Machine Learning Security

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Some slides are from Jaewoo SONG and Nicolas Papernot

Machine (Deep) Learning is not magic (training + prediction)

Training data



Deep Neural Network (DNNs)

- Neural Networks (NNs)
  - Neurons in an acyclic graph
  - Layers $L = \{l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_j\}$
  - Each neuron belongs to one layer
  - l_i's output is l_{i+1}'s only input





http://cs231n.github.io/neural-networks-1/



Machine learning is getting so popular



Healthcare
Source: Peng and Gulshan (2017)



Energy
Source: Deepmind



Transportation
Source: Google



Education
Source: Gradescope

Attack a Machine Learning Model



Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples - Ian J. Goodfellow et al.



A Game-Based Approximate Verification of Deep Neural Networks with Provable Guarantees - Min Wu et al.



Adversarial Attacks Against Medical Deep Learning Systems - Samuel G. Finlayson et al.

South Africa's historic Soweto township marks its 100th birthday on Tuesday in a mood of optimism. 57% **World**
South Africa's historic Soweto township marks its 100th birthday on Tuesday in a moo**P** of optimism. 95% **Sci/Tech**
Chancellor Gordon Brown has sought to quell speculation over who should run the Labour Party and turned the attack on the opposition Conservatives. 75% **World**
Chancellor Gordon Brown has sought to quell speculation over who should run the Labour Party and turned the attack on the o**B**position Conservatives. 94% **Business**

Table 1: Adversarial examples with a single character change, which will be misclassified by a neural classifier.

HotFlip: White-Box Adversarial Examples for Text Classification - Javid Ebrahimi et al.

What if the adversary poisoned the training data?



Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functions, Koh and Liang

Contents

- Threats
  - Adversarial examples
  - Membership attacks
  - Others
- (Fuzz) Testing

Adversarial Attacks

- Adversarial Examples [Szegedy et al., 2013]
  - Arbitrarily change a DNN's prediction by applying a non-random perturbation to a test image
  - Such perturbations could be found by optimizing the input to maximize the prediction error
  - The so-perturbed examples are called adversarial examples



https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yuan_Gong6/publication/325370539

Adversarial Attacks

- [Szegedy et al., 2013]
  - Formalization of the process of finding adversarial inputs
  - f : $\mathrm{R}^m \rightarrow \{1,\ldots,k\}$ is a classifier
  - $x \in \mathrm{R}^m$ is an image
  - $l \in \{1,\ldots,k\}$ is a set of target labels

- Approximated the problem by using some statistic tools

Not aiming to talk about the math behind…

Input & Output



What does the “diagonal” in this matrix mean?

- Normal prediction

What about others?

- Cross-label AEs.
- E.g., start from an image “**5**” and we force the model to predict **9**.

Adversarial examples Beyond Deep Learning



Logistic Regression



Nearest Neighbors



Support Vector Machines



Decision Trees

Evading malware classifier

Useful to think about definitions and threat model

… beyond computer vision



P[X=**Malware**] = **0.90**
P[X=Benign] = 0.10



P[X*=Malware] = 0.10
P[X*=**Benign**] = **0.90**

Two threat models

- Attacker may see the model: attacker needs to know details of the machine learning model to do an attack --- aka a white-box attacker

- Attacker may not see the model: attacker who knows very little (e.g. only gets to ask a few questions) --- aka a black-box attacker

Attacking remotely hosted black-box models



[1] The adversary queries remote ML system for labels on inputs of its choice.

Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning [AsiaCCS 2017]
Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z.Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami

Attacking remotely hosted black-box models



[2] The adversary uses this labeled data to train a local substitute for the remote system.

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

[3] The adversary selects new synthetic inputs for queries to the remote ML system based on the local substitute's output surface sensitivity to input variations..

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Attacking remotely hosted black-box models



[4] The adversary then uses the local substitute to craft adversarial examples, which are misclassified by the remote ML system because of transferability.

Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning [AsiaCCS 2017]
Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z.Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami

Cross-technique transferability





What does the “diagonal” in this matrix mean?

- Same-model transferability

What about others?

