Assignment - 02

Q-01

Setup:

```
GNU nano 7.2 /etc/hosts

127.0.0.1 localhost

127.0.1.1 kali

# CTF

10.10.11.217 latex.topology.htb

# IS Assignment

10.9.0.5 www.seed-server.com

10.9.0.5 www.example32.com

10.9.0.105 www.example32.com

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts

::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback

ff02::1 ip6-allnodes

ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
```

Observing HTTP Request



Request Parameters:

- 1. **Host**: Specifies the domain name of the server you're trying to access.
- 2. **User-Agent:** Provides information about the user agent (in this case, Firefox running on Linux).
- 3. Accept: Indicates the types of content that the client can understand, listed by priority.
- 4. **Accept-Language:** Specifies the preferred language of the user.
- 5. **Accept-Encoding:** Informs the server about the types of encoding that the client can understand.
- 6. **Connection:** Suggests to the server that the connection should be kept open for multiple requests.
- 7. **Upgrade-Insecure-Requests:** Indicates that the client supports upgrading to a secure connection (HTTPS).

8.

Response Parameters:

- 9. **GET:** HTTP/1.1 200 OK Indicates that the client requested a resource, and the server successfully processed the request.
- 10. Date: Specifies the date and time when the message was generated.
- 11. Server: Specifies information about the server software.
- 12. Cache-Control: Directives for caching mechanisms in both requests and responses.
- 13. **x-frame-options:** Provides clickjacking protection by preventing the content from being embedded into other websites.
- 14. **expires:** Suggests a date and time after which the response is considered stale.
- 15. **pragma:** Indicates that the client should not cache the response.
- 16. **x-content-type-options:** nosniff A security measure to prevent browsers from interpreting files as a different MIME type.
- 17. **Set-Cookie:** Sets a cookie on the client side.
- 18. **Content-Encoding:** Indicates the type of encoding used on the data.
- 19. Content-Length: Specifies the size of the response body in bytes.
- 20. **Keep-Alive:** Provides parameters for the keep-alive mechanism.
- 21. Connection: Indicates that the connection should be kept open for multiple requests.

22. **Content-Type:** Specifies the media type and character set of the resource.

Request Parameters:

Host: Specifies the domain name of the server you're trying to access.

User-Agent: Provides information about the user agent (in this case, Firefox running on Linux).

Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 - Indicates the types of content that the client can understand, with a preference for JSON and JavaScript.

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 - Specifies the preferred language of the user.

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate - Informs the server about the types of encoding that the client can understand.

X-Elgg-Ajax-API: 2 - Custom header that is used by the server to identify the request as an AJAX API request and to specify the version of the API.

X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest - Indicates that the request was made with XMLHttpRequest, which is commonly used in AJAX requests.

Content-Type: - Specifies that the content of the request is in multipart form data format with a specific boundary.

Content-Length: 564 - Specifies the size of the request body in bytes.

Origin: http://www.seed-server.com - Indicates the origin from which the request is initiated.

Connection: keep-alive - Suggests to the server that the connection should be kept open for multiple requests.

Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/ - Specifies the URL of the page from which the request was initiated.

Cookie: Elgg=7o6qrthh64ik8r7fmomcl7en26 - Sends the cookie information along with the request.

Request body includes parameters in the form of key-value pairs:

```
__elgg_token=P7cmHCCO_WCX7XFCW7jF5w
```

```
__elgg_ts=1700159413
```

username=test

password=test

Response Parameters:

POST: HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized - Indicates that the client attempted to authenticate itself, but the server did not accept that authentication information.

Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 18:30:24 GMT - Specifies the date and time when the message was generated.

Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) - Specifies information about the server software.

Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT - Suggests a date and time after which the response is considered stale.

Pragma: no-cache - Indicates that the client should not cache the response.

Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, no-cache, private - Directives for caching mechanisms in both requests and responses, specifying no caching.

