

MODICOIN

Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Re-Audit Report

Security Report

January 2022

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Report Summary

Title	MODICOIN Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	MODICOIN		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura	Revision date	21/01/2022
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited	Approval date	21/01/2022
		Nº Pages	30

Overview

Background

MODICOIN's team requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their Smart Contract.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **January 17**: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **January 17**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)
- **January 21**: Delivery of Smart Contract Re-Audit Report (Completed)

Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of MODICOIN.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

MODICOIN Project:



Introduction

Given the opportunity to review MODICOIN Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

About MODICOIN: -

Item	Description
Issuer	MODICOIN
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	January 21, 2022

The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description	
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the	
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the	
	critical vulnerabilities.	
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.	
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.	
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project	
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should	
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.	
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to	
	reproduce in engineering.	

The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item	
	Constructor Mismatch	
	Ownership Takeover	
	Redundant Fallback Function	
	Overflows & Underflows	
	Reentrancy	
	MONEY-Giving Bug	
Basic Coding Bugs	Blackhole	
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	
	Revert DoS	
	Unchecked External Call	
	Gasless Send	
	Send Instead of Transfer	
	Costly Loop	
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	
	Transaction Ordering Dependence	
	Deprecated Uses	
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks	
	Business Logics Review	

	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DoFi Courting	Oracle Security	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the MODICOIN's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract sourcecode and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review businesslogics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutinyto uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	2(Resolved/Acknowledged)
Total	2

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical, 0 High, 0 Medium, and 2 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered.

Functional Overview

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + Modicoin (Context, IBEP20, Ownable)
 - [Pub] <Constructor> #
 - [Pub] name
 - [Pub] symbol
 - [Pub] decimals
 - [Pub] totalSupply
 - [Pub] balanceOf
 - [Pub] transfer #
 - [Pub] allowance
 - [Pub] approve #
 - [Pub] transferFrom #
 - [Pub] increaseAllowance #
 - [Pub] decreaseAllowance #
 - [Pub] isExcludedFromReward
 - [Pub] totalFees
 - [Pub] reflectionFromToken #
 - [Pub] tokenFromReflection
 - [Pub] excludeFromReward #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Ext] includeInReward #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
 - [Pub] excludeFromFee #

- modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] includeInFee # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setMarketingAdd # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setFoundationAddress # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setBuyFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setSellFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setNormalFees # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] setRouter # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Prv] _setAutomatedMarketMakerPair # - [Pub] setAutomatedMarketMakerPair # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] setMaxTx # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] num2Add2LP # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Ext] <Fallback> (\$) - [Prv] _reflectFee # - [Prv] _getValues # - [Prv] _getTValues # - [Prv] _getRValues # - [Prv] _getRate

- [Prv] _getCurrentSupply

- [Prv] _takeLiquidity #
- [Prv] _calFees #
- [Prv] calculateTaxFee
- [Prv] calculateMarketingFee
- [Prv] calculateModicoin_Foundation_Fee
- [Prv] calculateBurnFee
- [Prv] calculateLiquidityFee
- [Pub] RescueBNB #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] RescueTokens #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Prv] removeAllFee #
- [Prv] restoreAllFee #
- [Pub] isExcludedFromFee
- [Prv] _approve #
- [Prv] _transfer #
- [Prv] swapAndLiquify #
 - modifiers: lockTheSwap
- [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
- [Prv] addLiquidity #
- [Prv] _tokenTransfer #
- [Prv] _transferToExcluded #
- [Prv] _transferFromExcluded #
- [Prv] _transferBothExcluded #
- [Prv] _transferStandard #

Detailed Results

Issues Checking Status

1. Floating Pragma

SWC ID: 103Severity: Low

• Location: Contract.sol

- Relationships: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

- Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.
- Resolved: After the first phase of audit, this issue was discussed with the ModiCoin's dev team, and they've resolved the issue by setting fix solidity version 0.8.11.

2. State Variable Default Visibility

SWC ID: 108Severity: Low

• Location: Contract.sol

• Relationships: CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

 Description: State variable visibility is not set. It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "takeFee", "inSwapAndLiquify", "TV", "RV" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

```
uint256 private _previousBurnFee = _BurnFee;
             64
                      bool takeFee;
            65
73
         uint256 private numTokensSellToAddToLiquidity = 500000000000 * 10**18;
74
         bool inSwapAndLiquify;
75
         bool public swapAndLiquifyEnabled = true;
                            450
                                      tValues TV;
                            451
                            452
                            458
                            459
                                      rValues RV;
                            460
```

- Remediations: Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.
- Resolved: After the first phase of audit, this issue was discussed with the ModiCoin's dev team, and they've resolved the issue by changing all above mentioned 4 variables visibility to private.

