NATIONALISM
AND
AFTER

BY

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" Nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin."

ACTON (1862)

I

THE CLIMAX OF NATIONALISM

IT is commonly assumed that nations in the modern sense are the product of the disruption of the international — or rather pre-international — order of mediaeval Christendom, and that they represent the projection on a collective national plane of the Renaissance spirit of adventurous and self-assertive individualism. It is further assumed that international relations in the contemporary sense of the term date from the 16th and 17th centuries, when international wars recognizably similar to those of more recent times began to be waged and modern international law first took shape. These assumptions are broadly correct. But the third assumption frequently made that the fundamental character of nations and the type of problem presented by relations between them have remained more or less unchanged through the past three or four centuries is less well founded. The modern history of international relations divides into three partly overlapping periods, marked by widely differing views of the nation as a political entity.[1] The first was

[1] The vocabulary of this subject is notoriously full of pitfalls. Since the 16th or 17th century "nation" with its equivalents in other languages has been the most natural word throughout western Europe for the major political unit: this explains the paucity of derivatives from the word "state" and its equivalents and the use in their place of words like "national" and "nationalization". The realms of the Habsburgs and Romanovs were, however, not nations but empires; and the colourless legal word "state" covered both them and the nations of western Europe, as well as the numerous small German and Italian states. In central and eastern Europe the word "nation" and its equivalents meant a racial or linguistic group and had no political significance before the 19th century, when the doctrine gradually became prevalent that such groups had a right to political independence and statehood ("national self-determina-

terminated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, having the Congress of Vienna as its tail-piece and swan-song; the second was essentially the product of the French Revolution and, though its foundations were heavily undermined from 1870 onwards, lasted on till the catastrophe of 1914, with the Versailles settlement as its belated epilogue; the third period, whose main features first began to take shape after 1870, reached its culmination between 1914 and 1939. It is still perhaps too soon to say whether we are already passing into a fourth period, as sharply differentiated in character from the third as was the third from its predecessors.

The First Period

The first period begins with the gradual dissolution of the mediaeval unity of empire and church and the establishment of the national state and the national church. In the new national unit it was normally the secular arm which, relying on the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, emerged predominant; but there was nothing anomalous in a bishop or prince of the church exercising territorial sovereignty. The essential characteristic of the period was the identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign. Luther regarded " the bishops and princes " as constituting the German nation. Louis XIV thought that the French nation " resided wholly in the person of the King ". De Maistre, an early 19th-century throw-back to the previous period, argued that the nation consisted of " the ruler and

tion "). In the same way it has lately become customary to speak of Scottish, Welsh or Indian nationalism, though more rarely of the Scottish, Welsh or Indian nations. The terminology is further complicated by the usage of the United States, where " nation " is reserved for the major unit and " states " are its components and have no international standing; from the American point of view it would have made nonsense to call the League of Nations a " League of States ".

the nobility ".[1] International relations were relations between kings and princes ; and matrimonial alliances were a regular instrument of diplomacy. The behaviour of the 17th- and 18th-century sovereigns conformed perfectly to this prescription. The absolute power of the monarch at home might be contested. Even Frederick the Great described himself as the " first servant " of his state. But nobody questioned that in international relations with other monarchs he spoke as one having authority over his " subjects " and " possessions " ; and these could be freely disposed of for personal or dynastic reasons. The doctrine of sovereignty made sense so long as this authority remained real and " our sovereign lord the king " had not yet become a ceremonial phrase.

These were the auspices under which international law was born. It was primarily a set of rules governing the mutual relations of individuals in their capacity as rulers. A treaty was a contract concluded between sovereigns — a form not yet extinct ; and the personal good faith of the sovereign was the guarantee of its execution. Grotius in the concluding chapter of *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* appealed to " the duty of kings to cherish good faith scrupulously, first for conscience' sake, and then also for the sake of the reputation by which the authority of the royal power is supported ". The " international of monarchs ", all speak-

[1] These and other relevant quotations will be found in F. Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*, pp. 274-5, 314, 374. In much of eastern Europe the restriction of the nation to the upper classes still held good in the 19th century. " It was said of a Croat landowner of the 19th century that he would sooner have regarded his horse than his peasant as a member of the Croat nation " (*Nationalism, A Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, p. 96). In the middle of the 19th century, and even later, the distance which separated the Polish gentry from the Polish-speaking peasantry was still so great that the latter did not as a rule look on themselves as part of the Polish nation.

ing a common language, owning a common tradition, and conscious of a common interest in maintaining the submissiveness of their subjects, was not wholly a fiction, and secured at any rate formal recognition of a common standard of values. A sense of obligation deriving from the unity of Christendom and the validity of natural law — *rex non debet sub homine, sed sub Deo ac lege*, in Bracton's formula — survived in the secular trappings of the Enlightenment. Claiming the sanctity of law as the basis of their own authority, they could not afford openly and flagrantly to flout it in their relations with one another. It was not a 17th- or 18th-century autocrat, but a 19th-century American democrat, who coined the slogan " My country, right or wrong ".

In this scheme of things a common analogy was drawn between the wars of monarchs and the actions at law of private citizens. As Grotius explicitly argues, the causes for which action at law may justly be sustained are those which make it just to wage war. A sovereign waging war no more desired to inflict injury or loss on the subjects of his enemy than a citizen going to law desires to inflict them on the servants of his adversary. They might indeed, and commonly did, suffer from the rapacity and savagery of his pressed or hired soldiers; but his own subjects were also not immune from these hazards. A large part of the early history of international law consists of the building up of rules to protect the property and commerce of non-combatants. Civilians were in effect not parties to the quarrel. The 18th century witnessed many wars; but in respect of the freedom and friendliness of intercourse between the educated classes in the principal European countries, with French as a recognized common language, it was the most " international " period of modern history, and civilians could pass to and fro and transact their business freely with one another while their respective sovereigns were at war.

The conception of international relations from which these rules and habits proceeded is obviously something quite different from that prevailing in our own time.

