II

Describing Kenya: Administrative and Political Control

I have noted that Kenya has become a controversial country and a symbol of progressive or regressive political and economic evolution and social and economic development, depending on one's point of view and interpretation of the data.[1] Yet there is rather a large amount of agreement on describing Kenya's economy, society, and political institutions. There is less agreement in explaining the features described: why did political institutions evolve in a particular pattern or why did a given economic strategy evolve? There is also less agreement on the relationship of economic and political factors. How, for example, has a fragmented ruling party affected the course of economic development in Kenya and political participation from below? Or, what is the effect of growing economic differentiation among African farmers on participation? What are the consequences of rapid rates of urbanization in Kenya for political organizing in cities and towns?

Thus the meaning of the descriptions of Kenya's

[1] There are positive accounts of Kenya's economic development strategies, but favorable academic evaluations of Kenya's political evolution are less common. The analysis which follows is a minority view in its treatment of participation and support in Kenya. It is certainly true that Kenya has frequently been described in the British and American press as "stable" and "pragmatic" as compared to other African countries.

economy, political arrangements, and social structure is hotly debated. To raise questions about the meaning of facts is really to ask how things are interrelated: what are their causes and consequences and contexts.

First, I want to describe briefly the Kenya that I think observers agree exist. Then I want to explore interrelationships in order to try to understand that which is described.

Most political studies of Kenya begin by stressing the importance of the colonial legacies for the contemporary period. While African countries in the 1960s were analyzed in terms of party systems, charismatic leaders, ideologies of mobilization or the absence thereof, and, latterly, political machines and patron-client relationships, Kenya was still being discussed largely in terms of its colonial inheritance. Much of the writing on Kenya, even up to the mid-1960s, focused on Mau Mau, its origins and causes, and its consequences for independent Kenya. Closely related to concern with Mau Mau were the treatments of land policy and land reform.[2] One reason for the focus on land and revolt and the colonial past rather than the institutions and ideology of the present as compared to treatments of other African countries was that the colonial experience had marked Kenya as it had few other now independent Black African countries.

Another reason for a certain lack of focus on Kenya's

[2] See, for example, Carl G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, *The Myth of Mau Mau* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966); Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau From Within* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966); M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). An exception among major studies was George Bennett and Carl Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya, 1960-61* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

contemporary politics was the image that the ruling KANU presented. Because KANU was fragmented and had even less of a central presence and institutional grid than many other African ruling parties, there was a tendency to dismiss party politics, and with it contemporary politics as still being a function of the colonial past.[3] Above all, it was that colonial past which continued to dominate thinking about Kenya because in part it was so traumatic a past and in part because its legacies were, in fact, important and immediate factors in the first decade of independence.

Mau Mau as a violent revolt against colonial rule had been an atypical form of African nationalism in the mid-twentieth century for Africa between the Zambezi and the Sahara. It had pitted African against African as well as African against European. One of its legacies for Kenya was a strong and centralized Civil Service and strong security forces. During Mau Mau, far-reaching changes had taken place in land consolidation and registration among Kikuyu.[4] And Kikuyu participation in politics had been forcibly cut off with the banning until 1959 of political parties in Central Province, the Kikuyu home area.

Mau Mau was an upsurge of Kikuyu activity, but the colonial response had cut Kikuyu off from open political organizing at a crucial time before independence. After

[3] For a discussion of African party systems see Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), and Henry Bienen, "African One-Party Systems."

[4] See Sorrenson, *op.cit.* The plan to consolidate African land holdings and to establish individual tenure was called the Swynerton Plan. See Colony and Protectorate on Kenya, *African Land Development in Kenya, 1956-62* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1962).

independence, Kikuyu who as a group were relatively well off educationally[5] and who placed high on various indices of modernization[6] found themselves having to reassert political positions by getting control of the major party, KANU, and by Kikuyuizing the armed forces and Civil Service. In other words, the colonial impact was such that Kikuyu were highly mobilized but for a time cut off from political influence. Also, the colonial impact which had been uneven throughout Kenya was most intense among Kikuyu. This meant that Kikuyu had been most affected by education, by the colonial administrative and communication grids, but also that Kikuyu had suffered physically through loss of land and were internally split by the colonial experience. These splits were expressed in a land division that had gone farthest in Kikuyuland so that better-off farmers were frequently Kikuyu but those without land often were Kikuyu also; many urban workers were Kikuyu in Nairobi, on the White Highlands farms of the Rift Valley, and in the towns of Nakuru, Eldoret, and coastal Mombasa, but

[5] Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities on Kenya," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1969), pp. 689-711, reports that 95 percent of Central Province children were enrolled in primary schools. Central Province is almost entirely Kikuyu in its present boundaries if Nairobi is excluded as it was for this figure. Aside from Nairobi, no other province in Kenya, in 1964 when the figures were taken, had much more than 70 percent enrollment and most were under 50 percent. See *ibid.*, p. 692. Rothchild used data from the *Kenya Education Commission Report, Part II* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 9.

