This book is an attempt to understand the world in which we live. Its fundamental premise is that nationalism lies at the basis of this world. To grasp its significance, one has to explain nationalism.

The word "nationalism" is used here as an umbrella term under which are subsumed the related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness, and collectivities based on them—nations; occasionally it is employed to refer to the articulate ideology on which national identity and consciousness rest, though not—unless specified—to the politically activist, xenophobic variety of national patriotism, which it frequently designates.

The specific questions which the book addresses are why and how nationalism emerged, why and how it was transformed in the process of transfer from one society to another, and why and how different forms of national identity and consciousness became translated into institutional practices and patterns of culture, molding the social and political structures of societies which defined themselves as nations. To answer these questions, I focus on five major societies which were the first to do so: England, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States of America.

The Definition of Nationalism

The specificity of nationalism, that which distinguishes nationality from other types of identity, derives from the fact that nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a "people," which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity. The "people" is the mass of a population whose boundaries and nature are defined in various ways, but which is usually perceived as larger than any concrete community and always as fundamentally homogeneous, and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class, locality, and in some cases even ethnicity. This specificity is conceptual. The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular perspective or

a style of thought.[1] The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the idea of the "nation."

The Origins of the Idea of the "Nation"

To understand the nature of the idea of the "nation," it might be helpful to examine the semantic permutations which eventually resulted in it, as we follow the history of the word. The early stages of this history were traced by the Italian scholar Guido Zernatto.[2] The origin of the word is to be found in the Latin *natio*—something born. 1 he initial concept was derogatory: in Rome the name *natio* was reserved for groups of foreigners coming from the same geographical region, whose status—because they were foreigners-—was below that of the Roman citizens. This concept was thus similar in meaning to the Greek *ta ethne,* also used to designate foreigners and, specifically, heathens, and to the Hebrew *amamim,* which referred to those who did not belong to the chosen monotheistic people. The word had other meanings as well, but they were less common, and this one—a group of foreigners united by place of origin—for a long time remained its primary implication.

In this sense, of a group of foreigners united by place of origin, the word 'nation was applied to die communities of students coming to several universities shared by Western Christendom from loosely—geographically or linguistically .related regions. For example, there were four nations in the University of Paris, the great center of theological learning: "1'honorable »ration de France, la fidele nation de Picardie," "la venerable nation de Normandie," and "la constante nation de Germanie." The "nation de France" included all students coming from France, Italy, and Spain; that of "Germanie," those from England and Germany; the Picard "nation" was reserved for the Dutch; and the Norman, for those from the Northeast. It is important to note that the students had a national identity only in their status as students (that is, in most cases, while residing abroad); this identity was immediately shed when their studies were completed and they returned home. While applied in this setting, the word "nation," on the one hand, tost its derogatory connotation, and on the other, acquired an additional meaning. Owing to the specific structure of university life at the time, the -.omm uni ties of students functioned as support groups or unions and, as they regularly took sides in scholastic disputations, also developed common opinions. As a result, the word "nation" came to mean more than a community of origin: it referred now to the community of opinion and purpose.

As universities sent representatives to adjudicate grave ecclesiastical questions at the Church Councils, the word underwent yet another transformation. Since the late thirteenth century, starting at the Council of Lyon in 1274, the new concept—"nation" as a community of opinion—was applied

to the parties of the "ecclesiastical republic," But the individuals who composed them, the spokesmen of various intraecclesiastical approaches, were also representatives of secular and religious potentates. And so the word "nation" acquired another meaning, that of representatives of cultural and political authority, or a political, cultural, and then social *elite.* Zernatto cites -Montesquieu, Joseph de Maistre, and Schopenhauer to demonstrate how late this was still the accepted significance of the word. It is impossible to mistake its meaning in the famous passage from *Esprit des lots:* "Sous les deux premieres races on assembla souvent la nation, c'est a dire, les seigneurs et les eveques; il n'etait point des communes."[3]

The Zigzag Pattern of Semantic Change

At this point, where Zernatto's story breaks off, we may pause to take a closer look at it. To an extent, the history of the word "nation" allows us to anticipate the analysis employed in much of the book. The successive changes in meaning combine into a pattern which, for the sake of formality, we shall call "the zigzag pattern of semantic change." At each stage of this development, the meaning of the word, which comes with a certain semantic baggage, evolves out of usage in a particular situation. The available conventional concept is applied within new circumstances, to certain aspects of which it corresponds. However, aspects of the new situation, which were absent in the situation in which the conventional concept evolved, become cognitively associated with it, resulting in a duality of meaning. The meaning of the original concept is gradually obscured, and the new one emerges as conventional. When the word is used again in a new situation, it is likely to be used in this new meaning, and so on and so forth. (This pattern is depicted in Figure 1.)

The process of semantic transformation is constantly redirected by structural (situational) constraints which form the new concepts (meanings of the word); at the same time, the structural constraints are conceptualized, interpreted, or defined in terms of the concepts (the definition of the situation changes as the concepts evolve), which thereby orient action. The social potency and psychological effects of this orientation vary in accordance with the sphere of the concept's applicability and its relative centrality in the actor's overall existence. A student in a medieval university, defined as a member of one or another nation, might derive therefrom an idea of the quarters he was supposed to be lodged in, people he was likely to associate with most closely, and some specific opinions he was expected to hold in the course of the few years his studies lasted. Otherwise his "national" identity, probably, did not have much impact on his self-image or behavior; outside the narrow sphere of the university, the concept had no applicability. The influence of the equally transient "national" identity on a participant at a Church Coun-



Figure 1 The zigzag pattern of semantic change

cil could be more profound. Membership in a nation defined him as a person of very high status, the impact of such definition on one's self-perception could be permanent, and the lingering memory of nationality could affect the person's conduct far beyond conciliar deliberations, even if his nation no longer existed.

