



Backgrounds and Motivations

End users on the internet are not anonymized by default.

This poses serious privacy risk.

Tor Network

ISP: Internet Service Provider

ISP1 does not collude with ISP2.

End-to-End Correlation Attacks

If ISP1 colludes with ISP2, they can deanonymize the client-destination connection.

Mix Networks (Mixnets)

Mixnets provide strong anonymity by breaking the linkability of traffic flows.

High End-to-End Latency

As a result of routing through intermediate nodes and mixing delays at each mixnode, the end-to-end latency is high.

LARMix [1]

Clustering

Diversification

LAMP [2]

Single Circle (SC):
1- Super efficient approach
2- Moderate low-latency links

Low-latency routing

Load balancing

Multiple Circles (MC):
1- Efficient approach
2- Very low-latency links

Regional Mixnets (RM):
1- Efficient approach
2- Variant low-latency links

Results

Approach	Metrics	Latency	Entropy	Gain	Complexity
Vanilla		153.4 ms	5.9 bits	38.5	1
LARMix [1]		68 ms	3.9 bits	57.35	139581
Single Circle [2]		52 ms	4.2 bits	80.77	1
Multiple Circles [2]		20 ms	3.8 bits	190	56t
Regional Mixnet (EU) [2]		18 ms	3.75 bits	208.3	8t
Regional Mixnet (NA) [2]		46 ms	2.4 bits	52.2	1

Conclusions

Hiding who communicates with whom is **necessary** on the Internet.

Mixnets provide **high degree of anonymity** at the cost of **high latency**.

To reduce the high latency, we can use **LAMP** which improves the **performance** of mixnets by up to **87%**.

References

[1]. M. Rahimi, P. Kumar & C. Diaz, "LARMix: Latency-Aware Routing in Mix Networks," in NDSS 2024: 31st Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Internet Society.

[2]. M. Rahimi, P. Kumar & C. Diaz, "LAMP: Lightweight Approaches for Latency Minimization in Mixnets with Practical Deployment Considerations," in NDSS 2025: 32nd Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, Internet Society.

Acknowledgments

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