[6] One of the most complete studies of differential resource distribution and the consequences of a colonial impact on resource growth and distribution in a developing country is Edward Soja, *The Geography of Modernization in Kenya* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

many urban unemployed were also Kikuyu. Economic differentiation had proceeded furthest among Kikuyu than any other African group in Kenya. The benefits and the costs of colonial impact had fallen most heavily on Kikuyu. The Mau Mau experience which some have analyzed in class terms as a struggle of "have" and "have not" Kikuyus also led to a situation where after Mau Mau some Kikuyu were seen as Loyalists and others as rebels.[7] Thus the Mau Mau experience was itself polarizing.

The politics of independent Kenya in good part was to revolve around the share of resources allocated to Kikuyus, and the question of Kikuyu dominance of political life and civil and military service institutions. I shall return to these questions. Here I want to underline that one colonial legacy was the accelerated thrust for Kikuyu participation and domination in the politics of Kenya. Given scarce resources in Kenya, it was likely that economics and ethnicity would interact to inflame tribal tensions in independent Kenyan society. Thus, it also made sense to analyze contemporary Kenya by going back to the colonial period to look at the formation of a Kenyan political elite as well as at the differential distribution of economic and social resources.[8]

One institutional feature of Kenya's political life that can be traced to colonial developments was the emergence of a strong Civil Service. Also directly related to the colonial experience was the emergence of a party

[7] Kaggia's autobiography treats Mau Mau in this fashion. To some extent, Waruihu Itote's "*Mau Mau*" *General* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967) does too. Also see Barnett and Njama, *op.cit.*

[8] See Odinga, *op.cit.* and Okumu, *op.cit.* The focus on the colonial past was not peculiar to western social scientists; this framework governed Kenya commentators, social scientists and politicians alike.

system characterized by a fission and fusion of contending groups sometimes acting within the framework of two or more parties, sometimes competing inside KANU. The weakly centralized parties with their fluid party alignments must be understood in the context of the relatively strong Civil Service, Kenyatta's personal rule, the nature of ethnic and group conflict in Kenya, and the way that economic and ethnic cleavage overlap.

We ought to be interested in the effects of an institutional structure both on the processes through which resources are distributed and on the direction of the distributions. We also want to know how an institutional structure affects the way that people participate in politics and how the emergence of new groups in politics or the closing off from politics of old ones affects institutional structures. The analysis of Civil Service and party in Kenya provides us with a way of looking at participation and distribution of resources. Also, the analysis of Civil Service and party is a way of cutting into questions about ethnicity and class.

A. The Strength of the Civil Service

At the time of independence in 1963, Kenya had a relatively well-developed Civil Service. The size of the Kenya Civil Service was about one-third larger than the then Tanganyika's, although the latter had about 10 percent larger population. Kenya's Civil Service was more developed than elsewhere in former British colonial territories in East Africa because it had been constructed to provide services for a white-settler population[9] and because during the Mau Mau period both provincial ad-

[9] District councils depended for revenues on taxes collected by the provincial administration.

ministration and security forces in particular had been strengthened to deal with law and order problems.[10] Moreover, during Mau Mau large numbers of Kikuyu had been forcibly repatriated from the Rift Valley—where they had worked on white-owned farms and from Nairobi where they constituted a sizable proportion of the labor force—to the Kikuyu home areas or reserves in Central Province. The collection of many thousands of people and their forced migration back to home areas necessitated the development of a Civil Service structure to cope with the problems entailed.[11] When the colonial Government used Kikuyu opponents of the regime to push across land registration and consolidation in Kikuyu areas and to forcibly villagize the population, again, security forces and general administration had to be elaborated.[12]

[10] From 1952 to 1957, 419,000 arrests were made in Kenya. The population was under 9 million at the time. A. W. Southall, "The Growth of Urban Society," in Stanley Diamond and Fred Burke, eds., *The Transformation of East Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 463-493.

