no security problem
False recharge loophole	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Reentrant attack detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Replay attack detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem
Rearrangement attack detection	through	After testing, there is no security problem



3. Service security detection

3.1. Token function [through]

Audit analysis: Tokens are inherited from IERC20 contracts and comply with TRC20 tokens contract standards. After audit, the function of token is complete and the logical design is reasonable.

```
contract MaiToken is Context, IERC20, Ownable {
   using SafeMath for uint256;// Millionaire Use a secure arithmetic library
   using Address for address;
   address
                                        DIVIDENDS ADDRESS
                     constant
0x23128A25E9285cd62ac79a5659C65fbeb86EE31e;
   address constant LP ADDRESS = 0x9E55bda94dFc8fe18898b715602846BC419915A4;
   string private name = "Mai Token"; // Millionaire Token name
   string private symbol = "Mai";// Millionaire Token symbol
   uint8 private decimals = 18;//Millionaire Token precision
   mapping (address => uint256) private rOwned;
   mapping (address => uint256) private tOwned;
   mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) private allowances;
   mapping (address => bool) private isExcludedFromFee;
   mapping (address => bool) private isExcluded;
   address[] private excluded;
   uint256 private constant MAX = \sim uint256(0);
```

```
uint256 private _tTotal = 100_000_000 * 10 ** _decimals;// Millionaire Total circulation
uint256 \ private \ rTotal = (MAX - (MAX \% \ tTotal));
uint256 private tFeeTotal;
uint256 public taxFee = 1;
uint256 private previousTaxFee = taxFee;
 uint256 public dividendsFee = 1;
 uint256 public burnFee = 2;
 uint256 public specifyFee = 1;
 uint256 public liquidityFee = dividendsFee + burnFee + specifyFee,
 uint256 private previousLiquidityFee = liquidityFee;
 constructor () {// Millionaire Constructor
      rOwned[msgSender()] = rTotal;
      //exclude owner and this contract from fee
       isExcludedFromFee[owner()] = true;
       isExcludedFromFee[address(this)] = true;
      emit Transfer(address(0), msgSender(), tTotal);
```

Safety recommendation: None.

3.2. Dividend account setting function [through]

Audit analysis: The contract is passed._isExcluded[account] Judge whether it is a dividend account, Owner By calling the excludeFromReward And includeInReward Realize the function of setting the user not to participate in the dividend and setting the user to participate in the dividend.

After audit, the authority control is correct and the logical design is reasonable.

```
function excludeFromReward(address account) public onlyOwner() {// Millionaire Set users
not to participate in dividends
         require(! isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded");
         if(rOwned[account] > 0) {
              tOwned[account] = tokenFromReflection( rOwned[account]);
         isExcluded[account] = true;
         excluded.push(account);
    function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() {// Millionaire Set up
    user participation dividend
         require( isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded"),
         for (uint256 i = 0; i < excluded.length; i++)
              if ( excluded[i] == account) {
                  _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1];
                  tOwned[account] = 0;
                  isExcluded[account] = false;
                   excluded.pop();
                  break;
```

Safety recommendation: None.

3.3. Transfer function [through]

Audit analysis: Check account number and amount of transfer before transfer, judge whether to charge service fee

Make token transfers. The transfer is completed after determining whether the sender and receiver are dividend accounts and using different transfer functions

according to the actual situation and deducting transfer fees and liquidity fees.

