No.	Author	Year	Title	Venue
	Dezfuli, H et		A "Systems/Case-Based" approach to system	
1	al.	2012	safety	ESREL and PSAM
	Cassano, V et		A (Proto) logical basis for the notion of a	
2	al.	2016	structured argument in a safety case	ICFEM
	Denney, E et			
3	al.	2013	A formal basis for safety case patterns	SAFECOMP
	Wang, R et		A framework for assessing safety	
4	al.	2016	argumentation confidence	SERENE
	Hawkins, R		A framework for determining the sufficiency	
5	et al.	2012	of software safety assurance	SSCS
			A framework for synthesis of safety	
	Despotou, G	2047	justification for digitally enabled healthcare	B: 2 day alik
6	et al.	2017	services	Digital Health
_		2016	A Framework to Support Generation and	ICCDENA
7	Lin, C et al.	2016	Maintenance of an Assurance Case	ISSREW
			A knowledge integration approach of safety-	
	V	2014	critical software development and operation	VEC.
8	Yamamoto, S	2014	based on the method architecture	KES
9	Birch, J et al.	2014	A layered model for structuring automotive safety arguments	EDCC
	Direit, J et al.	2014		LDCC
10	Viger, T et al.	2021	A Lean Approach to Building Valid Model- Based Safety Arguments	MODELS
10	Denney, E et	2021	A lightweight methodology for safety case	WIGDELS
11	al.	2012	assembly	SAFECOMP
	ui.	2012	A method to formally evaluate safety case	3/11 2001411
	Björnander,		arguments against a system architecture	
12	S et al.	2012	model	ISSREW
			A method to generate reusable safety case	
			argument-fragments from compositional	
13	Šljivo, I et al.	2017	safety analysis	JSS
	Guiochet, J		A model for safety case confidence	
14	et al.	2015	assessment	SAFECOMP
			A model-driven safety certification method for	
15	Gallina, B	2014	process compliance	ISSREW
	Larrucea, A		A modular safety case for an IEC-61508	
16	et al.	2015	compliant generic COTS multicore processor	CIT
	Larrucea, A		A modular safety case for an IEC-61508	
17	et al.	2015	compliant generic hypervisor	DSD
			A pattern-based approach towards the guided	
	Khalil, M et		reuse of safety mechanisms in the automotive	
18	al.	2014	domain	IMBSA

	Nešić, D et			
19	al.	2021	A probabilistic model of belief in safety cases	Safety Science Journal
	I aliana a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a		A Qualitative Counterpart of Belief Functions	
20	Idmessaoud,	2022	with Application to Uncertainty Propagation	DELLEE
20	Y et al.	2022	in Safety Cases	BELIEF
			A safety argument strategy for PCA closed-	
21	Feng, L et al.	2014	loop systems: A preliminary proposal	MCPS
			A Safety Argumentation for Fail-Operational	
	Schmid, T et		Automotive Systems in Compliance with ISO	
22	al.	2019	26262	ICSRS
	Ayoub, A et		A safety case pattern for model-based	
23	al.	2012	development approach	NFM
			A safety-argument based method to predict	
24	Liu, Q et al.	2012	system failure	PHM
	Menon, Cet		A safety-case approach to the ethics of	
25	al.	2020	autonomous vehicles	Safety and Reliability
			A Structured Argument for Assuring Safety of	,
26	Birch, J et al.	2020	the Intended Functionality (SOTIF)	WAISE
20	Direit, 3 et al.	2020	A systematic approach and tool support for	Wilse
27	Luo V et el	2017	GSN-based safety case assessment	ICA
27	Luo, Y et al.	2017	•	JSA
20	Ayoub, A et	2012	A systematic approach to justifying sufficient	545560445
28	al.	2012	confidence in software safety arguments	SAFECOMP
			A V-model framework for the certification	
20	Vorapojpisut,	2016	against the Annex R of IEC 60335-1: Class B	10.7
29	S	2016	appliances	ICIT
	Denney, E et		AdvoCATE: An assurance case automation	
30	al.	2012	toolset	SASSUR
	Myklebust, T		Agile safety case and DevOps for the	
31	et al.	2020	automotive industry	ESREL and PSAM
	Myklebust, T			
32	et al.	2022	Agile safety case for vehicle trial operations	PSAM
			An analysis of safety evidence management	
	de la Vara, J		with the Structured Assurance Case	
33	et al.	2017	Metamodel [Article]	CSI
			An Assurance Case Pattern for the	
			Interpretability of Machine Learning in Safety-	
34	Ward, F et al.	2020	Critical Systems	DECSoS
