

ICMP Tunneling


Related PCAP File(s):

- icmp_tunneling.pcapng

Tunneling is a technique employed by adversaries in order to exfiltrate data from one location to another. There are many different kinds of tunneling, and each different kind uses a different protocol. Commonly, attackers may utilize proxies to bypass our network controls, or protocols that our systems and controls allow.

Basics of Tunneling


Essentially, when an attacker wants to communicate data to another host, they may employ tunneling. In many cases, we might notice this through the attacker possessing some command and control over one of our machines. As noted, tunneling can be conducted in many different ways. One of the more common types is SSH tunneling. However, proxy-based, HTTP, HTTPs, DNS, and other types can be observed in similar ways.



The idea behind tunneling is that an attacker will be able to expand their command and control and bypass our network controls through the protocol of their choosing.

ICMP Tunneling

In the case of ICMP tunneling an attacker will append data they want to exfiltrate to the outside world or another host in the data field in an ICMP request. This is done with the intention to hide this data among a common protocol type like ICMP, and hopefully get lost within our network traffic.



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- Skills Assessment

My Workstation

Finding ICMP Tunneling

Since ICMP tunneling is primarily done through an attacker adding data into the data field for ICMP, we can find it by looking at the contents of data per request and reply.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=1/256, ttl=64 (reply in 2)
2	0.000313	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=1/256, ttl=64 (request in 1)
3	1.077716	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=2/512, ttl=64 (reply in 4)
4	1.077974	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=2/512, ttl=64 (request in 3)
5	2.198598	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (reply in 6)
6	2.198837	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (request in 5)
7	3.229529	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (reply in 8)
8	3.229778	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (request in 7)
9	4.264589	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=5/1280, ttl=64 (reply in 10)
10	4.264821	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=5/1280, ttl=64 (request in 9)
11	5.282900	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=6/1536, ttl=64 (reply in 12)
12	5.283166	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=6/1536, ttl=64 (request in 11)
13	6.311992	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=7/1792, ttl=64 (reply in 14)
14	6.312274	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=7/1792, ttl=64 (request in 13)
15	13.750695	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	IPv4	1514	Fragmented IP protocol (proto=ICMP 1, offf=0, ID=0000) [Reassembled in #40]
16	13.751046	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	IPv4	1514	Fragmented IP protocol (proto=ICMP 1, offf=1488, ID=0001) [Reassembled in #40]
17	13.751427	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	IPv4	1514	Fragmented IP protocol (proto=ICMP 1, offf=2960, ID=0001) [Reassembled in #40]

We can filter our wireshark capture to only ICMP requests and replies by entering ICMP into the filter bar.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=1/256, ttl=64 (reply in 2)
2	0.000313	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=1/256, ttl=64 (request in 1)
3	1.077716	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=2/512, ttl=64 (reply in 4)
4	1.077974	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=2/512, ttl=64 (request in 3)
5	2.198598	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (reply in 6)
6	2.198837	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=3/768, ttl=64 (request in 5)
7	3.229529	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (reply in 8)
8	3.229778	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=4/1024, ttl=64 (request in 7)
9	4.264589	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=5/1280, ttl=64 (reply in 10)
10	4.264821	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=5/1280, ttl=64 (request in 9)
11	5.282900	192.168.10.5	192.168.10.1	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request id=0x7ec6, seq=6/1536, ttl=64 (reply in 12)
12	5.283166	192.168.10.1	192.168.10.5	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply id=0x7ec6, seq=6/1536, ttl=64 (request in 11)

Suppose we noticed fragmentation occurring within our ICMP traffic as it is above, this would indicate a large amount of data being transferred via ICMP. In order to understand this behavior, we should look at a normal ICMP request. We may note that the data is something reasonable like 48 bytes.