After audit, the authority control is correct and the function design is reasonable.

```
function transfer(
         address from,
         address to,
         uint256 amount
    ) private {// Millionaire Transfer
         require(from != address(0), "TRC20: transfer from the zero address");
         require(to != address(0), "TRC20: transfer to the zero address");
         require(amount > 0, "Transfer amount must be greater than zero");
         //indicates if fee should be deducted from transfer
         bool\ takeFee = true:
         //if any account belongs to isExcludedFromFee account then remove the fee
         if( isExcludedFromFee[from] || isExcludedFromFee[to]){// Millionaire Judge
         whether it is a whitelist,
                                         and if it is a whitelist, there is no
         servi ce charge.
              takeFee = false;
         //transfer amount, it will take tax, burn, liquidity fee
          tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee);
    //this method is responsible for taking all fee, if takeFee is true
    function tokenTransfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount,bool takeFee)
private {// Millionaire Actual transfer
         if(!takeFee)
              removeAllFee();
         // Millionaire Judge whether it is a dividend account and select the
         transfer channel
              if ( isExcluded[sender] &&! isExcluded[recipient]) {
              transferFromExcluded(sender, recipient, amount);
```

```
} else if (! isExcluded[sender] && isExcluded[recipient]) {
              transferToExcluded(sender, recipient, amount);
         } else if (! isExcluded[sender] && ! isExcluded[recipient]) {
              _transferStandard(sender, recipient, amount);
         } else if (_isExcluded[sender] && _isExcluded[recipient]) {
              transferBothExcluded(sender, recipient, amount);
         } else {
              transferStandard(sender, recipient, amount);
         if(!takeFee)
              restoreAllFee();
    function transferStandard(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private {
         (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount,
uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = getValues(tAmount);
         rOwned[sender] = rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);
         _rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);
         if (0 \le tLiquidity) 
               takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * specifyFee / liquidityFee);// Millionaire Mobile fee
               _takeDividends(tLiquidity * _dividendsFee / _liquidityFee);// Millionaire The
              holder of the coin receives dividends
               takeBurn(tLiquidity * burnFee / liquidityFee);
         reflectFee(rFee, tFee);
         emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
    function transferToExcluded(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private {
         (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount,
uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = getValues(tAmount);
         rOwned[sender] = rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);
```

```
tOwned[recipient] = tOwned[recipient].add(tTransferAmount);
         rOwned[recipient] = rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);
         if (0 \le tLiquidity) {
              _takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * _specifyFee / _liquidityFee);
              _takeDividends(tLiquidity * _dividendsFee / _liquidityFee);
              takeBurn(tLiquidity * burnFee / liquidityFee);
         reflectFee(rFee, tFee);
         emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
    function transferFromExcluded(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private
{
         (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount,
uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = getValues(tAmount);
         tOwned[sender] = tOwned[sender].sub(tAmount);
         _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);
         rOwned[recipient] = rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);
         if (0 \le tLiquidity) {
              _takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * _specifyFee / _liquidityFee);
              _takeDividends(tLiquidity * _dividendsFee / _liquidityFee);
              takeBurn(tLiquidity * burnFee / liquidityFee);
          reflectFee(rFee, tFee);
         emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
    function transferBothExcluded(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private {
         (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount,
uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = getValues(tAmount);
         tOwned[sender] = tOwned[sender].sub(tAmount);
         rOwned[sender] = rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);
         tOwned[recipient] = tOwned[recipient].add(tTransferAmount);
```

```
_rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);

if (0 < tLiquidity) {

_takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * _specifyFee / _liquidityFee);

_takeDividends(tLiquidity * _dividendsFee / _liquidityFee);

_takeBurn(tLiquidity * _burnFee / _liquidityFee);
}

_reflectFee(rFee, tFee);

emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
}
```

Safety recommendation: None.

._

4. Code basic vulnerability detection

4.1. Compiler version security [through]

Check to see if a secure compiler version is used in the contract code implementation

Test result: After testing, the compiler version ^ 0.8.0 is established in the

intelligent contract code, and there is no security problem.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.2. Redundant code [through]

Check if redundant code is included in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem

does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.3. The use of secure arithmetic Library [through]

Check whether the SafeMath secure arithmetic library is used in the contract code implementation

Test result: After testing, the SafeMath security arithmetic library has been used in the intelligent contract code, and the security problem does not exist.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.4. An unrecommended coding method [through]

Check if there are any coding methods that are not officially recommended or discarded in the implementation of the contract code.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.5. require/assert Rational use of [through]

Check the reasonableness of the use of require and assert statements in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem

does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.6. fallback Function security [through]

Check whether the fallback function is used correctly in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.7. tx.origin Authenti cation [through]

Tx.origin is a global variable of Solidity that traverses the call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction).

