

Outline

I - Problem

II - Baseline method & Limitations

III - Solution & Improvements


IV - Results & Evaluation

Problem

Devise a black-box adversarial attack that is simple but effective across multiple domains.


Problem: Adversarial attack

Adversarial attack is a machine learning technique attempting to fool models by supplying corrupted input. By inserting a small noise to the original input, which is undetectable to humans, a different output is produced by the network.



Problem: Blackbox

Attack done without knowing the internal structure of the model, which can only utilize the output as feedback, is called a **blackbox attack**.



Problem: simple & effective?

- Simple: search-based
- Effective: High attack success rate

Small number of queries

Small distortion from original input

Simultaneously fuzzing

Why is adversarial attack important?

Adversarial inputs pose security risks to Al-based software. Generating and defending these tricky test cases helps improving the safety of the software.

Example: Autonomous cars are still vulnerable to adversarial input that may cause

casualties.



classification: 120 km/h



classification: STOP



(White image was possibly taken as open space.)

Baseline method

DeepSearch: A Simple and Effective Blackbox

Attack for Deep Neural Networks

Paper method

- 1) Input: Original Image + Classifier + parameters
- 2) Feedback (Fitness): Classifier probability output
- 3) Method: Searching + Query reduction + Distortion (difference) reduction



Goal: Find input that will get wrong output + less evaluation + more similar

Paper method

Finding noise pattern for adversary

Simple hill climbing -ish method

- try out a step and stay if fitter

Hierarchical Grouping (to reduce query usage)

Iterative Refinement (to reduce distortion)

Paper method - shortcomings/limitations

Non targeted attack

Unnatural grouping

Restricted to image domain

Rely on prob outputs



Solution

Replicate the paper

Improve the method

Expand to a different domain


Re-implemented:

Re-implemented:

- DeepSearch algorithm (main algorithm)
 - + Perturbation batching
- Hierarchical grouping

Re-implemented:

- DeepSearch algorithm (main algorithm)
 - + Perturbation batching
- Hierarchical grouping



Re-implemented:

- DeepSearch algorithm (main algorithm)
 - + Perturbation batching
- Hierarchical grouping



🤒 evaluation.py




mutation.py


Re-implemented:

- DeepSearch algorithm (main algorithm)
 - + Perturbation batching
- Hierarchical grouping









Re-implemented:

- DeepSearch algorithm
 - + Perturbation batching
- Hierarchical grouping

Borrowed:

- The models (and datasets)
- Interfaces

borrowed for fair comparison of results.

- deepSearch.py
- evaluation.py
- mutation.py
- imgntWrapper.py
- madryCifarUndefWrapper.py
- madryCifarWrapper.py
- model.py
- testDeepSearch.py

Readability was subjectively improved during the replication

Readability was subjectively improved during the replication

Before

LazierGreedy.py Line 44~64

```
def loss(image):
    self.loss_fn=loss
    self.loss=loss(self.image)
```

- Swapping method bonding to a variable bonding right after definition. (???)
- No comments or explanation at all.

Readability was subjectively improved during the replication

LazierGreedy.py Line 44~64

44 def loss(image):
63 self.loss_fn=loss
64 self.loss=loss(self.image)

to

- Swapping method bonding to a variable bonding right after definition. (???)
- No comments or explanation at all.

After (Separate example)


- Full documentation of how the algorithm works.
- Full length variable naming.

Improvement

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Improvement: Targeting


Research




- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Improvement: Targeting

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme





Improvement: Categorical


- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme



Improvement: Categorical


- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme





Improvement: Grouping


Research



- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Improvement: Grouping


Research



New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Random Grouping




New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack⁻
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Changing focus:

<Probability gap> to <Target probability>





New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack-
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Changing focus:

<Probability gap> to <Target probability>





Category to probability: **Frequency distribution** Repeatedly challenge the confidence




- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme


Category to probability: **Frequency distribution**Repeatedly challenge the confidence



New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Category to probability: **Frequency distribution**Repeatedly challenge the confidence