Equally characteristic were the national economic policies of the period, to which the name " mercantilism " was afterwards given. The aim of mercantilism, both in its domestic and in its external policies, was not to promote the welfare of the community and its members, but to augment the power of the state, of which the sovereign was the embodiment. Trade was stimulated because it brought wealth to the coffers of the state; and wealth was the source of power, or more specifically of fitness for war. As Colbert, the most famous and consistent exponent of the system, put it, " trade is the source of finance, and finance is the vital nerve of war ".[1] Internally, mercantilism sought to break down the economic particularism, the local markets and restrictive regulations, which underlay the uniformity of the mediaeval order, to make the state the economic unit and to assert its undivided authority in matters of trade and manufacture throughout its territory. Externally, it sought to promote the wealth and therefore the power of the state in relation to other states. Wealth, conceived in its simplest form as bullion, was brought in by exports; and since, in the static conception of society prevailing in this period, export markets were a fixed quantity not susceptible of increase as a whole, the only way for a nation to expand its markets and therefore its wealth was to capture them from some other nation, if necessary by waging a " trade war ". War thus became an instrument of mercantilist policy as well as its ultimate end. It is a mistake to contrast mercantilism with *laissez-faire* as if the one were directed to national, the other to individual,

[1] Quoted in E. F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism*, ii, 17. The " finance " referred to is public finance.

ends. Both were directed to national ends; the difference between them related to a difference in the conception of the nation. Mercantilism was the economic policy of a period which identified the interest of the nation with the interest of its rulers. Its aim, as defined by its most authoritative historian, was " wealth for the nation, but wealth from which the majority of the people must be excluded ".[1]

The Second Period

The second period, which issued from the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars and ended in 1914, is generally accounted the most orderly and enviable of modern international relations. Its success depended on a remarkable series of compromises which made it in some respects the natural heir, in others the antithesis, of the earlier period. Looked at in one way, it succeeded in delicately balancing the forces of " nationalism " and " internationalism "; for it established an international order or framework strong enough to permit of a striking extension and intensification of national feeling without disruption on any wide scale of regular and peaceful international relations. Put in another way, it might be said that, while in the previous period political and economic power had marched hand in hand to build up the national political unit and to substitute a single national economy for a conglomeration of local economies, in the 19th century a compromise was struck between political and economic power so that each could develop on its own lines. Politically, therefore, national forces were more and more successful throughout the 19th century in asserting the claim of the nation to statehood, whether through a coalescence or through a break-up of existing units. Economically, on the other hand, inter-

[1] E. F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism*, ii, 166.

national forces carried a stage further the process inaugurated in the previous period by transforming a multiplicity of national economies into a single world economy. From yet a third angle the system might be seen as a compromise between the popular and democratic appeal of political nationalism and the esoteric and autocratic management of the international economic mechanism. The collapse of these compromises, and the revelation of the weaknesses and unrealities that lay behind them, marked the concluding stages of the second period. The failure since 1914 to establish any new compromise capable of reconciling the forces of nationalism and internationalism is the essence of the contemporary crisis.

The founder of modern nationalism as it began to take shape in the 19th century was Rousseau, who, rejecting the embodiment of the nation in the personal sovereign or the ruling class, boldly identified " nation " and " people " ; and this identification became a fundamental principle both of the French and of the American revolutions. It is true that the " people " in this terminology did not mean those who came to be known to a later epoch as the " workers " or the " common people ". The Jacobin constitution, which would have substituted manhood suffrage for the substantial property qualification of the National Convention, was never operative.[1] Babeuf went to the guillotine ; and the solid and respectable middle class, which made up the " Third Estate ", retained through a large part of the 19th century a rooted fear and mistrust of the masses.

[1] " The philosophers and political writers of the 18th century were unanimously — not excepting Rousseau — against the idea of establishing in France a democracy as we understand it — the rule of universal suffrage ; and the French had been still further encouraged to repudiate the idea of such a democracy by the example of the American English who had established in their republican states a property-owners' suffrage " (A. Aulard, *The French Revolution*, English trans., p. 179).

Nevertheless this middle-class nationalism had in it from the first a democratic and potentially popular flavour which was wholly foreign to the 18th century. The distance in this respect between Frederick the Great and Napoleon, two ambitious and unscrupulous military conquerors separated in time by less than half a century, is enormous. Frederick the Great still belonged to the age of legitimate monarchy, treated his subjects as instruments of his ambition, despised his native language and culture and regarded Prussia not as a national entity but as his family domain. Napoleon, by posing as the champion and mandatory of the emancipated French nation, made himself the chief missionary of modern nationalism. He was in many senses the first " popular " dictator. Intellectually the transition from Frederick to Napoleon was paralleled by the transition from Gibbon to Burke, or from Goethe and Lessing to Herder and Schiller ; the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment was replaced by the nationalism of the Romantic movement. The implications of the change were far-reaching. The nation in its new and popular connotation had come to stay. International relations were henceforth to be governed not by the personal interests, ambitions and emotions of the monarch, but by the collective interests, ambitions and emotions of the nation.

The " democratization " [1] of nationalism imparted to it a new and disturbing emotional fervour. With the disappearance of the absolute monarch the personification of the nation became a necessary convenience in international

[1] Here again terminology becomes disputable. The " liberal democracy " or " *bourgeois* democracy " of the 19th century is often distinguished from modern " social democracy " or " mass democracy ". Some thinkers would regard the restricted democracy of the 19th century as liberal but not democratic, and reserve the term democracy for the modern egalitarian form ; others would argue that, whereas liberalism is essential to democratic forms of government, socialism has not yet been proved compatible with them.

relations and international law. But it was far more than a convenient abstraction. The idea of the personality and character of the nation acquired a profound psychological significance. Writers like Mazzini thought and argued about nations exactly as if they were sublimated individuals. Even to-day people are still capable, especially in English-speaking countries, of feeling a keen emotional excitement over the rights or wrongs of " Patagonia " or " Ruritania " without the slightest knowledge or understanding of the highly complex entities behind these abstractions. The 19th century was passionately devoted to individualism and to democracy as it was then understood; and nationalism seemed a natural corollary of both. What is not so clear is why the rugged individualism of nations should have been regarded as less self-assertive and menacing to peace than the rugged individualism of monarchs, why nations should have been expected to display the princely qualities of forbearance and a sense of honour, but not the equally princely qualities of aggressiveness and greed, why nationalism should have been regarded as a promising stepping-stone to internationalism, and why, finally, it was rarely perceived that nationalism is not so much the apogee of individualism and of democracy as a denial of them. But these questions were seldom asked. A generation reared in the doctrine of a natural harmony of interest between individuals was readily persuaded of a harmony of interest between personified nations. And, after all, the really puzzling question is not why people in the 19th century thought as they did, but why, in spite of theoretical arguments which seems so cogent to the present generation, the dynamite of nationalism did not produce its catastrophic explosion for a full century after the downfall of Napoleon, so that this second period of modern international relations looks to-day like an idyllic interlude between the turbulent first period of warring monarchies and the

contemporary, and apparently still more turbulent, period of warring nations.

