

On Apophatic Ontology — from the Topology of the *Ab-grund des Seyns* (Heidegger) and that of the Hole of No Sexual Relationship (Lacan)

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Summary:

I call Heidegger's *Denken des Seyns* (the thinking of ~~Being~~) "apophatic ontology", which Heidegger himself develops as the topology of ~~Being~~ (*Topologie des Seyns*). In this article, I will show how Lacan uses it to found psychoanalysis purely, i.e. in a way that is both non-empirical and non-metaphysical, and how the topological thinking of ~~Being~~ can be schematized in Lacanian topology of the hole.

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Last year, I made these two hypotheses: firstly, psychoanalysis is one of the ways of restoring our relationship with God; secondly, Lacan's entire teaching can be seen as commentaries on this phrase of Hegel: "*Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein*" (self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness). I'll try to explain myself to you¹.

§ 1. Topology of the apophatico-ontological hole

The expression "apophatic ontology" was inspired to me by Heidegger, who crosses out the word *Sein* with a cross (*Durchkreuzung*)² (cf. fig. 1 : all the figures are attached to the end of this paper).

Among the texts published during his lifetime, this crossed-out *Sein* can only be found in *Zur Seinsfrage* (1955). But now the crossed-out *Seyn*³ (cf. fig. 2) can be found everywhere in his postwar Black Notebooks.

For example, he begins his *Anmerkungen IV* by saying this (GA 97, p.327):

Das Denken beginnt indessen, das Denken des ~~Seyns~~ zu seyn.

¹ This text, written originally in French, was read in the teleconference of the Slovenian Association of Lacanian Psychoanalysis on 18 January 2025. I express here my thanks to Ms Nina Krajnik, the president of the said association, who invited me to talk there.

² Since in a document written with a word processor, as this text is, you can't cross out a word with a cross, I'm content to cross out these words with a line: ~~Sein~~, ~~Seyn~~ or ~~Being~~.

³ The spelling *Seyn* was used until the 19th century. In texts published during his lifetime, Heidegger wrote *Sein* in principle, but in those he didn't intend to publish during his lifetime, he wrote *Seyn* from 1931 onwards, to differentiate it from the *Sein* of the ontological tradition.

Thinking begins when it is the thinking of **Being**.

That means this: I think if and only if I think of **Being**, not of a being (*Seiendes*) or of the unbarred Being, i.e. metaphysical Being (*Sein*).

But what is *Seyn*? Since Heidegger's answer to this question is not very clear, I'll redefine it myself as follows: *Seyn* is the mathème⁴ of the result of the work he calls in *Sein und Zeit* "the destruction of the ontological tradition", that is, the destruction of metaphysical ontology as Aristotle defines it as "ἐπιστήμη τις ἥ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν" (a science that contemplates being as being). According to Heidegger⁵, the ontological tradition begins with the positing (*Setzung*) of the Platonic *idéa* as τὸ ὄντως ὄν (what really is) and ends with the Nietzschean announcement of the coming of the *Übermensch* who embodies the will to power (*Wille zur Macht*). So, what do we find when we destroy this tradition? The hole of *Seyn* which the metaphysical *Sein* obturates from Plato to Nietzsche. I'll call it the apophatico-ontological hole (*sit venia verbo*).

However, Heidegger doesn't say *Loch* (hole) but *Abgrund* (abyss). Sometimes he writes *Ab-grund* to suggest that this is the fundamental abyss or abyssal foundation. It's Lacan who uses the term "hole", because psychoanalysis deals with a variety of holes: those of mouth, of anus, of gaze, of silence and above all of phallic lack, i.e. of castration, which Lacan redefines as the hole of no sexual relationship, in other words, the hole of the impossible phallus (which doesn't cease not to be written).

In short, *Seyn* is the Heideggerian mathème of the apophatico-ontological hole.

Now, based on the topology of this *Ab-grund des Seyns*, we can schematize what Heidegger calls *Kehre von "Sein und Zeit" zu "Zeit und Sein"* as follows (cf. fig. 3):

In his *Sein und Zeit*, in order to question the meaning of Being, Heidegger starts from our *Dasein* as far as we are in this world as a living being, to arrive at the realm of Being as such by traversing the problematic zone of ontological difference (the difference between being [*Seiendes*] and Being [*Sein*], which in *Sein und Zeit* is called transcendental horizon). But it is precisely the question of what this ontological difference would be that leads him to the *Kehre*, which consists in this topological reversal: now, from the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* on, it is the hole of *Seyn* that is situated in the central locality (*Ortschaft*) of topology. Ontological difference then resolves itself in this very hole. And the movement of the *Denken des Seyns* consists in revolving around the apophatico-ontological hole. In other words, the topology of *Seyns* is the focus of Heidegger's thinking.

But of all Heidegger's readers at that time, who realized, when *Zur Seinsfrage* was published in 1955, the importance of this central topology of the *Ab-grund des Seyns* in Heidegger's thinking, if not Lacan? I say so because I assume that Lacan invented his mathème of the barred subject \$ from *das Sein* and presented it to his audience for the first time in his Seminar V (1957-1958) *Les formations de l'inconscient (The Formations of the Unconscious)*. I must tell you that this is only my conjecture, since I have no proof or witness to back up this hypothesis. But given that in the ontological tradition

⁴ The term *mathème*, introduced in Lacan's teaching during his Seminar (1971-1972) ...ou pire, comes from μάθημα (that which is learned, science) and the suffix -ème (element) just as the linguistic term *phonème* comes from φώνημα and -ème. What he calls mathème is those symbols such as S_1 , S_2 , \$ and *a*, which he places in his mathematico-topological schemas such as the schema L, the graph of desire and the four discourses.

⁵ Cf. Heidegger, M.: *Nietzsche*. Gesamtausgabe (GA) 6.

Being (οὐσία), subject (ὑποκείμενον) and substance (ὑπόστασις) are quasi-synonymous, it's very likely that the Heidegger's *Sein* gave Lacan the inspiration for the mathème of the barred subject \$.

And where does Lacan place this mathème in his graph of desire (cf. fig. 4) presented at the same time as \$ in his Seminar V? In the bottom right-hand corner, which is the starting point of the dialectical process. What this rather complicated schema formalizes is essentially the movement of the hole of the subject \$ which is desire – as Hegel defines *Selbstbewußtsein* as *Begierde* or, to put it better, *Urbegierde* (original desire) – and which, from there, will finally arrive not at a satisfaction that would occur when the hole is filled by the phallus Φ, but at another hole – or the Other hole – which is S(A), the signifier of lack in the Other.

I'd like to suggest in advance that this movement of the hole of the subject \$ arriving at the locus of the Other hole S(A) is a schematization of Hegel's phrase "*Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein*", which *Befriedigung* (satisfaction) is the jouissance of sublimation of desire that occurs at the end of analysis.

But why do we need to return to sublimation, which Lacan no longer mentions in his teaching of the 1970s? Because there is no sexual relationship, in other words, the phallus Φ that can obturate the apophatico-ontological hole is impossible (what doesn't cease not to be written). Although Lacan no longer uses the word *sublimation* in his last teaching, he continues to speak of love, which is defined as "sublimation of desire" in his Seminar X (1962-1963) *L'angoisse* (*Angst*) and which appears in a distorted form in the title of his Seminar XXIV (1976-1977) *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre*, which means: *L'insuccès de l'Unbewußt* (c'est-à-dire *l'inconscient*) *c'est l'amour* (the unsuccess of the unconscious is love). I would point out that this is the only one of Lacan's Seminars to have the word *love* in its title. But what does this "unsuccess of the unconscious" mean? It's exactly the Other hole S(A), which Lacan also calls the "hole of no sexual relationship" in his Seminar XXII (1974-1975) *R.S.I.*, because of which what Freud calls *Genitalorganisation*, the supposed final stage of maturation of the sexual instinct is doomed to unsuccess (failure). Then, only sublimation can put an end to the movement of *Urbegierde* \$. I'll come back to this later.

In any case, the fundamental position of \$ in his teaching suggests that Lacan was well aware as early as in 1955 of the importance of the central topology of the *Ab-grund des Seins* in Heidegger's thinking. And as we shall see, Lacan uses the topology of the hole of the subject \$, in other words, the topology of the apophatico-ontological hole, to found psychoanalysis purely, that is, in a way that is both non-empirical and non-metaphysical.

Yes, we can say that Lacan's entire teaching consists in efforts to found psychoanalysis purely. Now, if someone asks you "Who is Lacan?", you can answer succinctly: if Freud is founder of psychoanalysis, Lacan is its refounder. And we can see this from these three quotations, which I present you antichronologically: firstly, in his Seminar XXV (1977-1978) *Le moment de conclure* (Moment to conclude) he says that "there is no sexual relationship: that's *the foundation of psychoanalysis*"; then, he begins his Seminar XI (1964) *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* by saying exactly that "I will talk to you of the *foundations of psychoanalysis*"; and finally, I will quote this passage from his *Rapport de Rome* (1953): "It (psychoanalysis) will only provide scientific *foundations* for its theory and technique by adequately *formalizing* these essential dimensions of its experience, which are, along with the historical theory of symbol: the intersubjective logic and the temporality of subject. Bringing psychoanalytic experience back to speech and language, as to these *foundations*, interests its technique"⁶. Thus, what is concerned in Lacan's teaching is the pure foundation of psychoanalysis. I recommend you to reread him from this point of view.