[11] The percentage of Kikuyu and Embu and Meru (related tribes) in the total labor force fell from 47 percent to 22 percent between 1963 and 1956. The number of Luo, Luyha, and Kisii rose from 27 percent to 38 percent and Kamba rose from 18 percent to 28 percent in Nairobi. A swing back came about after the Emergency so that by the 1962 Census, the number of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru males in Nairobi was 44 percent while Luo, Luyha, and Kisii males in Nairobi were 33 percent and Kamba males were 17 percent. (Males would not be perfectly correlated with total labor force figures in Nairobi.) *Ibid.*, p. 493.

[12] As Thomas Mulusa, "Central Government and Local Authorities," in Hyden, Okumu, and Jackson, pp. 233-251, points out, the provincial administration was particularly elaborate in Central Province. This was the Kikuyu homeland where Nairobi is situated. "Nairobi, granted the status of a city in 1950, was virtually reduced to a set of villages . . . effectively administered

There was also an interest in getting greater agricultural production out of both the settler areas and the African ones during World War II and afterward. In Tanganyika this concern had led to the ill-fated Ground Nut scheme; in Kenya both expansion of the European sector and transformation of the African subsistence sector were pushed. Thus not only was there a general expansion of the Civil Service between 1945 and 1955 from 14,000 to 45,000 (in rounded figures) but also in technical ministries the Civil Service expanded rapidly. There were 298 in the staff of the Agricultural Department at all levels in 1945 and 2,519 in 1958. The African Land Development Department did not exist in 1945; it had 477 people in 1958.[13] By the end of 1965, the Civil Service had grown to 63,000 and 92 percent were Kenyan citizens; overwhelmingly they were Africans. By 1969, the Civil Service had increased to 77,000 with almost 95 percent citizens.

The growth in size of the Civil Service after independence was in part a response to economic needs. That is,

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by the central government through district officers in various suburban areas" (p. 239). Local authorities in most areas lost most of their powers to provincial administration during the Emergency in Kenya from 1952 to 1955. In Kiambu District, a Kikuyu heartland area, there were one district commissioner and two district officers in 1952. In 1956, there were one district commissioner, twenty-six district officers, and eleven district assistants.

[13] These figures for the technical departments are from Cherry Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 22. The discussion of the Kenya Civil Service relies heavily on Gertzel, especially pp. 20-39 and 166-173. I have also used Hyden, Jackson, and Okumu, *op.cit.*, esp. Goran Hyden, "Basic Civil Service Characteristics," pp. 3-32; Henry Bienen, "Economic Environment," pp. 43-62; and John Okumu, "Socio-Politico Setting," pp. 25-42.

the economy of Kenya was perceived to have potential for growth and was in fact growing. Total GNP expanded at 6.8 percent cumulatively at constant prices for the 1964-68 period. Expansion and economic change also created personnel needs. As the Kenya Government implemented policies designed to Africanize trade and business, personnel were required to administer licensing and loan programs. As Government proliferated marketing boards and regulatory agencies, the size of the Civil Service had to expand. Government agricultural improvement policies led to increases in field staff.[14]

However, as Hyden pointed out, the growth of the Kenya Civil Service can be viewed only partially as a response of Government to economic growth and growth potential and to the concern for structural transformation of the economy. "It [growth] must also be viewed as the consequences of the autonomous goal-setting character of the civil service itself. . . ."[15] Civil servants were trying to expand their empires. But as the public sector employment grew from over 188,000 in 1965 to almost 222,000 in 1968, at a time when employment in the private sector was declining from 402,000 to 387,000, the expansion of the Civil Service must also be understood in political terms.[16] The public sector ac-

[14] Jon Moris has described in detail the available structure of agricultural extension services and personnel in "The Agrarian Revolution in Central Kenya: A Study of Farm Innovation in Embu District," Northwestern University, Dissertation submitted to the Department of Anthropology, 1970, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor.