The first answer would appear to be that the framework of liberal democracy within which 19th-century nationalism, at any rate down to 1870, chiefly operated had certain common standards of universal validity which, though different from those of the 18th century, were not less effective in upholding a measure of international solidarity. The rights of nations were consciously derived from, and subordinated to, the rights of man which were in their very essence both individual and universal. A nation which did not respect the rights of its own subjects or of other nations denied its own essential character. Moreover, loyalty to this common standard was reinforced by a tangible solidarity of interest. The ruling middle classes who were the bearers of the 19th-century nationalism entertained almost everywhere throughout the middle years of the century a lively fear of revolution from below. The rights of property were scarcely less sacrosanct than the rights of man and the functions of the *bourgeois* democratic state — the " night-watchman state " in Lassalle's sarcastic phrase — were largely concerned with its protection. Property, sometimes described as " a stake in the country ", was a condition of political rights and — it might be said without much exaggeration — of full membership of the nation : the worker had, in this sense, no fatherland. When Marx appealed to the workers of the world to unite, he was fully conscious of the strength which unity gave to his adversaries. The 19th-century *bourgeoisie* of the propertied classes in western Europe formed a coherent entity, trained to the management both of public and of business affairs (the modern English public school, like the French *lycée*, dates from this period), and united by ties of common ideals and common interests. In their competent hands the

democratized nation was still proof for many years to come against the disruptive turbulence of popular nationalism.

The second explanation of the pacific character of 19th-century nationalism goes deeper and is fundamental to the whole 19th century. What happened after 1815, though through no particular merit of the peace-makers of Vienna,[1] was nothing less than the gradual development of a new kind of economic order which, by making possible a phenomenal increase of production and population, offered to the newly enfranchised nations of Europe the opportunity to expand and spread their material civilization all over the world, and, by concentrating the direction of this world economic order in one great capital city, created an international — or, more accurately, supra-national — framework strong enough to contain with safety and without serious embarrassment the heady wine of the new nationalism. There was thus a real foundation for the Cobdenite view of international trade as a guarantee of international peace. Not only were the middle-class governments of the western nations united by a common respect for the rights of property and for the principle of non-interference in the management of a world economy which was so triumphantly advancing the wealth and authority of the middle classes, but even Habsburg and Romanov relicts of 18th-century autocracy did not disdain the financial crumbs that fell from prosperous *bourgeois* tables and became humble hangers-on of the *bourgeois* economic order.

This new international economic society was built on the fact of progressive expansion and on the theory of *laissez-faire*. The expansion of Europe, consisting both in a startling increase in the population and production of Europe itself and in an unprecedentedly rapid dissemination

[1] No such windfall awaited the less fortunate peace-makers of Versailles.

of the population, products and material civilization of Europe throughout other continents, created the fundamental change from the static order and outlook of the 18th century to the dynamic order and outlook of the 19th. The initial divergence which explains the whole opposition of principle between mercantilism and *laissez-faire* is that, while the mercantilists believed that the size of the cake was fixed, the philosophers of *laissez-faire* believed in a cake whose size could and should be indefinitely extended through the enterprise and inventiveness of individual effort. Restriction and discrimination are the natural reaction of producers to a limitation of demand. In the 19th century most people were convinced, on the plausible evidence around them, that a continuously increasing production would be absorbed by a progressively and infinitely expanding demand.

In a world of this kind goods could pass freely from place to place — and not only goods, but men. Freedom of migration was an even more vital factor in the 19th-century economic and political system, and more necessary to its survival, than freedom of trade. Newcomers were made welcome by the prospect of their contribution to an expanding production; unlimited opportunity for all who were willing to work was an accepted item in the 19th-century creed. The same kind of welcome awaited new nations, whether formed, as in Germany, by a belated application of the mercantilist policy of breaking down internal barriers to unity, or, as in eastern Europe, by splitting off from former multi-national units. Nations, like individuals, had their contribution to make; and freedom of opportunity should not be denied to them. Human nature being fallible, clashes might no doubt occur. But just as order at home was not threatened by sporadic outbreaks of crime, so occasional wars between the more

turbulent nations did not constitute a serious menace to the stability of international society.

The success of this 19th-century compromise between a closely-knit world economic system and unqualified recognition of the political diversity and independence of nations was rendered possible by two subtle and valuable pieces of make-believe which were largely unconscious and contained sufficient elements of reality to make them plausible. These two salutary illusions were, first, that the world economic system was truly international, and second, that the economic and political systems were entirely separate and operated independently of each other.

The illusion of the international character of the world economic system rested on the conviction that it was not an artificial creation of man but part of an order of nature. Under absolute *laissez-faire* all valid economic decisions are assumed to be taken by individuals in the furtherance of their own interest and any central economic authority (or, in present-day terms, planning) to be superfluous, so that the system as a whole remains "impersonal". The 19th-century economic order enjoyed its brilliant success largely because people believed that its operation was impersonal and thus in the truest sense international. In fact the hypothetical conditions of absolute *laissez-faire* did not obtain in 19th-century society, or in any other society which has ever existed. To put the issue in its simplest and most concrete form, progressive expansion was the product not of the principle of universal free trade (which was never applied, and whose application would have been found intolerable) but of the open British market. The colonization of the empty spaces, the development of machine-driven industry dependent on coal and the opening-up of world-wide communications through railways and shipping services proceeded apace under British leadership,

and stimulated everywhere the emergence and development of nations and national consciousness; and the counterpart of this " expansion of England " was the free market provided in Britain from the eighteen-forties onward for the natural products, foodstuffs and raw materials of the rest of the world. In recent years it has become customary to dwell on British exports as the foundation of Britain's greatness. It might in most respects be more relevant to stress the significance of her position as the greatest import and *entrepôt* market. The British have in the past been universally regarded first and foremost as a nation of merchants rather than of manufacturers; and beyond doubt the primary foundation of the 19th-century economic system was the provision of a single wide-open and apparently insatiable market for all consumable commodities. It was the existence of this national market which made the so-called international system work.