Vary: User-Agent - Informs downstream proxies about whether they should use the cached response for different user agents.

Content-Length: 84 - Specifies the size of the response body in bytes.

Connection: close - Indicates that the connection will be closed after completion of the response.

Content-Type: application/json - Specifies the media type of the resource, indicating JSON content.

CSRF Attack using GET Request

Attacker Side:

- Login as Samy.
- Open alice's profile.
- Send Friend Request to alice and capture the request.
- Then forge it and add it to attacker website inside image tag.

```
Establish DHTDP Honder Use Man ... Marille Fredox

http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friends566_elgg_ts=17001615206_elgg_token=tI_haPl48pDWectlWURZIO6511 www.seed-server.com.

http://www.seed-server.com.

ht
```

Original Request:


http://www.seed-

server.com/action/friends/add?friend=56& elgg ts=1700161520& elgg token=tl haP14BpDWec t1WURzIQ& elgg ts=1700161520& elgg token=tl haP14BpDWect1WURzIQ

Forged Request:


- Remove elgg_ts and elgg_token as they are not required.
- Change the id from 56 (Alice) to 59(Samy)


http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59



Victim Side:

- Login as Alice.
- Open the link sent by Samy on the other tab . http://www.attacker32.com/
- and Samy will be added to friends.





CSRF Attack using POST Request

Attacker Side:

- First we will login as Samy and make changes in the profile description and capture the request.
- Now that we have the proper structure of request, we can modify it and add to our website.

```
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit
http://mars.seed-server.com/action/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/prefile/edit/http://mars.seed-server.com/p
```

Original Request:

__elgg_token=mfk-

 $CntFIDMicTrhTss7uw\&_elgg_ts=1700165563\&name=Samy\&description=\&accesslevel[description]=2\&briefdescription=I$

am


samy. & access level [brief description] = 2 & location = & access level [location] = 2 & interests = & access level [interests] = 2 & skills = & access level [skills] = 2 & contacte mail = & access level [contacte mail] = 2 & phone = & access level [phone] = 2 & mobile = & access level [mobile] = 2 & website = & access level [website] = 2 & twitter = & access level [twitter] = 2 & guid = 59

Forged Request:


name=Alice&description=&accesslevel[description]=2&briefdescription=Samy


Is My

Hero. & access level [brief description] = 2 & location = & access level [location] = 2 & interests = & access level [interests] = 2 & skills = & access level [skills] = 2 & contacte mail = & access level [contacte mail] = 2 & phone = & access level [phone] = 2 & mobile = & access level [mobile] = 2 & website = & access level [website] = 2 & twitter = & access level [twitter] = 2 & guid = 56



Victim Side:





Q-01:

Boby can send request to Alice and get the id from there by examining the request.

```
http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=56&__elgg_ts=1700170054&__elgg_token=-
Host: www.seed-server.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/profile/alice
Cookie: Elgg=b7n9juu0dk0f5copadbnkd0f4d
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 21:27:40 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 388
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
```

Here we can see add?friend=56, Alice's ID is 56.

Q-02:

No, Boby cannot attack to modify the victim's Elgg profile without knowing credentials.


One thing he can do is take ID and Name from user through input box.


Enabling Elgg's Countermeasure

- First we get the shell on the server to make changes in files.
- Then we go to the file where the token is validated. Now we remove **return** at the beginning of the function which is stopping the validation statements to be executed.
- Following are the steps that prevent CSRF in this validate function :
- Token's ownership is validated using a function **validateTokenOwnership** which takes timestamp and session token and encrypt them and match them to the required token.
- Token's timestamp is validated in **validateTokenTimestamp** function which checks if the token is expired or not.

- If both conditions are met, token is validated.







Experimenting with the SameSite Cookie Method

Please describe what you see and explain why some cookies are not sent in certain scenarios.

- When request is sent using link A, all three cookies are sent with the request which indicates that the request is coming from same site.
- When request is sent using link B, only normal cookie is sent which indicates that the request is cross site.