⁶ Lacan, J. (1953): *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse. Écrits*, p.289.

§ 2. History of **Being** (*Die Geschichte des Seyns*)

So, I will reformulate in terms of apophatico-ontological hole what Heidegger calls *Geschichte des Seyns* (History of **Being**) in three stages as follows:

0) First of all, the archeological moment⁷: In the beginning (ἐν ἀρχῇ)⁸ was open the apophatico-ontological hole. We would happily assume a perfect initial state where nothing is missing like that of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, but that's just a mythology. Instead, we should read the first two verses of the first chapter of *Genesis*:

In the beginning, God created heaven and earth. The earth was formless and void, and darkness over the surface of the abyss (תְּהוֹם), and the Spirit of God hovered over the surface of the waters.

We can see there a witness to the archaeological opening of the apophatico-ontological hole from which the creation *ex nihilo* occurs. The Greek translation of the Hebrew word תְּהוֹם (tehom) in the *Septuagint* is exactly ἄβυσσος from which comes the word *abyss*, and the German translation of it may well be *Abgrund*, although Luther translated it as *Tiefe* (depth). Heidegger looked in fragments of the Presocratics for witnesses of the archaeological *Seyn* that preceded the metaphysical *Sein*, whereas we have one in the Bible, which is much more familiar to us than the Presocratics.

1) And then, when the apophatico-ontological hole is obturated by the Platonic *ιδέα* as τὸ ὄντως ὄν, in other words, when the metaphysical *Sein* replaces the archaeological *Seyn*, the metaphysical phase begins. The metaphysical obturation is maintained by transcendental figures that succeed the Platonic *ιδέα* (e.g., τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν, οὐσία, ἐνέργεια, substantia, actualitas and the Scholastic God as *causa sui*) until the Classical Age. In this phase, one does not and cannot doubt their transcendence (in other words, their apriority).

2) But when, around the middle of the eighteenth century, the metaphysical obturation of the apophatico-ontological hole is annulled under the domination of modern science and capitalism, the eschatological phase begins, which continues to this day and will continue in this increasingly intolerable eschatological tension, until the eschatological moment that Heidegger calls *Ereignis*.

Why does the domination of science and capitalism induce the cancellation of metaphysical obturation? Because it's now clear that those transcendental figures that obturated the apophatico-ontological hole are not τὸ ὄντως ὄν: for science, what really exists is what they can analyze by scientific means, including what they can't analyze for the moment because of technological conditions, but which they'll be able to analyze if a certain technological development allows it; and for capitalism, what really exists is what they can exploit for the increase of capital, including what they can't exploit for the moment because of technological conditions, but which they'll be able to exploit if a certain technological development allows it. But those metaphysical figures cannot be scientifically analyzed or capitalistically exploited, so they don't exist.

Thus, from the second half of the 18th century onwards, the metaphysical obturation of the apophatico-ontological hole can no longer be maintained as an obvious, unquestionable presupposition. So, the hole will open up emerging and emerge opening up (*aufgehen*). And this *Aufgehen* is signaled by several forms of angst, which are, as psychoanalytic experience shows us,

⁷ The term “archaeological” here means that the matter is concerning the beginning (ἀρχή) that Heidegger calls *anderer Anfang*, i.e. the other beginning than that of metaphysics or that of thought of ancient Greek in general. And as we shall see, archaeology goes hand in hand with eschatology.

⁸ It is with these two words “ἐν ἀρχῇ” that the Book of Genesis in the Septuagint and the Gospel according to John begin.

angst before nothingness (including meaninglessness and uncertainty), angst before death and angst before sin, as a function of the hole that opens as hole of nothingness, hole of death and hole of sin.

This angst then provokes various forms of resistance and defense, as psychoanalytic experience shows. But in the history of philosophy, what happens at that point, in the second half of the 18th century? The posit (*Setzung*) by Kant of the pure reason, which will obturate once again the apophatico-ontological hole to guarantee the certainty and truth of scientific knowledge. And Kant doesn't just naively suppose this transcendental figure, but he posits it by critically examining its necessity. This kind of defense through the metaphysical re-obturation of the hole continues right through to Husserl's *das transzendente Ich*.

However, it is in Nietzsche, the thinker who proclaims the death of the eternal God and the coming of the *Übermensch* embodying the will to power, that Heidegger sees the completion (*Vollendung*) of metaphysics, which means this⁹:

In the thought of the will to power, Nietzsche thinks in advance what is the metaphysical foundation of the completion of the *Neuzeit*¹⁰. In the thought of the will to power, the metaphysical thinking itself is completed in advance. Nietzsche, the thinker of the will to power, is the last metaphysician of the West. The epoch whose completion unfolds in his thought, the *Neuzeit*, is an *Endzeit*¹¹. That is to say: an epoch where, at a certain moment and in a certain way, the historical decision arises as to whether this *Endzeit* is the closure of Western History, or the counterplay to another beginning. To follow Nietzsche's steps of thought as far as the will to power means to come face to face with this historical decision.

When the traditional ideal figures have lost their effectiveness to obturate the apophatico-ontological hole, the supreme values are devalued (*Entwertung der obersten Werte*). And that is nihilism¹². If people merely deplore this loss in a pessimistic way, they are in the passive nihilism that would bring about the end of Western History. On the other hand, if they dare to place a new value in the place of the lost ones, they are in the active nihilism that would make counterplay (*Gegenspiel*, i.e. resistance and defense) to the other beginning, i.e. to the eschatological moment of the History of Being. The will to power is precisely the will to posit a new value so that all existing values are overturned (*Umwertung der aller Werte*), which basically means overturn of Platonism (*Umdrehung des Platonismus*) so that now, in the place of the mythological *īdēā*, Real Life is posited, which will become ever more powerful than itself (*Machtsteigerung*: increase in power).

Thus, the will to power is overturn of Platonism in the sense that Becoming is substituted for Being (*Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen*: imprinting on Becoming the character of Being). Now, what obturates the apophatico-ontological hole is no longer something eternal and immutable as the Platonic *īdēā*, but the will to power, which will and must become ever more powerful than itself. And the embodiment of the will to power which Nietzsche presents to us, through the mouth of Zarathustra, is the *Übermensch* who is to come soon.

But it's obvious that a person as an individual cannot be *Übermensch*, since anyone who tries to be so will necessarily fall into exhaustion. And the idea that one day a new "race" of *Übermensch* will

⁹ Heidegger, M.: *Nietzsche*. GA 6.1, p.431.

¹⁰ The German term *Neuzeit* encompasses the modern and contemporary eras.

¹¹ The translation of the word *Endzeit* would be "final epoch", i.e. "eschatological epoch".

¹² Cf. Heidegger, M.: *Nietzsche*. GA 6.2, pp.35-40.

emerge is obviously nothing more than a fantasy, or even a delusion if one is convinced of it like Nietzsche.

Maybe we could imagine that Nietzsche might have found, had he read *Das Kapital*, a concrete example of *Übermensch* in the capitalist as the personification of capital who relentlessly pursues the increase of capital under what Marx calls “absolute instinct for enrichment” (*der absolute Bereicherungstrieb*). But we must say now this: it is undeniable that capitalism will lead to the depletion of natural resources and the environmental degradation of the Earth, and thus to the doom of the entire humankind.

Nietzsche’s concept of *Übermensch* as the embodiment of the will to power is already paranoiac enough, without any correlation to the encephalopathy that brought about suddenly his *Umnachtung*. Since then, we’ve observed that those ideologies which, after the will to power, were posited or are posited to obturate the apophatico-ontological hole, for example communism, various forms of nationalism, racism and sexism (including masculinism and patriarchalism), are becoming more and more paranoiac. And from this month on, these four most powerful countries among the great powers – that is, the USA, Russia, China and India – are all governed by paranoiac men. What a horror!

This global and generalized paranoia is the result of defensive reactions against the angst before the *Aufgehen* of the apophatico-ontological hole. The more imminent the *Aufgehen* is, the more paranoiac the situation will be. This increasingly intolerable world will last until the eschatological moment of *Ereignis*.

§ 3. An example of clinical experience of *Aufgehen* of the apophatico-ontological hole

Aufgehen (opening and emerging) of the apophatico-ontological hole provokes the angst which Heidegger calls *Grundbefindlichkeit* or *Grundstimmung*. It is fundamental for us insofar as we are in the eschatological phase where the hole will always open and emerge in front of us. Psychoanalytic experience shows us that, in general, the angst takes one or more of those three forms: angst before nothingness, angst before death and angst before sin.

To see how the *Aufgehen* of the apophatico-ontological hole manifests itself in experience, let’s re-examine this prime example of dream interpretation, i.e. the dream of Irma’s injection which Freud had on the night of 23/24 July 1895.