	Yamamoto, S		An evaluation of argument patterns to reduce	
35	et al.	2013	pitfalls of applying assurance case	ASSURE
			An evidential reasoning approach for	
36	Nair, S et al.	2016	assessing confidence in safety evidence	ISSRE
	Matsuno, Y	_010	An implementation of GSN community	
37	et al.	2013	standard	ASSURE
5/	ctai.	2013	Standard	ASSURE

	Larrucea, X		Analyzing a ROS based architecture for its	
38	et al.	2018	cross reuse in ISO26262 settings	MEDI
			Applying Safety Case Pattern to Generate	
39	Lin, C et al.	2015	Assurance Cases for Safety-Critical Systems	HASE
40	Gleirscher, M	2047	Arguing from hazard analysis in safety cases: A	
40	et al.	2017	modular argument pattern	HASE
41	Cârlan, C et al.	2017	Arguing on software-level verification techniques appropriateness	SAFECOMP
41	Hocking, A et	2017	techniques appropriateriess	SAI LCOIVIF
42	al.	2014	Arguing software compliance with ISO 26262	ISSREW
	Grigorova, S		Argument Evaluation in the Context of	
43	et al.	2014	Assurance Case Confidence Modeling	ISSREW
	Denney, E et		ARgument-based airworthiness assurance of	
44	al.	2015	small UAS	DASC
			Argument-based approach to computer	
45	Yuan, T et al.	2012	system safety engineering	IJCCBS
			Argument-Driven Safety Engineering of a	
46	Reich, J et al.	2020	Generic Infusion Pump with Digital Dependability Identities	IMBSA
	de la Vara, J	2020	Assessment of the Quality of Safety Cases: A	11112011
47	et al.	2019	Research Preview	REFSQ
	Picardi, C et		Assurance argument patterns and processes	
48	al.	2020	for machine learning in safety-related systems	SafeAl
	Y. Zhang et		Assurance case considerations for	
49	al.	2018	interoperable medical systems	ASSURE
	Cobusions A		Assurance Case to Structure COTS Hardware	
50	Schwierz, A et al.	2018	Component Assurance for Safety-Critical Avionics	DASC
30	Asaadi, E et	2010	Assured Integration of Machine Learning-	27.00
51	al.	2020	based Autonomy on Aviation Platforms	DASC
	Denney, E et		Assuring ground-based detect and avoid for	
52	al.	2014	UAS operations	DASC
	Conmy, P et		Assuring safety for component based	
53	al.	2014	software engineering	HASE
			Automated evidence analysis of safety	
54	Reich, J et al.	2019	arguments using digital dependability identities	SAFECOMP
J- 1	Hartsell, C et	2013	Automated Method for Assurance Case	JAN ECOIVII
55	al.	2021	Construction from System Design Models	ICSRS
	Armengaud,		Automated safety case compilation for	
56	E	2014	product-based argumentation	ERTS
	Cârlan, C et		Automating Safety Argument Change Impact	
57	al.	2022	Analysis for Machine Learning Components	PRDC

	Denney, E et		Automating the assembly of aviation safety	
58	al.	2014	cases	TOR
	Macher, G et			
59	al.	2014	Automotive safety case pattern	EuroPLoP
	Idmessaoud,		Belief Functions for Safety Arguments	
60	Y et al.	2020	Confidence Estimation: A Comparative Study	SUM
61	Williams, B et al.	2014	Building the safety case for UAS operations in support of natural disaster response	Integration, and Operations Conference
62	Wassyng, A et al.	2015	Can Product-Specific Assurance Case Templates Be Used as Medical Device Standards?	IEEE Design & Test
63	Carlan, C et al.	2020	Checkable Safety Cases: Enabling Automated Consistency Checks between Safety Work Products	ISSREW
	Hirata, C et		Combining GSN and STPA for Safety	
64	al.	2019	Arguments	ASSURE
	Denney, E et			
65	al.	2016	Composition of safety argument patterns	SAFECOMP
66	Yuan, T et al.	2015	Computer-assisted safety argument review - A dialectics approach	Argument and Computation
67	Burton, S et al.	2019	Confidence Arguments for Evidence of Performance in Machine Learning for Highly Automated Driving Functions	WAISE
68	Wang, R et al.	2017	Confidence assessment framework for safety arguments	SAFECOMP
69	Groza, A et al.	2014	Consistency checking of safety arguments in the Goal Structuring Notation standard	ICCP
70	Nešić, D et al.	2019	Constructing product-line safety cases from contract-based specifications	SAC
71	Ray, A et al.	2013	Constructing safety assurance cases for medical devices	ASSURE