Based on your understanding, please describe how the SameSite cookies can help a server detect whether a request is a cross-site or same-site request.

- Lax and strict cookies are only attached with the request coming from same site while normal cookies are attached to any request. So, server can detect cross site requests if there are no Lax and Strict cookies attached with it.

Please describe how you would use the SameSite cookie mechanism to help Elgg defend against CSRF attacks. You only need to describe general ideas, and there is no need to implement them.

- Use Lax and strict cookies.

TLS handshake

What is the cipher used between the client and the server?

AES-256-GCM

Please print out the server certificate in the program.

Explain the purpose of /etc/ssl/certs.

- The primary purpose of this directory is to store SSL/TLS certificates.
- The directory often contains a collection of system-wide Certificate Authority (CA)
 certificates. When a client connects to a server secured with SSL/TLS, it checks the server's
 certificate against the CA certificates stored in this directory to ensure the server's
 legitimacy.
- Many applications and services on a Unix-like system, including web browsers and servers, are configured to look for CA certificates in the /etc/ssl/certs directory by default.
- Applications that use SSL/TLS can be configured to use specific certificates from /etc/ssl/certs for authentication and encryption purposes.
- Using a standardized directory like /etc/ssl/certs helps maintain compatibility across different applications and services. It follows conventions that are widely adopted in the Unix/Linux ecosystem.

Use Wireshark to capture the network traffics during the execution of the program, and explain your observation. In particular, explain which step triggers the TCP handshake, and which step triggers the TLS handshake. Explain the relationship between the TLS handshake and the TCP handshake.

```
First TCP handshale is initiated and then TLS handshale was doze.

2.0 01.22 (30 - 100 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0 - 10.0
```

CA's Certificate

CA certificate is needed to verify www.hackthebox.com server's certificate is :

```
'subject': ((('countryName<sup>'</sup>, 'IE'),),
(('organizationName', 'Baltimore'),),
(('organizationalUnitName', 'CyberTrust'),),
(('commonName', 'Baltimore CyberTrust Root'),)),
```

Copying the certificate to our own directory.

```
(moghees@kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
$ cp /etc/ssl/certs/Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem .

(moghees@kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
$ ls

Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem README.md

(moghees@kali)-[/etc/ssl/certs]
$ openssl x509 -in Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem -hash -noout

653b494a

(moghees@kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
$ ln -s Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem 653b494a.0

(moghees@kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
$ ls
653b494a.0 Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem README.md

(moghees@kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
$ ls -l
total 8
lrwxrwxrwx 1 moghees blackcat 29 Nov 19 01:06 653b494a.0 → Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 moghees blackcat 1261 Nov 19 00:58 Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 moghees blackcat 103 Jan 3 2021 README.md
```

Experiment with the hostname check

Getting the IP of server

```
(moghees⊗ kali)-[~]

$ dig www.example.com

; <<>> DiG 9.19.17-1-Debian <<>> www.example.com

;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; →>HEADER</->
→ opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 29007
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;; www.example.com. IN A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com. 48293 IN A 93.184.216.34

;; Query time: 4 msec
;; SERVER: 10.100.1.1#53(10.100.1.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Sun Nov 19 01:32:44 PKT 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 60
```

Adding it to /etc/hosts file:

```
GNU nano 7.2 /etc/hosts

127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali

# CTF
10.10.11.217 latex.topology.htb

# IS Assignment
93.184.216.34 www.example20.com
104.18.21.126 www.hackthebox20.com
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
```

When check_hotname = False

```
context.load_verify_locations(capath=cadir)
context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED

context.check_hostname = False

Context.c
```

When check_hotname = True

Importance of Hostname Check:

- If hostname verification is not performed, then the attacker can use the legitimate certificate of other websites to impersonate the legitimate certificate of his forged website and send it back to the user for verification. Since the hostname verification is ignored, the user will not notice it. Achieve the website's purpose of deceiving users.