Using this variable for authentication in a smart contract makes the contract vulnerable to phishing attacks.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.8. owner Authority control [through]

Check to see if the owner in the contract code implementation has excessive permissions. For example, arbitrarily modify other account balances and so on.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.9. gas Consumption detection [through]

Check whether the gas consumption exceeds the block maximum limit

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.10. call Injection attack [through]

call When a function is called, it should be strictly controlled or written to death call The function called.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.11. Low-level function security [through]

Check whether there are security vulnerabilities in the use of low-level functions (call/delegatecall) in the contract code implementation

call The execution context of the function is in the contract being called; And delegatecall On the execution of the function

The following is in the contract that currently calls the function

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem

does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.12. Loophole in the issuance of additional tokens [through]

Check whether there is a function in the token contract that may increase the total amount of tokens after initializing the total amount of tokens.

Test result: After testing, the intelligent contract code does not contain the function of issuing additional tokens.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.13. Access control defect detection [through]

Reasonable permissions should be set for different functions in the contract.

Check whether the functions in the contract correctly use public, private and other keywords for visibility modification, check whether the contract is correctly defined and use modifier to restrict access to key functions to avoid problems caused by ultra vires.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.14. Numerical overflow detection [through]

The arithmetic problem in intelligent contract refers to integer overflow and integer underflow.

Solidity can handle up to 256 digits (2 ^ 256-1), and increasing the maximum number by 1 will overflow to 0.

Similarly, when the number is unsigned, 0 minus 1 overflows to the maximum numeric value.

Integer overflows and underflows are not a new type of vulnerability, but they are particularly dangerous in smart contracts.

Overflow conditions can lead to incorrect results, especially if the possibility is not expected, which may affect the reliability and security of the program.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.15. Arithmetic accuracy error [through]

As a programming language, Solidity has similar data structure design to ordinary programming languages, such as variables, constants, functions, arrays, functions, structures, and so on. There is also a big difference between Solidity and ordinary programming languages-Solidity does not have floating point, and all numerical operations of Solidity will only be integers, there will be no decimal number, and it is not allowed to define decimal data.

The numerical operation in the contract is essential, and the design of the numerical operation may cause relative errors, such as the sibling operation: 5, 2, 10, 20, and 5, 10, 10, and 25, resulting in errors, and the errors will be larger and more obvious when the data is larger.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code. Safety recommendation: None.

4.16. Incorrect use of random numbers [through]

Random numbers may be used in smart contracts, and although the functions and variables provided by Solidity can access obviously unpredictable values, such as block.number and block.timestamp, they are usually either more public than they seem, or influenced by miners, that is, these random numbers are somewhat predictable, so malicious users can usually copy it and rely on its unpredictability to attack the feature.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code. Safety recommendation: None.

4.17. Use of unsafe interfaces [through]

Check whether unsafe interfaces are used in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.18. Variable coverage [through]

Check whether there are security problems caused by variable coverage in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.19. Uninitialized storage pointer [through]

In solidity, a special data structure is allowed to be a struct structure, while local variables within a function are stored using storage or memory by default. The existence of storage (memory) and memory (memory) are two different concepts. Solidity allows pointers to point to an uninitialized reference, while uninitialized local stroage will cause variables to point to other stored variables, leading to variable overrides, and even other more serious consequences. Initialization of struct variables in functions should be avoided in development.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.20. Return value invokes verification [through]

This problem often occurs in intelligent contracts related to money transfer, so it is also known as silent failure transmission or unchecked transmission.

There are transfer (), send (), call.value () and other currency conversion methods in Solidity, which can all be used to send BNB to a certain address. The difference lies in: when transfer fails to send, it will throw and rollback the status; it will only pass 2300gas for call to prevent reentrant attacks; when send fails to send, it will return false; only for 2300gas to prevent reentrant attacks; when call. value fails to send, it will return false.

Passing all available gas calls (which can be restricted by passing in gas_value parameters) does not effectively prevent reentrant attacks.

