

# Theory of Blockchain



## Session 4:

### Asymmetric Cryptography - Part 2

Module 3 – Basics of Zero Knowledge


# Zero Knowledge Proof

It's a way of proving that you know something (e.g. a key or a password), without revealing it.

## Example:


Alice claims she knows the key to the door in the cave. Bob wants to verify.

Alice goes in first, Bob stands at the entrance and randomly shouts A or B. Alice should come back from that route.



# Zero Knowledge Proof

- ZKPs are based on challenge-response.
- Can be iterative or non-iterative.
- Can be used for authentication without leaking information
  - There's no information going on the channel that's confidential
  - Nothing can be inferred from eavesdropping the challenge-response(s)
  - Can be robust against malicious verifiers because you don't give away your password or anything related to it.



Robust to  
Dictionary Attack

# Example

- given a value  $Y$ , a large prime  $p$  and a generator  $g$ , Alice wants to prove that she knows a value  $x$  such that  $g^x \bmod p = Y$ , without revealing  $x$ . (basically the response to a discrete logarithm problem)

This could be used for authentication if Alice gave the verifiers her  $y$  beforehand.




# Example

- in each round, Alice generates a random number  $r$ , computes  $C = g^r \bmod p$  and discloses this to Bob.
- After receiving  $C$ , Bob randomly issues one of the following two requests: he either requests that **Alice** discloses
  1. the value of  $r$ , or
  2. the value of  $(x + r) \bmod (p - 1)$
- With either answer, Alice is only disclosing a random value, so no information is disclosed by a correct execution of one round of the protocol.

# Example


- Bob can verify either answer;
  1. if he requested  $r$ , he can then compute  $g^r \bmod p$  and verify that it matches  $C$ .
  2. If he requested  $(x + r) \bmod (p - 1)$ , he can verify that  $C$  is consistent with this, by computing  $g^{(x + r) \bmod (p - 1)} \bmod p$  and verifying that it matches  $C \cdot Y \bmod p$ .
- Repeated questions can authenticate Alice with high probability  $(1 - 1/2^n)$ .
- If Alice indeed knows the value of  $x$ , she can respond to either one of Bob's possible challenges. Otherwise, it's 50/50.
  - Alice can cheat if she knows what question is being asked.

# Visual Presentation



Bob

Alice



# What Comes Next ...

- We learned about the concept of zero knowledge.
- We saw an iterative protocol for zero knowledge proof.
- In the next module, we explain the basics of distributed ledger and consensus problem.