72	Warg, F et al.	2019	Continuous deployment for dependable systems with continuous assurance cases	ISSREW
73	Juarez Dominguez, A et al.	2013	Creating safety assurance cases for rebreather systems	ASSURE
	Chowdhury,		Criteria to Systematically Evaluate (Safety)	
74	T et al.	2019	Assurance Cases	ISSRE
75	Beyene, T et al.	2021	CyberGSN: A Semi-formal Language for Specifying Safety Cases	DSN-W
76	Jaradat, O et al.	2016	Deriving Hierarchical Safety Contracts	PRDC

77	Gallina, B et al.	2015	Deriving reusable process-based arguments from process models in the context of railway safety standards	ADA
78	Gallina, B et al.	2016	Deriving safety case fragments for assessing MBASafe's compliance with EN 50128	SPICE
79	Sljivo, I et al.	2015	Deriving Safety Contracts to Support Architecture Design of Safety Critical Systems	HASE
80	Gallina, B et al.	2016	Deriving verification-related means of compliance for a model-based testing process	DASC
81	Jia, Y et al.	2019	Developing a safety case for electronic prescribing	MEDINFO
82	Carr, A et al.	2017	Developing the Safety Case for MediPi: An Open-Source Platform for Self Management	IHCCLWPH
83	Luo, Y et al.	2016	Development of a safety case editor with assessment features	WASA
84	Clothier, R et al.	2015	Development of a Template Safety Case for Unmanned Aircraft Operations over Populous Areas	SAE Technical papers
85	Wang, R et al.	2016	D-S Theory for argument confidence assessment	BELIEF
86	Muram, F et al.	2020	Dynamic Reconfiguration of Safety-Critical Production Systems	PRDC
87	Denney, E et al.	2015	Dynamic Safety Cases for Through-Life Safety Assurance	ICSE
88	Diemert, S et al.	2020	Eliminative argumentation for arguing system safety - A practitioner's experience	SYSCON
89	Gallina, B et al.	2014	Enabling cross-domain reuse of tool qualification certification artefacts	DEVVARTS
90	Reich, J et al.	2020	Engineering of Runtime Safety Monitors for Cyber-Physical Systems with Digital Dependability Identities	SAFECOMP
91	Mumtaz, M et al.	2019	ENGINEERING SAFETY CASE ARGUMENTS USING GSN STANDARDS	JNAS
92	Cârlan, C et al.	2020	Enhancing state-of-the-art safety case patterns to support change impact analysis	ESREL and PSAM
93	Denney, E et al.	2013	Evidence arguments for using formal methods in software certification	ISSREW
94	Cârlan, C et al.	2017	ExplicitCase: Integrated model-based development of system and safety cases	ASSURE
95	Cârlan, C et al.	2019	ExplicitCase: Tool-Support for Creating and Maintaining Assurance Arguments Integrated with System Models	ISSREW
96	Prokhorova, Y et al.	2015	Facilitating construction of safety cases from formal models in Event-B	IST

	Jaradat, O et			
97	al.	2016	Facilitating the Maintenance of Safety Cases	ICRESH-ARMS
			FASTEN.Safe: A Model-Driven Engineering	
00	Cârlan, C et	2020	Tool to Experiment with Checkable Assurance	C455004B
98	al.	2020	Cases.	SAFECOMP
00	Denney, E et	2045	Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety	HACE
99	al.	2015	Cases	HASE
100	Iliasov, A et al.	2022	Formal verification of railway interlocking and its safety case	SCS
100	Laibinis, L et	2022	From requirements engineering to safety	
101	al.	2015	assurance: Refinement approach	SETTA
101	ui.	2013	assurance. Remiement approach	JETTA
	Woodham, K			Integration, and Operations
102	et al.	2018	FUELEAP model-based system safety analysis	Conference
			General development framework and its	
103	Zeng, F et al.	2013	application method for software safety case	Journal of Software
	Annable, N		Generating Assurance Cases Using Workflow+	
104	et al.	2022	Models	SAFECOMP
			Generation of safety case argument-	
105	Sljivo, I et al.	2014	fragments from safety contracts	SAFECOMP
	Zapata, D et		Geohazard management approach within	
106	al.	2018	safety case	IPC
			Graphical safety assurance case using Goal	
			Structuring Notation (GSN)–challenges,	B-66
107	Chelouati, M et al.	2022	opportunities and a framework for	RESS
107		2022	autonomous trains	