Automated Tools Results

Slither: -

```
Tables and topic (print) (prin
```

```
ansfer(address,address,wint256) (Contract.sol#665-729):
                           External calls
                                  External calls sending eth:

- swaphnds.lguify(contractTokenBalance) (contract.sol#716)

- uniswapV2Router.addiiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this).tokenAnount,0.0.cwner().block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#777-794)

State variables written after the call(s):

- tokenTransfer(fron,to.anount,takefee) (Contract.sol#728)

- NV = n (Contract.sol#532)

- tokenTransfer(fron,to.anount,takefee) (Contract.sol#728)

- tokenTransfer(fron,to.anount,takefee) (Contract.sol#728)

- BurnFee = 0 (Contract.sol#585)

- BurnFee = 0 (Contract.sol#638)

- bokenTransfer(fron,to.anount,takefee) (Contract.sol#728)

- tokenTransfer(fron,to.anount,takefee) (Contract.sol#728)

- Arrketing = previousMarrHee (Contract.sol#728)

- Marketing = previousMarrHee (Contract.sol#728)

- Jarvicefee = previousMarrketingFee (Contract.sol#728)

- Servicefee = previousServiceFee (Contract.sol#728)

- Servicefee = previousServiceFee (Contract.sol#728)
                        - tokentransre(from,to,amount,takeree) (contract.sol#/zb)
- ServiceFee - previousServiceFee (Contract.sol#/zb)
- ServiceFee = B (Contract.sol#/zb)
- tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takefee) (Contract.sol#/zb)
- liquidityFee - previousLiquidityFee (Contract.sol#/zb)
- liquidityFee = B (Contract.sol#/zb)
                         __iquistyvee = 0 (Confract.sol#017)
tokenTransfer(from,to,anount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)
__previousBurnfee = _burnfee (Contract.sol#032)
tokenTransfer(from,to,anount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)
__previousi.[quidityfee = _liquidityfee (Centract.sol#281)
tokenTransfer(from,to,anount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)
                        tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)

praviousMarKetingFee = Marketing (Contract.sol#629)

tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#628)

previousMarKete = ServiceFee (Contract.sol#728)

tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)

previousMarKee = taxFee (Contract.sol#728)

tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Contract.sol#728)

treeTotal = treeTotal.add(tree) (Contract.sol#728)

taxFee = previousMarKee (Contract.sol#728)

taxFee = previousMarKee (Contract.sol#728)

taxFee = b (Contract.sol#728)

taxFee = true (Contract.sol#728)

taxFee = fise (Contract.sol#728)
                         rey in Token.comstructor() (Contract.sul#112-131):
External calls:
- uniswapv2Pair = luniswapv2Factory(_uniswapv2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),_uniswapv2Router.wETM()) (Contract.sol#119-128)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _isExcluded[uniswapv2Pair] = true (Contract.sol#128)
- _isExcludedFuniswapv2Pair] = true (Contract.sol#126)
- _isExcludedFuniFee(address(this)] = true (Contract.sol#127)
- _isExcludedFuniFee(address(this)] = true (Contract.sol#127)
- _isExcludedFuniFee(address(this)] = true (Contract.sol#121)

    automatedMarketMakerPairs[pair] = value (Contract.sol#192)
    uniswapVZRouter = _uniswapVZRouter (Contract.sol#123)
    eentrancy in Token.setRouter(address) (Contract.sol#370-181);

 External calls:

External calls:

uniswapVZPatr = UniswapVZFactory( uniswapVZRouter factory()).createPatr(address(this), uniswapVZRouter.WETH()) (Contract.sol#381-382)

State variables writing after the call(s):

uniswapVZRouter = uniswapVZRouter (Contract.sol#384)

Hentrancy in Taken, swapAndilqvify(uint256) (Contract.sol#731-752):
                          External calls:
- swapTokensForEth(half) (Contract.sol#743)
                                                             uniswapV2Router, swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount, 0. path.address(this), block, timestamo) (Contract, sola)
- addLiquidity(othermalf, medbalance) (Contract.sol#749)
- uniswapV2Ruuter.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAmount,0,8,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)

External calls sending eth:
- addLiquidity(othermalf, medbalance) (Contract.sol#749)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAmount,0,8,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)

State variables written after the call(s):
- addLiquidity(othermalf, medbalance) (Contract.sol#749)
- allowances(owner)(spender) = amount (Contract.sol#68)

Beontrancy in Token.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Contract.sol#881-296):
- External calls:
- transferFrom(andress,address,uint256)
                                _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (Contract.sol#366)
- uniamapV2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)
- uniamapV2Router.umapExactTokensForETHEOpportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#)
O)-709)

External calls sending oth:

-_transfer(sender,reclpient,anount) (Contract.so[#188)

-_uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.so[#777-784)

State variables written after the call(s):

-_approve(sender,_magEender(),_allowances[sender)(_msgSender()).sub(anount,BEP28: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (Contract.sol#187-194)

-_allowances[owner][spender] = amount (Contract.sol#661)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sl(ther/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
```

```
ansfer(address,address,utnt256) (Contract.sol#665-729):
                                       External calls sending eth:
- swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBelance) (Contract.sol#716)
- uniswapY28outer.addLiquifityETH[value: ethAnount](address(this),tokenAmount.6.8,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)

Event entitled after the call(s):