From "Rabble" to "Nation"

The applicability of the idea of the nation and its potency increased a thousandfold as the meaning of the word was transformed again. At a certain point in history—to be precise, in early sixteenth-century England—the word "nation" in its conciliar meaning of "an elite" was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with the word "people." *This semantic transformation signaled the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the era of nationalism.* The stark significance of this conceptual revolution was highlighted by the fact that, while the general referent of the word "people" prior to its nationalization was the population of a region, specifically it applied to the lower classes and was most frequently used in the sense of "rabble" or "plebs." The equation of the two concepts implied the elevation of the populace to the position of an (at first specifically political) elite. As a

synonym of the "nation"—an elite—the "people" lost its derogatory connotation and, now denoting an eminently positive entity, acquired the meaning of the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity, and the supreme object of loyalty. A tremendous change of attitude, which it later reinforced, had to precede such redefinition of the situation, for with if members of all orders of rhe society identified with the group, from which earlier the better placed of them could only wish to dissociate themselves. What brought this change about in the first place, and then again and again, as national identity replaced other types in one country after another, is, In every particular case, the first issue to be accounted for, and it will be the focus of discussion in several chapters of the book.

^National identity in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity which derives from membership in a "people," the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is defined as a "nation." Every member of the "people" thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality, and it is in consequence that a stratified national population is perceived as essentially homogeneous, and the lines of status and class as superficial. This principled lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions of the same general phenomenon. Apart from it, different nationalisms share little. The national populations—diversely termed "peoples," "nations," and "nationalities"—are defined in many ways, and the criteria of membership in them vary. The multiformity which results is the source of the conceptually evasive, Protean nature of nationalism and the cause of the perennial frustration of its students, vainly trying to define it with the help of one or another "objective" factor, all of which are rendered relevant to the problem only if the national principle happens to be applied to them. The definition of nationalism proposed here recognizes it as an "emergent phenomenon," that is, a phenomenon whose nature—as well as the possibilities of its development and the possibilities of the development of the elements of which it is composed—is determined not by the character of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and imparts to them a special significance/

There are important exceptions to every relationship in terms of which nationalism has ever been interpreted—whether with common territory or common language, statehood or shared traditions, history or race. None of these relationships has proved inevitable. But from the definition proposed above, it follows not only that such exceptions are to be expected, but that nationalism does not have to be related to *any* of these factors, though as a rule it is related to at least some of them. In other words, *nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism.* It is apoffScalTdeology (or a class of pdiit^Hdg.Qk^es^erivingTfom'TheSame basicjmnctpfe), an3^s..such.ft/. dpes'noThave to_be.jdenffiS"wiih"anyparticular community/ A_narion—coextensive with humanity, is in no way a contradiction in terms. The United

States of the World, which will perhaps exist in the future, with sovereignty vested in the population, and the various segments of the latter regarded as equal, would be a nation in the strict sense of the word within the framework of nationalism. The United States of America represents an approximation to precisely this state of affairs.

The Emergence of Particularistic Nationalisms

As it is, however, nationalism is the most common and salient form of particularism in the modern world. Moreover, if compared with the forms of particularism it has replaced, it is a particularly effective (or, depending on one's viewpoint, pernicious) form of particularism, because, as every individual derives his or her identity from membership in the community, the sense of commitment to it and its collective goals is much more widespread. In a world divided into particular communities, national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community's sense of uniqueness and the qualities contributing to it. These qualities (social, political, cultural in the narrow sense, or ethnic)[6] therefore acquire a great significance in the formation of every specific nationalism. The association between the nationality of a community and its uniqueness represents the next and last transformation in the meaning of the "nation" and may be deduced from the zigzag pattern of semantic (and by implication social) change.

The word "nation" which, in its conciliar and at the time prevalent meaning of an elite, was applied to the population of a specific country (England) became cognitively associated with the existing (political, territorial, and ethnic) connotations of a population and a country. While the interpretation of the latter in terms of the concept "nation" modified their significance, the concept "nation" was also transformed and—as it carried over the connotations of a population and a country, which were consistent with it—came to mean "a sovereign people." This new meaning replaced that of "an elite" initially only in England. As we may judge from Montesquieu's definition, elsewhere the older meaning long remained dominant, but it was, eventually, supplanted.

The word "nation," meaning "*sovereign* people," was now applied to other populations and countries which, like the first nation, naturally had some political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and became associated with such geo-political and ethnic baggage. As a result of this association, "nation" changed its meaning once again, coming to signify "a *unique* sovereign people." (These changes are shown in Figure 2.) The last transformation[7] may be considered responsible for the conceptual confusion reigning in the theories of nationalism. The new concept of the nation in most cases eclipsed the one immediately preceding it, as the latter



Figure 2 The transformation of the idea of the nation

eclipsed those from which it descended, but, significantly, this did not happen everywhere. Because of the persistence and, as we shall see, in certain places development and extension of structural conditions responsible for the evolution of the original, non-particularistic idea of the nation, the two concepts now coexist.

The term "nation" applied to both conceals important differences. The emergence of the more recent concept signified a profound transformation in the nature of nationalism, and the two concepts under one name reflect two radically different forms of the phenomenon (which means both two radically different forms of national identity and consciousness, and two radically different types of national collectivities—nations).

Types of Nationalism

The two branches of nationalism are obviously related in a significant way, but are grounded in different values and develop for different reasons. They

also give rise to dissimilar patterns of social behavior, culture, and political institutions, often conceptualized as expressions of unlike "national characters."