▼ Internet Control Message Protocol
Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
Code: 0
Checksum: 0xd930 [correct]
[Checksum Status: Good]
Identifier (BE): 32454 (0x7ec6)
Identifier (LE): 50814 (0xc67e)
Sequence Number (BE): 1 (0x0001)
Sequence Number (LE): 256 (0x0100)
<u>[Response frame: 2]</u>
Timestamp from icmp data: Jul 17, 2023 15:43:14.000000000 Mountain Daylight Time
[Timestamp from icmp data (relative): 0.331815000 seconds]
▼ Data (48 bytes)
Data: 341a050000000000101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b...
[Length: 48]

However a suspicious ICMP request might have a large data length like 38000 bytes.

▼ Internet Control Message Protocol
Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
Code: 0
Checksum: 0x4ab7 [correct]
[Checksum Status: Good]
Identifier (BE): 0 (0x0000)
Identifier (LE): 0 (0x0000)
Sequence Number (BE): 0 (0x0000)
Sequence Number (LE): 0 (0x0000)
<u>[Response frame: 66]</u>
▼ Data (38000 bytes)
Data: 557365726e61d653a20726f6f743b2050617373776f72643a2050617373776f72643132...
[Length: 38000]

If we would like to take a look at the data in transit, we can look on the right side of our screen in Wireshark. In this case, we might notice something like a Username and Password being pinged to an external or internal host. This is a direct indication of ICMP tunneling.

0000	08 00 4a b7 00 00 00 00	55 73 65 72 6e 61 6d 65 Username
0010	3a 20 72 6f 6f 74 3b 20	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	: root; Password
0020	3a 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	72 64 31 32 33 24 55 73	: Passwo rd123\$Us
0030	65 72 6e 61 6d 65 3a 20	72 6f 6f 74 3b 20 50 61	ername: root; Pa
0040	73 73 77 6f 72 64 3a 20	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	ssword: Password
0050	31 32 33 24 55 73 65 72	6e 61 6d 65 3a 20 72 6f	123\$User name: ro
0060	6f 74 3b 20 50 61 73 73	77 6f 72 64 3a 20 50 61	ot; Pass word: Pa
0070	73 73 77 6f 72 64 31 32	33 24 55 73 65 72 6e 61	ssword12 3\$Userna
0080	6d 65 3a 20 72 6f 6f 74	3b 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	me: root ; Passwo
0090	72 64 3a 20 50 61 73 73	77 6f 72 64 31 32 33 24	rd: Pass word123\$
00a0	55 73 65 72 6e 61 6d 65	3a 20 72 6f 6f 74 3b 20	Username : root;
00b0	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	3a 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	Password : Passwo
00c0	72 64 31 32 33 24 55 73	65 72 6e 61 6d 65 3a 20	rd123\$Us ername:
00d0	72 6f 6f 74 3b 20 50 61	73 73 77 6f 72 64 3a 20	root; Pa ssword:
00e0	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	31 32 33 24 55 73 65 72	Password 123\$User
00f0	6e 61 6d 65 3a 20 72 6f	6f 74 3b 20 50 61 73 73	name: ro ot; Pass
0100	77 6f 72 64 3a 20 50 61	73 73 77 6f 72 64 31 32	word: Pa ssword12
0110	33 24 55 73 65 72 6e 61	6d 65 3a 20 72 6f 6f 74	3\$Userna me: root
0120	3b 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	72 64 3a 20 50 61 73 73	; Passwo rd: Pass
0130	77 6f 72 64 31 32 33 24	55 73 65 72 6e 61 6d 65	word123\$ Username
0140	3a 20 72 6f 6f 74 3b 20	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	: root;[] Password
0150	3a 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	72 64 31 32 33 24 55 73	: Passwo rd123\$Us
0160	65 72 6e 61 6d 65 3a 20	72 6f 6f 74 3b 20 50 61	ername: root; Pa
0170	73 73 77 6f 72 64 3a 20	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	ssword: Password
0180	31 32 33 24 55 73 65 72	6e 61 6d 65 3a 20 72 6f	123\$User name: ro
0190	6f 74 3b 20 50 61 73 73	77 6f 72 64 3a 20 50 61	ot; Pass word: Pa
01a0	73 73 77 6f 72 64 31 32	33 24 55 73 65 72 6e 61	ssword12 3\$Userna
01b0	6d 65 3a 20 72 6f 6f 74	3b 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	me: root ; Passwo
01c0	72 64 3a 20 50 61 73 73	77 6f 72 64 31 32 33 24	rd: Pass word123\$
01d0	55 73 65 72 6e 61 6d 65	3a 20 72 6f 6f 74 3b 20	Username : root;
01e0	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	3a 20 50 61 73 73 77 6f	Password : Passwo
01f0	72 64 31 32 33 24 55 73	65 72 6e 61 6d 65 3a 20	rd123\$Us ername:
0200	72 6f 6f 74 3b 20 50 61	73 73 77 6f 72 64 3a 20	root; Pa ssword:
0210	50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64	31 32 33 24 55 73 65 72	Password 123\$User
0220	6e 61 6d 65 3a 20 72 6f	6f 74 3b 20 50 61 73 73	name: ro ot; Pass
0230	77 6f 72 64 3a 20 50 61	73 73 77 6f 72 64 31 32	word: Pa ssword12
0240	33 24 55 73 65 72 6e 61	6d 65 3a 20 72 6f 6f 74	3\$Userna me: root