A large hall – numerous guests, whom we were receiving. – Among them was Irma. I at once took her on one side, as though to answer her letter and to reproach her for not having accepted my “solution” yet. I said to her: “If you still get pains, it’s really only your fault.” She replied: “If you only knew what pains I’ve got now in my throat and stomach and abdomen – it’s choking me” – I was alarmed and looked at her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must be missing some organic trouble. I took her to the window and looked down her throat, and she showed signs of recalcitrance, like women with artificial dentures. I thought to myself that there was really no need for her to do that. – She then opened her mouth properly [*Der Mund geht dann auch gut auf*], and on the right I found a big white patch; at another place I saw extensive whitish grey scabs upon some remarkable curry structures which were evidently modelled on the turbinal bones of the nose. – I at once called in Dr. M., and he repeated the examination and confirmed it... Dr. M. looked quite different from usual: he was very pale, he walked with a limp and his chin was clean-shaven... My friend Otto was now standing beside her as well, and my friend Leopold was percussing her through her bodice and saying: “She has a dull area low down on the left.” He also indicated that a portion of the skin on the left shoulder was infiltrated. (I noticed this, just as he did, in spite of her dress.)... M. said: “There’s no doubt it’s an infection, but no matter; dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be eliminated.”... We were directly aware, too, of the origin of the infection. Not long before, when she was feeling

unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection of a preparation of propyl, propylene... propionic acid... trimethylamine (and I saw before me its formula printed in heavy type)... Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly... And probably the syringe had not been clean.

From the apophatico-ontological point of view, it is quite clear that Irma's wide-opened mouth represents the *Aufgehen* of the hole (in fact, in the phrase "*Der Mund geht dann auch gut auf*" [Then her mouth well opens up] Freud uses the verb *aufgehen*), and that it opens up as a hole of sin, because there are those reproachful words "it's really only your fault" (*es ist wirklich nur deine Schuld*) and the doubt of a diagnostic error. And indeed, as we know, Masson's biographical study¹³ of Freud's letters to his friend Wilhelm Fliess reveals what really took place in the background of this dream: Fliess's grave error in performing a nasal operation around 21 February 1895 (i.e. five months before Irma's dream) on one of Freud's analysands, Emma Eckstein, who nearly died early in the following month from the massive bleeding resulting from the said medical error. So, it wasn't Freud himself who was at fault, but the Berlin ENT surgeon. However, since it was he who persuaded his patient to have the operation performed by Fliess, he first blames himself. But then, in order to deny his friend's responsibility, he ends up repressing his own guilt and blaming the victim, as represented in the dream by the words: "It's really only your fault". Yet what is repressed does indeed return in the form of *Aufgehen* of the hole of sin.

This *Aufgehen* could cause him a great angst, but it doesn't. Why? Because the hole is again obturated in two stages: first, his three friends, Dr. M (Joseph Breuer), Otto and Leopold, are mobilized to put on a ridiculous scene around Irma. At the end, however, what appears as a *deus ex machina* is the chemical formula of trimethylamine, boldly printed (*fettgedruckt*). But the formula in question is not the one we think of today (cf. fig. 5), but the one Lacan presents to us in the session of 9 March 1955 of his Seminar II (cf. fig. 6). Probably this may have been how chemical formulas were presented in printed matter in the past.

Trimethylamine is found in the living body as one of the intermediate metabolites of choline. Fliess believed that it should have a place in the biochemistry of sexual activity, and undoubtedly that motivated the appearance of the formula in Freud's dream. However, already in his Seminar II, Lacan says that this formula is made up of "sacred signs", since the Trinitarian structure is multiplied in it. And Gérard Haddad¹⁴ fully explains what it symbolizes. Presented in this way (cf. fig. 7), the formula of trimethylamine is similar to the Hebrew letter ש (shin), which is the initial of the word שֵׁם (shem: name). And this word with the definite article הַשֵּׁם (HaShem: the Name) is in Judaism one of substitute names of God יְהוָה (YHWH), which name, His proper name, is declared ineffable by the Torah. In addition, the letter ש is also the initial of the word שְׁדַי (Shaddai: Παντοκράτωρ, Almighty) which is another substitute name of YHWH.

Then we can have this topological interpretation: the formula of trimethylamine represents through its similarity to the letter ש the Name of God, i.e., in Lacanian terminology, the Name-of-the-Father or the master signifier S₁, which obturates again the hole of sin opening up before Freud in the form of Irma's gaping mouth. Indeed, obturation of the apophatico-ontological hole is the function of the Name-of-the-Father, as Lacan suggests in his article *D'une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose* where he says: "The hole [is] bored in the field of signifier because of the forclusion of the Name-of-the-Father¹⁵". If the forclusion of the Name-of-the-Father bores the hole,

¹³ Masson, J.M. (1984): *The Assault on Truth*.

¹⁴ Haddad, G. (1981): *Lacan et le judaïsme*.

¹⁵ Lacan, J. (1958) : *D'une question préliminaire à tout possible traitement de la psychose. Écrits*, p.563.

its restoration obturates it again. And it is thanks to this re-obturation of the hole by the Name that Irma's dream does not cause to Freud a great angst, nor does trigger for him a psychosis.

But this re-obturation of the hole by the Name is only a defense against the angstfull *Aufgehen* of the hole, whereas this *Aufgehen* is necessary in the eschatological phase of the History of *Being* in order that the eschatological moment of *Ereignis* can occur. We must not resist it, but be obedient to it, so that *Ereignis* appropriates (*sich aneignen*) our *Dasein* and we ourselves become *Ereignis* according to the necessity of the History of *Being*.

In this way, the History of *Being* and the process of psychoanalytic experience coincide, and they do so on the model of the dialectical process of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, since Heidegger and Lacan both refer to Hegel to think of the dialectical movement and change of the *Being* and the subject \$.

§ 4. Christian temporality

As we know, Hegel was a Lutheran. Every three years or so (1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831), he gave his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* at the University of Berlin. In 1824, he said: "The object of religion as well as of philosophy is the eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication of God", and in 1827, he said: "In philosophy, which is theology, what matters is solely and only to present the reason [*Vernunft*] of religion." So, for him, philosophy and theology are one and the same thing, that is, when he thinks, he thinks of God. Of Heidegger and Lacan, who both belong to the Catholic tradition, we can also say the same thing: when they think, they think of God. This is quite obvious with Lacan, since, for example, the Name-of-the-Father is one of the key words of his teaching, and in a passage¹⁶ of his *Télévision* he puts in equivalence the "being a saint" and the "being a psychoanalyst", a passage which, as far as I know, has never been sufficiently commented on in its relation to the four discourses. Furthermore, we can now see that, when he says that "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other" and that "desire of man is desire of the Other", and when he puts the Other in a relationship with the subject in his schemas L and R (cf. figs. 8 and 9), this Other is none other than God, since that is clearly indicated by the same position of the Other and the Name-of-the-Father in the schema R. And if he is particularly interested in the case of President Schreber, it's because there the delusion explicitly concerns the sexual relationship with God. As for Heidegger, we can quote this passage for example¹⁷:

The God [*der Gott*] comes into philosophy through the *Austrag*¹⁸, which we can first consider as the prior locus [*Vorort*] of the essence of the difference between Being [*Sein*] and being [*Seiendes*]. This difference makes the fundamental cleft [*Grundriß*] in the structure of the essence of metaphysics. The *Austrag* yields and gives Being as pro-ducing foundation [*her-vor-bringender Grund*], which foundation itself requires, from what is founded by it, the foundation suitable for it, i.e. causation by the most fundamental thing, which is the cause as *causa sui*. And this is the reasonable name for the God in philosophy. We cannot pray to this God, nor make an offering to Him. Before *causa sui*, we cannot fall on our knees in fear, nor can we play music or dance before this God.

¹⁶ Lacan, J. (1974): *Télévision. Autres écrits*, pp.519-520.

¹⁷ Heidegger, M. (1957): *Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*. GA 11, p.77.

¹⁸ I interpret this neosemic term *Austrag* as a Heideggerian name for the apophatico-ontological hole in the context of the question of ontological difference.

Consequently, an a-theistic thinking [*das gott-lose Denken*], which must reject the God of philosophy, the God as *causa sui*, is perhaps closer to the divine God [*der göttliche Gott*]. That means here simply: it is freer for Him than the onto-theo-logic would like to admit.

So, we must distinguish between these two Gods, the “God of philosophy” and the “divine God”, or to put it another way, distinguish between the true God and the scholastic “God” which is in fact nothing more than an idol. And this is exactly what Blaise Pascal did in his mystical experience of the “Night of Fire” when he says that he believes in “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not [the God] of philosophers and scholars.” That is, the metaphysical God must be rejected, or, in Lacanian terminology, foreclosed, because he is an idol standing in the way of access to the real God who never ceases not to be written.

Anyway, as to those three great thinkers in the modern history, Hegel, Heidegger and Lacan, we can say that when they think, they think of God. Then, what does this bring us when we read them? Christian temporality, or, because I suppose that Judaism and Islam also share it, it would be better to call it monotheistic temporality. And what does it consist in? In this: it comprises not only the time in ordinary or Aristotelian sense, i.e. the time of History or that of physics, but also the archaeological moment of creation *ex nihilo* and the eschatological moment of the *consummatio saeculi* (consummation of the world), both of which cannot be situated on the axis of time. As we shall see below, what Heidegger calls *ekstatisch* (ecstatic) is this character: “not situatable on the axis of time”.