The international system, simple in its conception but infinitely complex in its technique, called into being a delicate and powerful financial machine whose seat was in the city of London. The corollary of an international commodity market was an international discount market, an international market for shipping freights, an international insurance market and, finally, an international capital market. All this required and depended on the effective maintenance of a single international monetary standard into which national currencies were exchangeable at fixed rates; and this in turn presupposed a central control over the currency policies of the different national units, enforced by the potential sanction of a refusal to deal in " unsound " currencies. The prestige of sterling, proudly anchored to the gold standard by the Bank Act of 1844, made it the only serious candidate for the role of international money. The Bank of England, as custodian of the

integrity of sterling, found itself — unwillingly and for the most part unwittingly — the final arbiter and court of appeal and the central executive authority of the international system of trade and finance. All gold-standard countries had to keep pace with one another in expanding and contracting the flow of money and trade; and it was the London market which inevitably set the pace. Just as mercantilism in the 17th and 18th centuries had transformed local economies into a single national economy, so in the 19th century the merchants, brokers and bankers of London, acting under the sovereign responsibility of the "old lady of Threadneedle Street", transformed the national economies into a single world economy. It mattered little that they had never sought the function which they discharged, and that they remained unconscious of its scope and importance. The task was thrust on them. "Money will not manage itself", wrote Bagehot in the first chapter of his famous book, "and Lombard Street has a great deal of money to manage." [1] Here was the seat of government of the world economy of the so-called age of *laissez-faire*.

If then the 19th-century system was the work of art rather than of nature, what remains of its international character? No other market could hope to challenge the supremacy of London; and mere supremacy might be held to justify its claims in terms of what would be called nowadays "functional" internationalism. The fetishism of the gold standard made sterling a real international currency. The foreign financier or merchant dealing with, or established in, London enjoyed all the benefits of the system, was treated on his merits and suffered no disability or discrimination. Above all the London market achieved, and deserved, a remarkable reputation for probity and

[1] W. Bagehot, *Lombard Street* (concluding words of ch. i.).

impartiality. It certainly did not seek to serve British interests in any narrow or exclusive sense; the commerce of the world was a British concern. Nevertheless the control exercised from London was continuous; and because it was not consciously directed to anything but the day-to-day task of ensuring the maintenance of sound currency and balanced exchanges — the control which made the whole system work — it was autocratic, without appeal and completely effective. Nor was it, properly speaking, international, much less representative. It was at once supra-national and British.

The second illusion which secured acceptance of the 19th-century world order sprang from the formal divorce between political and economic power. The secrecy in which the activities of the city of London were veiled served to mask economic realities from those who thought in traditional political terms; and these activities were altogether withdrawn from political scrutiny. Yet it was precisely because economic authority was silently wielded by a single highly centralized autocracy that political authority could safely be parcelled out in national units, large and small, increasingly subject to democratic control. This economic authority was a political fact of the first importance; and the British economic power of which it was a function was inseparably bound up with the political power conferred by the uncontested supremacy of the British navy. But these interconnexions of political and economic power were overlooked; and since it was not recognized, either by those who exercised the control or by those who submitted to it, how far the political independence of nations was conditioned by the pseudo-international world economic order based on British supremacy, there was no resentment of what would nowadays be regarded as infringements of national sovereignty. Thus the democratized nations of

the 19th century went on from strength to strength proclaiming aloud, and exercising in the political sphere, the unrestricted rights of nationalism, while tacitly accepting the discipline of a supreme external arbiter of their economic destinies in the disguise of a law of nature. On this supposed separation of political and economic power, and this real blend of freedom and authority, the 19th-century order rested.

In the eighteen-seventies the first subterranean rumblings began to shake this splendid edifice. Germany emerged beyond challenge as the leading continental power; and it was in Germany that Friedrich List had sown many years before the first seeds of rebellion against Britain's world economic system. The last imperfect triumphs of free trade were left behind in the 'sixties. The German tariff of 1879 was long remembered as the first modern " scientific " tariff — a piece of economic manipulation in the interests of national policy. After 1870 the constructive work of nation-building seemed complete. Nationalism came to be associated with " the Balkans " and with all that that ominous term implied. When British commercial and British naval supremacy were first seriously challenged in the 'nineties, ominous cracks soon began to appear in the structure. When this supremacy in both its forms was broken by the first world war, the 19th-century economic system collapsed in utter and irretrievable ruin. Subsequent struggles to restore it merely showed how little its essential foundations had been understood.

The Third Period

The third period brings yet another change in the character of the nation. The catastrophic growth of nationalism and bankruptcy of internationalism which were the symptoms

of the period can be traced back to their origins in the years after 1870 but reach their full overt development only after 1914. This does not mean that individuals became in this period more outrageously nationalist in sentiment or more unwilling to cooperate with their fellow-men of other nations. It means that nationalism began to operate in a new political and economic environment. The phenomenon cannot be understood without examination of the three main underlying causes which provoked it : the bringing of new social strata within the effective membership of the nation, the visible reunion of economic with political power, and the increase in the number of nations.

The rise of new social strata to full membership of the nation marked the last three decades of the 19th century throughout western and central Europe. Its landmarks were the development of industry and industrial skills ; the rapid expansion in numbers and importance of urban populations ; the growth of workers' organizations and of the political consciousness of the workers ; the introduction of universal compulsory education ; and the extension of the franchise. These changes, while they seemed logical steps in a process inaugurated long before, quickly began to affect the content of national policy in a revolutionary way. The " democratization " of the nation in the earlier part of the century had resulted in the establishment of popular control over the functions of maintaining law and order, guaranteeing the rights of property and, in general, " holding the ring " for the operations of an economic society managed and directed from another centre under rules of its own. The " socialization " of the nation which set in towards the end of the century brought about a far more radical change. Hitherto, as Peterloo and the fate of the Chartists had shown, the masses had had little power to protect themselves against the immense hardships and sufferings which *laissez-faire*

industrialism imposed on them. Henceforth the political power of the masses was directed to improving their own social and economic lot. The primary aim of national policy was no longer merely to maintain order and conduct what was narrowly defined as public business, but to minister to the welfare of members of the nation and to enable them to earn their living. The democratization of the nation in the second period had meant the assertion of the political claims of the dominant middle class. The socialization of the nation for the first time brings the economic claims of the masses into the forefront of the picture. The defence of wages and employment becomes a concern of national policy and must be asserted, if necessary, against the national policies of other countries; and this in turn gives the worker an intimate practical interest in the policy and power of his nation. The socialization of the nation has as its natural corollary the nationalization of socialism.[1]

