SQLMAP ESSENTIALS

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Bypassing Web Application Protections

There won't be any protection(s) deployed on the target side in an ideal scenario, thus not preventing automatic exploitation. Otherwise, we can expect problems when running an automated tool of any kind against such a target. Nevertheless, many mechanisms are incorporated into SQLMap, which can help us successfully bypass such protections.

Anti-CSRF Token Bypass

One of the first lines of defense against the usage of automation tools is the incorporation of anti-CSRF (i.e., Cross-Site Request Forgery) tokens into all HTTP requests, especially those generated as a result of web-form filling.

In most basic terms, each HTTP request in such a scenario should have a (valid) token value available only if the user actually visited and used the page. While the original idea was the prevention of scenarios with malicious links, where just opening these links would have undesired consequences for unaware logged-in users (e.g., open administrator pages and add a new user with predefined credentials), this security feature also inadvertently hardened the applications against the (unwanted) automation.

Nevertheless, SQLMap has options that can help in bypassing anti-CSRF protection. Namely, the most important option is --csrf-token. By specifying the token parameter name (which should already be available within the provided request data), SQLMap will automatically attempt to parse the target response content and search for fresh token values so it can use them in the next request.

Additionally, even in a case where the user does not explicitly specify the token's name via --csrf-token, if one of the provided parameters contains any of the common infixes (i.e. csrf. xsrf. token), the user will be prompted whether to update it in further requests:



Unique Value Bypass

In some cases, the web application may only require unique values to be provided inside predefined parameters. Such a mechanism is similar to the anti-CSRF technique described above, except that there is no need to parse the web page content. So, by simply ensuring that each request has a unique value for a predefined parameter, the web application can easily prevent CSRF attempts while at the same time averting some of the automation tools. For this, the option --randomize should be used, pointing to the parameter name containing a value which should be randomized before being sent:

```
. . .
                                                             Bypassing Web Application Protections
 MisaelMacias@htb[/htb]$ sqlmap -u "http://www.example.com/?id=1&rp=29125" --randomize=rp --batch -v 5 | grep URI
  URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1&rp=99954
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1&rp=87216
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=9030&rp=36456
  URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1.%2C%29%29%27.%28%28%2C%22&rp=16689
  URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1%27%aFUVK%3C%27%22%3EHKtQngkrp=40049
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1%29%20AND%209368%3D6381%20AND%20%287422%3D7422&rp=95185
```

Calculated Parameter Bypass

ner similar mechanism is where a web application expects a proper parameter value to be calculated based on some other param value(s). Most often, one parameter value has to contain the message digest (e.g. h=MD5(id)) of another one. To bypass this, the option --eval should be used, where a valid Python code is being evaluated just before the request is being sent to the target:

```
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MisaelMacias@htb[/htb]$ sqlmap -u "http://www.example.com/?id=1&h=c4ca4238a0b923828dcc599a6f75849b" --eval="import has
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1&h=c4ca4238a0b923820dcc569a6f75849b
URI: http://www.example.com:80/id=1&h=c4ca4238a0b923820dcc569a6f75849b
URI: http://www.example.com:80/id=960i&h=4d7e0d72898ae7ea3593eb5ebf20c744
URI: http://www.example.com:80/id=1&2C.%2C%27%22.%2C%28.%298h=6204608365536e2d32fb2f4842ad5a88d
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1%27Myip6P%3C%27%22%3EibjjSuSh=db7c815825b14d67aaa32da09b8b2d42
URI: http://www.example.com:80/?id=1%29%20AND%209978%socks4://177.39.187.70:332835socks4://177.39.187.70:332835b1232%2
```

IP Address Concealing

In case we want to conceal our IP address, or if a certain web application has a protection mechanism that blacklists our current IP address, we can try to use a proxy or the anonymity network Tor. A proxy can be set with the option --proxy (e.g. -proxy="socks4://177.39.187.70:33283"), where we should add a working proxy

In addition to that, if we have a list of proxies, we can provide them to SQLMap with the option --proxy-file. This way, SQLMap will go sequentially through the list, and in case of any problems (e.g., blacklisting of IP address), it will just skip from current to the next from the list. The other option is Tor network use to provide an easy to use anonymization, where our IP can appear anywhere from a large list of Tor exit,



tor, SQLMap will automatically try to find the local port and use it appropriately.