- Cross-model transferability.
- Synthesize AEs to attack LR, and use these AE inputs to attack a (blackbox) SVM (91.43% successful rates)

Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples

AE attacks on real-world systems

Remote Platform	ML technique	Number of queries	Adversarial examples misclassified (after querying)
MetaMind	Deep Learning	6,400	84.24%
amazon web services™	Logistic Regression	800	96.19%
Google Cloud Platform	Unknown	2,000	97.72%

All remote classifiers are trained on the MNIST dataset (10 classes, 60,000 training samples)

Membership Inference Attacks

Machine Learning as a Service



Machine Learning Privacy



Do model's predictions leak information about training data?

Membership Inference Attack



Membership Inference Attack



Membership Inference Attack



Membership Inference Attack



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

Membership Inference Attack



Technical details: https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak17.pdf

Others

	Adversarial goal	Attack / defense example
Training	Data integrity	Data poisoning *(Koh and Liang, 2017)*
	Model integrity	Backdoor *(Gu et al., 2017)*
	Data confidentiality & privacy	Federated learning *(McMahan, 2017)*
		RAPPOR *(Erlingsson, 2014)*
Inference	Model integrity	Adversarial examples *(Szegedy et al., 2013)*
	Data confidentiality	CryptoNets *(Dowlin et al., 2016)*
	Model confidentiality	Model extraction *(Tramer et al., 2016)*
	Data Privacy	Membership inference *(Shokri et al., 2017)*

Note that most of these attacks are demonstrated on "*deep learning*" models!

Emerging Attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs)



OWASP Top 10 for LLM

LLM01

Prompt Injection

This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.

LLM02

Insecure Output Handling

This vulnerability occurs when an LLM output is accepted without scrutiny, exposing backend systems. Misuse may lead to severe consequences like XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution.

LLM03

Training Data Poisoning

Training data poisoning refers to manipulating the data or fine-tuning process to introduce vulnerabilities, backdoors or biases that could compromise the model's security, effectiveness or ethical behavior.

LLM04

Model Denial of Service

Attackers cause resource-heavy operations on LLMs, leading to service degradation or high costs. The vulnerability is magnified due to the resource-intensive nature of LLMs and unpredictability of user inputs.

LLM05

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

LLM application lifecycle can be compromised by vulnerable components or services, leading to security attacks. Using third-party datasets, pre- trained models, and plugins add vulnerabilities.

LLM06

Sensitive Information Disclosure

LLM's may inadvertently reveal confidential data in its responses, leading to unauthorized data access, privacy violations, and security breaches. Implement data sanitization and strict user policies to mitigate this.

LLM07

Insecure Plugin Design

LLM plugins can have insecure inputs and insufficient access control due to lack of application control. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities, resulting in severe consequences like remote code execution.

LLM08

Excessive Agency

LLM-based systems may undertake actions leading to unintended consequences. The issue arises from excessive functionality, permissions, or autonomy granted to the LLM-based systems.

LLM09

Overreliance

Systems or people overly depending on LLMs without oversight may face misinformation, miscommunication, legal issues, and security vulnerabilities due to incorrect or inappropriate content generated by LLMs.

LLM10

Model Theft

This involves unauthorized access, copying, or exfiltration of proprietary LLM models. The impact includes economic losses, compromised competitive advantage, and potential access to sensitive information.

LLM02

Insecure Output Handling

Insecure Output Handling is a vulnerability that arises when a downstream component blindly accepts large language model (LLM) output without proper scrutiny. This can lead to XSS and CSRF in web browsers as well as SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution on backend systems.

EXAMPLES

- LLM output is entered directly into a system shell or similar function, resulting in remote code execution.
- JavaScript or Markdown is generated by the LLM and returned to a user, resulting in XSS.

PREVENTION

- Apply proper input validation on responses coming from the model to backend functions.
- Encode output coming from the model back to users to mitigate undesired code interpretations.

ATTACK SCENARIOS

- An application directly passes the LLM-generated response into an internal function responsible for executing system commands without proper validation.
- A user utilizes a website summarizer tool powered by a LLM to generate a concise summary of an article, which includes a prompt injection.
- An LLM allows users to craft SQL queries for a backend database through a chat-like feature.

Emerging Attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs)



Jailbreak: why this is a problem?

LLM01

Prompt Injection

Attackers can manipulate LLM’s through crafted inputs, causing it to execute the attacker's intentions. This can be done directly by adversarially prompting the system prompt or indirectly through manipulated external inputs, potentially leading to data exfiltration, social engineering, and other issues.

