

```
void
print_msg(const char *msg)
{
    printf("There is a problem here;\n");
    printf("%s", msg);
}
```

→ CORRECT way

The lip syndrome

- Every "call" tends to evolve to do more than its own good
- Beware of abstraction layer violations

"Everything is awesome!" → "Everything is broken!"

Hidden shells

- For instance system(3) and popen(3)
- That's what of the Quality CVEs
- Both basically run sh-c "string"
- ... so to properly use them you have to quote everything
- What's everything
- #{}()""'\\$

The best solution tho is to NOT use those function
 ↳ better off using fork(), pipe() and shit like that

- system(3) is more or less:

```
int R = fork();
if (R == -1)
    err(1, "fork");
if (R == 0) {
    execl("mycmd", "cmd", "param", ..., NULL);
    err(1, "exec");
}
```

```
int status;
R = wait(&status); // XXX
// check status
```

Problem: - won't wait until the program is finished or
 - will fuck up other parts of the code

- popen(3) is more or less:

```
int fd[2];
int R = pipe(fd);
if (R == -1)
    err(1, "pipe");
int R = fork();
if (R == -1)
    err(1, "fork");
if (R == 0) {
    close(fd[0]);
    dup2(fd[1], 1); // XXX
    close(fd[1]);
    execl("mycmd", "cmd", "param", NULL);
    err(1, "exec");
    close(fd[1]);
    R = wait(&status);
}
```



```
#! /bin/sh
file = $1
rm $file
```

./s "my file"

```
#! /bin/sh
rm "$@"
```

./s ./myfile
./s -ep ./myfile

- quoting is not enough
- use `cmd -- args` to stop option parsing
- GNU fucked it up...
- if you write your own commands don't allow Reorder!

Fail closed

- Always use `set -e`

```
#!/bin/sh
```

```
set -e
```

```
error=false
```

```
if ! then find Makefile && test -f distinfo && test -d pkg
```

```
then echo "No ports files?"
```

```
error=true
```

```
fi
```

```
fulldir = $(pwd)
```

```
importname = $(echo $fulldir | sed -e s, */ports/, ports/)
```

```
$error && exit 1
```

```
cd $importname espie ports
```

```
cd ..
```

```
rm -rf $fulldir
```

The Unix security model

You check you can access a file at open/exec

How does it work

- identify who you are: uid/gid
- don't forget supplementary groups
- only check the first entry that applies
- if uid = file owner, check user bits
- else if one group matches file group, check group bits
- else match other bits

Beware of extensions

- Sometimes you've got Mandatory Access control extensions that make this complicated
- The main problem is testing all combinations
- see windows and Active Directory

I am root

- We ignore rights!
- ... so first open the file
- then check (stat) you could do it

What Rights do I have

- I have the Rights of the process
- ... plus every valid fd I own

Priv Drop

- Start life as root
 - do privileged operations yielding fds
 - ... then change identity
 - I still have the fds!
- (application: network server on a privileged port)

Too much

- There is a closeform(3) on BSD/Solaris. Not on linux though
- There is `O_CLOEXEC`

Dropping privileges, the fine print

- Set supplementary groups using `setgroups`
- Set your group id using `setgid`
- Set your user id using `setuid`
- (you can check your code by invoking `system("id")`)

Beware of Linux: Make sure you verify `setuid/setgid` did work (capabilities).
(this broke sendmail btw)

What about setuid?

- a program with `setuid` is run "as the user to whom it belongs"
- you have three concepts of ids
 - effective id
 - real id
 - saved id

Privilege separation

- each process has its own memory space (but see `mmap`)
- each identity has its own rights
- ... a bug in a process only affects what it can do

Designing software

- the more complex the code, the less rights it should have
- sanitize input once thoroughly
- ... then you don't