The 20th-century alliance between nationalism and socialism may be traced back to its first seed in the revolutionary nationalism of the Jacobins; and in France, where the Jacobin tradition remained potent, the Left has asserted itself in successive national crises — in 1871, in 1917 and again in 1940 — as the custodian of the national interest against the compromisers and defeatists of the Right. In its modern form, however, the alliance dates from Bismarck, who, schooled by Lassalle, showed the German workers how much they had to gain from a vigorous and ruthless nationalism — " no sickness insurance without Sedan ", as

[1] It need hardly be said that the term " national socialism " is not a " Nazi " invention. It seems to have been first used in Germany about 1895 by a group of intellectuals formed by Friedrich Naumann. A few years later it was applied in Austria-Hungary to those Social Democrats who demanded the organization of the party as a federation of " national " units as opposed to those who wished to maintain a single " international " party for the whole of the Habsburg dominions.

a recent writer has put it.[1] In the same period the word "jingoism" was coined in Great Britain to describe something that had not hitherto existed — the nationalism of the masses; and a decade later it was answered from the other side by Harcourt's famous "we are all socialists now". The successes of Tory democracy, the career of Joseph Chamberlain and the adoption by the Liberal party after 1906 of far-reaching measures of social reform were all straws in the wind. National policy was henceforth founded on the support of the masses; and the counterpart was the loyalty of the masses to a nation which had become the instrument of their collective interests and ambitions.[2]

By the early nineteen-hundreds, therefore, the breach between the "two nations" had been substantially healed in all the advanced European countries. In the 19th century, when the nation belonged to the middle class and the worker had no fatherland, socialism had been international. The crisis of 1914 showed in a flash that, except in backward Russia, this attitude was everywhere obsolete. The mass of workers knew instinctively on which side their bread was buttered; and Lenin was a lone voice proclaiming the

[1] F. Borkenau, *Socialism, National or International* (1942), p. 51. This book contains the best critical analysis known to me of the process which I have called "the nationalization of socialism". Its later chapters foreshadowing an organization of Europe west of Russia under Anglo-American leadership bear marks of their date and of a certain anti-Russian bias in the author.

[2] In a work originally published in 1907 the Austrian Social Democrat, Otto Bauer, argued that socialism meant "an increasing differentiation of nations, a sharper emphasis on their peculiarities, a sharper division between their characters", and attacked those who believed that socialism would "diminish or even remove the differences between nations" (Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 2nd ed. pp. 105-6). Writers on international relations in English-speaking countries had less insight; for the most part they were content to congratulate themselves on the increasing "popular" interest in international affairs and believed that this would promote international concord.

defeat of his own country as a socialist aim and crying treason against the " social-chauvinists ". International socialism ignominiously collapsed. Lenin's desperate rear-guard action to revive it made sense only in Russia, and there only so long as revolutionary conditions persisted. Once the " workers' state " was effectively established, " socialism in one country " was the logical corollary. The subsequent history of Russia and the tragi-comedy of the Communist International are an eloquent tribute to the solidarity of the alliance between nationalism and socialism.

The second underlying cause of the modern inflation of nationalism — its extension from the political to the economic sphere through the reassertion of political power over economic policy — has been everywhere recognized. But it has commonly been attributed to the perversity of politicians or to the nefarious influence of big business, and its far more significant connexion with the socialization of the nation overlooked. The democratic nationalism of our second period had proved manageable and compatible with some kind of international order precisely because its aspirations were predominantly political and could be satisfied within the framework of the 19th-century *laissez-faire* or " night-watchman " state. The social nationalism (or national socialism) of the third period, by shifting the ground from political to economic aspirations, brought about the abdication of the *laissez-faire* state in favour of the " social service " state. The transition from the predominance of the middle class to the predominance of the masses, or from liberal democracy to mass democracy, was, so far as concerned the nature of the state, the transition from politics to economics. Henceforth the functions of the nation-state were as much economic as political. The assumption of these functions presupposed the abrogation of the international economic order and would, even if there

had been no other obstacles, have prevented a revival of that order after 1919. Nationalism had invaded and conquered the economic domain from which the 19th century had so cunningly excluded it. The single world economy was replaced by a multiplicity of national economics, each concerned with the well-being of its own members.[1]

The link between "economic nationalism" and the socialization of the nation emerged clearly in the decisive and fateful step taken by all the great industrial countries after 1919 — the closing of national frontiers to large-scale immigration. The middle-class governments of the 19th century, concerned with the importance of cheap and abundant labour to swell the tide of production and profits, had been under no political compulsion to give prior consideration to the wage-levels and standards of living of their own workers; and for fifty years the exclusion of the foreign worker had been the hopeless dream of all labour organizations (it had even preoccupied Marx's First International). Now the prohibition was imposed, contrary to the patent interests of employer and capitalist, almost without opposition;[2] and one of the most effective and necessary safety-valves of the 19th-century international order, the avenue of escape opened to the enterprising and the discontented, was closed with a snap. No single measure did

[1] Modern policies of economic nationalism, since they represent a breach with the international order of *laissez-faire* and are in some respects identical with practices current before the rise of *laissez-faire*, have sometimes been dubbed "neo-mercantilist". This designation is, however, misleading. From the standpoint of nationalism they constitute not a return to the past, but a further stage in a continuous process of the extension of the nation from the aristocracy to the middle class and from the middle class to the masses.

[2] It should not be forgotten that the attitude of the workers was precisely imitated by the professional middle class in similar conditions. Medical opposition in Great Britain to the immigration of refugee doctors in the nineteen-thirties was a conspicuous and not particularly creditable example.

more to render a renewal of the clash between nations inevitable. No single measure more clearly exhibited the inherent drive of the new and powerful labour interests towards policies of exclusive nationalism. When in the nineteen-thirties humanitarian pressure demanded the admission of alien refugees to Great Britain, consent was given on the condition that they did not " seek employment ". The nation was prepared to receive those whose support would be a charge on the national wealth, but not those whose productive capacity might help to increase it.