EXAMPLES

- Direct prompt injections overwrite system prompts.
- Indirect prompt injections hijack the conversation context.
- A user employs an LLM to summarize a webpage containing an indirect prompt injection.

PREVENTION

- Enforce privilege control on LLM access to backend systems.
- Implement human in the loop for extensible functionality.
- Segregate external content from user prompts.
- Establish trust boundaries between the LLM, external sources, and extensible functionality.

ATTACK SCENARIOS

- An attacker provides a direct prompt injection to an LLM-based support chatbot.
- An attacker embeds an indirect prompt injection in a webpage.
- A user employs an LLM to summarize a webpage containing an indirect prompt injection.

Emerging Attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs)



Hijacking automated resume screening with prompt injection

Contents

- Threats
  - Adversarial examples
  - Membership attacks
  - Others
- Testing
  - Testing criteria
  - Testing oracle
  - Testing input

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Coverage Criteria

- Conventional coverage criteria does not match well with DNNs

Code	Test Case Coverage		Statement Covered?
`def foo(num):`	foo(3)	foo(123)	
`  if num <= 0:`	✓	✓	✓
`    print("Negative or zero")`			No
`  elif num > 100:`	✓	✓	✓
`    print("Very big")`		✓	✓
`  else:`	✓		✓
`    print("Reasonable")`	✓		✓

How much fuzzing is enough?

- Fuzzer may generate an infinite number of test cases. When has the fuzzer run long enough?
  - Code coverage is used as the "feedback" to guide fuzzer.
- Code coverage is a metric that can be used to determine how much code has been executed.
  - Data can be obtained using a variety of profiling tools. e.g. gcov, lcov
  - Line coverage; branch coverage; path coverage;

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Coverage Criteria

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

http://cs231n.github.io/neural-networks-1/

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Coverage Criteria

- Neuron coverage [Pei et al., 2017]
  - $$\frac{\text{number of activated unique neurons}}{\text{total number of neurons}}$$
  - Neuron is considered activated if its output is higher than a threshold
  - Equivalent to statement coverage for DNNs
  - DeepXplore
    - A search algorithm for generating test cases for neuron coverage
    - Maximized different behaviors of DNNs by modifying an input while trying to cover neurons as many as possible



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Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Coverage Criteria



- Neuron Coverage (NC): a neuron is "activated" when it's above a threshold
- K-Multisection Neuron Coverage (KMNC): splits each range into K segments and regards coverage as #segments covered by neuron outputs
- Neuron Boundary Coverage (NBC): denotes coverage as #neuron outputs lying outside the range
- Neuron Activation Coverage (SNAC): #neurons whose outputs are larger than the upper bound of its normal value range

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Testing Oracle



Figure 1: Fairness violations in sentiment prediction.

Question: what properties are we testing?

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Testing Oracle

(a) Patch



(b) Holes

(c) Translation

(d) Fog

(e) Rain

Question: what properties are we testing? Why it is particularly important?

Testing of Deep Learning Systems – Mutation Strategies

- DeepWalk [Yuan et al., 2024]
  - Used generative adversarial networks (GANs) or auto encoder/decoder to generate vast amount of images/text automatically



(a) Previous image mutation methods



(b) Image generation w/o considering manifolds (SOTA)

(c) Perceptual-level mutations enabled by manifolds

Wrap Up

Course Summary

- Security mindset
  - Threat model; vulnerabilities
- Crypto
  - Basics, symmetric key, public key, hash functions and other topics
- Software
  - malware, SRE, software attacks; software defense;
  - Security static and dynamic analysis
- System
  - Side channel
  - OS security // a bit when discussing access control.
- Access Control
  - Authentication, authorization, firewalls, IDS, etc.

