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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, New York University 2018 - 2025 (expected)
M.Sc. in Economics, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai 2014 - 2016
B.A. in Economics (Hons.), St. Stephen's College, University of Delhi 2011 - 2014

REFERENCES

Professor Debraj Ray
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Professor Martin Rotemberg
19 West 4th Street, 7th Floor
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Professor Guillaume Fréchette
19 West 4th Street, 5th Floor
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FIELDS

Applied Microeconomics, Health Economics, Development Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Development Economics (Undergraduate), New York University Fall 2021
Course Assistant to Professor Debraj Ray

Econometrics II (PhD), New York University Spring 2021
Teaching Assistant to Professors Timothy Cogley and Timothy Christensen

Money and Banking (Undergraduate), New York University Summer 2020
Course Assistant to Josue Cox

Introduction to Econometrics (Undergraduate), New York University Fall 2019
Teaching Assistant to Professor Sharon Traiberman

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

Research Assistant to Professor Debraj Ray, NYU and NBER	2019 - 2024
Experienced Associate, PricewaterhouseCoopers DIAC-US Advisory	2017 - 2018
Associate, PricewaterhouseCoopers DIAC-US Advisory	2016 - 2017
Summer Intern, The Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai	Summer 2015

HONORS, FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

Department of Economics Dissertation Fellowship, New York University	2023 - 2024
Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, National Science Foundation ($25,000; Returned)	2023 - 2024
The Weiss Fund for Research in Development Economics ($23,340; Returned)	2023 - 2024
SurveyCTO Primary Data Collection Research Grant	2023 - 2024
Best Third Year Paper Award (co-awardee), New York University	2020 - 2021
Henry M. MacCracken Fellowship Program, New York University	2018 - 2023
Chancellor's Medal, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai	March 2017

WORKING PAPERS

Disparate Treatment and Outcomes in Emergency Departments: Evidence from Florida (with Ozde Ozkaya) — Job Market Paper

This paper studies racial disparity in stroke diagnosis at emergency departments. The unique feature of this setting is that the underlying state of whether the patient actually had a stroke can be inferred retrospectively. We find that strokes are roughly twice more likely to be missed among Black patients, with most of the disparity arising from physicians testing Black patients less often. We then ask how much of this disparity comes from disparate treatment by physicians. Disparate treatment by race within a facility is indicated by difference in testing rates conditional on the same disease risk. Physicians, however, infer disease risk based on signals such as symptoms or patient history that potentially vary in quality or informativeness across racial groups. To facilitate cross-group comparisons, we benchmark testing decisions against objective algorithmic risk projections. We show that disparate treatment accounts for about 60% of this racial disparity in testing, realized via two mechanisms: *unjustified skill gap*, wherein physicians make noisier risk assessments for Black patients, and *racial prejudice* in the canonical sense, where physicians apply differential thresholds. The two mechanisms are not only distinct conceptually but also have different implications for policy.

Who are Sex-Selecting, and When? (Co-Awarded Best Third Year Paper 2020-21 at NYU)

This paper studies fertility choices of parents in India who typically have a strong preferential bias for sons over daughters. Such parents are known to engineer the sex-composition of their children using prenatal sex-selective abortions or continued childbearing. I propose and empirically validate a general heuristic or a rule that describes *when* parents decide to sex-select. The decision to sex-select is motivated by a desire for more sons and necessitated by a high cost of continued childbearing. Identifying a heuristic of sex-selection therefore requires: (1) accounting for parental preferences over sex-composition and total children, and (2) observing parents' decisions of sex-selection. Towards the first, I use data on mothers' ideal number of children (self-reported) to define *relative birth orders* for all births in my sample indicating how far they are from their mother's ideal number of children. The use of sex-selection at any relative birth order is indicated by skewed male-to-female births at the order. I find the ratio of male-to-female births to be the highest for children born at their mother's ideal number of children. This suggests a heuristic whereby

parents sex-select when at their ideal number of children, to avoid exceeding it. I empirically validate this heuristic by exploiting the natural orthogonality between sex assigned at birth and the birth interval that precedes it. This orthogonality breaks down only if sex-selective abortion is resorted to, i.e. birth intervals preceding male births become artificially longer than those preceding female births. Following birth histories with no or few male births, I find intervals preceding male births to be longer for parents who are at their ideal parity than others—as the heuristic suggests.

Group-Bias in Interpersonal Interactions

Groups, including those created based on trivial and meaningless criteria, exhibit group-bias; i.e. they favor their in-group relative to the out-group. What generates this bias has been a source of debate: Is it an effect of salience in categorization, or is what appears to be group-bias merely a consequence of strategic behavior to gain from the interdependance of payoffs in settings with groups? Using groups induced in the lab, I experimentally manipulate payoff structures to study what drives this bias in interpersonal interactions. I find subjects favor their assigned in-group even when their respective in-groups cannot affect their payoffs. Categorization is hence a sufficient source of group-bias that operates even in the absence of any strategic pecuniary interests or expectations of generalized reciprocity. Additionally, I find subjects to attach importance to group labels more than just as a salient dimension of categorization, and care about how they're perceived by their in-group. Subjects are asked to nominate two out of a total of four group members for a bonus, and the nomination results are revealed only to treated groups. Subjects informed of being nominated by their in-group not only increase their allocations to the in-group but also decrease allocations to the out-group, thereby exhibiting more group-bias. This is consistent with subjects identifying with their assigned group and drawing non-pecuniary gains from the categorization. Those informed of their non-nomination decrease allocations to all and do not maintain any positive distinctness between their in-group and out-group, as if having disidentified from the group labels.

PUBLICATIONS

Minu Philip, Debraj Ray, and S. Subramanian (2021). Decoding India's Low Covid-19 Case Fatality Rate, *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 22:1, 27-51, DOI: 10.1080/19452829.2020.1863026
Mentions: The Economist, mint, The Federal, Business Today, BloombergQuint

WORK IN PROGRESS

Database: Events Data on Communal and Caste Conflicts in India (with Vrinda Anand and Wonjoon Choi)
Motivated or in Denial? Explaining the low take-up of Tuberculosis Preventive Therapy
Intra-household Health Rationing and Policy Perspectives

REFEREE

Journal of Health Economics (2021), Young Economists' Symposium (2020)

SKILLS

Python, R, Stata, oTree, Tableau, SurveyCTO

Updated: October 2024