But this was merely one symptom of a far broader trend. Only in Great Britain did the interest of the worker in cheap food keep the labour movement for some time faithful to the free trade tradition ; and even here, after 1931, the greater attraction of wage stability won the day. Workers became interested equally with employers in measures of protection and subsidies for industry. Advocacy of such measures proved a fruitful meeting-ground for the hitherto conflicting forces of capital and labour ; and national and social policies were welded more firmly than ever together. The same instruments serve both. The " monopoly of foreign trade " and similar organizations elsewhere conform to irreproachably socialist principles ; yet they have also proved most efficient instruments of economic nationalism. " Planned economy " is a Janus with a nationalist as well as a socialist face ; if its doctrine seems socialist, its pedigree is unimpeachably nationalist. A few years ago " socialism means strength " would have seemed, even to socialists, a paradoxical slogan. To-day when a nation determines to exert its utmost strength in war, it resorts without hesitation to policies of out-and-out socialism. Now that *laissez-faire* has succumbed to the joint onslaught of nationalism and socialism, its two assailants have become in a strange way almost indistinguishable in their aims ; and both have

become immensely more powerful through the alliance.

The third cause of the inflation of nationalism — the startling increase in the number of nations during our third period — is one of which sufficient account is rarely taken. Here too the year 1870 marks a significant turning-point. Down to that time the influence of nationalism had been to diminish the number of sovereign and independent political units in Europe. In 1871 after the unification of Germany and Italy had been completed there were fourteen; in 1914 there were twenty; in 1924 the number had risen to twenty-six. It would be an understatement to say that the virtual doubling in fifty years of the number of independent European states aggravated in degree the problem of European order. It altered that problem in kind — the more so since the convention ruling in 1871 that only five or at most six Great Powers were concerned in major European issues no longer commanded general acceptance. Nor could the settlement after the first world war be regarded as in any way final or conclusive. National self-determination became a standing invitation to secession. The movement which dismembered Austria-Hungary and created Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was bound to be succeeded by movements for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Given the premises of nationalism the process was natural and legitimate, and no end could be set to it. After 1914 it spread rapidly to the Arab world, to India, to the Far East; though elsewhere the British Dominions offered the more impressive spectacle of separate nations growing to maturity within the unsevered bonds of the Commonwealth. Moreover, this dispersal of authority occurred at a time when both military and economic developments were forcing on the world a rapid concentration of power: it not only ignored, but defied, a trend deeply rooted in the industrial conditions of the period. The bare fact that there are in

Europe to-day more than twenty, and in the world more than sixty, political units claiming the status of independent sovereign states goes far by itself to explain the aggravation of the evils of nationalism in our third period.

Although, however, this multiplication of national frontiers in Europe and the extension throughout the world of a conception hitherto limited to western Europe and its direct dependencies have given an immense impetus to " economic nationalism ", it may well seem unfair to apply this term in an invidious sense to the natural and legitimate determination of " backward " nations to share in advantages hitherto monopolized by those who had had so long a start in industrial development. The 19th-century concentration of industry in a few great countries in western Europe, which furnished their industrial products to the rest of the world and consumed in return its food and raw materials, may have been a highly practical example of the division of labour. But this privileged status of the industrial nations was self-destructive in so far as it was bound sooner or later to create a desire and capacity for industrial production and a development of national consciousness in the less privileged countries. List had argued as long ago as 1840 that, while free trade might be the interest of industrially mature nations, protective tariffs were a necessary and legitimate instrument for developing backward industries and countries to a state of maturity. In the 19th century Germany and the United States had both learned and profited by this lesson. It was now taken up by new and smaller nations all over the world, and the whole machinery of economic nationalism was set in motion to develop their industries and bring them some fraction of the power and prestige which went with industrial development. Such procedures inevitably curtailed international trade and multiplied competition for narrowing markets.

The results were disastrous : yet nobody was to blame for them. They arose simply from the multiplication of the number of sovereign and independent nations, each claiming its share in the profits and prerogatives of industrial production.

These three factors — the socialization of the nation, the nationalization of economic policy and the geographical extension of nationalism — have combined to produce the characteristic totalitarian symptoms of our third period. The combination of these factors has found expression in two world wars, or two instalments of the same world war, in a single generation, and has imparted to them a peculiar quality of embittered exasperation for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in any war in history.

The Climax

The world war of 1914 was the first war between socialized nations and took on for the first time the character of what has since been called " total war ". The view of war as the exclusive affair of governments and armies was tacitly abandoned. Before hostilities ended, the obliteration of the traditional line between soldier and civilian had gone very far ; attack on civilian morale by propaganda, by mass terrorism, by blockade and by bombing from the air had become a recognized technique of war. Popular national hatreds were for the first time deliberately inflamed as an instrument of policy, and it came to be regarded in many quarters as a legitimate war aim, not merely to defeat the enemy armed forces, but to inflict punishment on members of the enemy nation. In the second world war any valid or useful distinction between armed forces and civilian populations disappeared almost from the outset ; both were merely different forms of man-power and woman-power

mobilized for different tasks and on different " fronts " in the same struggle. The individual had become little more, in the eyes either of his own national government or of that of the enemy, than a unit in the organized ranks of the nation. In May 1940 an act of Parliament empowered the British Government to make regulations " requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty " for any purpose arising out of the prosecution of the war. Nationalism and socialism joined hands to applaud the most unreservedly totalitarian measure ever adopted by any nation at its hour of greatest need.

The re-establishment of national political authority over the economic system, which was a necessary corollary of the socialization of the nation, was no doubt one of the factors contributing to the situation which produced the two world wars. But it received from them so powerful an impetus that its relation to them is as much one of effect as of cause. The immediate and revolutionary consequence of the outbreak of war in 1914 was the assumption by every belligerent government of the right to create and control its own national money and the deposition of sterling from its role as the universal currency. These measures had their counterpart in commercial policy. The careful respect extended for more than two centuries to the private property and business interests of the ordinary citizen of a belligerent country was altogether set aside. After 1914 both personal relations and commercial transactions, direct or indirect, with enemy citizens became a criminal offence; and for the first time in the history of modern war enemy private property was confiscated — a devastating blow at the foundations of *laissez-faire* society and *bourgeois* civilization. International law, framed for days when munitions and military stores were the only contraband and neutrals

traded freely with belligerents, was severely strained by submarine warfare on the one side and by an "all-in" blockade on the other. More important still, the change in spirit extended from the methods of war to its purposes. It soon became clear that the terms of peace, whichever side emerged victorious, would constitute an attack on the standard of living of the defeated nation. The kind of policy hitherto reserved for colonial wars against backward peoples was for the first time being turned by European powers against one another. War among socialized nations inevitably became an instrument for securing economic advantages for the victor and inflicting economic disabilities on the defeated. Modern wars are fought to a finish and the loser has no rights.