108	Nicolas, C et al.	2017	GSN support of mixed-criticality systems certification	DECSoS
100	-	2017		DEC303
109	Denney, E et al.	2012	Heterogeneous aviation safety cases: Integrating the formal and the non-formal	ICECCS
103	Denney, E et	2012	integrating the formal and the non-formal	102003
110	al.	2013	Hierarchical safety cases	NFM
	Murphy, K et			
111	al.	2012	How reliable is my safety case?	HAZARDS
	Hoang, Q et		Human-robot interactions: Model-based risk	
112	al.	2012	analysis and safety case construction	ERTS
	Dardar, R et		Industrial experiences of building a safety case	
113	al.	2012	in compliance with ISO 26262	ISSREW
	Cârlan, C et		Integrated Formal Methods for Constructing	
114	al.	2016	Assurance Cases	ISSREW
	Vierhauser,		Interlocking Safety Cases for Unmanned	
115	M et al.	2021	Autonomous Systems in Shared Airspaces	TSE

Despotou, G Despot		Łukasiewicz,		Introducing agile practices into development	
117 et al. 2012 Introducing safety cases for health IT SEHC 118 Ibarra, I et al. 2012 ISO 26262 concept phase safety argument for a complex item SSCS 119 et al. 2017 IV&V Case: Empirical study of software independent verification and validation based on safety case ISSREW 120 Brain, J. M 2014 Station? Agrawal, A et al. 2019 ILinking modelling in event-B with safety cases ISSREW 121 al. 2012 ILinking modelling in event-B with safety cases SERENE 122 Y et al. 2012 ILinking modelling in event-B with safety cases ISSREW 123 al. 2014 ILinking traceability with GSN ISSREW 124 Carlan, C 2017 ILiving safety arguments for open systems ISSREW 125 al. 2016 Allocation of Safety Requirements IFAC 126 al. 2017 Making a risk informed safety case for small unmanned aircraft system operations ATIO 127 R et al. 2018 Massurement sufficiency versus completeness: Integrating safety cases into verification and validation in nuclear control or om modernization 128 Lin, C et al. 2017 Medical device risk management and safety case into verification and validation in nuclear control or om modernization 129 Jones, P et Jones, P et Jones, P et al. 2017 Model-based design for CPS with learning-enabled components DESTION 130 et al. 2012 Model-based safety engineering for autonomous train map JSS 131 et al. 2022 Model-Dased safety engineering for autonomous train map JSS 132 A et al. 2017 Model-connected safety cases IMBSA	116	K et al.	2018	processes of safety critical software	ASD
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18	117	et al.	2012	Introducing safety cases for health IT	SEHC
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	Larrucea, A		Modular Development and Certification of	
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140	Di Sandro, A et al.	2019	Querying automotive system models and safety artifacts with MMINT and viatra	MODELS-C
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			Representation of Confidence in Assurance	22
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			Requirements Engineering for Safety-Critical	
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			Rethinking of strategy for safety argument	
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	Wang, R et		Safety case confidence propagation based on	
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162	Buysse, L et al.	2022	Notation to Structured Assurance Case Metamodel	ET
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			Towards a clearer understanding of context	
200	Graydon, P. J	2014	and its role in assurance argument confidence	SAFECOMP
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	Pissoort, D et		Use of the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) as	
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			Using complementary risk acceptance criteria	
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217	Zeng, F et al.	2013	confidence in safety case	JTAIT
240	Jaradat, O et	2217	Using Safety Contracts to Guide the	
218	al.	2017	Maintenance of Systems and Safety Cases	EDCC
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