If the return values of the above send and call.value money transfer functions are not checked in the code, the contract will continue to execute the following code, which may result in unexpected results due to the failure of TRX delivery.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.21. Transaction order dependence [through]

Because miners always get gas fees through codes that represent externally owned addresses (EOA), users can specify higher fees to trade faster. Because the block chain is public, everyone can see the content of other people'soutst anding transactions. This means that if a user submits a valuable solution, a ma licious user can steal the solution and copy its transaction at a higher cost to pr eempt the original solution.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.22. Timestamp dependent attack [through]

Generally speaking, the timestamp of the data block uses the miner's local time, and this time can fluctuate over a range of about 900 seconds. When other nodes accept a new block, you only need to verify that the timestamp is later than the previous block and the error with the local time is less than 900 seconds.

A miner can profit from it by setting a timestamp of the block to meet as many conditions as possible in his favor.

Check whether there are key functions that depend on timestamps in the contract code implementation

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.23. Denial of service attack [through]

In the world of Tron, denial of service is fatal, and smart contracts subjected to this type of attack may last forever.

It is far from being able to return to normal working condition. There may be many reasons for the denial of service of the smart contract, including malicious behavior as the recipient of the transaction, gas exhaustion caused by artificially increasing the gas needed for computing functions, abuse of access control to access the private components of the smart contract, confusion and negligence, and so on.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.24. False recharge loophole [through]

In the transfer function of the token contract, the if judgment method is used to check the balance of the transfer initiator (msg.sender). When balances [msg. sender] < value, enter the else logic part and returnfalse, and finally no exception is thrown. We think that only the mild judgment method of if/else is a lax coding method in sensitive function scenarios such as transfer.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.25. Reentrant attack detection [through]

The call.value () function in Solidity consumes all the gas it receives when it is used to send TRX, and there is a risk of reentrant attacks when calling the call.value () function to send TRX occurs before the balance of the sender's account is actually reduced.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.26. Replay attack detection [through]

If the requirements of entrusted management are involved in the contract, we should pay attention to the non-reusability of verification and avoid replay attacks. In the asset management system, there is often entrusted management, and the principal manages the assets to the trustee, and the principal pays a certain fee to the trustee.

This business scenario is also common in smart contracts.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

4.27. Rearrangement attack detection [through]

A rearrangement attack is an attempt by miners or other parties to "compete" with smart contract participants by inserting their own information into a list (list) or mapping (mapping), giving the attacker the opportunity to store his information in the contract.

Test result: It has been tested that the security problem does not exist in the intelligent contract code.

Safety recommendation: None.