Nor would it be a legitimate diagnosis which treated these symptoms as the passing aberration of nations at war. In spite of the novel machinery provided by the League of Nations, the period between the wars was marked by a progressive and catastrophic deterioration in international relations, broken only by a brief and uncertain respite between 1924 and 1929. During these twenty years more agreement between nations was recorded on paper, but less substantial agreement attained in practice on major political and economic issues, than at any recent period; nor were acts of aggression confined to those who became the aggressors in the second world war. It would be erroneous to attribute this deterioration to an unhappy accident or to the malevolence of a few men or a few nations; evil men will always be found to turn an unhealthy condition to account. Neither the delegates of fifty or more nations who met at Geneva nor those at home who instructed them were abnormally quarrelsome or abnormally obstinate men. On the contrary their passion for agreement was shown by the pertinacity with which they signed meaningless protocols and resolu-

tions in order to maintain at least the forms of agreement even where the substance was lacking. These men failed to agree precisely because they represented nations in this last and culminating phase of their evolution. In no period has there been more talk of cooperation between nations; in few periods less of the reality. As custodians of the living standards, employment and amenities of their whole populations, modern nations are, in virtue of their nature and function, probably less capable than any other groups in modern times of reaching agreement with one another.

The contrast between the comparatively law-abiding habits of members of a national community and the law-breaking proclivities of nation members of the international community has long been a truism; and recent rapid decline in the observance of international law is common ground among all observers. The decline, like the decline in international agreement, is easily explicable in terms of the preceding analysis. The international law of the 17th and 18th centuries rested on the good faith of sovereigns. What was at stake was the personal execution of personal promises and obligations; and the sense of solidarity among monarchs was sufficient to leave them with a certain desire to keep their word to one another. In the 19th century solidarity between middle-class governments, buttressed on respect for the rights of property, and reinforced by fear of offending the international financial authorities in London by any irregularity in the discharge of obligations, still sufficed to keep the observance of international law and agreements on a tolerably high level. Paradoxically enough, it was Bismarck who first diagnosed the symptoms of decline and ascribed it to the unreliability of democracies. The diagnosis was too narrow. The decline was due not to any particular form of government or constitution, but to the socialized nation of which

Bismarck was one of the first promoters.

In the contemporary period the discharge of any major international obligation depends on the will of the nation, under whatever form of government, to honour it. An 18th-century monarch, operating with foreign mercenaries or with pressed troops drawn from a social class which had no voice in the management of affairs, could undertake to make war in a given contingency with the reasonable assurance that the undertaking could be carried out. In the 19th century the rise of liberal democracy led Great Britain to adopt an extremely cautious attitude towards commitments likely to involve anything more serious than a naval demonstration;[1] and the American constitution has up to the present virtually precluded the assumption by the United States of an obligation to make war in any circumstances whatever. In the modern age of the socialized nation and of total war, a prudent government, whatever its constitutional powers, may well doubt its competence to give such an undertaking — at any rate for more than a few days or weeks ahead; and this caution applies in particular to unspecified obligations like those in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Even the policing of conquered enemy territory with conscript armies is an obligation which no modern democracy can lightly assume for any prolonged period.

Financial and economic commitments are equally suspect. They may be accepted by governments in all good faith, but without full understanding of their consequences; and should these eventually turn out to be detrimental to the standard of living or level of employment in one of the

[1] It is worth recalling the three classic pronouncements on the subject: Castlereagh's State Paper of May 5, 1820; Gladstone's refusal in the House of Commons on August 10, 1870, to treat the Belgian guarantee treaty as a "rigid" obligation; and Salisbury's memorandum of May 29, 1901.

contracting countries, they will be dishonoured, as Great Britain dishonoured her financial obligations to the United States in 1933.[1] Nor can the general provisions of international law be any longer observed by a modern nation if their observance is found or believed to involve loss of life or risk of defeat in time of war, or serious economic loss in time of peace. The first obligation of the modern national government, which no other obligation will be allowed to override, is to its own people. It would be absurd to lament this state of affairs as proof of increased human wickedness; it might equally well be regarded as proof of a sharpened social conscience. But whatever view we take of it, it would be folly to neglect the overwhelming evidence that modern national governments cannot and will not observe international treaties or rules of international law when these become burdensome or dangerous to the welfare or security of their own nation. Any so-called international order built on contingent obligations assumed by national governments is an affair of lath and plaster and will crumble into dust as soon as pressure is placed upon it. In peace, as in war, the international law of the age of sovereigns is incompatible with the socialized nation. The failure to create an international community of nations on the basis of international treaties and international law marks the final bankruptcy of nationalism in the west.

[1] The *locus classicus* on the subject is the statement made by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, on the occasion of the last full payment made by Great Britain under the American war debt agreement: "When we are told that contracts must be kept sacred, and that we must on no account depart from the obligations which we have undertaken, it must not be forgotten that we have other obligations and responsibilities, obligations not only to our own countrymen but to many millions of human beings throughout the world, whose happiness or misery may depend upon how far the fulfilment of these obligations is insisted upon on the one side and met on the other" (*House of Commons Official Report*, December 14, 1932, vol. 273, col. 354).

Meanwhile the extension of the geographical limits of nationalism has meant not only a multiplication of the number of nations, but a planting of nationalism in new and unfamiliar soils. In western Europe nationalism had grown in soils fertilized by the traditions of Christendom, of natural law and of secular individualism. In German lands the natural law and individualist traditions had struck only light roots; in Russia and other countries dominated by the Orthodox Church they had been ignored or rejected. Beyond Europe nationalism was now spreading to countries where every Christian or European tradition was alien, and where the illogical inhibitions which had for so long helped to restrain European nationalism were unknown. Even in Europe the ruthlessness of the first world war did much to break down these inhibitions. The second world war was started by a German power which scarcely paid even lip-service either to the humanitarian tradition of individualism or to the universalist tradition of natural law. Mass deportations of civilians have been carried on all over Europe; in eastern Europe a large number of Jews have been deliberately exterminated. Germany in several cases, and Japan in the notorious attack on Pearl Harbour, took military action without any previous declaration of war. International law had come to seem almost irrelevant except perhaps when it could be invoked to discredit an opponent. In the conduct of the war there have been gradations of inhumanity and ruthlessness, significantly corresponding to the degree in which the respective theatres of war had participated in the western European tradition. It has been fought with greater ferocity in eastern than in western Europe, and with most savagery of all in Asia and the Pacific. Neither Russia nor Japan is a party to the Geneva convention on prisoners of war; and in Germany powerful and specifically Nazi organs showed an increasing disregard for its obligations.