On the other hand, more advanced adversaries will utilize encoding or encryption when transmitting exfiltrated data, even in the case of ICMP tunneling. Suppose we noticed the following.

0000	00 00 d0 ed 00 00 00 00	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70 V GhpcyBp
0010	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0020	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0030	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0040	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0050	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0060	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0070	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0080	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0090	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
00a0	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
00b0	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
00c0	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
00d0	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
00e0	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
00f0	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0100	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0110	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0120	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0130	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0140	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0150	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0160	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
0170	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0180	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
0190	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
01a0	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
01b0	4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d	56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70	Njc40Qo= V GhpcyBp
01c0	63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c	59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72	cyBhIHNL Y3VyzSBr
01d0	5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c	65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31	ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1

```
01e0  4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d  56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70  Njc40Qo= VGhpcyBp
01f0  63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c  59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72  cyBhIHNL Y3VyZSBr
0200  5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c  65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31  ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0210  4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d  56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70  Njc40Qo= VGhpcyBp
0220  63 79 42 68 49 48 4e 6c  59 33 56 79 5a 53 42 72  cyBhIHNL Y3VyZSBr
0230  5a 58 6b 36 49 45 74 6c  65 54 45 79 4d 7a 51 31  ZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1
0240  4e 6a 63 34 4f 51 6f 3d  56 47 68 70 63 79 42 70  Njc40Qo= VGhpcyBp
```

We could copy this value out of Wireshark and decode it within linux with the base64 utility.



ICMP Tunneling

```
MisaelMacias@htb[/htb]$ echo 'VGhpcyBpcyBhIHNL Y3VyZSBrZXk6IEtl eTEyMzQ1Njc40Qo=' | base64 -d
```

This would also be a case where ICMP tunneling is observed. In many cases, if the ICMP data length is larger than 48-bytes, we know something fishy is going on, and should always look into it.

Preventing ICMP Tunneling

In order to prevent ICMP tunneling from occurring we can conduct the following actions.

1. **Block ICMP Requests** - Simply, if ICMP is not allowed, attackers will not be able to utilize it.
2. **Inspect ICMP Requests and Replies for Data** - Stripping data, or inspecting data for malicious content on these requests and replies can allow us better insight into our environment, and the ability to prevent this data exfiltration.



Connect to Pwnbox

Your own web-based Parrot Linux instance to play our labs.

Pwnbox Location

UK

139ms

Terminate Pwnbox to switch location

Start Instance

∞ / 1 spawns left

Waiting to start...

Questions

Answer the question(s) below to complete this Section and earn cubes!

+ 1  Enter the decoded value of the base64-encoded string that was mentioned in this section as your answer.

This is a secure key: Key123456789

 Submit

 Previous

Next 

 Mark Complete & Next