Perhaps the most important difference concerns the relationship between *nationalism* and *democracy.* The location of sovereignty within the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata, which constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time the basic tenets of democracy. Democracy was born with the sense of nationality. The two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon. Originally, nationalism developed *as* democracy; where the conditions of such original development persisted, the identity between the two was maintained. But as nationalism spread in different conditions and the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign character to the uniqueness of rhe people, the original equivalence between it and democratic principles was lost. One implication of this, which should be emphasized, is that democracy may not be exportable. It may be an inherent predisposition in certain nations (inherent in their very definition as nations—that-is, the original national concept), yet entirely alien to others, and the ability to adopt and develop it in the latter may require a change of identity.

The emergence of the original (in principle, non-particularistic) idea of the nation as a sovereign people was, evidently, predicated on a transformation in the character of the relevant population, which suggested the symbolic elevation of the "people" and its definition as a political elite, in other words, on a profound change in structural conditions. The emergence of the ensuing, particularistic, concept resulted from the application of the original idea to conditions which did not necessarily undergo such transformation. It was the other, in the original concept accidental, connotations of people and country which prompted and made possible such application. In both instances, the adoption of the idea of the nation implied symbolic elevation of the populace (and therefore the creation of a new social order, a new structural reality). But while in the former case the idea was inspired by the structural context which preceded its formation—the people acting in some way as a political elite, and actually exercising sovereignty—in the latter case the sequence of events was the opposite: the importation of the idea of popular sovereignty—as part and parcel of the idea of the nation—initiated the transformation in the social and political structure.

As it did so, the nature of sovereignty was inevitably reinterpreted. The *observable* sovereignty of the people (its nationality) in the former case could only mean that some individuals, who were of the people, exercised

sovereignty. The idea of the nation (which implied sovereignty of the people) acknowledged this experience and rationalized it. The national principle that emerged was individualistic: sovereignty of the people was the implication of the actual sovereignty of individuals; it was because these individuals (of the people) actually exercised sovereignty that they were members of a nation. The *theoretical* sovereignty of the people in rhe latter case, by contrast, was an implication of the people's uniqueness, its very being a distinct people, because this was the meaning of the nation, and the nation was, by definition, sovereign. The national principle was collectivistic; it reflected the collective being. Collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.

These two dissimilar interpretations of popular sovereignty underlie the basic types of nationalism, which one may classify as individualistic-libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian. In addition, nationalism may be distinguished according to criteria of membership in the national collectivity, which may be either "civic," that is, identical with citizenship, or "ethnic." In the former case, nationality is at least in principle open and voluntaristic; it can and sometimes must be acquired. In the latter, it is believed to be inherent—one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic. Individualistic nationalism cannot be but civic, but civic nationalism can also be collectivistic. More often, though, collectivistic nationalism takes on the form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily collectivistic. (These concepts are summarized in Figure 3.)

It must be kept in mind, of course, that these are only categories which serve to pinpoint certain characteristic tendencies within different—specific—nationalisms. They should be regarded as models which can be approximated, but are unlikely to be fully realized. In reality, obviously, the

	Civic	*Ethnic*
Individualistic-libertarian	Type I	Void
Collectivistic-authoritarian	Type II	Type III

Figure 3 Types of nationalism

most common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures vary significantly enough to justify their classification in these terms and render it a useful analytical tool.

Distinctiveness of National Identity

Nationalism being defined as a specific conceptual perspective, it is evident that to understand national identity one must explain how this perspective—the fundamental idea of the nation and its various interpretations—emerged. Clearly, national identity should not be confused with other types of identity which do not share this perspective, and it cannot be explained in general terms or in terms which may explain any other type of identity. This point is worth reiterating, for national identity is frequently equated with collective identity as such.

Nationalism is not related to membership in all human communities, but only in communities defined as "nations." National identity is different from an exclusively religious or s class identity. Nor is it a synonym for an exclusively or primarily linguistic or territorial identity, or a political identity of a certain kind (such, for instance, as an identity derived from being a subject of a particular dynasty), or even a *unique* identity, that is, a sense of Frenchness, Englishness, or Germanity, all of which are commonly associated with national identity. Such other identities are discussed in this book only if they influence the formation of national identity and are as a result essential to its understanding, which is not always the case. Frequently a unique identity (the character of which, depending on the source of uniqueness, may be religious or linguistic, territorial or political) exists centuries before the national identity is formed, in no way guaranteeing and anticipating it; such was the case in France and to a certain extent in Germany. In other cases, the sense of uniqueness may be articulated simultaneously with the emergence of the national identity, as happened in England and, most certainly, in Russia. It is even possible, though very unusual, for national identity to predate the formation of a unique identity; the development of identity in America followed this course. National identity is not a generic identity; it is specific. Generating an identity may be a psychological necessity, a given of human nature. Generating national identity is not. It is important to keep this distinction in mind.

In ethnic nationalisms, "nationality" became a synonym of "ethnicity," and national identity is often perceived as a reflection or awareness of possession of "primordial" or inherited group characteristics, components of "ethnicity," such as language, customs, territorial affiliation, and physical type. Such objective "ethnicity" in itself, however,, does not represent an identity, not even an "ethnic" identity. The possession of some sort of "eth-

nic" endowment is close to universal, yet the identity of a person born in England of English parentage and English-speaking may be that of a Christian; the identity of a person bom and living in France, speaking French, unmistakably French in habits and tastes, that of a nobleman; their "ethnicity" being quite irrelevant to their motives and actions, and seen, if at all noticed, as purely accidental. An essential characteristic of any identity is that it is necessarily the view the concerned actor has of himself or herself. It therefore either exists or does not; it cannot be asleep and then be awakened, as some sort of disease. It cannot be presumed on the basis of any objective characteristics, however closely associated with it in other cases. Identity is perception. If a particular identity does not mean anything to the population in question, this population does not have this particular identity.[8]