Sending and getting Data

1. Add the chunk in the previous code.

```
# Send HTTP Request to Server
request = b"GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost:" + hostname.encode('utf-8') + b"\r\n\r\n"
ssock.sendall(request)
# Read HTTP Response from Server
response = ssock.recv(2048)
while response:
    pprint.pprint(response.split(b"\r\n"))
    response = ssock.recv(2048)
```

The program will get the response of the request made to the host.

2. Modify to get image.

```
# Send HTTP Request to Server
request = b^GET /images/landingv3/why-1.svg HTTP/1.0\r\nHost:" + hostname.encode('utf-8') + b"\r\n\r\n"
ssock.sendall(request)

# Read HTTP Response from Server
response = ssock.recv(2048)

while response:
    pprint.pprint(response.split(b"\r\n"))
    response = ssock.recv(2048)

b'33 80:128.959 30 128.338 30.5864 128.338 31.3453L128.303 43.2115C128.303 43.9'
b'338 128.89 44.5567 129.649 44.5567(130.373 44.5567 130.994 43.9763 130.994 4
b'3.2115L131.029 31.3455(131.029 30.6209 130.408 30 129.683 302M109.918 33.415'
b'(109.262 33.7254 108.952 34.5533 109.262 35.2087L114.333 45.902C114.644 46.5'
b'574 115.471 46.8679 116.127 46.5754C116.724 46.247 117.093 45.3191 116.782 4'
b'4.7637L111.712 34.0704C111.401 33.3805 110.608 33.1045 109.918 33.4152M93.60'
b'18 46.4195C93.1534 47.0659 39.3259 47.8682 39.9123 48.2822L108.755 55.1281C1'
b'04.123 55.6295 104.985 55.4571 105.399 54.8706C105.847 54.2842 105.675 53.42'
b'19 105.0898 53.0679155.4654 66.109C94.8781 45.6606 94.0625 45.833 39.6018 46.'
b'4195ZM86.6684 63.7013C86.5649 64.4257 87.0478 65.1156 87.8067 65.2535L99.534'
b'9 67.0473C100.259 67.1507 100.949 66.6678 101.087 65.95805C101.191 65.1845 10'
b'0.708 64.4947 99.9488 64.3567L88.2207 62.563C87.4963 62.4595 86.8064 62.9769'
```

Implement a simple TLS server

Creating public-key Certificate and Private Key:

openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -sha256 -days 3650 \-keyout ca.key -out ca.crt

```
(moghees@kall)-[-/_/Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/server-certs]
5 openssl req -x509 -newkey rasi4096 -sha256 -days 3650 \
-keyout ca.key -out ca.crt

Enter PEM pass phrase:
Werifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
Wou are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter ', the field will be left blank.

Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (3 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (4 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (5 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (5 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long, must be at most 2 bytes long
Country Name (5 letter code) [AU]:PAK
String too long long too long long too long too
```

```
(moghees⊕kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]

• sopenssl x509 -in ca.crt -noout -subject_hash
b957905c
```

```
es®kali)-[~/.../Q-02/Labsetup/volumes/client-certs]
         total 24
drxxr-xr-x 2 moghees blackcat 4096 Nov 20 00:26 .
drxxr-xr-x 4 moghees blackcat 4096 Nov 20 00:25 ..
lrxxrxxrxx 1 moghees blackcat 29 Nov 19 01:06 653b494a.0 -> Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem
lrxxrxxrxxx 1 moghees blackcat 6 Nov 20 00:25 b957905c.0 -> ca.crt
-rx-r--r- 1 moghees blackcat 1261 Nov 19 00:58 Baltimore_CyberTrust_Root.pem
-rx-r--- 1 moghees blackcat 2094 Nov 20 00:25 ca.crt
-rx-r---- 1 moghees blackcat 3422 Nov 20 00:24 ca.key
-rx-r--- 1 moghees blackcat 103 Jan 3 2021 README.md
(moghees@kali)-[-/Downloads/q-02/Labsetup/volumes]
| Sudo openssl ca -in server.csr -out server.crt -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key -config my_openssl.cnf
Using configuration from my_openssl.cnf
Enter pass phrase for ca.key:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
Signature ok
Certificate Detalis:
Serial Number: 1 (0*1)
Validity
Not Before: Nov 19 20:56:39 2023 GMT
Not After: Nov 18 20:56:39 2024 GMT
Subject:
CountryName = AU
stateOrProvinceName = FAST
organizationName = FAST
organizationName = CS
commonName
enailAddress = Moghees20.com
enailAddress = Moghees20.com
enailAddress = testagnail.com
X500V2 extensions:
1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]y Write out database with 1 new entries Database updated
  1986 sudo openssl req -new -x509 -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt -config my_openssl.cnf
1987 openssl genrsa -aes128 -out server.key 1024
1988 openssl ca -in server.csr -out server.ctr -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key -config my_openssl.cnf
1989 openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr -config my_openssl.cnf
1990 sudo openssl ca -in server.csr -out server.crt -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key -config my_openssl.cnf
  1995 cp server.key server.pem
1996 cat server.crt >> server.pem
     TLS connection established

("Request: b'GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1\r\\nHost: "

'moghees20.com:4433\r\\nConnection: keep-alive\\r\\nsec-ch-ua: "Google '

'Chrome";v="119", "Chromium";v="119", '

'"Not7A Brand";v="24"\r\\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\\r\\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 '

'(X11; Linux x86 64) AppleWebhit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 '

'Safari/537.36\\r\\nsec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"\\r\\nAccept: '


'image/avif,image/webp,image/appg,image/svg+xml,image/*,*/*;q=0.8\\r\\nSec-Fetch-Site: '

'same-origin\\r\\nSec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors\\r\\nSec-Fetch-Dest: '

'image\\r\\nReferer: https://moghees20.com:4433/\r\\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, '

"deflate, br\\r\\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\\r\\n\\r\\n\")
```

Testing the server program using browsers



This is Bank32.com!


Certificate with multiple names

openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -config ./server_openssl.cnf -batch -sha256 -keyout server.key -out server_2.csr

sudo openssl ca -md sha256 -days 3650 -config server_openssl.cnf -batch -in server_2.csr -out server_2.crt -cert ca.crt -keyfile ca.key

```
handshake.py hands
```





A Simple HTTP Proxy

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import threading
import ssl
import socket
cadir = '/etc/ssl/certs'
def process request(ssock for browser):
hostname = "www.hackthebox.com"
sock for server = socket.create connection((hostname, 443))
context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL TLS CLIENT)
context.load_verify_locations(capath=cadir)
context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
context.check_hostname = True
print("sock for server ")
ssock for server = context.wrap_socket(sock_for_server, server_hostname=hostname,
do_handshake_on_connect=False)
ssock_for_server.do_handshake()
request = ssock_for_browser.recv(2048)
if request:
ssock for server.sendall(request)
response = ssock for server.recv(2048)
while response:
```

```
ssock_for_browser.sendall(response)
response = ssock_for_server.recv(2048)
ssock_for_browser.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
ssock_for_browser.close()
SERVER_CERT = "./pr.crt"
SERVER_PRIVATE = "./pr.key"
context_srv = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
context_srv.load_cert_chain(SERVER_CERT, SERVER_PRIVATE)
sock_listen = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0)
sock_listen.bind(("0.0.0.0", 443))
sock_listen.listen(5)
while True:
sock_for_browser, fromaddr = sock_listen.accept()
print(fromaddr)
ssock_for_browser = context_srv.wrap_socket(sock_for_browser, server_side=True)
x = threading.Thread(target=process_request, args=(ssock_for_browser,))
x.start()
```