New features implemented:

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme

Category to probability: Frequency distribution Repeatedly challenge the confidence #2 Weighted Frequency distribution 8 0.067 0.017 0.183 **0.45** 0.05 | 0.233 | 0


Class 9

- Targeted Attack
- Categorical Feedback Attack
- Alternative Grouping scheme



Expansion

- Audio classifier 5 classes:
 human, cat, dog, parrot, kid
- Data harnessed by youtube_dl
- Data converted to spectrogram images
- Training by fine-tuned Resnet50 architecture, accuracy ~80%



Results

Replicated

Targeted

Randomly Grouped

Audio Domain



Cifar-10 Example



ImageNet Example

		Success Rate (%)		Average Query	
		Research	Ours	Research	Ours
ImageNet		(on 1000) 99.3	(on 50) 98	(on 1000) 561	(on 50) 666
C:£ 10	Undefended	100	100	247	531
Cifar-10	Defended	47.7	44	963	925

ImageNet Example

		Success Rate (%)		Average Query	
		Research	Ours	Research	Ours
		(on 1000)	(on 50)	(on 1000)	(on 50)
ImageNet		99.3	98	561	666
Cifar-10	Undefended	100	100	247	531
	Defended	47.7	44	963	925



<goldfish>



<screwdriver>

ImageNet Example



<screwdriver>


		Success Rate (%)		Average Query	
		Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)	Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)
ImageNet		99.3	98	561	666
Cifar-10	Undefended	100	100	247	531
	Defended	47.7	44	963	925

True label → Ship Dog Plane Deer

Cifar-10 Example

Cat

Bird



Trụck



Results: Targeted

ImageNet Example





<goldfish>

<street sign>

6	Success Rate (%)	Average Query
ImageNet	54	5547
Cifar (Undefended)	100	931

Cifar-10 Example



<airplane>

<horse>

<frog>

Results: Random Grouping

		Success Rate (%)		Average Query	
		Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)	Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)
ImageNet		99.3	98	561	666
Cifar-10	Undefended	100	100	247	531
	Defended	47.7	44	963	925

ImageNet Example



<goldfish>



<lollipop>

	Success Rate (%)	Average Query	
ImageNet	80	1522	
Cifar (Undefended)	96	581	

Cifar-10 Example



<deer> → <dog>



<horse> → <dog>

Results: Categorical

CIFAR Undefended Non-Targeted

- Success Rate (on 50) = 6%
- Average Query = 5617



 $\langle cat \rangle \rightarrow \langle dog \rangle$




<deer> → <frog>



 $\langle \text{deer} \rangle \rightarrow \langle \text{frog} \rangle$

Audio Non-Targeted

- Success Rate (on 2) = 100%
- Average Query = 655.5



Results: Audio

Conclusion

- DS is effective on targeted attacks & audio domain (spectrograms turned out to be robust to noise)
- Random grouping has less artifacts, but with worse quality
- Categorical Attack → not successful in query usage


Replication		Success Rate (%)		Average Query	
•		Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)	Research (on 1000)	Ours (on 50)
ImageNet		99.3	98	561	666
Cifar-10	Undefended	100	100	247	531
	Defended	47.7	44	963	925


Targeted Attack	Success Rate (%)	Average Query	
ImageNet	54	5547	
Cifar (Undefended)	100	931	

Random Grouping	Success Rate (%)	Average Query	
ImageNet	80	1522	
Cifar (Undefended)	96	581	

Future work

- Different representations for audio
- Representation-independent implementation:
- Raw mutation (directly on sound)
- Back-and-forth implementation (raw








Non Targeted Imgnt

* Attack Succeeded with 261 queries



goldfish, Carassius auratus



screwdriver

Non Targeted CIFAR (defended)

* Attack Succeeded with 117 queries



Results: Targeted

Targeted Imgnt

* Attack Succeeded with 4654 queries



<goldfish, Carassius auratus>



<street sign>

Results: Targeted

Targeted CIFAR (UD)

* Attack Succeeded with 202 queries



<ship>