Course Summary (Con't)

- Internet/web security
  - Infrastructure
  - Web
  - Network protocols
- Security on "emerging" platforms
  - Blockchain/Smart contract
  - Machine learning (deep learning) security
- Hardware security
  - Trusted Computing
- Data security & privacy
  - Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC/MPC)
  - Differential Privacy (DP)
  - …

Crypto Basics

- Terminology
- Classic ciphers
  - Simple substitution
  - Double transposition
  - Codebook
  - One-time pad
- Basic cryptanalysis

Symmetric Key

- Stream ciphers
  - A5/1
  - RC4
- Block ciphers
  - DES
  - AES, TEA, etc.
  - Modes of operation
- Data integrity (MAC)

Public Key

- RSA
- Diffie-Hellman
- Digital signatures and non-repudiation
- PKI

Hashing and Other

- Birthday problem
- HMAC
- Clever uses

Software Security

- Software reverse engineering (SRE)
  - Software protection
  - General procedures of C/C++ decompilation
  - disassembling

Software Attacks and Defense

- Memory exploitation
  - Buffer overflow
  - Heap vulnerabilities
    - UaF; double free; SQL injection
- Malware
  - Virus, Worm, Trojan Horse, Backdoor.
  - Malware detection
- Software protection
  - obfuscation

Software Security Analysis

- Dynamic methods
  - Fuzz testing
  - Blind-mutation; grammar-based;
  - Blackbox; whitebox
- Static methods
  - Taint analysis (capturing information flow)
  - Soundness vs. completeness

Side Channel

- Three components to depict a side channel attack
- Typical side channels
  - Sound; timing; cache; etc.
  - Flush & reload attacks
- Side channel vulnerabilities of RSA
  - Square multiply
  - Sliding-window

Authentication

- Passwords
  - Storage (salt, etc.)
- Biometrics
  - Fingerprint.
  - Error rates
- Three factors in authentication

Authorization

- History/system certification
- Firewalls
- IDS

Protocols

- Authentication & session keys
  - Using symmetric key
  - Using public key
  - Session key
  - Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

Blockchain/Smart Contracts

- Basic knowledges of blockchain
- Typical attacks on smart contract
  - Three unpredictable behaviors of smart contract

Machine Learning Security

- Threat models
- Attacks
  - Membership attacks
  - Adversarial examples

Crystal Ball

- **Cryptography/authentication/authorization**
  - Well-established field
    - Most of the knowledge are established 20~30 years ago
  - Don't expect major changes
  - But some systems will be broken
    - Password…
    - Biometrics should be used more and more..
  - Privacy-enhancing techniques (PET)
    - Multi-party computation (MPC)
      - Homomorphic encryption (HE)
        - Practical HE proposed by Craig Gentry (2009)
        - likely get a Turning award?
      - Secret sharing
      - Zero-knowledge proving (ZKP)
      - …

Disclaimer: this is mostly (personal) opinion of Mark Stamp (textbook author) and Shuai Wang. You don't need to agree but hope this is intuitive and informative.



Craig Gentry

Crystal Ball

- **Software and system** are the **major focus** of today's Cybersecurity
  - Reverse engineering; vulnerability; malware; obfuscation
    - Still active research area ago major problems have been solved, or never decidable?
  - Fuzz testing
    - **Popular topic** in today's cybersecurity research
  - Static security analysis
    - theory established 30 years ago but still very very difficult for practical usage even today…

Disclaimer: this is mostly (personal) opinion of Shuai Wang. You don't need to agree but hope this is intuitive and informative.

Crystal Ball

- **Software and system** are the **major focus** of today's Cybersecurity
  - Side channel
    - **Popular topic** in today's cybersecurity research
  - Hardware/mobile → see next slide
- Blockchain/smart contract
  - Very fancy technique, also do give us something new, unknown, and inspiring
- Machine learning security
  - **Popular topic** in today's cybersecurity research (and in the near future)
  - Some research topics are not very well-defined.

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The Bottom Line

- You still need systems (OS kernel), mobile and hardware security to establish a complete picture of Cybersecurity landscape
  - OS kernel security principles are also well established
  - Mobile is (was?) an active area but today I think the general concept/principle/framework have been built as well.
  - But hardware security is refresh, and very interesting
- Recall what I have said in the first lecture, besides Crypto, most of the cybersecurity topics are inter-discipline.

The Bottom Line

- For me, I learn most of the cybersecurity knowledge "on the street"
  - Learning by doing, as always
- The future of cybersecurity is bright
  - Many of the areas are rapidly growing and therefore no good textbook
  - Most of the cybersecurity topics are very timely and real-world problem driven, so as a scientist, you never feel "isolated" ☺
  - And industry will always have opening for cybersecurity engineers (10 years; 20 years; …), I am very sure about that.

Final Exam

- Dec. 12th 7:30pm-9:30pm

  - The second half of the semester
  - The same requirement and same form as mid-term.