[15] Hyden, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

[16] Bienen, "Economic Environment," p. 49. See *Economic Survey, 1969* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969), Table 8.2, p. 120. Public sector employment figures include employees of central government, parastatal organizations, East African Com-

counted in 1969 for over 36 percent of all employed and was a critical sector for absorbing the rising would-be employed, and in particular the well-educated would-be employed. Civil Service was second only to teaching as the career preference of Kenyan university students.[17] Not only were there severe pressures from the better educated and from civil servants trying to increase the size of their departments for bureaucratic power and leverage, but the ethnic pressures were strong to expand positions to let individuals in for a slice of the pie through pressuring Civil Service for jobs and services.

Another consideration working for growth was the age structure in the Civil Service. Because the Civil Service was Africanized belatedly and then expanded rapidly in the 1950s and early 1960s it was heavy with relatively young people throughout its ranks. This meant that normal attrition patterns were not working. The only way to bring new and often better-qualified technical personnel and better-educated general administrators into the system was to expand it.

Within this expanding Civil Service, the provincial administration played a critical role during Mau Mau, the security forces expanded rapidly as did the provincial administration, but even the police was subordinate to the provincial administration in matters concerning law and order during the emergency.[18] At independence, Kenya had a provincial administration staffed not by young graduates just out of university but by experienced junior peo-

munity Services organizations, and local government. The important political actors are civil servants in the central government.

[17] Joel D. Barkan, "What Makes East African Students Run," *Transition* (Kampala), Vol. 7, No. 37 (1968), p. 28, Table 5.

[18] Gertzel, *Politics of Independent Kenya*, p. 23.

ple who had served on African district councils or in the colonial provincial administration. Many such people saw themselves as taking power within the structure of the administration. The provincial commissioners had operated as heads of Government in Kenya's provinces; they were the agents of executive control for the Governor as they were to become subsequently for the President of Kenya. Even during the short interlude 1963-64 when Kenya operated under a system of regionalism in the Majimbo Constitution when the provincial commissioners were heads of Civil Service in the regions and responsible to elected regional authorities or assemblies, Kenya remained a centralized administrative system. *De facto* the central ministries kept the critical functions of Government, and the provincial administration often bypassed the regional assemblies.[19] There was never a full implementation of the Majimbo Constitution and control functions as well as development initiatives continued to be vested in the provincial administration. Indeed, the provincial administration was itself much more of a coordinator and initiator in both realms than the technical ministries as compared to other African countries.

Thus even when Kenya was in theory decentralized through regional assemblies, the political realities were different. Prime Minister Kenyatta ruled through his provincial administration. In December 1964, Kenya became both a Republic and a *de facto* one-party state when the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) crossed the floor and its members joined KANU. The powers of the regions were abolished and the ex-

[19] The most complete discussion of the provincial administration is Cherry Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,* Vol. 4, No. 3 (November 1966), pp. 201-215.

ecutive head of Government became a President in place of a Prime Minister.[20] In the course of 1964-66, the constitutional structure of Kenya was altered to produce a yet more centralized system. The President's emergency powers were enlarged; the Executive's power continued to encroach on those of Legislature, and the provincial administration worked directly to the Office of the President and became his primary agent for exerting political control throughout Kenya.

As Gertzel points out, the provincial administration, led by district and provincial commissioners, assumed again most of the responsibilities in theory but in practice only partially lost to local or county councils and regional assemblies in 1963.[21] Indeed, for many civil servants in the provincial administration, the Majimbo period of Kenya regionalism reinforced feelings of superiority to politicians. The politicians they were most in contact with were regional and local ones. The central ministries also resumed full control of their activities in the regions and districts with the exception of certain educational, health, and road services. Even these functions were taken away from the county councils with the Local Government Transfer of Functions Bill of October 1969, when primary education, health, and secondary road

[20] Gertzel, *Politics of Independent Kenya*, p. 34. The President as Head of Government remained Head of Cabinet; he had to be an elected member of the Legislature. The Legislature became unicameral instead of bicameral in December 1966, when the Senate and the House of Representatives were merged. For a constitutional history of Kenya see D. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, *Public Law and Political Change in Kenya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). For the administrative and executive aspects, see especially pp. 177-309.

[21] Gertzel, *Politics of Independent Kenya*, p. 36. For a discussion of local authorities see Mulusa, "Central Government."

maintenance were transferred to central government ministries which already indirectly controlled these functions.[22] (The Ministry of Local Government had direct control over local authorities by 1965.) The continued weakness of local Government as manifested in county councils and the fragmentary and intermittent presence of KANU in many districts accentuated district and provincial commissioners' tendencies to think of themselves as leaders of districts and provinces.

