America's Cyber Defense Agency

NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

#StopRansomware: Zeppelin Ransomware

Last Revised: August 11, 2022   **Alert Code:** AA22-223A

Summary

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:

• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities <https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>.

• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.

• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.

Give Feedback

Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Zeppelin ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with ransomware variants identified through FBI investigations as recently as 21 June 2022.

The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 999 kb </sites/default/files/publications/aa22-223a_zeppelin_csa.pdf>

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb </sites/default/files/publications/zeppelin.yar>

Download the IOCs: .stix 113 kb </sites/default/files/publications/aa22-223a.stix.xml>

Technical Details

Note: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.

Zeppelin ransomware is a derivative of the Delphi-based Vega malware family and functions as a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). From 2019 through at least June 2022, actors have used this malware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.

Give Feedback

Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks via RDP exploitation [T1133 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1133/>], exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities [T1190 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1190/>], and phishing campaigns [T1566 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1566/>]. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups [TA0007 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/ta0007/>]. Zeppelin actors can deploy Zeppelin ransomware as a `.dll` or `.exe` file or contained within a PowerShell loader. [1 <https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs/articles/what-zeppelin-ransomware-steps-prepare-respond-and-prevent-infection>]

Prior to encryption, Zeppelin actors exfiltrate [TA0010 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/tactics/ta0010/>] sensitive company data files to sell or publish in the event the victim refuses to pay the ransom. Once the ransomware is executed, a randomized nine-digit hexadecimal number is appended to each encrypted file as a file extension, e.g., `file.txt.txt.C59-E0C-929` [T1486 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1486/>]. A note file with a ransom note is left on compromised systems, frequently on the desktop (see figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Sample Ransom Note

The FBI has observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim's network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.

Indicators of Compromise (IOC)

See table 1 below for IOCs as of June 2022 obtained from FBI incident response investigations.

MD5	SHA1	SHA256
981526650af8d6f8f20177a26abb513a	4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f	0019938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d
c25d45e9bbfea29cb6d9ee0d9bf2864d	eaeff8d315cca71e997063a2baec5cc73fad9453	a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173fb071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b
183b6b0c90c1e0276a2015752344a4cf	1cb5e8132302b420af9b1e5f333c507d8b2a2441	aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe
9349e1cc3de7c7f6893a21bd6c3c4a6b	db398e38ee6221df7e4aa49d8f96799cca4d87e1	a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b0376b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037
c8f75487d0d496a3746e6c81a5ecc6dc	4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd	54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1
477eedb422041385e59a4fff72cb97c1	9892cc90e6712d3548e45f34f14f362bccedf0be	fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6

5841ef35aaff08bb03d25e5afe3856a2	ffd228b0d7afe7cab4e9734f7093e7ba01c5a06e	1e3c5a0aa079f8dfcc49cdca82891ab78d016a919d9810120b79c5deb332f388
d6c4b253ab1d169cf312fec12cc9a28f	0f47c279fea1423c7a0e7bc967d9ff3fae7a0de8	347f14497df4df73bc414f4e852c5490b12db991a4b3811712bac7476a3f1bc9
fba7180ad49d6a7f3c60c890e2784704	f561f9e3c949fe87f12dbfa166ffb2eb85712419	7d8c4c742689c097ac861fcbf7734709fd7dcab1f7ef2ceffb4b0b7dec109f55
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f3490951ae51922cb360a3d76a670159	e2cb60be111716e32db7ca2365ad6e73c30f0e21	894b03ed203cfa712a28ec472efec0ca9a55d6058115970fe7d1697a3ddb0072
e4f1f05c2e6c3fc2f3336a8c8799ffb4	dbd9fcf2b05e703d34181c46f4c22392b9fcc1da	307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e

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17c5cae3bce5832dd429 86fe612517d9	6f70e73c53d7622d8c48 08ae7849133df1343484	d618c1ccd24d29e911cd3 e899a4df2625155297e8 0f4c5c1354bc2e79f7076 8c
bfe7f54f1f0640936dd7a 3384608b1f6	9436ccee41c01ca3cb4d b55c10884615aba76d19	8170612574f914eec9e66 902767b834432a75b1d6 ae510f77546af2a291a48 a2
f28af04ef0370addfebfd d31f1ec25ed	cfcfa995c15d9f33de21d 0dd88d3b95d0f91d6bc	5326f52bd9a7a52759fe 2fde3407dc28e8c2caa3 3abf1c09c47b192a1c004 c12

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21807d9fcaa91a0945e80d92778760e7856268883d36139a1ad29ab91f9d983d

Give Feedback

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0d279

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MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES

Zeppelin actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Zeppelin Actors Att&ck Techniques for Enterprise

Initial Access		
Technique Title	ID	Use
Exploit External Remote Services	T1133 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1133/>	Zeppelin actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks.
Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1190 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1190/>	Zeppelin actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to systems
Phishing	T1566 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1566/>	Zeppelin actors have used phishing and spear phishing to gain access to victims' networks.

Give Feedback

Execution

Technique Title	ID	Use
Malicious Link	T1204.001 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1204/001/>	Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious link to execute malicious macros.
Malicious File Attachment	T1204.002 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1204/002/>	Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious attachment disguised as advertisements to execute malicious macros.

Persistence

Technique Title	ID	Use

Modify System Process	T1543.003 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1543/003/>	Zeppelin actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions.

Impact

Technique Title	ID	Use
Data Encrypted for Impact	T1486 <https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v11/techniques/t1486/>	Zeppelin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

DETECTION

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb
</sites/default/files/publications/zeppelin.yar>

Mitigations

The FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Zeppelin ransomware:

- **Implement a recovery plan** to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
- **Require all accounts** with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) **to comply** with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards <https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/> for developing and managing password policies.
  - Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length;
  - Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers;
  - Add password user "salts" to shared login credentials;
  - Avoid reusing passwords;
  - Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts;
  - Disable password "hints";
  - Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. **Note**: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password "patterns" cyber criminals can easily decipher.
  - Require administrator credentials to install software.
- **Require multifactor authentication** for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.

Give Feedback

- **Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date.** Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities <https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog> in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list <https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list>.

- **Segment networks** to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.

- **Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool.** To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.

- **Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software** on all hosts.

- **Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories** for new and/or unrecognized accounts.

- **Audit user accounts** with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.

- **Disable unused ports.**

- **Consider adding an email banner to emails** received from outside your organization.

- **Disable hyperlinks** in received emails.

- **Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher.** For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.

- **Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions**. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.

- **Maintain offline backups of data**, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.

- **Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable** (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization's data infrastructure.

RESOURCES

- Stopransomware.gov <https://www.stopransomware.gov/> is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.

- Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.

- No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services <https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services> and Ransomware Readiness Assessment <https://github.com/cisagov/cset/releases/tag/v10.3.0.0>.

REPORTING

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Zeppelin actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report>, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office <http://www.secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices/>.

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References

[1] What is Zeppelin Ransomware? Steps to Prepare, Respond, and Prevent Infection (coresecurity.com) <https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs/articles/what-zeppelin-ransomware-steps-prepare-respond-and-prevent-infection>

Revisions

August 11, 2022: Initial Version

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CISA Central

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CISA.gov
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