Such Christian temporality is suggested in the Bible by this expression in the Book of Revelation: ὁ θεός, ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, which means: God, the One who exists in the time of History, who was at the archaeological moment of creation *ex nihilo*, and who is to come at the eschatological moment of the Day of the Lord.

This Christian temporality is formulated in Hegelian dialectics in those three stages: first, archaeological immediacy [*Unmittelbarkeit*], then actual alienation, and finally eschatological reflection into the Being itself [*Reflexion in sich selbst*], which produces absolutely mediated Being [*das absolut vermittelte Sein*].

As for Heidegger, in his summer-semester lecture in 1927 entitled *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, that is, several months after the publication of his magnum opus, he defines temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] more clearly than in his *Being and Time*, saying: “As ecstatic unity of future, past and present [*ekstatische Einheit von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart*], the temporality has a horizon determined by ecstasy. The temporality is, as the original unity of future, past and present [*die ursprüngliche Einheit von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart*], in itself ecstatic-horizontal¹⁹”. It seems to me that this Heideggerian expression of “*die Einheit von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart*” comes directly from this Biblical expression of “ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος” where John of Patmos uses this quasi-neologism of “ὁ ἦν” (the “He was”), just as Heidegger doesn’t simply say *Vergangenheit* but this quasi-neologism of *Gewesenheit*. Since Heidegger expressly states that “‘being’ in *Being and Time* is nothing other than ‘time’ insofar as the word ‘time’ is used as the prior name of the truth of Being²⁰” and he also says that those three questions – the question of the meaning of Being (*Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*), the question of the truth of Being (*Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins*) and the question of the locus or locality of Being (*Frage nach dem Ort oder der Ortschaft des Seins*), in other words the topology of Being (*Topologie des Seins*, which Heidegger writes in his post-war Black Notebooks *Topologie des Seyns* [topology of *Being*]) – are successively placed on the same path of thinking²¹, the path that leads to the abyss of *Being*, i.e. to the apophatico-ontological

¹⁹ Heidegger, M. (1927): *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. GA 24, p. 378,

²⁰ Heidegger, M. (1949): *Einleitung zu: »Was ist Metaphysik?«* GA 9, p.376.

²¹ Cf. Heidegger, M.: *Seminar in Le Thor 1969*. GA 15, p.344.

hole. Now we can see how the notion of temporality in *Being and Time* leads to the hole of ~~Being~~: it is because it consists in the “ὁ ὄν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος” which comprises not only the present Being (*Anwesenheit*) but also the non-Being of the archaeological moment of creation *ex nihilo* and the non-Being of the eschatological moment of *consummatio saeculi*, that the question of temporality leads Heidegger to the hole of ~~Being~~, which is the condition of the possibility of Being as presence.

§ 5. Apophatico-ontological topology and the four discourses

Then, where can we find Lacan’s clearest formulation of this Christian temporality? I think it’s in the four discourses (cf. fig. 10), above all in the process of transformation that begins with the discourse of the master and leads, via the discourse of the university, to the discourse of the analyst.

The schematization of the four discourses is the most achieved and the most beautiful and therefore the most powerful of the Lacanian schemas which I call mathematico-topological, since in those schemas – the optical schema with two mirrors, the schemas L and R, the graph of desire and the four discourses – several mathèmes are arranged in topologically defined loci.

The four discourses can be related to the topology of the projective plane, alias *cross-cap* (cf. figs. 11, 12 and 13), which Lacan introduces in his teaching at the moment of his Seminar IX (1961-1962) *L’Identification*, in order to think better of the topology of the apophatico-ontological hole and to schematize it better. When we identify the edge of the hole bored on a sphere (this bored sphere is homeomorphic to a disc) and the edge of a Möbius strip (cf. fig. 11), we obtain a closed surface called projective plane (cf. figs. 12 and 13), which is called so because of its connection with projective geometry, but I won’t go into that here. As can be seen in the figures 12 and 13 (which Lacan sometimes calls *asphères*), the projective plane as a closed surface cannot be adequately represented in Euclidean space of dimension 3, but we can only see the surface of the bored sphere (blue) and a part of the identification edge (green), while the Möbius surface (red) is situated out of the space of dimension 3. In mathematical terminology, we say that the *embedding* of the projective plane in Euclidean space of dimension 3 is impossible, and that the *cross-cap* or the *asphères* (see figs. 12 and 13) are one of the possible ways of *immersion* of the projective plane in Euclidean space of dimension 3. In any case, the reverse operation, i.e. cutting the projective plane in a suitable way, produces a bored sphere and a Möbius strip.

As we can see, the topology of the projective plane is neither easy to represent nor to handle. So, in Seminar XI (1964) *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan introduces the schema of two circles, which resembles Venn diagram (cf. fig. 14) but has nothing to do with set theory. As this juxtaposition of the figures 11 and 14 shows, the two-circle schema is a clearer and more manageable schematization of the topology of the projective plane, where the apophatico-ontological hole (white) lies in the center with its edge (green), the surface of the bored sphere (blue) on the right and the Möbius surface (red) on the left.

So, what is the correspondence between the topology of the projective plane and the four discourses? Let’s take as an example the correspondence between the schema of alienation and the discourse of the university (cf. fig. 15). As I said already, the alienation and the discourse of the university are our everyday mode of existence. However, I have to tell you that this schema of alienation is not exactly the ones Lacan presented in his Seminars XI (session of 27 May 1964) and XIII (session of 15 December 1965), but a reconstruction based on the original schemas and some attempts by Jacques-Alain Miller who at certain moments in his course of lectures *L’Orientation lacanienne* tried to situate the mathèmes of the four discourses in the two-circle schema.

Firstly, in the schema of alienation, the central hole representing the apophatico-ontological hole is obturated by the master signifier S_1 (yellow). In the discourse of the university, the S_1 is in the place of truth, which truth is the metaphysical truth traceable back to the Platonic $\text{i}\delta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}$. So, the place of

truth is the place of what obturates the hole. As you'll notice, in my figures, the color of the hole is white when it's open, whereas, when it's obturated, the color of what obturates it is yellow.

Next, we must pay attention to the edge of the hole (green), as Lacan often tells us to do so. In the schema of alienation, the edge of the hole joins the surface of the bored sphere (blue) and that of the Möbius strip (red). And what makes up the edge is the object *a*. When Lacan sometimes says that the object *a* is a hole, he means, it seems to me, that the object *a* makes edge of the hole. In the discourse of the university, the object *a* is in the place of the other. So, the place of the other is the place of what makes edge of the hole.

Thirdly, the surface of bored sphere (blue) is, as can be seen in the figures 12 and 13, almost all that exists of the projective plane in Euclidean space of dimension 3. As Lacan puts it in Seminar XXII (1974-1975) *R.S.I.*, it gives to the projective plane the *consistency* of being (*Seiendes*). What makes up this surface is the S_2 , which is situated in the discourse of the university in the place of the agent. So, the place of the agent is the place of the consistency of being.

Finally, as can also be seen in the figures 12 and 13, the surface of Möbius strip (red) is out of the Euclidean space of dimension 3, i.e., as Lacan puts it in his Séminaire *R.S.I.*, it *ex-sists* to that space. What makes up the Möbius strip is the subject $\$$, which is situated in the discourse of the university in the place of production. So, the place of production is the place of ex-sistence. By the way, if we reread Lacan's remark in the first paragraph of the *Seminar on The Purloined Letter* that the subject of the unconscious is to be situated in the place of ex-sistence²², it's now clear to us that he's thinking of the structure he'll call alienation and the discourse of the university, which structure is our everyday mode of existence.

Now, using the two-circle schema, we can schematize the four discourses (cf. fig. 10) as follows (cf. fig. 16): In the beginning, i.e. at the archaeological moment of the History of ~~Being~~, there was the discourse of the master, where the apophatico-ontological hole was open as the hole of the subject $\$$ itself. Then, the discourse of the university arrives when the metaphysical phase begins with the obturation of the hole with the master signifier S_1 , which signifier is thus the mathème of all those metaphysical figures from Plato's *idéa* to Nietzsche's will to power. But when the eschatological phase begins, where the metaphysical obturation of the hole loses its efficacy, the hole will open up and emerge (*aufgehen*) in order that the analyst's discourse will occur. As you can see in the figure 16, in the analyst's discourse, the two circles separate from each other so that the subject $\$$ appears, making the edge of the hole. This is what Lacan calls *separation* in his Seminar XI and in the article written in the course of that seminar, *Position de l'inconscient*. But as soon as the separation occurs, the hole is closed up again, so that there's a constant to-and-fro between alienation (the discourse of the university) and separation (the discourse of the analyst). This is what Lacan calls *temporal pulsation*, also in Seminar XI and in the *Position de l'inconscient*. But then the moment arrives when not only the analyst's discourse is established, but the jouissance of sublimation occurs as well. This will be the eschatological moment of *Ereignis*, which is the moment of the end of analysis (I'll come back to this later). As for the discourse of the hysteric, what characterizes it is the obturation of the hole by the object *a* as far as hysterics abstain from making jouissance of it in order to keep their desire $\$$ unsatisfied²³.