If we wanted to be sure that Tor is properly being used, to prevent unwanted behavior, we could use the switch --check-tor. In such cases, SQLMap will connect to the https://check.torproject.org/ and check the response for the intended result (i.e., Congratulations appears inside)

WAF Bypass

Whenever we run SQLMap, As part of the initial tests, SQLMap sends a predefined malicious looking payload using a non-existent parameter name (e.g. ?pfov=...) to test for the existence of a WAF (Web Application Firewall). There will be a substantial change in the response compared to the original in case of any protection between the user and the target. For example, if one of the most popular WAF solutions (ModSecurity) is implemented, there should be a 486 - Not Acceptable response after such a request.

In case of a positive detection, to identify the actual protection mechanism, SQLMap uses a third-party library ident/Waf, containing the signatures of 80 different WAF solutions. If we wanted to skip this heuristical test altogether (i.e., to produce less noise), we can use switch -skip-waf.

User-agent Blacklisting Bypass

In case of immediate problems (e.g., HTTP error code 5XX from the start) while running SQLMap, one of the first things we should think of is the potential blacklisting of the default user-agent used by SQLMap (e.g. User-agent: sqlmap/1.4.9 (http://sqlmap.org)).

This is trivial to bypass with the switch --random-agent, which changes the default user-agent with a randomly chosen value from a large pool of values used by browsers

Note: If some form of protection is detected during the run, we can expect problems with the target, even other security mechanisms.

The main reason is the continuous development and new improvements in such protections, leaving smaller and smaller maneuver space for attackers.

Tamper Scripts

Finally, one of the most popular mechanisms implemented in SQLMap for bypassing WAF/IPS solutions is the so-called "tamper" scripts.

Tamper scripts are a special kind of (Python) scripts written for modifying requests just before being sent to the target, in most cases to bypass some protection.

For example, one of the most popular tamper scripts between is replacing all occurrences of greater than operator (-) with NOT SETWEEN 8

AND #, and the equals operator (-) with SETWEEN # AND #. This way, many primitive protection mechanisms (focused mostly on preventing XSS attacks) are easily bypassed, at least for SQLi purposes.

Tamper scripts can be chained, one after another, within the --tamper option (e.g. --tamper=between, randomcase), where they are run based on their predefined priority. A priority is predefined to prevent any unwanted behavior, as some scripts modify payloads by modifying their SQL syntax (e.g. ifnull2fisnull). In contrast, some tamper scripts do not care about the inner content (e.g. appendnullbyte).

Tamper scripts can modify any part of the request, although the majority change the payload content. The most notable tamper scripts are the following:


Tamper-Script	Description
Oeunion	Replaces instances of UNION with eOUNION
base64encode	Base64-encodes all characters in a given payload
between	Replaces greater than operator (>) with NOT BETWEEN 8 AND # and equals operator (=) with BETWEEN # AND #
commalesslimit	Replaces (MySQL) instances like LIMIT M, N with LIMIT N OFFSET M counterpart
equaltolike	Replaces all occurrences of operator equal (=) with LTKE counterpart
halfversionedmorekeywords	Adds (MySQL) versioned comment before each keyword
modsecurityversioned	Embraces complete query with (MySQL) versioned comment
modsecurityzeroversioned	Embraces complete query with (MySQL) zero-versioned comment
percentage	Adds a percentage sign (%) in front of each character (e.g. SELECT -> %S%E%L%E%C%T)
plus2concat	Replaces plus operator (+) with (MsSQL) function CONCAT() counterpart
randomcase	Replaces each keyword character with random case value (e.g. SELECT -> SEleCt)
space2comment	Replaces space character () with comments '/
space2dash	Replaces space character () with a dash comment () followed by a random string and a new line (\n)
space2hash	Replaces (MySQL) instances of space character () with a pound character (#) followed by a random string and a new line (\n)
space2mssqlblank	Replaces (MsSQL) instances of space character () with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters
space2plus	Replaces space character () with plus (+)
space2randomblank	Replaces space character () with a random blank character from a valid set of alternate characters
symboliclogical	Replaces AND and OR logical operators with their symbolic counterparts (&& and)
versionedkeywords	Encloses each non-function keyword with (MySQL) versioned comment
versionedmorekeywords	Encloses each keyword with (MySQL) versioned comment

To get a whole list of implemented tamper scripts, along with the description as above, switch --list-tampers can be used. We can also develop custom Tamper scripts for any custom type of attack, like a second-order SQLi.

Miscellaneous Bypasses

The other bypass mechanisms is the HTTP parameter pollution (HPP), where payloads are split in a similar way as in case of --chunked between different same parameter named values (e.g. ?id=16id=UNION6id=SELECT&id=Username, password&id=FROM6id=Users...), which are concatenated by the target platform if supporting it (e.g. ASP).





Waiting to start...