5. Appendix A: Contract code

The source of this test code is:

```
Mai Token.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
contract MaiToken is Context, IERC20, Ownable {
    using SafeMath for uint256;// Millionaire Use a secure arithmetic library using Address for address;
      mapping (address => uint256) private _rOwned;
mapping (address => uint256) private _tOwned;
mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) private _allowances;
       mapping (address => bool) private _isExcludedFromFee;
       mapping (address => bool) private _isExcluded;
address[] private _excluded;
       uint256 private constant MAX = \sim uint256(0);
       \begin{array}{ll} uint256\ private\ \_tTotal = 100\ 000\ 000\ *10\ **\ dec\\ uint256\ private\ \_rTotal = (M\overline{AX}\ -\ \overline{(MAX\ \%\ \_tTotal)});\\ uint256\ private\ \_tFeeTotal; \end{array}
                                                                             decimals;// Millionaire Total circulation
       uint256 public _taxFee = 1;
uint256 private _previousTaxFee = _taxFee;
       uint256 public dividendsFee = uint256 public burnFee = 2; uint256 public specifyFee = 1;
       uint256 public _liquidityFee = _dividendsFee + _burnFee + _specifyFee;
uint256 private _previousLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee;
       constructor () {// Millionaire Constructor function
    rOwned[_msgSender()] = _rTotal;
              //exclude owner and this contract from fee
              _isExcludedFromFee[owner()] = true;
_isExcludedFromFee[address(this)] = true;
              emit Transfer(address(0), _msgSender(), _tTotal);
      function name() public view returns (string memory) {
              return _name;
      function symbol() public view returns (string memory) {
    return _symbol;
      function decimals() public view returns (uint8) {
              return _decimâls;
       function totalSupply() public view override returns (uint256) {
              return _tTotal;
```

```
function balanceOf(address account) public view override returns (uint256) {
            function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool) {
             transfer( msgSender(), recipient, amount);
            return true;
     function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view override returns (uint256) {
            return allowances[owner][spender];
     function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool) {
              _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
            return true:
      function transferFrom(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) public override returns (bool) {
             _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
__approve(sender, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));
            return true:
     function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) public virtual returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].add(addedValue));
function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) public virtual returns (bool) {
    approve(_msgSender(), spender, _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].sub(subtractedValue, "ERC20:
decreased_allowance_below_zero"));
            return true;
      function is Excluded From Reward (address account) public view returns (bool)
            return _isExcluded[account];
     function totalFees() public view returns (uint256) { return _tFeeTotal;
     function reflectionFromToken(uint256 tAmount, bool deductTransferFee) public view returns(uint256) { require(tAmount <= _tTotal, "Amount must be less than supply");
            if (!deductTransferFee) {
    (uint256 rAmount,,,,,) = _getValues(tAmount);
                  return rAmount:
            } else {
                  e {
(,uint256 rTransferAmount,,,,) = _getValues(tAmount);
return rTransferAmount;
      function tokenFromReflection(uint256 rAmount) public view returns(uint256) {
    require(rAmount <= _rTotal, "Amount must be less than total reflections");
    uint256 currentRate = __getRate();
            return rAmount.div(currentRate);
     function excludeFromReward(address account) public onlyOwner() {// Millionaire Set users not to part require('_isExcluded[account], "Account is already excluded"); ici pate in dividends if(_rOwned[account] > 0) {
__tOwned[account] = tokenFromReflection(_rOwned[account]);
             isExcluded[account] = true;
             excluded.push(account);
     Бreak;
      function excludeFromFee(address account) public onlyOwner {
             isExcludedFromFee[account] = true;
```

```
function_includeInFee(address account) public onlyOwner {
                                  _isExcludedFromFee[account] = false;
                function _reflectFee(uint256 rFee, uint256 tFee) private {
                                    rTotal = rTotal.sub(rFee);
_tFeeTotal = _tFeeTotal.add(tFee);
function _getValues(uint256 tAmount) private view returns (uint256, uint256, uint256
                                  (uint256 tTransferAmount, uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = _getTValues(tAmount);
(uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee) = _getRValues(tAmount, tFee, tLiquidity,
  _getRate());
                                 return (rAmount, rTransferAmount, rFee, tTransferAmount, tFee, tLiquidity);
                function getTValues(uint256 tAmount) private view returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) { uint256 tFee = tAmount.mul(_taxFee).div(100);
                                 uint256 \ tLiquidity = tAmount.mul(\ liquidityFee).div(100);
                                 uint256 tTransferAmount = tAmount.sub(tFee).sub(tLiquidity);
return (tTransferAmount, tFee, tLiquidity);
function getRValues(uint256 tAmount, uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity, uint256 currentRate) private pure returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) {
            uint256 rAmount = tAmount.mul(currentRate);
            uint256 rFee = tFee.mul(currentRate);
            uint256 rLiquidity = tLiquidity.mul(currentRate);