The "ethnicity" of a community (its being an "ethnic community") presupposes the uniformity and antiquity of its origins, as a result of which it may be viewed as a natural grouping and its characteristics as inherent in the population. Such inherent characteristics do regularly form the basis of the group's sense of particularity, or what has been here referred to as its unique identity. Yet ethnicity does not generate unique identity. It does not, because of the available "ethnic" characteristics only some are selected, not the same ones in every case, and the choice, in addition to the availability or even salience of the selected qualities, is determined by many other factors. Moreover, no clear line separates selection from artificial construction. A language of a part may be imposed on the entire population and declared native to the latter (or, if no part of a population has a language to speak of, it may be outright invented). An "ancestral" territory may be acquired in conquest, "common" history fabricated, traditions imagined and projected into the past. One should add to this that the unique identity of a community is not necessarily ethnic, because the community may not see any of the (allegedly) inherent attributes of the population as the source of its uniqueness, but may concentrate, for example, as was the case in France, on the personal attributes of the king or on high, academic, culture. Some populations have no "ethnic" characteristics at all, though this is very unusual. The population of the United States of America, the identity of which is unmistakably national and which undoubtedly possesses a well-developed sense of uniqueness, is a case in point: it has no "ethnic" characteristics because its population is not an "ethnic community."

National identity frequently utilized ethnic characteristics (this is obvious in the case of ethnic nationalisms). Yet it should be emphasized that "ethnicity" in itself is in no way conducive to nationality. "Ethnic" characteristics form a certain category of raw material which can be organized and rendered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements of any number of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an organizing prin-

ciple applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity.

The Outline of the Argument

The original modern idea of the nation emerged in sixteenth-century England, which was the first nation in the world (and the only one, with the possible exception of Holland, for about two hundred years). The individualistic civic nationalism which developed there was inherited by its colonies in America, and later became characteristic of the United States.

Particularistic nationalism, reflecting the dissociation of the meaning of the "nation" as a "people" extolled as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of collective loyalty, and the basis of political solidarity, from that of an "elite," and its fusion with geo-political and/or ethnic characteristics of particular populations, did not emerge until the eighteenth century. This happened on the continent of Europe, whence it started to spread all over the world. Collectivistic nationalism appeared first, and almost simultaneously, in France and Russia, then, close to the end of the eighteenth century and in the beginning of the nineteenth, in German principalities. While France, from many points of view, represented an ambivalent case (its nationalism was collectivistic and yet civic), Russia and Germany developed clear examples of ethnic nationalism.

When nationalism started to spread in the eighteenth century, the emergence of new national identities was no longer a result of original creation, but rather of the importation of an already existing idea. The dominance of England in eighteenth-century Europe, and then the dominance of the West in the world, made nationality the canon. As the sphere of influence of the core Western societies (which defined themselves as nations) expanded, societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societal system of which the West was the center had in fact no choice but to become nations.[9] The development of national identities thus was essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the first lay outside the evolving nation.

At the same time, for several reasons, every nationalism was an indigenous development. The availability of the concept alone could not have motivated anyone to adopt a foreign model, however successful, and be the reason for the change of identity and the transformation which such fundamental change implied. For such a transformation to occur, influential actors must have been willing, or forced, to undergo it. The adoption of national identity must have been, in one way or another, in the interest of the groups which imported it.[10] Specifically, it must have been preceded by the dissatisfaction of these groups with the identity they had previously. A change of identity presupposed a crisis of identity.

Such was in fact the case. The dissatisfaction with the traditional identity reflected a fundamental inconsistency between the definition of social order it expressed and the experience of the involved actors. This could result from the upward or downward mobility of whole strata, from the conflation of social roles (which might imply contradictory expectations from the same individuals), or from the appearance of new roles which did not fit existing categories. Whatever the cause of the identity crisis, its structural manifestation was in every case the same—"anomie."[51] This might be, but was not necessarily, the condition of the society at large; it did, however, directly affect the relevant agents (that is, those who participated in the creation or importation of national identity). Since the agents were different in different cases, the anomie was expressed and experienced differently. Very often it took the form of status-inconsistency, which, depending on its nature, could be accompanied by a profound sense of insecurity and anxiety.

The specific nature of the change and its effects on the agents in each case profoundly influenced the character of nationalism in it. The underlying ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with the situational constraints of the actors, and with the aspirations, frustrations, and interests which these constraints generated. This often involved reinterpreting them in terms of indigenous traditions which might have existed alongside the dominant system of ideas in which the now rejected traditional identity was embedded, as well as in terms of the elements of this system of ideas itself which were not rejected. Such reinterpretation implied incorporation of pre-national modes of thought within the nascent national consciousness, which were then carried on in it and reinforced.

The effects of these structural and cultural influences frequently combined with that of a certain psychological facjor which both necessitated a reinterpretation of the imported ideas and determined the direction of such reinterpretation. Every society importing the foreign idea of the nation inevitably focused on the source of importation—an object of imitation by definition—and reacted to it. Because the model was superior to the imitator in the latter's own perception (its being a model implied that), and the contact itself more often than not served to emphasize the latter's inferiority, the reaction commonly assumed the form of *ressentiment.* A term coined by Nietzsche and later defined and developed by Max Scheier,[52] *ressentiment* refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings. The sociological basis for *ressentiment*—or the structural conditions that are necessary for the development of this psychological state—is twofold. The first condition (the structural basis of envy itself) is the fundamental comparability between the subject and the object of envy, or rather the belief on the part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them, which makes them in principle interchangeable. The second condition is the actual

inequality (perceived as not fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules out practical achievement of the theoretically existing equality. The presence of these conditions renders a situation *ressentiment*-prone irrespective of the temperaments and psychological makeup of the individuals who compose the relevant population. The effect produced by *ressentiment* is similar to that of "anomie" and to what Furet, discussing Tocqueville's argument regarding the emphasis on equality in pre-revolutionary France, calls "the Tocqueville effect."[33] In all these cases the creative impulse comes from the psychologically unbearable inconsistency between several aspects of reality.