I'd like to add several remarks here, since these schematizations shed light on a number of points in Lacan's teaching, particularly in that of the 1970s. Firstly, the topology concerned in psychoanalysis is tetradic (cf. fig. 17), not triadic, as suggested by the four places of the four discourses and the

²² Lacan, J. (1956): *Le séminaire sur « La Lettre volée »*. *Écrits*, p.11.

²³ Cf. the chapter IV *Die Traumentstellung* of *Die Traumdeutung* of Freud, particularly the case Freud calls *witzige Patientin*, and some discussions of Lacan about her in *La direction de la cure et les principes de son pouvoir*, *Écrits*, pp.625-627.

introduction of the Borromean knot with four rings²⁴ (cf. fig. 18) in Seminar XXII (1974-1975) *R.S.I.*. Of course, the triad of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real is fundamental, but we need to distinguish between two definitions of the real: the real as what does not cease not to be written, i.e. the impossible (red), and the real as what does not cease to be written, i.e. the necessary (green). Moreover, the latter definition is already suggested by the definition of the real as what always returns to the same place, a definition elaborated in his Seminars II and III. Thus, the classic Lacanian triad of the symbolic (what is situated in the place of the hole, in other words, in the place of what obturates the hole), the imaginary (what is situated in the place of consistency) and the real (what is situated in the place of ex-sistence, in other words, in the place of the impossible) must be completed by the fourth element, which is the real as what is situated at the edge of the hole, in other words, in the place of the necessary, and which Lacan chooses in his Seminar XXIII (1975-1976) on James Joyce to call *sinthome*, which is the spelling of the word *symptom* around the year 1500, and a homophone of *saint homme* (holy man), of which Lacan himself reminds us that he spoke of the saint in *Télévision* insofar as “being a saint” and “being a psychoanalyst” are equivalent to each other. I’ll come back to this later too.

Secondly, the correspondences between the mathèmes used in the graph of desire (cf. fig. 4) and those used in the four discourses (cf. fig. 15). Firstly, the mathème of the subject $\$$ is always the same: the mathème of the apophatico-ontological hole and that of the *Urbegierde* (original desire). By contrast, the mathème A (the capital A) requires a great deal of comment. The capital A in the schemas L and R (figures 8 and 9) is the mathème of the symbolic Other, which corresponds to the mathème S_1 in the discourse of the university. But in Seminar V (1957-1958), where Lacan first presents the graph of desire and during which he writes *D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose*, he distinguishes two Others, and this distinction is taken up again in the *Subversion du sujet*: 1) the Other as the locus of signifier, in other words, the set of signifiers, but which includes the hole of lack, corresponds to the mathème S_2 ; 2) the Other-of-the-Other, i.e. the Name-of-the-Father, which is the signifier missing in the Other, corresponds to the mathème S_1 . Then, the Other as locus of signifier is reduced, since it has the hole of lack, to the maternal body which contains the hole of castration, i.e. reduced to the consistency of the imaginary, while the symbolic Other is the Other-of-the-Other which is lacking in the Other as locus of signifier. This Other-of-the-Other appears in the graph of desire as the hole of the missing signifier \mathbb{A} . The mathème $S(\mathbb{A})$, defined as the signifier of the lack in the Other²⁵, corresponds to the edge of the apophatico-ontological hole, i.e. the place of the other (the place at the top right) in the four discourses. The mathème of the instinct ($\$ \diamond D$), where D is defined as the instinctual demand (*Triebanspruch*), is also a mathème of the apophatico-ontological hole, insofar as it opens up, bordered by the object a , when the obturation of the hole by the master signifier S_1 becomes ineffective. The mathème of fantasy ($\$ \diamond a$), presented as an imaginary formation, is the mathème of what dissimulates the hole, but even so, we can find a certain representation of the hole there too.

Thirdly, the structural transformation from the master’s discourse to the university discourse schematizes what Freud calls *Urverdrängung* (primal repression) (cf. fig. 19), which consists in this: at the beginning of the metaphysical phase of the History of ~~Being~~, the master signifier S_1 , by obturating the hole, represses the subject $\$$ as *Urbegierde* into the place of ex-sistence. And not only does it repress it, but it substitutes itself for it. That is what alienation consists in.

²⁴ Now in mathematics, when they talk of the knots that Lacan calls generalized Borromean knots in his Seminar XXVI (1978-1979) *La topologie et le temps*, they call them Brunnian knots (*Brunnsche Verschlingungen*, *Brunnian links*) after Hermann Brunn (1862-1939), German mathematician who described them in his article *Über Verkettung* (1892). Borromean knot is the simplest Brunnian knot consisting of three elements.

²⁵ Lacan, J. (1960): *Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient freudien*. *Écrits*, p.818.

Fourthly, the same structural transformation (cf. fig. 19) formalizes the Freudian myth of the murder of the *Urvater* (primitive father or patriarch) and, in so doing, discloses the truth of this myth. The discourse of the master corresponds to the primordial state of the primitive horde where, in the absence of the taboo of incest, the *Urvater* S₁ in the place of the agent, as the absolute and greedy master, sexually possesses all the women in his horde, i.e. he alone makes *jouissance* of all the women, i.e. The Woman (*La Femme*). And then, murder brings about this transformation where sons S₂ usurp the place of the agent by dethroning the dead father S₁ into the place of truth, and at the same time, they identify with him by eating his flesh. But at this point, they come under the domination of the dead father, as the ego under the domination of the superego. The *Urbegierde* (original desire) § is repressed (*Urverdrängung*), and sons cannot make *jouissance* of The Woman, but they can only make *jouissance* of the *plus-de-jouir* of pregenital objects *a*. Such is the discourse of the university. However, if we formalize it in this way, we realize that the *Urvater*'s perfect and complete *jouissance* is only a myth, since in the discourse of the master the hole is not filled at all. We must remember that at the archaeological moment of creation *ex nihilo*, Eden does not yet exist, but the Spirit of God alone hovers over the abyssal hole. The myth of the *Urvater* mythologizes, in reverse form, the impossibility of sexual *jouissance* of The Woman.

Fifthly, since I've alluded to the ego and the superego, I'd like to present Freud's Second Topic, situating the instances in the schema of alienation and the discourse of the university (cf. fig. 20): the S₂ is the ego (*das Ich*), the S₁ the superego (*das Über-Ich*), the § the id (*das Es*) and the petit *a* the libidinal object (*Libidoobjekt*).

§ 6. The eschatological transformation from the discourse of the university to the discourse of the analyst

Now let's go into the details of the eschatological transformation from the university discourse to the analyst's discourse (cf. fig. 21), since this is what must happen in psychoanalysis in order that it can reach the end.

The discourse of the university is our daily mode of existence. Hegel calls it *Entfremdung* (alienation) and Heidegger *Verfallenheit* (falling). In this structure, the master signifier S₁, by obturating the apophatico-ontological hole, represses the subject § and substitutes itself for it (*Urverdrängung*). So, the subject § is pushed out of its own place (the place of truth) into the place of production, which is that of ex-sistence, that of what never ceases not to be written (the impossible) and that of *Verborgenheit* (hiddenness). The ego S₂ identifying with the master signifier S₁ as superego, becomes *das Man*. But now, in the eschatological phase of the History of ~~Being~~, the obturation of the hole can no longer be stably maintained as in the metaphysical phase, so that the hole will always open and emerge (*aufgehen*) despite the resistance and defense we form against the angstfull *Aufgehen* of the hole. And when the hole does indeed open and emerge, it's not by the regressive direction from the university discourse to the master's discourse, but by the progressive direction from the university discourse to the analyst's discourse, that the hole emerges bordered by the subject §. So to speak, the hole of the subject § at the archeological moment of the master's discourse was *an sich*, whereas after the dialectical experience of analysis, the hole of the subject § at the eschatological moment of the analyst's discourse is *an und für sich*.

In the eschatological transformation, the master signifier S₁ is foreclosed from the place of what obturates the hole (the place of truth) into the place of the impossible (the place of production). If the deified S₁ in the place of truth is merely the symbolic God and the metaphysical idol, i.e., the God Pascal calls God of philosophers and scholars, the S₁ foreclosed and harbored (*geborgen*) in the place of the impossible (what never ceases not to be written) is the real and living God in his mystery. This is the God Pascal calls God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

And this forclusion of the S_1 induces the *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject $\$$ which rises (ἀνάστασις, resurrection) from the place of the impossible (the place of *Verborgenheit*, hiddenness) to reveal itself in the place of the necessary (the edge of the hole, the place of *Unverborgenheit*, unhiddenness). If we go into more detail, the subject $\$$ in the place of the production of the university discourse is what never ceases not to be written (the impossible). But through the eschatological transformation of the university discourse into the analyst's discourse, this subject $\$$ ceases not to be written (the contingent) to become what never ceases to be written (the necessary) in the analyst's discourse.