- Transfer(sender,HarketIngAdd,tMarketIng) (Contract.sol#728)
- Transfer(sender,ServiceAdd,tMarketIng) (Contract.sol#728)
                          Transfer(sender, servicesod, iservice) (contract. sol#728)

- Transfer(sender, bead, thurn) (contract. sol#724)

- Transfer(sender, bead, thurn) (contract. sol#724)

- Transfer(sender, bead, thurn) (contract. sol#824)

- Transfer(sender, bead, thurn) (contract. sol#828)

- Transfer(sender, rectpient, TransferAmount) (contract. sol#838)

- Transfer(sender, rectpient, TransferAmount) (contract. sol#838)
   eentrancy in Token.constructor() (Contract.sol#112-131):
External calls:
                               - uniswapv2Pair = IUniswapv2Factory(_uniswapv2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),_uniswapv2Router.WETH()) (Contract.sol#119-120) 
Event emitted after the call(s):
 twent whited after the catts):

- SetAutonatedMarketMakerPatr(pair value) (Contract.sol#393)
- SetAutonatedMarketMakerPatr(uniswagv2Pair,true) (Contract.sol#121)
- Transfer(uddress(8),owner(), Liotel) (Contract.sol#130)
| Record of the catts of the cat
                                       swapTokensForEth(half) (Contract.sol#743)
uniswapV3#auter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#7
                              - additquidity(otherHalf,newBalance) (Contract.sol#749)
- uniswapVZRouter.additquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,owner(),block.thmestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)
External calls seeding eth:
- additquidity(otherHalf,newBalance) (Contract.sol#749)
- uniswapVZRouter.additquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,8,owner(),block.ttmestamp) (Contract.sol#777-784)
 Event entited after the call(s):
- Approval(owner, spender, amounts) (Contract.sol#062)
- Add, iquidity(otherHalf, newBalance) (Contract.sol#740)
- SwapandLiquify(half, newBalance, otherHalf) (Contract.sol#751)
Reentrancy in Token, transferFrom(address, address, uint256) (Contract.sol#181-196):
                              cy to foken transferronge.

External calls:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,arount) (Contract.sol#186)
- _transfer(sender,recipient,arount) (Contract.sol#777-784)
- _uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETHEvalue: ethérount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,8,cmner(),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#7
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#7
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Contract.sol#7
                               External calls mending eth:
    transfer(sender,recipient,anount) (Contract.sol#186)
                               - uniswap/2Router.addLiquidityEnd(value: #thArount)(address(this),tokenArount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (Contract,sol#777-784)
Evect emitted after the call(s):
                                      Approval(owner,apender,anount) (Contract.sel#602)
-_approve(sender,_nsgSender(),_allowances[sender)[_nsgSender()].sub(amount.BEP20: transfer annunt exceeds allowance)) (Contract.sol#1
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Bocumentation@reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
Address.vertfyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (Address.sol#237-257) uses assembly
INLINE ASM (Address.sola249-232)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/betector-DocumentationWassembly-usage
```

```
Version used: ['>=0.5.0',
'8.8.0 (Address.sol#3)
'8.8.0 (Context.sol#3)
- %4.8.0 (IEEF20.sol#3)
- ==0.5.0 (IUnitwapV2Factory.sol#3)
->=0.5.0 (IUnitwapV2Factory.sol#3)
->=0.8.2 (IUnitwapV2Factory.sol#3)
->=0.8.2 (IUnitwapV2Fouter01.sol#3)
->=0.6.2 (IUnitwapV2Fouter02.sol#3)
->=0.6.2 (IUnitwapV2Fouter02.sol#3)
->=0.8.0 (Ownable.sol#3)
->=0.8.0 (SafeNath.sol#3)
->=0.8.0 (SafeNath.sol#3)
->=0.8.0 (SafeNath.sol#3)
Address_functionCall(address_bytes) (Address_sol#98-95) is never used and should be removed
Address_functionCall(address_bytes_string) (Address_sol#162-169) is never used and should be removed
Address_functionCallWithValue(address_bytes_utnt256) (Address_sol#122-134) is never used and should be removed
Address_functionCallWithValue(address_bytes_utnt256,string) (Address_sol#142-158) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCalimithValueCaddress, bytes, wint236, string) (Address.solWar2-158) is never used and should be removed Address.functionDelegateCall(address.bytes) (Address.solWar2-232) is never used and should be removed Address.functionDelegateCall(address.bytes) (Address.solWar2-232) is never used and should be removed Address.functionOstaticCall(address.bytes) (Address.solWar2-232) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address.bytes, itring) (Address.solWar2-229) is never used and should be removed Address.solWar2-231 is never used and should be removed SafeMath.solWar2-231 is never used and should be removed SafeMath.solWar2-231 is never used and should be removed SafeMath.nod(utnt256, utnt256, string) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.nod(utnt256, utnt256, string) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.ryAdd(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryAdd(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryAdd(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.tryMut(utnt256, utnt256) (SafeMath.solWar2-241) is never used and should be removed Tokem previousfaxee (controct.solWar2) is set pre-construction with a non-constant fun
  uken._previousMarketingRee (Contract.sol#45) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
 - Marketing
(oken__previousServicefee (Contract.sol#51) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:

    ServiceFee
loken_previousLiquidityFee (Contract.sol#57) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:

                                   liquidityFee
Token._previousBurnfee (Contract.sol#63) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