All commentators agree that Kenya's provincial administration is centralized in the President's Office and carries out a wide array of functions compared to other African civil services. Not only were the provincial administrative officers collecting taxes on behalf of local authorities, they also chaired land boards, loan boards, agricultural committees, licensing committees, self-help committees. They were given major responsibilities for development in a province and district and when the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development set up structures for planning and plan implementation, the provincial administration became the agent of development as coordinator of other Civil Service personnel. Weaknesses in field representation of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development meant that the provincial and district commissioners filled certain technical roles. But most important for the centralization of authority and the wide range of functions carried out by provincial administration was the political power of the commissioners themselves and the reliance of the President on them. In other words, while there was a colonial legacy which had been manifested in the structural dominance of the provincial administration, it was a set of choices

[22] Mulusa, p. 251.

at the center which gave the provincial administration ongoing political power. The Office of the President defined the nature of the power of its provincial administration. The provincial administration was the major agent and spokesman of the Government and it also had to be involved in local politics. But it did not "make" policy at the center although powerful provincial commissioners did argue for their own priorities.

The commissioners have understood themselves to be powerful men, powerful vis-à-vis party people in their areas and vis-à-vis the representatives of the central ministries and elected officials like MPs, district councilors, and even ministers when the latter were operating in a commissioner's province or district and involving themselves in provincial affairs. But they do not see themselves as powerful central actors, setting priorities for the nation. They are prefects but they are not national figures in their own right; they do not build up independent bases of political power outside of the regions to which they are posted. The district commissioners in particular are moved around. While it is true that some members of the provincial administration resigned from the Civil Service to stand for Parliament in 1969, the provincial and district commissioners are not overtly political officials like Tanzania's regional and area commissioners.[23] They do not shy away from involving themselves in political problems but they do not define themselves as political people. While they see their power as being delegated from the Office of the President and President Kenyatta personally, and while they rely on the his-

[23] For a discussion of Tanzania's regional and area commissioners see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 307-333.

torical tradition of a strong provincial administration in Kenya, they circumscribe their own roles. A lot of politics that does go on goes on outside their purview by their own choice; indeed, the provincial and district commissioners were often reluctant to get involved in intra-KANU squabbles and had to be ordered to do so by the President. And when district commissioners were involved in disqualifying Kenya People's Union (KPU) candidates for local office in 1968 they were frequently unhappy about the role they had been given.[24] Some were unhappy about being called to a KANU meeting held in Nakuru in 1968 to discuss the way the Civil Service would relate to party politics. President Kenyatta has used the provincial administration as the major agent of Government because it was for him the most reliable institution and one which he could control personally in a way that we shall see was impossible to do with KANU.

No one doubts that the Civil Service, and the provincial administration in particular, has been a strong institution in Kenyan life and that it is the main instrument of social control. The Civil Service is also the major vehicle for political participation from below for three reasons: (1) it is the major point of contact with Government for most Kenyans; (2) it is given social and economic transformation tasks; (3) it is explicitly told by top political authorities that it should be a channel for local demands and that it should try to handle local grievances because the political leadership has determined to bypass an unreliable and fragmented ruling party. A visitor to provincial, district, or divisional headquarters can find people waiting to see representatives of the central ministries and the provincial administration

[24] From interviews with commissioners in 1968-69.

in order to state their problems and to involve them in their grievances. KANU officials come to headquarters to petition also. The scenes of people waiting to see a district commissioner are similar to the lines in district *bomas* or headquarters in Tanzania where people wait on area commissioners. In Tanzania, however, people are waiting to see a party official as well as a representative of Government in the person of the commissioner. And they also queue at TANU offices to see party chairmen about the granting of favors and the settlement of disputes.

Well-placed people in Kenya, those of wealth and power, will involve themselves in high-level KANU politics, and middle-level elites will engage in internal KANU struggles in order to be better placed to pursue their advantage. High-level elites will also try to deal directly with the President or more frequently will deal with officials in his Office. But for most Kenyans, the Civil Service is the main point of contact with public authority. Civil servants in the technical ministries, especially agriculture, provide information about Government's policies and they provide assistance and resources to farmers. Representatives of some of the agricultural and marketing boards do this too.