The creative power of *ressentiment*—and its sociological importance—consists in that it may eventually lead to the "transvaluation of values," that is, to the transformation of the value scale in a way which denigrates the originally supreme values, replacing them with notions which are unimportant, external, or indeed bear in the original scale the negative sign. The term "transvaluation of values" may be somewhat misleading, because what usually takes place is not a direct reversal of the original hierarchy. Adopting values directly antithetical to those of another is borrowing with the opposite sign. A society with a well-developed institutional structure and a rich legacy of cultural traditions is not likely to borrow lock, stock, and barrel from anywhere. However, since the creative process resulting from *ressentiment* is by definition a reaction to the values of others and not to one's own condition regardless of others, the new system of values that emerges is necessarily influenced by the one to which it is a reaction. It is due to this that philosophies of *ressentiment* are characterized by the quality of "transparency": it is always possible to see behind them the values they disclaim. *Ressentiment* felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and articulated the national consciousness of their respective societies usually resulted in the selection out of their own indigenous traditions of elements hostile to the original national principle and in their deliberate cultivation. In certain cases—notably in Russia—where indigenous cultural resources were absent or clearly insufficient, *ressentiment* was the single most important factor in determining the specific terms in which national identity was defined. Wherever it existed, it fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered.[14]

It is possible, then, to distinguish analytically three phases in the formation of specific nationalisms: structural, cultural, and psychological, each defined by the factor dominant in it. The adoption of a new, national identity is precipitated by a regrouping within or change in the position of influential social groups. This structural change results in the inadequacy of the traditional definition, or identity, of the involved groups—a crisis of identity, structurally expressed as "anomie"—which creates among them an incentive to search for and, given the availability, adopt a new identity. The

crisis of identity as such does not explain why the identity which is adopted is *national*, but only why there is a predisposition to opt for some new idem tity. The fact that the identity is *national* is explained, first of all, by the availability at the time of a certain type of ideas, in the first case a result of invention, and in the rest of an importation. (It is this dependence on the idea of the nation, ultimately irreducible to situational givens and solely attributable to the unpredictable ways of human creativity, that makes national identity a matter of historical contingency rather than necessity.) In addition, *national* identity is adopted because of its ability to solve the crisis. The variation in the nature of the crises to which all specific nationalisms owe their inception explains some of the variation in the nature of different nationalisms.

The adjustment of the idea of the nation to the situational constraints of the relevant agents involves its conceptualization in terms of indigenous traditions. This conceptualization further distinguishes every national identity.

Finally, where the emergence of national identity is accompanied by *ressentiment,* the latter leads to the emphasis on the elements of indigenous traditions—or rhe construction of a new system of values—hostile to the principles of the original nationalism. The matrix of the national identity and consciousness in such cases evolves out of this transvaluation of values, the results of which, together with the modifications of the original principles reflecting the structural and cultural specificity of each setting, are responsible for the unique, distinct character of any one nationalism.

This bare-bones outline should be regarded as but the skeleton of a very complex story, which can be observed in such stark nakedness only when stripped of the resplendent historical flesh that covered it. As I tried to reveal the skeleton in the book—through a careful study of detail and comparison of different cases—I made every effort not to reduce the presentation to an x-ray picture. As much as was possible within the confines of one volume, I tried to allow the reader the opportunity to examine the evidence that led me to these conclusions, and thus to agree or disagree with them after reading the book.

The Nature of the Argument

This work belongs to the long tradition of sociological inquiry which seeks to understand the nature, and to account for the emergence, of modem society. Among its founders one finds the founding fathers of the discipline of sociology: Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies, as well as such great proto-sociologists as Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville. While I have been, no doubt, influenced by the ideas of all these great men, it is Weber's thought that I find the most congenial. I adopt Weber's definition of

social reality as essentially symbolic, of social action as *meaningfully* oriented action, and share his conviction that the study of meaningful orientations, of the motivations of social actors, constitutes "the central subject" of sociology.[15] In this Weberian orientation my book differs from much of the current sociological literature on modernity as well as on nationalism, which is commonly regarded as one of the components of the latter.

The focus of the book—throughout—is a set of ideas or, rather, several sub-sets of a set of ideas, at the core of which lies the idea of the "nation," which I believe forms *the constitutive element of modernity.* In this belief, I reverse the order of precedence, and therefore of causality, which is usually, if sometimes tacitly, assumed to exist between national identity and nations, and nationalism and modernity: namely that national identity is simply the identity characteristic of nations, while nationalism is a product or reflection of major components of modernization. Rather than define nationalism by its modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism. The Weberian idea of the *social* provides a rationale for this view.[16]