Yet it would be premature to claim for western Europe any exemption even from the worst brutalities of international strife. The collapse of military discipline and the release of the conquered countries from four years of grinding oppression may yet lead to outbreaks which will match in horror anything that has occurred in other parts of the world. Nor is there much in declared national policies which holds out hope of an ultimate pacification between nations. Perhaps the apex of nationalism is reached when it comes to be regarded as an enlightened policy to remove men, women and children forcibly from their homes and transfer them from place to place in order to create homogeneous national units. Such plans were first canvassed in the first flush of French revolutionary nationalism when the Jacobins wished to deport the German-speaking population of Alsace and replace it with good Frenchmen.[1] Having remained dormant for a hundred and twenty-five years, they revived after the first world war. In January 1919 Venizelos was already proposing to tidy up national frontiers in Asia Minor by "a wholesale and mutual transfer of population"; and about the same time Mackinder in his famous essay in geopolitics suggested an exchange of the German population of East Prussia for the Polish population of Posen.[2] Minor transfers of population were subsequently carried out between Turkey and Greece and Greece and Bulgaria; and these desperate expedients were unhappily invested by the League of Nations with a spurious and untimely air of high-mindedness, which was apparently not dispersed even when Hitler drew liberally on the precedent thus created. To-day annexations of territory are regarded

[1] Authorities quoted in F. Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*, p. 86.

[2] H. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (Pelican ed., 1944), p. 121.

as more, not less, respectable if they are accompanied by wholesale deportation of the existing population — not perhaps the most callous act recorded in history, but surely the most explicit exaltation of the nation over the individual as an end in itself, the mass sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism.

A Fourth Period?

The second world war thus marks the climax and the catastrophe of the third period of modern international relations, and leaves us on the threshold of a fourth period whose character will probably shape the destinies of mankind for a century to come. A first view suggests beyond doubt that nationalism has never been stronger than at this moment; and this view would lead to almost unqualified pessimism about the future of international relations. Yet closer analysis may reveal certain trends, not necessarily more reassuring, but at any rate sufficiently different to suggest that, whatever may be in store in the next few years, nations and international relations are in process of undergoing another subtle, not yet clearly definable, change.

Paradoxically enough, certain features of the war itself seem to mark a retrogression from the unqualified nationalism of the preceding period. The absence of any trace of national exaltation or enthusiasm on the outbreak of the second world war offered in all countries — and not least in Germany itself — a striking contrast, which was much remarked at the time, to the patriotic fervour of 1914. National hatreds have lost their old spontaneous frankness, and mask themselves delicately in ideological trappings. In Germany the " hymn of hate " has not reappeared; in Great Britain what is called " Vansittartism " is the rather shamefaced rationalization of a frank popular emotion of

the last war. Even the " nationalism " of Hitler became, as time went on, less and less specifically German. It was " Aryan " or " Nordic " ; and, driven first by the needs of *Grossraumwirtschaft* and later by the demand for manpower, it began to discover these attributes in unexpected places. Full and impartial information of the extent and significance of " quislingism " in many countries can hardly be expected for some time. It was perhaps not surprising that it should have infected newly created national units like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia ; but widespread " collaboration " in the European country with the oldest and most deeply rooted national tradition of all was a new and startling development. Ten or twelve million foreign workers in German factories, factories in occupied countries working under high pressure on war production, substantial contingents of a dozen foreign nationalities embodied in the German armies, the extensive recruitment of foreigners not only for the rank and file, but for the officer corps, of the crack and highly trusted *Waffen S.S.* — these phenomena are not wholly explicable in terms of brute force, and seem difficult to reconcile with the picture of an age of unbridled and militant nationalism. Political warfare, whose contribution to Hitler's victories in 1940 and 1941 can hardly be denied, is at once a symptom and a cause of the decline of nationalism. It succeeds only by finding rifts in national solidarity ; it aims at widening and deepening those rifts. Some plausibility must be accorded to a shrewd comment penned at the peak of German power in Europe that " Hitler's successes are basically rooted, not in his extreme nationalism, but on the contrary in his shrewd judgment of the decay of nationalism among his neighbours ".[1]

These casual pointers might be dismissed as misleading and exceptional if they did not seem to coincide with other

[1] F. Borkenau, *Socialism, National or International* (1942), p. 165.

and broader indications. As the second world war draws to a close, none of the main forces that have gone to make the victory is nationalist in the older sense. Neither Great Britain nor the British Commonwealth was ever finally engulfed in the nationalist tide. The word " British " has never acquired a strictly national connotation ; and there is no name for the citizen of the entity officially known as " the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ". More significant are the non-national names and multi-national status of the two new giants of world politics — the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It is the pride of the United States to have been the " melting-pot " of nations. In the American army for the liberation of Europe men of German, Polish, Italian, Croat and a dozen other national origins have marched side by side ; in the presidential election of 1940 one candidate could speak with pride of his Dutch, the other of his German, ancestry. In the Soviet Union a fluctuating attitude towards the national issue has ended, under a Georgian leader, in the emphatic promulgation of a comprehensive Soviet allegiance which embraces in its overriding loyalty a multiplicity of component nations.

The climate at the end of the second world war will therefore be very different from that of 1919 when the disruption of the Habsburg, Romanov and Turkish empires under the banner of national self-determination was regarded as a landmark of progress in international relations. This may well turn out to have been the last triumph of the old fissiparous nationalism, of the ideology of the small nation as the ultimate political and economic unit ; for it was one of those victories which prove self-destructive to the victor. Political changes, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, rarely make themselves felt everywhere with equal intensity or at the same rate of advance. In Asia the demand

for self-determination may still be heard, though perhaps more faintly and less confidently than of late. In Europe some of the small units of the past may continue for a few generations longer to eke out a precariously independent existence; others may retain the shadow of independence when the reality has disappeared. But their military and economic insecurity has been demonstrated beyond recall. They can survive only as an anomaly and an anachronism in a world which has moved on to the other forms of organization. But it remains to consider what these forms may be, and whether there is any hope of making them more tolerable to mankind than the forms of the recent past.