Chiefs, who are the grass-roots agents of the provincial administration,[25] call meetings or *barazas*—which are probably the main point of contact between the rural population and the regime, even taking KANU meetings into account. The latter require permission from district

[25] The hierarchy of the provincial administration is, descending: provincial commissioner; district commissioner; district officer; senior district assistant; district assistant; chief; subchief. Village headmen are not salaried employees of the provincial administration.

commissioners which is not always granted.[26] But chiefs can get their meetings held. The chief explains Government policies at these barazas. And they are held frequently. In Vihiga, a division in western Kenya which is very densely settled and which has a population of close to 300,000, one observer states that there are 280 barazas each week.[27] In a year, chiefs held 288 barazas and subchiefs held over 3,000 in Vihiga.[28] The main attendants at such meetings were elders and village headmen and farmers. Nyangira reports that most frequently subsistence farmers were the majority of those in attendance. But they were elderly, often illiterate, and marginal for the development programs being espoused. At the barazas appeals are made for loyalty to the nation and the President. Government's plans are noted. Pleas are made for the payment of taxes and contributions to self-help schemes. The barazas frequently are tax-collecting devices. Police check tax receipts during them and not-so-voluntary contributions to self-help schemes are gathered. Nyangira states that the baraza still has an aura of the colonially enforced meeting. A policeman stands by the chief with his baton. The symbol of order and control, the chief, becomes the explainer of Government actions. The chief's baraza is the instrument of mobilization and control at the grass roots. But since the provincial administration has expended tremendous amounts of time and energy on graduated personal tax collection,

[26] Such permission is required for MPs who want to address meetings also.

[27] Kenya is divided for administrative purposes into provinces, districts, divisions, subdivisions and locations.

[28] I am relying on Nicholas Nyangira's "Chiefs' Barazas as Agents of Administration and Political Change," IDS, Staff Paper No. 80, Nairobi, July 1970.

some have wondered whether its developmental role has been compromised.

In fact, the provincial administration is carrying out roles which are not easily compatible when it acts as the implementer of centrally established policies and extractor of resources on the one hand and agent for social transformation and political participation on the other. The Civil Service as a whole is exhorted to be innovative, to get people to change old habits and to make it clear that incentives for change are available and also to listen to grievances and advance them upward in the chain of command. Representatives of some ministries are designated as representatives of constituents. This is clear for community development officers. But regional and district officials in the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture will see themselves in this light too. Trade officials who have the mission to increase African participation in trade will try to accommodate local demands and will get involved in local politics. The allocation of trade licenses and loans is, of course, a politically charged affair. But the representatives of the Ministry of Trade in the regions and districts do not always understand the constellation of politics at their level and they do not have the political power and resources to handle their problems. The district and provincial commissioners invariably get drawn into licensing and loan disputes.

There has also been an attack on the Civil Service in its "development administration" guise. The provincial administration in particular is said to have incompatible functions of social control and social transformation. Critics of Kenya's administration have argued that it is recruited and organized for maintenance of order and control, not for innovation or stimulation of participation from below. The highly centralized and bureaucratic

nature of the Civil Service, it is said, militates against its being a change-oriented institution.[29]

Government conducted its own Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Service to review both its structure and remuneration levels and more broadly to examine "whether the Civil Service inherited at Independence, modified in some respects and staffed with Kenyans, committed to the ideals of nation-building, is in fact well adapted to the task of development as it actually presents itself in the 1970's?"[30] This Commission frankly recognized that KANU does not formulate new policies and that other institutions which could contribute to policy formulation were relatively few and weak. Thus the Civil Service was called on to identify and solve national problems. But the Commission recognized that though there has been a clear shift in the focus of interest toward development the average civil servant followed old procedures. The problem has been exacerbated because the strong system of field administration expressed in the provincial administration was never designed around the concept of planned development and project management.[31]

The Civil Service has been criticized for being unable to handle political demands in a disinterested way. It is said to be a major interest group in the political process. It is also asserted that the Civil Service is without the local roots which only a political party can have and

[29] For the public administration arguments pro and con see Hyden, Jackson, and Okumu, *op.cit.*, and John Nellis, "Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?" *African Studies Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (December 1971), pp. 389-402.

[30] *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission, 1971) also known as the Ndegwa Commission (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), pp. 2-3.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

which allows a party to understand and channel and respond to local demands.

We can examine two issue areas, the role of local government councils and the question of self-help or Harambee schools, in order to see how the Civil Service tries to respond to and control local demands. We can also examine the idea that the Civil Service is a corporate group which acts in its own interest.