Social reality is intrinsically cultural; it is necessarily a symbolic reality, created by the subjective meanings and perceptions of social actors. Every social order (that is, the overall *structure* of a society) represents a materialization, or objectivization, of its image shared by those who participate in it. It exists as much in the minds of people as in the outside world, and if it loses its grip on the minds of a sufficient majority, or of a minority with sufficient power to impose it on others, it cannot be sustained and is bound to vanish from the outside world as well. The essentially symbolic character of social reality has to do with the fundamental biological constitution of the human species. In general, society appears to be a necessary corollary of life at the advanced stages of biological evolution. The preservation of a species requires cooperation of its member organisms (often to the detriment of the latter). For animals, nature, in the form of instincts, provides detailed "models for"[17] any ordinary activity; their ability to cooperate, their capacity for integration in general and in particular, is inborn. The cardinal fact of human existence is that humans lack built-in "models for" behavior in groups. Social integration and cooperation are necessary for the preservation of the human species (as well as of its individual members), but there is no innate knowledge of how this should be accomplished. The lack of innate knowledge results in the need for models and blueprints, for an image of order, or *created symbolic order,* among human beings. Such symbolic order—culture—is the human equivalent of animal instincts, and is an indispensable condition for the survival of the human species as well as of individuals. The particular image of social order provided by a culture forms the constitutive element of any given society. Within the limits set by the physical and psychological parameters of human nature, symbolic orders are widely variable, which explains the variability of human societies.

The recognition that human society is the social aspect of life of a certain species, and that to study it one must acknowledge this species' specificity, its baggage of biological disabilities (such as the lack of instincts) and abilities (for instance, creativity), implies an emphasis on the cultural, subjective, meaning- and model-creating symbolic elements in social reality, and makes consideration of the concepts and ideas in the minds of people necessary for the interpretation of any social phenomenon. In other words, since men (generically speaking) happen to be reasoning beings and their reasoning is immediately related to their actions, one must take their reasoning into account and look in it for an explanation of their actions. Of course, this reasoning—the actors' ideas, volitions, motivations—is influenced by their situational constraints, and through these *specific* situational constraints is related to the structural macro-social processes. But we can discover the relevant structural factors in any given case only if we first concentrate on the actors—the creators and carriers of ideas—and ascertain the situational constraints which have a bearing on their interests and motivations.

I have no argument with the claim that structures are an extremely important component of every social action and should necessarily be considered as a part of its explanation: a structural analysis is a central part of my discussion of nationalism. This view does not imply disregard for structures. What it implies is methodological individualism and, therefore, rejection of reification, be it of structures or of ideas. For this reason it is equally opposed to strict sociological structuralism and to idealism, which are akin in their tendency to reify concepts. Social structures are relatively stable systems of social relationships and opportunities in which individuals find themselves and by which they are vitally affected, but over which most of them have no control and of the exact nature of which they are usually unaware. The essence of sociological "structuralism" consists in that structures are reified and seen as "objective" (that is, ontologically independent of individual—subjective—volitions) social forces which act through and move individuals, who are in turn regarded as their vehicles and representatives. The behavior of individuals and their beliefs, in this framework, are determined by this "objective" reality and acquire the character of epiphenomena. Idealism regards ideas rather than structures as the moving forces in history. According to it, ideas beget ideas, and this symbolic generation accounts for the phenomenon of social change. Like reified structures, ideas act through and move individuals, seen as vehicles or representatives of clusters of ideas. Neither "structuralism" nor idealism recognizes the significance of the human agency, in which culture and structure are brought together, in which each of them is every day modified and recreated, and only by—not through—which both are moved and shaped, and given the ability to exert their influence. Both ideas and social structures are only operationalized in men. Men (to quote Durkheim this time) "are the only active ele-

ments of society."[18] Neither structural constraints nor ideas can beget other structural constraints and ideas. What they can do is produce different states of mind in the individuals within their sphere of influence. These states of mind are rationalized and, if rationalized creatively, may result in new interpretations of reality. These interpretations, in turn, affect structural conditions, which then can produce other states of mind at the same time as they directly affect states of mind, and the infinitely complex process is endlessly and unpredictably perpetuated. Theories of social reality, whether past or present, which disregard the human agency can never rise above pure speculation. They belong to metaphysics-

Cultural and structural constraints always interact, and because of the creative nature of the human agency, they rarely interact in predetermined ways. In most cases one cannot know in advance which factor plays the role of a cause and which is an effect in a particular stage of social formation and change. Social action is determined chiefly by the motivations of the relevant actors. Motivations are formed by their beliefs and values, and at the same time are shaped by the structural constraints of the actors, which also affect the beliefs and values. Social action, determined by motivations, creates structures. It follows from here that the arrow of causality may point both ways. Moreover, the very same phenomenon at one phase in its development may be a result, and at another—a primary factor in the social process. Only on the basis of careful examination of all the available evidence can one establish with certainty its place in the causal chain.

Nationalism, among other things, connotes a species of identity, in the psychological sense of the term, denoting self-definition. In this sense, any identity is a set of ideas, a symbolic construct. It is a particularly powerful construct, for it defines a person's position in his or her social world. It carries within itself expectations from the person and from different classes of others in the person's surroundings, and thus orients his or her actions. The least specialized identity, the one with the widest circumference, that is believed to define a person's very essence and guides his or her actions in many spheres of social existence is, of course, the most powerful. The image of social order is reflected in it most fully; it represents this image in a microcosm. In the course of history people's essence has been defined by different identities. In numerous societies religious identity performed this function. In many others an estate or a caste identity did the same. Such generalized identity in the modern world is the national identity.

A change of the generalized identity (for example, from religious or estate to national) presupposes a transformation of the image of the social order. It may be prompted by independent structural changes—that is, the transformation of the order itself—either as a result of the accumulation of minute and imperceptible-in-isolation modifications, or of a one-time cataclys-

Mie event—a major epidemic or war or, alternatively, a sudden emergence of great economic opportunities and even the appearance of a particularly strong-willed ruler with peculiar ideas. (The latter, as we shall see, is not merely a mad supposition: this was what started Russia on its path toward nationality.) The change in the image of social order may also reflect a desire to change an order resistant to change. In neither case does the emergent image simply mirror the transformations already ongoing: there is always a discrepancy between the image of reality and reality. Whether or not inspired and triggered by them, it represents a blueprint of a new order (a model) and, by motivating actions of individuals harboring it, causes further transformations and gradually modifies social structure in accordance with its tenets.