            uint256 rTransferAmount = rAmount.sub(rFee).sub(rLiquidity);
            return (rAmount, rTransferAmount, rFee);
}
                function _getRate() private view returns(uint256) {
    (uint256 rSupply, uint256 tSupply) = _getCurrentSupply();
    return rSupply.div(tSupply);
               function _getCurrentSupply() private view returns(uint256, uint256) {
    uint256 rSupply = _rTotal;
    uint256 tSupply = _tTotal;
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_rOwned[_excluded[i]] > rSupply || _tOwned[_excluded[i]] > tSupply) return (_rTotal, _tTotal);
        rSupply = rSupply.sub(_rOwned[_excluded[i]]);
        tSupply = tSupply.sub(_tOwned[_excluded[i]]);
    }
                                  if (rSupply < _rTotal.div(_tTotal)) return (_rTotal, _tTotal);
                                 return (rSuppTy, tSupply),
               function_takeDividends(uint256 tDividends) private {
    uint256 currentRate = __getRate();
    uint256 rDividends = tDividends.mul(currentRate);
    rOwned[DIVIDENDS ADDRESS] = rOwned[DIVIDENDS_ADDRESS].add(rDividends);
    if(_isExcluded[DIVIDENDS_ADDRESS])
    _tOwned[DIVIDENDS_ADDRESS] = _tOwned[DIVIDENDS_ADDRESS].add(tDividends);
                function takeBurn(uint256 tBurn) private {
    uint256 currentRate = getRate();
    uint256 rBurn = tBurn.mul(currentRate);
    rOwned[BURN ADDRESS] = rOwned[BURN_ADDRESS].add(rBurn);
    if(_isExeluded[BURN_ADDRESS])
    _tOwned[BURN_ADDRESS] = _tOwned[BURN_ADDRESS].add(tBurn);
}
               function takeLiquidity(uint256 tLiquidity) private {
    uint256 currentRate = __getRate();
    uint256 rLiquidity = tLiquidity.mul(currentRate);
    _rOwned[LP_ADDRESS] = rOwned[LP_ADDRESS].add(rLiquidity);
    if(_isExcluded[LP_ADDRESS])
    _tOwned[LP_ADDRESS] = _tOwned[LP_ADDRESS].add(tLiquidity);
}
                function removeAllFee() private {//Millionaire Removal cost if(_taxFee == 0 && _liquidityFee == 0) return;
                                  _previousTaxFee = _taxFee;
_previousLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee;
                                     taxFee = 0;
                                   [liquidityFee = 0;
                function restoreAllFee() private {// Millionaire Reset cost
```

```
taxFee = _previousTaxFee;
                            __liquidityFee = previousLiquidityFee;
            function isExcludedFromFee(address account) public view returns(bool) { return _isExcludedFromFee[account];
            function _approve(address owner, address spender, uint256 amount) private { require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address"); require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");
                              allowances[owner][spender] = amount;
                           emit Approval(owner, spender, amount);
            function_transfer(
address from,
                           address to,
uint256 amount
             uni230 amouni
) private {// Millionaire Transfer
) private {// Millionaire Transfer
require(from != address(0), "TRC20: transfer from the zero address");
require(to != address(0), "TRC20: transfer to the zero address");
require(amount > 0, "Transfer amount must be greater than zero");
                           //indicates if fee should be deducted from transfer bool takeFee = true;
                           //if any account belongs to _isExcludedFromFee account then remove the fee if(_isExcludedFromFee[from] \parallel_isExcludedFromFee[to]){// Millionaire _JUGET | JUGET | JUG
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ludge whether it is a
                           whitelist, and if it is a whitelist, there is no service charge takeFee = false;
                           //transfer amount, it will take tax, burn, liquidity fee
                            _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee);
             //this method is responsible for taking all fee, if takeFee is true
            function _tokenTransfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount, bool takeFee) private {// Millionaire
                           if(!takeFee)
                         transferStandard(sender, recipient, amount);
                            if(!takeFee)
                                        restoreAllFee();
function transferStandard(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private {
            (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount, uint256 tEe, uint256 tLiquidity) = getValues(tAmount);
                              iquidity) = getValues(tAmount);

rOwned[sender] = rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);

rOwned[recipient] = rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);
                           if (0 < tLiquidity) {
    takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * specifyFee / liquidityFee);// Millionaire Turnover fee
    TakeDividends(tLiquidity * dividendsFee / liquidityFee);// Millionaire Coin holders dividends
    takeBurn(tLiquidity * burnFee / liquidityFee);
}
                              _reflectFee(rFee, tFee);
                           emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
function_transferToExcluded(address sender, address recipient, uint256 tAmount) private {
    (uint256 rAmount, uint256 rTransferAmount, uint256 rFee, uint256 tTransferAmount, uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity) = _getValues(tAmount);
}
                            rOwned[sections] = rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount);

tOwned[recipient] = tOwned[recipient].add(tTransferAmount);

rOwned[recipient] = rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount);
                            \overline{i}f(0 \le tLiquidity) {
                                        __takeLiquidity(tLiquidity * _specifyFee / _liquidityFee);
_takeDividends(tLiquidity * _dividendsFee / _liquidityFee);
_takeBurn(tLiquidity * _burnFee / _liquidityFee);
                             reflectFee(rFee, tFee);
                           emit Transfer(sender, recipient, tTransferAmount);
```