__BurnFee
Pragma version 0.8.8 (Address.sol8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version 0.8.0 (Context.sol8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version 0.8.0 (Contract.sol8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version 0.8.0 (ImmiswapvZhoutrous) a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version 0.8.0 (ImmiswapvZhoutrous) allows old versions Pragma version 0.8.0 (ImmiswapvZhoutrous) allows old versions Pragma version 0.8.2 (ImmiswapvZhoutrous) and consider the trusted Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version 0.8.2 (ImmiswapvZhoutrous) allows old versions
  ragma version^0.0.0 (Ownable.sol03) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.0.12/0.7.0 ragma version^0.0.0 (Safemath.sol03) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.0.12/0.7.0
  alc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
eference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-bocumentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
```

```
Struct Token, tValues (Contract.sol#442-449) is not in Caphords
Struct Tokenhornal, FeesUpdated(unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256) (Contract.sol#79-85) is not in Caphords
Event Tokenhornal, FeesUpdated(unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256) (Contract.sol#89-92) is not in Caphords
Event Tokenbell, feesUpdated(unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256) (Contract.sol#89-99) is not in Caphords
Event Tokenbell, feesUpdated(unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256) (Contract.sol#89-99) is not in Caphords
Event Tokenbell, feesUpdated(unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256, unit256), anitation (unit256, unit256, unit256), anitation (unit256), anitation (unit256, unit256, unit256), anitation (unit256), anitation (unit256, unit256, unit256), anitation (contract.sol#893) is not in mixedcase
Parameter Token.settiveInfection(Interact.sol#875), another (Contract.sol#875) is not in mixedcase
Parameter Token.calculateMarketingFee(unit256), anound (Contract.sol#877) is not in mixedcase
Parameter Token.secuenboxes(address, unit256), contract.sol#871) is not in mixedcase
Parameter Token.secuenboxes(address, u
               arlable Token.Dead (Contract.sol#68) is not in mixedCase
arlable Token._maxTxAmount (Contract.sol#72) is not in mixedCase
               rariable Token.TV (Comtract.sol#451) is not in mixedCase
            Agriable Token.BV (Contract.sol#459) is not in mixedCase
function JUNIswapV2Pair.bONAIN_SEPARATOR() (JUNIswapV2Pair.sol#30) is not in mixedCase
function JUNIswapV2Pair.PERRIT TYPEHASH() (JUNIswapV2Pair.sol#30) is not in mixedCase
function JUNIswapV2Pair.MINHUM_LIQUIDITY() (JUNIswapV2Pair.sol#70) is not in mixedCase
function JUNIswapV2Router01.METH() (JUNIswapV2Pair.sol#71) is not in mixedCase
       Variable Token.B Marketing (Contract.sol#41) is too similar to Token.S Marketing (Contract.sol#42)
Variable Token.B Marketing (Contract.sol#41) is too similar to Token.W Marketing (Contract.sol#43)
Variable Token.B ServiceFee (Contract.sol#47) is too similar to Token.S ServiceFee (Contract.sol#48)
Variable Token.B ServiceFee (Contract.sol#47) is too similar to Token.S ServiceFee (Contract.sol#49)
Variable Token.B liquidityFee (Contract.sol#33) is too similar to Token.S LiquidityFee (Contract.sol#54)
Variable Token.B liquidityFee (Contract.sol#33) is too similar to Token.W LiquidityFee (Contract.sol#35)
Variable Token.S ServiceFee (Contract.sol#42) is too similar to Token.W ServiceFee (Contract.sol#49)
Variable Token.S ServiceFee (Contract.sol#482) is too similar to Token.W ServiceFee (Contract.sol#49)
Variable Token.S ServiceFee (Contract.sol#484) is too similar to Token.W ServiceFee (Contract.sol#49)
Variable Token.ServiceFee (Contract.sol#484) is too similar to Token.W ServiceFee (Contract.sol#49)
Variable Token.ServiceFee (Contract.sol#47)
               iss].TransferAnount (Contract.sol#847)
arlable Token_getWidlues(uint256,uint256).rTransferAnount (Contract.sol#516-320) is too similar to Token_transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint2
io).stransferAnount (Contract.sol#847)
arlable Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint250).rTransferAnount (Contract.sol#906) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#906)
arlable Token._getRyolues(uint256.int356).rTransferAnount (Contract.sol#516-326) is too similar to Token._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint2
io).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#877)
arlable Token.refinctionFranToken(uint256.bool).rTransferAnount (Contract.sol#344) is too similar to Token._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256.intsianta).address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.address.ad
               Fariable Taken, reflaction frantoken (utnizio, boot). Transfer Amount (Contract, sol #744) is too similar to Token, transfer Buthescluded (address, address, utnizio) lariable Token, transfer Frontikcluded (address, address, utnizio). Transfer Frontikcluded (address, address, address, utnizio). Transfer Frontikcluded (address, address, ad
          Variable Token. transferBethEscluded(address,uddress,udnt256).TransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferBothEscluded(address,address,utnt256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) variable Token._transferSonnters,udnt256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferBothEscluded(address,address,udnt256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferBothEscluded(address,address,udnt256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferBothEscluded(address,address,udnt256).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferBothEscluded(address,address,udnt256).tTransferBothEscluded(address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,address,addr
```