The eschatological *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject $\$$ is nothing other than what phenomenology is about as Heidegger defines it as ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα (*das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehn lassen*; to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself). And this eschatological *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject $\$$ is nothing other than the eschatological apocalypse (revelation) in Christianity.

Thus, in the analyst's discourse which is the topology of separation (cf. fig. 21), at the moment of the *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject $\$$, the spherical surface composed of the S_2 (the ego) and the small a (the other) separates from the Möbiusian surface of the S_1 (the real God), the edge of which is made of the subject $\$$. As we can see in the schema of the analyst's discourse, we now have the structure where the subject $\$$ in the place of the necessary (what never ceases to be written) is the representative of the S_1 (the Real God) in the place of the impossible (what never ceases not to be written): $\$/S_1$. In other words, the subject $\$$ is now freed from the imaginary relationship between the ego (S_2) and the other (a) to enter a true relationship with God, to be God's representative and to do God's will. In the Pater noster prayer, we say "fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra", but this "fiat" is only realized when we ourselves do God's will. And someone who does God's will is a saint, the saint Lacan speaks of in *Télévision* insofar as "being a saint" and "being a psychoanalyst" are equivalent to each other in their formalization of $\$/S_1$. In this respect, we can also recall what Lacan says in the session of 25 May 1955 of his Seminar II (1954-1955) *Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse*, where he remarks: "It is precisely in this that the formation of analyst consists: the ego of analyst as such must be absent. (...) That is what we must always obtain from the subject in analysis." The subject $\$$ who is freed from his ego S_2 is indeed what rises in the analyst's discourse. Speaking in Heideggerian terms, we could say that, at this point, the *Seyn* appropriates (*aneignen, ereignen*) our *Dasein* so that the eschatological *Ereignis* can occur (*sich ereignen*), which consists in the *Aufgehen* of the hole of *Seyn* (the subject $\$$) and in the harboring (*bergen*) of the real God S_1 . This is the reason why the *Seyn* needs our *Dasein*, as Heidegger emphasizes so.

Thus, at the end of analysis, by freeing ourselves from the imaginary relationship between the ego and the other, we become God's true representative to do His will on earth (as it is done in heaven), which for the psychoanalyst consists in helping any subject who asks for analysis to reach the end of his or her analysis, where the subject will himself or herself become a representative of God. And it is in this sense that we might well say that psychoanalysis is one of the ways of restoring a relationship with God.

Indeed, we have a personal witness of Gérard Haddad, who testifies in his book *Le jour où Lacan m'a adopté* (2002) to this dramatic episode of the awakening of faith in him, who had been an atheist Marxist before. One day, he had a violent quarrel with his "tyrannical" and "capricious" father over *bar mitzvah*²⁶ celebration of his son, and the quarrel ended with his declaration against his father of the severance of the filial relationship. He immediately told this episode to Lacan, who congratulated him, saying: "You are perfectly right". But no sooner had he left the psychoanalyst's office than

²⁶ The *bar-mitzvah* is a ceremony for young Jewish boys who reach the age of thirteen, representing the moment when a young man becomes responsible for observing religious commandments and committing his life as an adult member of the Jewish community. The female counterpart is the *bat-mitzvah*, celebrated at the age of twelve.

“something changed, and I found myself overcome by a decision” to do God’s will, i.e. to celebrate his son’s *bar mitzvah* himself. So, he asks himself: “What happened in the depths of my being in those few seconds? Something like the symbolic murder of the imaginary father, and on his still warm remains, the immediate emergence of the instance of the Law” that transmits God’s will to him. The next day, when he talks to the psychoanalyst about his decision, “to my great surprise, hearing what I said, Lacan showed a kind of enthusiasm” by praising him: “It’s wonderful!” And “he shook my hand for a long time to underline the importance of the moment.”

This episode occurred not at the end of his analysis with Lacan, but halfway through. Nevertheless, we can formulate what happened then as follows: through the violent forclusion of the master signifier S_1 (the Name-of-the-Father) from the place of truth, there came a moment of eschatological transformation from the university discourse to the analyst’s discourse, whereby the subject $\$$ becomes a realizer of the will of God S_1 harbored in the place of the impossible. What this episode suggests to us is this: eschatological transformation can happen at any moment, suddenly and unexpectedly, since the eschatological moment is not situatable on the axis of time. Let me give you two more historical examples: one is René Descartes and the other is Blaise Pascal, whom I’ve already mentioned here several times. Although they were both men of the seventeenth century, i.e. well before the eschatological phase of the History of *Being* began, we can find in both of them evidence of the experience of the eschatological moment.

Descartes’ example is his *cogito ergo sum* (cf. fig. 22). In the history of philosophy, the Cartesian *cogito* is usually seen as a form of transcendental ego, in other words, as metaphysical as can be. But Lacan suggests another interpretation in his Seminar XI. In his methodical doubt, the *cogito* (I think) is nothing other than the *dubito* (I doubt) that induces the forclusion of all scholastic presuppositions which are the S_1 in the university discourse. Then, at the moment of the *ergo* (therefore) the structural transformation occurs, so that the *sum* (I am) $\$$ emerges with full certainty in the place of the other in the analyst’s discourse, i.e. in the place of the necessary and the edge of the hole. But, given that separation (the analyst’s discourse) quickly reverts to alienation (the university discourse) in the temporal pulsation, this appearance of the subject $\$$ is only evanescent.

The second example is Pascal’s mystical experience known as the *Night of Fire* (cf. fig. 23), of which he leaves us the testimony by telling us firstly “Fire” (hence the *Night of Fire*), and then this: “[I believe in] God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not [in the God] of philosophers and scholars. Certainty, certainty, feeling, joy, peace...” This is an intense experience of certainty, joy and peace, which comes from the forclusion of the “God of philosophers and scholars” (who is in fact nothing but a scholastic idol: the S_1 in the place of truth in the university discourse) and mystical communion with the real God (the S_1 in the place of production in the analyst’s discourse). If I’m speaking in anticipation, this experience of certainty, joy and peace is that of the sublimatory jouissance at the end of analysis.

I’ve just given you a few examples of the experience of the eschatological moment, but in fact, there are countless examples throughout History: first and foremost, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who died and rose on the third day, and then all the prophets in the Old Testament and all the saints in the History of Christianity. Of course, I can’t go into that here. But, in any case, we can see that the eschatological moment can happen at any time and to anyone according to God’s will, despite our resistance to the *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject $\$$ which usually causes us intense angst: the angst of nothingness, death and sin.

§ 7. Beyond the *Aufgehen* of the hole: sublimation

As I’ve already alluded to, it’s not the angstfull *Aufgehn* of the hole as such that constitutes the end of analysis, but the jouissance of sublimation.

As you know, Lacan treats sublimation thematically in his Seminar VII (1959-1960) *L'éthique de la psychanalyse* in relation to courtly love insofar as this form of love excludes a priori the possibility of sexual jouissance. In his Seminar X (1962-1963) *L'angoisse* he defines love with reference to sublimation, saying that "love is sublimation of desire", and at the same time he presents us this thesis: "only love-sublimation allows jouissance to condescend to desire". And while he returns to the theme of sublimation from time to time until Seminar XVI (1968-1969) *D'un Autre à l'autre*, he stops talking about it after Seminar XVII (1969-1970) *L'envers de la psychanalyse*. Does this mean that sublimation loses its weight in Lacan's teaching in the 1970s? I don't think so, since he continues to speak of courtly love, which for him is the favorite example of sublimation. In this regard, we can recall Lacan's remark in the session of 20 February 1973 of his Seminar XX (1972-1973) *Encore*: "*L'amour courtois est la façon toute à fait raffinée de suppléer à l'absence de rapport sexuel*" (Courtly love is the most refined way of compensating for the absence of sexual relationship). So, we can say that Lacan continues to think of sublimation in the sense that only love-sublimation can compensate for the hole of no sexual relationship. Then, we can put forward this hypothesis: How can sublimation be topologically formalized as far as it is the compensation for the hole of the no sexual relationship? This question is, if not the only one, at least one of the major themes of Lacan's last teaching.

Now, at the beginning, I quoted this phrase: "*Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein*" (Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness), which Hegel presents to us a little before the end of the introductory part (i.e., a little before the beginning of the section on the dialectic of master and slave) of the chapter on *Selbstbewußtsein* of his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. If Hegel defines *Selbstbewußtsein* as *Begierde* (desire), it's because he (*Selbstbewußtsein*) will resolve the division or difference with himself (cf. fig. 24) and restore unity with himself. This desire is the driving force of the dialectical movement that, for Hegel, should attain the absolute knowledge, where the division between knowledge and truth is resolved. But if he says in that phrase that the *Selbstbewußtsein* as desire only achieves satisfaction in the Other *Selbstbewußtsein* as Other desire, what does all this mean, especially in the dimension of Hegelian philosophy which is nothing other than theology according to Hegel himself? It would mean that the division of the *Selbstbewußtsein* from itself is nothing other than the division between man and God, and that this final satisfaction would be the sublimatory jouissance of reconciliation, communion and even mystical union between man and God, where one and the Other know each other perfectly. Absolute knowledge would then be nothing other than this perfect mutual knowledge of man and God, where we abide in Him and He in us (cf. 1 Jn 4,13).