These assumptions—which allow for the causal primacy of ideas, without denying it to structures—are consistent with the course of historical events in the case of nationalism. Historically, the emergence of nationalism predated the development of every significant component of modernization. In interaction with other factors it helped to shape its economic forces, and stamped its cultural temper. As for the political organization and culture of modernity, its formative influence was also the controlling one. It is nationalism which has made our world, politically, what it is—this cannot be put strongly enough. Within the complex of national phenomena itself, national identity preceded the formation of nations. These social structures, a towering presence in the life of every conscious individual (and political collectivities which are the peculiar mark of modern society), owe their existence to the individuals' belief in it, and their character to the nature of their ideas. But the ideas of nationalism, which have forged social structures and suffused cultural traditions, were also produced by structural constraints and inspired by traditions that preceded them. Before nationalism was a cause of certain social processes, it was an effect of others.

The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into five chapters, each dealing with the development of national identity and consciousness in one of the societies in the sample. The chapters are organized chronologically, according to the periods crucial for the evolution of the respective national identities, which are the sixteenth century in England, the years between 1715 and 1789 in France, the second half of the eighteenth century in Russia, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Germany, and the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century in the United States of America. The discussion does not focus on these periods exclusively: the consideration of earlier history (in some cases, such

as France and Germany, centuries) is necessary to understand the nature of the identity that is formed in these years; and of later events, to appreciate its effects.

The moments of the emergence of nationalism in general and of its specific types can be located in time with a fair degree of precision. The new concepts are reflected in changes of vocabulary, which may be gauged from examination of period dictionaries, legal documents, and literature. Several sections of the book include such analysis and follow the permutation and development of the relevant political and cultural discourse from its beginning until the time when national consciousness, and the respective nations (the realization that the societies in question were nations), became, in the opinion of the participants, established facts and were no longer treated by them as problematic.

The data which make it possible to pinpoint the time when these specific nationalisms emerged also allow us to identify the agents, or actual participants, in this transformation. These are, in the first place, the people who came up with, articulated, and popularized the new concepts. This explains the central role played in the emergence of national identities by intellectuals—by definition, articulators and disseminators of ideas—whether or not professional and whatever their social origins. Conversely, the role *professional* intellectuals of middle-class origin played in the formation of national identity in some societies explains die high status they have since then enjoyed in them.

The influence, if not status, of groups instrumental in bringing nationalism about was great to begin with: groups lacking influence would not be able to promulgate the new identity within the rest of society. In some cases—notably in England, where nationality from the start acquired significance for wide sectors of the population—the influence of certain groups during the formative stage was due to their numerical strength. More commonly, those were elites, social, political, and cultural (the key group in England, France, and Russia was the aristocracy, and in Germany, the middle-class intellectuals), and their influence derived from various combinations of status, power, and wealth, and/or from their control of the means of communication. This book, however, concentrates upon the formation of national identity, not its promulgation, and when it analyzes its spread, it addresses the question of the transfer of the idea of the nation from one society to another, rather than its penetration from the center of each society into its periphery. The spread of nationalism in the latter case, an important and interesting topic in itself, doubtless increased the efficacy of national identity as a force of social mobilization, but it had no significant impact on the character of specific nationalisms. The character of every national identity was defined during the early phase, which is here discussed in detail. Its effects, in the political, social, and cultural constitution of the respective na-

tions, as well as their historical record, are attributable to this original definition which set the goals for mobilization, not to the nationalization of the masses. Even with regard to its efficiency, nationalism was a potent force already before it became a mass phenomenon, simply because it motivated the elites who held the reins of power and controlled collective resources.

The cases were chosen for several reasons. One was the undisputed centrality of each one of them in modern history. Between them they set the pattern followed by the rest of the planet, and have presided over its development. The transformations within them, which are the subject of this book, have repercussions far beyond their borders. In these five societies were shaped the destinies of our world.

The national evolution of these societies represents one coherent—though exceedingly complex—process, rather than five discrete developments. For several centuries they have shared the same social space, each being a significant other for the rest, each influencing the others' self-perception, goals, and policies. Neither Russia nor, clearly, the United States of America was present in the consciousness of sixteen th-century England, but the impact of the transformation that occurred in sixteenth-century England on both Russia and the United States is beyond question. The five nationalisms are interconnected and, with the exception of the English, none can be fully understood in isolation from the others. This interconnectedness lends substantive unity to the book, which complements its theoretical unity.

Finally, each one of the five cases has a particular analytical significance, bearing specifically on one or another aspect of the general argument, and therefore forming an indispensable element in the theoretical structure of the book. The significance of the English case is obvious. The birth of the English nation was not the birth of a nation; it was the birth of the nations, the birth of nationalism. England is where the process originated; its analysis is essential for the understanding of the nature of the original idea of the nation, the conditions for its development, and its social uses. France offers the possibility of observing the successive evolution of several unique identities within the same political entity, highlighting the specific nature of national identity. It also demonstrates the possible influences of pre-national identities on nationalism. Russia is an exemplary case of the formative influence of *ressentiment,* and therefore of external models, on national identity. The development of nationalism in Germany focuses attention on the importance of indigenous traditions which form a mold for national consciousness. All these four cases demonstrate the chronological and causal primacy of structural conditions-—the state of "anomie"—in starting off the process of the transformation of identity. The American case illustrates the essential independence of nationality from geo-political and ethnic factors and underscores its conceptual, or ideological, nature. Since national iden-

tity is the original identity of the American population, which preceded the formation of its geo-political and institutional framework, the analysis of American nationalism does not focus on the conditions of its emergence, which is unproblematic, but rather on its effects, which can in this case be observed in an almost pure form. Together, the five cases create a comparative perspective which alone makes the understanding of nationalism possible.