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uint256,bool);/TransferAmount (Contract.sol#244) is too similar to Token, transferTotxcloded(address,address,uint
     (a).TransferAnount (Contract.sol#817)

Artable Token._getRValues(uint250,uint250).FransferAnount (Contract.sol#526-520) is too similar to Token._transferTutxcluded(address,address,uint256).transferAnount (Contract.sol#817)

Artable Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).FransferAnount (Contract.sol#306) is too similar to Token._transferTotxcluded(address,address,uint250).transferAnount (Contract.sol#817)

Artable Token._transferFromExcluded(address,uint256).FransferAnount (Contract.sol#845) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).transferAnount (Contract.sol#845) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rransferAnount (Contract.sol#845) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).transferAnount (Contract.sol#845) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,uint256).rransferAnount (Contract.sol#855) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,uint256).rransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address,uint256).rransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address.uint256).rransferAnount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferStandard(address.uint256).rransferAnount(Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token._transferS
      ariable Token, transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint255),rTransferAmount (Contract.sol#875) is too similar to Token, transferStandard(address,add
ess,uint256).tTransferAmount (Contract.sol#986)
     ress,uint250).tTransferAnount (Contract.sol#900)
Agriable Token, transferAnount (Contract.sol#900)
Agriable Token, transferAnount (Contract.sol#817)
      idress_utnt256).tframsferAnount (Contract.sol#847)
(artable IUniswapv2Router81.addLiquidity(eddress,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).anountADestred (IUniswapv2Router81.sol#13) (
Loo similar to Tuniswapv2Router81.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).anount8Destred (IUniswapv2Router81.s
       eference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-are-too-similar
  oken.Dead (Contract.sol#68) should be constant
     oken.ServiceAdd (Contract.sol#67) should be constant
Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
   Token.name() (Contract.sol#333-135)
symbol() should be declared external:
Token.symbol() (Contract.sol#37-139)
declmals() should be declared external:
Token.declmals() (Contract.sol#341-343)
decimals() should be declared external:

- Token.decimals() (Contract.sol#141-143)

totalSupply() should be declared external:

- Token.totalSupply() (Contract.sol#145-147)

transfer(address,unt250) should be declared external:

- Token.transfer(address,unt250) (Contract.sol#154-101)

allowance(address,soddress) should be declared external:

- Token.allowance(address,unt250) (Contract.sol#134-101)

approve(address,unt250) should be declared external:

- Token.approve(address,unt250) should be declared external:

- Token.transferFrom(address,unt250) (Contract.sol#198-198)

decreaseAllowance(address,unt250) should be declared external:

- Token.totsCuldedfrom(external):

- Token.totsCuldedfrom(external):

- Token.totsLess() (Contract.sol#231-233)

reflectionFrom(oken(unt256,bool) should be declared external:

- Token.totsLess() (Contract.sol#231-233)

reflectionFrom(oken(unt256,bool) should be declared external:

- Token.totsLess() (Contract.sol#231-237)

excludefromReward(address) should be declared external:

- Token.totsLess() (Sould be declared external:

- Token.excludefromFromToken(utt256,bool) (Contract.sol#232-277)

excludefromFec(address) should be declared external:

- Token.excludefromFromFromFrom(contract.sol#232-237)

includeInFec(address) should be declared external:

- Token.excludefromFromFrom(contract.sol#232-237)

includeInFec(address) should be declared external:

- Token.excludefromFromFromFrom(contract.sol#232-237)

includeInFec(address) (Contract.sol#232-237)
   - Token.excludeFramFee(address) (Contract.sol#285-287)
includeInFee(address) should be declared external:
- Token.includeInFee(address) (Contract.sol#289-291)
setRauter(address) should be declared external:
- Token.setPauter(address) (Contract.sol#378-385)
setAutonatedMarketMakerFair(address, bool) should be declared external:
- Token.setAutonatedMarketMakerPair(address, bool) (Contract.sol#401-#10)
setSwapAndlquifyEnabled(bool) should be declared external:
- Token.setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool) (Contract.sol#412-415)
RescueINB() should be declared maternal:
- Token.RescueINB() (Contract.sol#683-693)
RescueTokens(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Token.RescueINB() Should be declared external:
      sExcludedFronFee(address) should be declared external:
Token.isExcludedFronFee(address) (Contract.sol#649-851)
                        nceDemership() should be declared external:
     Ownuble.remounceOwnershtp() (Ownuble.sul#56-58)
(ransferOwnershtp(address) should be declared external:
      - Camable, transferOwnership(address) (Ownable.sol#64-70)
beFerence: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-Tunction-that-could-be-declared-external
```

MythX: -

1.000	SUE TIME	Telephone and	* PROTEST CONTRACTOR C
Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
3	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
27	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
27	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
28	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
28	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
64	(SMC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	LOW	State variable visibility is not set.
72	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
72	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
73	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
73	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
74	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
274	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
275	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
276	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable " <uint> - 1" discovere</uint>
276	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
276	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
451	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
459	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
533	(SMC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
535	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
536	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
538	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
539	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
568	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
576	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
584	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
588	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
596	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
757	(SWC-118) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
758	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access


Mythril: -


root@sv-VirtualBox:/home/sv/TokenT# myth analyze Contract.sol The analysis was completed successfully. No issues were detected.

Solhint: -

```
Linter results:
  Contract.sol:13:1: Error: Contract has 46 states declarations but allowed no more than 15
  Contract.sol:27:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE CASE
  Contract.sol:32:29: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SMAKE_CASE
  Contract.sol:33:28: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized SNAKE CASE
  Contract.sol:35:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:36:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:37:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:41:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:43:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:44:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:47:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:48:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Contract.sol:49:21: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
```







Basic Coding Bugs

1. Constructor Mismatch

 Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

2. Ownership Takeover

o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

10. Unchecked External Call

 Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

11. Gasless Send

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

12. Send Instead of Transfer

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

17. Deprecated Uses

• Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

Semantic Consistency Checks

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed MODICOIN's Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some low-level issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit, this issue was discussed with the ModiCoin's dev team, and they've resolved the issue which was verified during the re-audit of contract.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About eNebula Solutions

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in