For Lacan, such is the model of sublimation for thinking about it in psychoanalysis. There's no doubt that he first encountered this enigmatic Hegelian phrase in Alexandre Kojève's lectures on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the 1930s, that is, at the start of the preparatory period of his teaching. And, as we shall see below, Lacan continues to think about sublimation right up to the very last moment of his teaching. From there, I'll say this: all the teaching of Lacan is commentaries on this Hegelian phrase: "*Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein*", since this final satisfaction is the jouissance of sublimation that conditions the end of analysis.

So, just as the eschatological moment can arrive at any time, sublimatory jouissance can also occur at any time. We saw an example of this in Pascal, who expressed it, without using this key word, as the joy of salvation, which is joyful because God will give us, beyond the nothingness of the *consummatio saeculi*, the new Being (of course non-metaphysical) of the new creation, beyond death in this world, eternal life in His kingdom, and beyond sin condemned by the Law, the remission of sin by Him who is all merciful. Just like this, there must be, beyond the angst of nothingness, death and sin, the jouissance of sublimation in psychoanalysis too.

Indeed, we have an example of that, and this time also from Gérard Haddad, who recounts this episode in his book *Le jour où Lacan m'a adopté*:

At the end of a particularly abrupt session, I feel infinite angst. I'm about to put on my coat when I realize that leaving like this is impossible, unbearable. I decide, in an uncontrolled impulse, rather than leave his office, to return to the waiting room, standing as if threatening. Lacan has already taken the next patient. A few minutes later, he shows up in the other doorway, carrying on the mad rounds of his consultations. He notices me. "What do you want?" he asks with a concerned air. "To talk to you!" "Come in. What's going on?" he asks me after we're back in his office, still standing by the door. He seems angry, exasperated. Then I pronounce those words without reflexion: "I feel f*cked!" I say to him. "You don't *feel* f*cked, you *are* f*cked". And he immediately adds, "I'll see you tomorrow." Paradoxical as it may seem, this "you are f*cked", that is, once again, castrated, relieved me. I even caught myself smiling.

As you can see, this instantaneous conversation where Lacan answers to Haddad's "I *feel* f*cked!" with a "You *are* f*cked" sounds like a piece of *Witz*. And, in fact, it's collected, in a distorted form, in the book *Les Impromptus de Lacan : 543 bons mots recueillis par Jean Allouch*. And there are people who deal with the relationship between *Witz* and sublimation, but I don't go into that. What I would like to point out here is this: Haddad, being on the very edge of the apophatico-ontological hole, was in an angstfull depression severe enough to make him feel "f*cked". Then Lacan's sharp, merciless remark, pushing him further towards the hole, suddenly provokes a reversal where suffering and angst are transformed into sublimatory jouissance, however small it may be, since at that moment, Haddad doesn't burst out laughing in exultation, but only smiles. In any case, he says he's relieved: relieved of the weight of angst, having been pushed a little beyond the hole.

I will also give you an example of my own experience: a dream I had a few years ago. When I'm walking alone somewhere in a city, suddenly a baby covered with blood emerges from the breast (or bosom) of my coat. Surprised, I try to push it back to hide it where it was before its emergence, but I can't. Full of angst, I wake up. At this moment, I have a very strong guilty feeling, and I wonder if I killed the baby, and I keep asking myself what this dream means. Then, a few weeks later, just as suddenly, this interpretation comes into my mind: this baby covered with blood, I gave birth to him, not killed him. The Japanese word I'm translating here in English as "breast" or "bosom" or in French "*sein*" mainly means the parts of clothing that cover the chest, and with that word we can say, for example, "Abraham's bosom" in Japanese. Although it doesn't itself have the meaning of *uterus*, by association with the French word *sein*, it can mean for me that reproductive organ too, which I do not possess in my male body. So, for me to give birth, the baby must come from the breast or bosom of my clothes. Then I have this certainty: I have given birth to both myself and the Infant Jesus, since he is my very Being. And if I must be born again, it's because Jesus tells us: "no one can see the Kingdom of God unless he is born again" (Jn 3:03). So, within me, angst and guilty feeling are transformed into sublimatory jouissance in the form of the joy of rebirth and salvation.

So, how does Lacan formalize this sublimatory jouissance beyond the angstfull *Aufgehen* of the hole? As I've already suggested, in the graph of desire (cf. fig. 25), the dialectical movement of the desire $\$$ which, passing through the locus of signifier A and through the instinct ($\$ \diamond D$), arrives at the Other desire $S(A)$, schematizes the way of sublimation.

How is this movement schematized in the four discourses? First, let's look at the schema of alienation (fig. 15), where the locus of the Other as locus of signifier is the blue-colored area, which corresponds to the place of the agent where the S_2 is situated. What is missing in the locus of the Other is the Other-of-the-Other, i.e. the master signifier S_1 , which is situated in the place of truth (yellow), i.e. in the place of what obturates the apophatico-ontological hole. So, the lack in the Other is this very hole. Then, the $S(A)$, the signifier of lack in the Other, designates the edge of the hole (green). In this schema of alienation, the edge of the hole is the small a , which is situated in the place of the other in the four discourses. So, the mathème $S(A)$ designates the edge of the hole in the schema of two circles and the place of the other in the four discourses.

Then let's look at the transformation from the university discourse (alienation) to the analyst's discourse (separation) (cf. fig. 21), where the subject \$, initially hidden in the place of production (the place of the impossible: red), emerges, through this structural transformation, in the place of the other (the place of the necessary: green), which corresponds to the mathème $S(A)$.

Therefore, we can say that the movement of the subject \$ that arrives at the locus of $S(A)$ in the graph of desire is schematized, in the four discourses, by this movement of the subject \$ which moves from the place of production (red) into the place of the other (green) in the transformation from the university discourse to the analyst's discourse. This subject \$ (which is *Urbegierde*) having arrived at the place of $S(A)$ (which is the Other desire) is the formalization of the *Befriedigung* of the *Selbstbewußtsein* in communion with the Other *Selbstbewußtsein*. And this subject \$, which is the sublimated desire in the analyst's discourse, is what Lacan calls desire of analyst (*désir de l'analyste*). So, we can say that the analyst functions, with his sublimated desire of analyst, as the locus of $S(A)$ which receives the subject-desire \$ of analysand so that it can be sublimated too.

But, as we see in the schema of separation, the hole of the subject \$ (more precisely, the hole bordered by the subject \$) emerges as a simple open hole, which distresses us with the angst of nothingness, death and sin. So how can we formalize sublimatory jouissance as compensation for the hole of no sexual relationship?

I think that it is to answer this question that Lacan puts all his efforts in his Seminar XXIV (1976-1977) *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre* and in his following Seminar XXV (1977-1978) *Le moment de conclure*. We can read these two consecutive Seminars as one, since it seems to me that Lacan only finds what he's looking for in Seminar XXIV towards the end of Seminar XXV. Indeed, in the session of 15 March 1977, he deplores that he hasn't found what he's looking for, saying that he's going round in circles. By contrast, in the last three sessions of Seminar XXV (those of 11 April, 18 April and 9 May 1978), he finds, as it seems to me, what he's looking for, i.e. a topological formalization of sublimatory jouissance as compensation for the hole of no sexual relationship. In what form? In the form of trefoil knot, insofar as it is obtained from the edge of the Möbius strip with three half-turn torsion.

Usually, when we simply say Möbius strip, we mean the unilateral surface obtained by uniting the two ends of a strip with one half-turn torsion (*la bande de Möbius à la torsion d'un demi-tour* : BM1) (cf. fig. 26). If we cut out its edge, we obtain what Lacan calls *huit intérieur* in his Seminar XI, and which in knot theory is called trivial knot or *unknot*, that is, what doesn't form a knot in ordinary sense.

However, what Lacan shows us in Seminar XXV is not the BM1, but the Möbius strip obtained with three half-turn torsion (*la bande de Möbius à la torsion de trois demi-tours* : BM3) (cf. fig. 27). If you cut out its edge, you get a trefoil knot.

But what is the psychoanalytical significance of this character of the BM3? Lacan tells us nothing about it. So, we need to return to the topology of the projective plane (cf. fig. 11). Since BM3 is homeomorphic to BM1, we can obtain a projective plane by identifying the edge of BM3 with the edge of the hole in the bored sphere or the edge of disk (le plan projectif avec la BM3 : PP-BM3). And let us suppose that Providence does this for us: from the outset, what serves as model for apophatico-ontological topology is PP-BM3, not PP-BM1.

Now let's look at the figure 28. The Möbius surface $\$/S_1$ that separates from the spherical surface a/S_2 at the moment of separation is a BM3, not a BM1. So, the subject \$ that forms the edge of Möbius surface is a trefoil knot, not a simple edge of the hole. And with this trefoil knot, Lacan formalizes the compensation for the hole of no sexual relationship.

In psychoanalytic experience, we see that at the moment of the *Aufgehen* of the hole of the subject \$, the analysand is in quite intense angst; at this point, the analyst has to support the analysand with his own hole \$ or S(A) and with adequate interpretations; then comes the moment of sublimatory jouissance when it turns out that the subject \$ that has emerged open forms not a simple hole, but a trefoil knot.