The analysis, in each chapter, is conducted on several levels: those of political vocabulary, of social relations and other structural constraints (specifically, those affecting key groups in the formation of national identity—the importance of a group always being defined as a function of the extent of actual participation of its members in the articulation and promulgation of national consciousness), and of general educated sentiment. The aim is to explain the evolution of a particular set of ideas and to show how they permeate the attitudes of relevant actors. For this reason, certain periods in the history of a given society, or certain groups, may be considered several times from different angles, while periods and groups with no bearing on the problem, however important otherwise, are omitted from discussion. Similarly, I have focused on those regions or sections within each population whose traditions have left a particularly deep imprint on that population's national identity. This is the reason for the emphasis on the developments in Protestant as against Catholic Germany (and specifically on Prussia as against Austria), or on New England as against other regions in the United States.

My aim was not to write the histories of the five nationalisms, but to understand the major forces which have shaped our identities and destinies. Thus I have focused on the commonalities of the developments in the five cases and on the significant singularities in each that either could illuminate the nature of the phenomenon of nationalism in general or helped to determine the course of modern history and lay at Che roots of the central features of modernity. The points that I emphasize include not only the interpretations of the sovereignty of the people and the relationship between the individual and the community, which influenced the fate of democracy and defined its political and social alternatives. The discussion of England, in addition, contains a section on the symbiotic relationship between the young English nationalism and science, because of which science was fostered and launched to become the mighty power it now is. A large section addresses the equally intimate connection between German nationalism and Romanticism—the basis of major political ideologies, such as Marxism, on the one hand, and National Socialism, on the other—which has for two centuries informed our notions of art and human creativity, made us clamor for openness and for freedom to develop our creative potentials, and, shap-

ing our views of our personalities, to a large extent shaped our personalities themselves.

Obviously science, though first institutionalized in England, developed in other countries as well, and Romanticism, though German in origin, had its representatives outside Germany. The same holds true for the universalistic and individualistic liberalism which I see as the central feature of English and American nationalisms, or, for that matter, anti-Semitism, the discussion of which completes the analysis of German nationalism. I treated such "international" traditions as singular features of particular nationalisms, first, if as a result of importation a tradition was not significantly modified (for example, science) or if the modified tradition (for example, English Romanticism), in distinction from the original one, did not profoundly affect the character of modern society in general; and second, if, while it shaped and was reflected in the nature of a particular nationalism, a tradition, even though present, in other cases failed to have such a formative influence. The same tradition, metaphorically, might be a dominant gene in one case, and a recessive one in another. I am aware of "multiple continuities" in every one of the nationalisms I studied. In each, there were defeated traditions and roads not taken. I did not focus on them *because* they were not taken.

This leads me to consider one final point that must be raised in the introduction. Do the origins of a nationalism which define its nature—establishing certain traditions as dominant and suppressing others—also *completely* shape its social and political expressions? Is the conduct of a nation—its historical record—*determined* by its dominant traditions? The answer to these questions is *no.* The dominant traditions create a predisposition for a certain type of action, and a probability that, in certain conditions, such action will take place. Without them this would be impossible; ideas of a certain kind are a necessary condition for certain kinds of social action. Knowledge of the nature of a specific nationalism should lead us to expect from the nation in question certain types of behavior, for there is a developed potentiality for some types and not for others. But society is an open system, and whether or not the existing potentialities are fully realized depends on many factors entirely unrelated to the nature of these potentialities.

The scope and the conception of the work prohibited exhaustive treatment, and much fascinating detail had to be left out. Yet I tried not to oversimplify and not to generalize for the sake of generalization. My goal was not to construct a model of reality that could have been, but to explain the reality that in fact emerged. I wished my analysis to reflect its complexity, even as I dissected it, and have sought to retain in my descriptions at least some of the unique flavor of the different times and societies I was describing. I tried to

get into the shoes of the heroes of my story to understand what was it like to live the lives they lived and think what they thought, for without doing so I would not know how and why their experiences were transformed into forces which affect our lives. And this necessitated immersion in historical detail.

I based my interpretation on the testimonies of the participants, left by them in laws and official proclamations, as well as in the works of literature or scholarship* they produced, their diaries and private correspondence. I tried to rely chiefly on primary sources, using secondary historical analysis for orientation where my own knowledge of them was insufficient. This secondary literature sensitized me to documents of which I was unaware, and through them to certain library shelves which would guide me from then on. Occasionally I used secondary literature as a source of data, quoting obscure writers and archival or hard-to-situate materials directly from them. Wherever appropriate, I acknowledged my indebtedness to other scholars.

I was bewildered by the complexity of historical evidence and periodically discouraged by the sheer quantity of the material. At times 1 despaired of my ability not to sin against and yet make sense of it, and questioned the feasibility of historical sociology (either as historical or as sociology). As I struggled, buttressed by piles of dictionaries, to present and interpret my data in English, I was always acutely conscious that this splendid medium needed a much better master, and was as often frustrated by my insufficient familiarity with its resources as I was exhilarated by their evident abundance.

Yet I was sustained in my determination—by the firm conviction in the absolute centrality of nationalism in our experience and the vital importance of its understanding today; by the irresistibly fascinating nature of social processes; and by the example of people I studied, who created a whole new world, not simply wrote a book about it. From one of them, the never discouraged American Sam Patch, a lesser version of Davy Crockett, I borrowed a motto: “Some things can be done as well as others.”[19]

I hope my readers will bear with me.