6. Appendix B: Safety risk rating standard

Intelligent contract vulnerability rating standard		
Rating	Vulnerability rating description	
High risk Loophole	Loopholes that can directly cause losses of token contracts or users' funds, such as numerical overflow loopholes that can cause tokens' value to zero, fake recharge loopholes that can cause exchange losses, loopholes that can cause contract account losses or token reentry loopholes, etc.	
	Loopholes that can cause the loss of ownership of token contracts, such as access control defects of key functions, access control bypass of key functions caused by call injection, etc.	
	Loopholes that can cause token contracts not to work properly, such as a denial of service vulnerability caused by sending TRX to a malicious address, and a denial of service vulnerability caused by gas exhaustion.	
Medium risk Ioophole	High-risk vulnerabilities that need a specific address to trigger, such as numerical overflow vulnerabilities that can only be triggered by the owner of a token contract, access control defects of non-critical functions, logical design defects that can not cause direct capital losses, and so on.	
Low risk loophole	Vulnerabilities that are difficult to trigger, vulnerabilities with limited harm after triggering, such as numerical overflow vulnerabilities that require a large number of TRX or tokens to trigger, vulnerabilities that attackers cannot directly profit after triggering numerical overflows, transaction sequence dependency risks triggered by specifying high gas, and so on.	

7. Appendix C: Brief introduction of Intelligent contract Security Audit tool

7.1. Manticore

Manticore is a symbol execution tool for analyzing binaries and smart contracts. Manticore includes a symbolic Ethernet Square Virtual Machine (EVM), an EVM disassembler / assembler, and a convenient interface for automatically compiling and analyzing Solidity.

It also integrates Ethersplay, a Bit of Traits of Bits visual disassembler for EVM bytecode, for visual analysis.

Like binaries, Manticore provides a simple command-line interface and a Python API for parsing EVM bytecode.

7.2. Oyente

Oyente is an intelligent contract analysis tool. Oyente can be used to detect common bug in smart contracts, such as reentrancy, transaction ordering dependency, and so on.

More conveniently, the design of Oyente is modular, so this allows advanced users to implement and insert their own detection logic to check custom attributes in their contracts.

7.3. securify.sh

Securify you can verify common security issues in ethersquare smart contracts, such as transaction disorder and lack of input validation, which analyzes all possible execution paths of the program while fully automated. In addition.

Securify has a specific language for specifying vulnerabilities, which allows Securify to pay attention to current security and other reliability issues at any time.

7.4. Echidna

Echidna is a Haskell library designed for fuzzy testing of EVM code.

7.5. MAIAN

MAIAN is an automated tool for finding vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Maian processes the bytecode of contracts and attempts to establish a series of transactions to identify and confirm errors.

7.6. ethersplay

Ethersplay is an EVM disassembler that contains related analysis tools.

7.7. ida-evm

Ida-evm is an IDA processor module for virtual machines (EVM).

7.8. Remix-ide

Remix is a browser-based compiler and IDE that allows users to build contracts and debug transactions using the Solidity language.

7.9. Know the special tool kit for Chuangyu block chain security auditors

Know that the special tool kit for penetration testers is developed, collected and used by Chuangyu penetration testing engineers, including batch automatic testing tools for testers, self-developed tools, scripts or utilization tools, etc.



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