One of my patients who is Catholic but knows nothing of theology, philosophy or psychoanalytical theory, once told me, in a session at the moment of seven or eight years after the beginning of her analysis, that she feels close by herself a presence of something like death or nothingness, and that therefore she is afraid, but that at the same time she is in peace and very happy. The moment of sublimatory jouissance can be like that.

§ 8. Phallus and the hole of no sexual relationship

Since Lacan first presented it in his Seminar XVI (1968-1969) *D'un Autre à l'autre*, the formula “there is no sexual relationship” has been much talked about, but I don’t know if anyone has put it in the context of Lacan’s critique of Freudian phallocentrism, which is expressed throughout his texts, but conceptualized above all in the Oedipus-castration complex and in his theory of libidinal development.

Phallocentrism consists in this supposition that there is the symbolic phallus or phallic signifier Φ that can obturate the apophatico-ontological hole. This supposition gives the meaning of phallic lack ($-\phi$), i.e. castration (cf. fig. 29), to the hole that is properly the hole of nothingness, death and sin, as the clinical experiences of psychoanalysis tell us. Nevertheless, this phallic supposition is attested long before Platonic *ιδέα* in the form of Dionysia, i.e. Dionysian orgies, where the procession called *τὰ φαλληφόρια* or *τὰ φαλλαγωγία* takes place and where, as those names indicate, people carry an enormous wooden phallus (cf. fig. 30) as a symbol of fertility, vitality and sexual jouissance. So, in the dimension of worship or religion, there was a hole-obturing S_1 in the form of the phallus Φ that was already adored long before the pre-Socratic period, and so it could be one of the oldest S_1 or even the oldest S_1 in History. And this phallocentrism continues up to Freud, and beyond him, even to the present day.

To explain the formula “there is no sexual relationship”, I’d first like to draw your attention to Lacan’s expression in his *Rapport de Rome*: the “mythology of instinctual maturation²⁷”. It’s a criticism of Freudian theory of libidinal development, which assumes that, in the beginning, there are partial pregenital instincts; then, they are integrated under the primacy of phallus to form *the* sexual instinct; then little boys are in the phallic phase; and at that point, the Oedipus complex is at the height of its activities. But since their genital organs are premature, the developmental process enters the latency period until the onset of puberty, where libidinal development reaches the final stage of maturation that Freud calls *Genitalorganisation*, and then the sexual instinct can serve its own purpose, i.e. procreation. The objects of Lacan’s critique are these two mutually equivalent concepts: the primacy of phallus and the genital organization. The maturation of sexual instinct under the primacy of phallus is mythological, since the assumption that the finality of the sexual instinct consists in procreation is merely a metaphysical teleology. The phallus that would bring about genital organization is impossible (what never ceases not to be written): that is what the formula “there is no sexual relationship” means. Lacan could say that Freud’s *Genitalorganisation* is impossible, but he prefers sensationalism to impress his audience.

If you reread Freud’s cases, you’ll notice what blunders he makes because of his belief in phallocentrism and the Oedipus complex, the most striking of which is found in the case of Dora. If she interrupts the analysis only after around eleven weeks, it’s because Freud’s phallogocentric

²⁷ Lacan, J. (1953): *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse*. *Écrits*, p.263.

assumption disgusts her. In the case of Little Hans, we can laugh at flagrantly Oedipean interpretations of Hans' father. You can also see how phallocentrism prevents Freud from realizing the importance of the *Aufgehen* of the apophatico-ontological hole. In Dora's case, the hole opens in the form of the fire that will devour her in her first dream, and in the form of her father's death in her second dream. In the case of Little Hans and the Wolf Man, it opens in the form of mouth of horse or wolf. Moreover, Freud overlooks the importance of the accident in which a large horse pulling a heavy wagon falls down in front of Hans, who thinks the horse is going to die. For us, it's quite clear that it's this sudden and traumatic encounter with the hole of death, not the Oedipus complex, that triggers Hans' phobia. In the case of the Wolf Man, the hole will also open up, in his paranoiac episode, in the form of multiple open pores on his nose. In the case of the Rat Man, it's first the hole of anus and the hole of the rat's mouth that devours viscera from the inside, and then the hole of *Schuld* (debt and guilt) towards poor girls, which hole, impossible to fill, he endeavors nevertheless to obturate in his obsessional actions. If Lacan supervised the young psychoanalyst Freud, he would tell him: "Leave aside the Oedipus complex, and you'll see better". In fact, Lacan says in his Seminar XVII (1969-1970) *L'envers de la psychanalyse* that the Oedipus complex is "strictly unusable" in practice, and "of no use for psychoanalysts".

Finally, let's see how phallocentrism prevents Freud from thinking adequately of the problem of the end of analysis in his article *Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse* (1937) where he says in the last paragraph the following:

With *Penisneid* (the desire for penis in women) and *männlicher Protest* (the masculine protest, i.e. castration anxiety, or *Penisangst*, which is the term Freud uses as the male counterpart to the female *Penisneid*), we often have the impression of having traversed the entire psychological stratification down to the "*gewachsener Fels*" (immense bedrock), and thus having reached the end of its action.


This passage tells us clearly that Freud thinks the psychoanalytic experience is doomed to end in the impasse conditioned by the necessity of the phallus Φ that could obturate the apophatico-ontological hole to prevent the emergence of angst. It is unthinkable for him to go beyond the hole, enduring angst for some time in front of the open hole, to reach the authentic end of analysis. That is the limit of Freud who was unable to rid himself of his phallocentrism. It's true that Lacan always proclaims he is Freudian, not Lacanian, to declare that it is he, not the IPA, who is the veritable heir of the founding father, but we cannot overlook the fact that his teaching comprises important criticism against the Freudian theory, and that is because he must go beyond the phallic impasse to think more adequately of the problems of end of psychoanalysis and formation of psychoanalysts.

~~Sein~~

Fig. 1


~~Seyn~~

Fig. 2




nach dem Sinn von Sein fragen

Sein und Zeit (1927)



Kehre



die Topologie des ~~Seyns~~

*Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938)

Fig. 3




Fig. 4




Fig. 5





Fig. 6



Formule de la tri-méthyl-amine



Shin




Fig. 8




Fig. 9

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \rightarrow \frac{S_2}{a}$$

le discours du maître



$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \rightarrow \frac{a}{\$}$$

le discours de l'université



$$\frac{\$}{a} \rightarrow \frac{S_1}{S_2}$$

le discours de l'hystérique



$$\frac{a}{S_2} \rightarrow \frac{\$}{S_1}$$

le discours de l'analyste

Fig. 10

la surface discoïde (la sphère trouée)



le bord



la surface möbiusienne
(la bande de Möbius)

Fig. 11




Fig. 12



Fig. 13

la surface discoïde (la sphère trouée)



le bord



la surface möbiusienne
(la bande de Möbius)

Fig. 11

le bord




Fig. 14




Fig. 15






Fig. 16



la topologie tétradique

Fig. 17



le nœud borroméen à quatre ronds de ficelle

Fig. 18




Fig. 4







Fig. 15




le trou archéologique du sujet \$
 le trou du phallus patriarcal Φ impossible
 le trou du désir inconscient indestructible




l'archi-refoulement (Urverdrängung) du trou du sujet \$



la structure archéologique




la structure de l'aliénation



le discours du maître




le « progrès » du discours du maître
 dans le discours de l'université
 au moment de l'archi-refoulement



le discours de l'université


Fig. 19



$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{S}_2 : \text{Ich} & \rightarrow & a : \text{Libidoobjekt} \\
 \hline
 \text{S}_1 : \text{Über-Ich} & & \$: \text{Es}
 \end{array}$$

le discours de l'université


$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \rightarrow \frac{a}{\$}$$





$$\frac{a}{S_2} \rightarrow \frac{\$}{S_1}$$

le discours de l'analyste

le discours de l'université



L'aliénation :
la fermeture de l'inconsicent



La séparation :
l'ouverture de l'inconscient

le discours de l'analyste

Fig. 21





Fig. 22



La division du sujet entre le savoir et la vérité dans l'aliénation






Fig. 25



la bande de möbius
à la torsion d'un demi-tour
BM1



si on en découpe le bord



alors on obtient ce que Lacan
appelle « huit intérieur »
dans son Séminaire XI



la bande de Möbius
à la torsion de trois demi-tours
BM3




si on en découpe le bord





alors on obtient le nœud de trèfle



Fig. 27




l'archi-refoulement (Urverdrängung) du trou du sujet \$




le surgissement du trou du sujet \$



au-delà du trou : le nœud de trèfle du sujet \$



la structure de l'aliénation



la structure de la séparation

$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \rightarrow \frac{a}{\$}$$

le discours de l'université



le « progrès » du discours de l'université
dans le discours de l'analyste
au cours de l'expérience psychanalytique

$$\frac{a}{S_2} \rightarrow \frac{\$}{S_1}$$

le discours de l'analyste

Fig. 28




Fig. 29



Fig. 30 : Ce cratère avec la figure d'une φαλλοφόρος est estimé être produit vers 470 av J-C