B. Controlling Local Councils

These arguments are heard even more in the land since 1970 when the central government took over the three basic services which county councils, the major elected body in the rural areas, had responsibility for. Primary education, which had taken up 62.5 percent on the total county council expenditure of 16 million pounds in 1969 and which had essentially bankrupted the councils, and roads and health were all taken over by central Government.[32] Together they had accounted for over 80 percent of total county council expenditure. In 1968, local councils were spending 26 percent of total governmental expenditure. Many, but not all county councils, had become financially in disarray and Government took over their main functions on the grounds that they could not provide services

[32] For a discussion of local government in Kenya see Mulusa, "Central Government"; V. P. Diejomaoh, "Financing Local Government Authorities in Kenya," IDS Discussion Paper No. 96, Nairobi, September 1970; Goran Hyden, "Local Government Reform in Kenya," *East Africa Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 19-24; W.J.W. Bowring, "Competitive Politics in East African Local Government," *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 5 (October 1970), pp. 43-60.

and had failed to solve financial problems.[33] While this is true, Government had also taken away from the councils their major revenue-getting devices. And it had become clear that central leaders preferred to end local autonomy over crucial areas.

Not all the reasons of central leaders had to do with good administrative procedures. In 1968, Government refused to allow fair municipal elections to take place.[34] The then existing opposition party, KPU, had its candidates barred through administrative procedures. It was claimed that they had made out their papers incorrectly when filing. It was the regional administration which acted as the agent for squashing the possibilities of free elections and a number of district commissioners were unhappy about the political use made of them.[35] While some have claimed that the KANU Government feared a good KPU showing, there is little evidence that outside of Luo areas the KPU would have done well in municipal elections. I would argue instead that the KANU Govern-

[33] Richard Stren, "Local Government in Kenya: The Limits of Development Planning," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Montreal, October 15-18, 1969, p. 3. Some councils had been unable to pay teachers. Accounting procedures were not always strict and corruption did exist in some councils.

[34] Kenya has had a tiered system of local government. There are seven municipal councils: Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu, Thika, Eldoret, and Kitale. There are thirty-three county councils. These county councils sometimes coincide with, sometimes overlap, district councils. There are eighteen urban councils and fifty-four area councils. The latter two categories fall under county council jurisdiction. The municipal councils do not.

[35] Personal interviews with provincial and district commissioners in 1968-69.

ment was more generally interested in tightening controls over political activity. Local councils had often given prominent politicians a local political base. They provided an important arena for factional politics.[36] Alliances were made between the center and the rural areas; politicians poached on each other's territory. The county councils were distributors of patronage through their hiring and development activities. Intense fighting within KANU went on between those who controlled county or municipal councils and often different groups who controlled a KANU district branch or important trade union. Government found competition at the local level messy at best and dangerous for local stability and even at times threatening to national stability as local factionalism ramified up to the national level. Government refused to let independents stand for either local election or Parliament out of concern for internal factionalism within KANU more than out of fear of opposition parties. At first, an attempt was made to use KANU to discipline local factions. When this failed, legislation was imposed in 1968.[37]

The treatment of local councils then was part of a general response aimed at setting limits to participation from below. It grew out of the same concerns which led to attempts to control the trade union movement after independence. Then Government's supervision and reg-

[36] For an excellent account of factional politics on the Coast see Richard Stren, "Factional Politics and Central Control in Mombasa, 1960-1969," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (Winter 1970), pp. 33-56.

[37] The minutes of an important KANU meeting in Mombasa state that the district chairmen of the party and MPs should supervise the selection of local government candidates. Often, chairmen and MPs could not agree among themselves.

ulation of the trade unions were essentially a response to political activities pursued by union leaders from independent bases of power. However, Government's regulation was justified by the need to control wages and strike levels that would benefit the economy as a whole.[38] Interestingly, one of the main architects of both Government's administrative juggling with the 1968 municipal elections and the legislative and administrative regulation of the trade union movement was Tom Mboya.[39] Since neither Mboya nor Kenyatta himself was able to impose party discipline on the trade unions or on local councils or on local KANU bodies, the Civil Service was used to carry out legislation and to deal administratively with the problems. The Civil Service was given the mission to try to channel demands, for the county councils

[38] Richard Sandbrook has written valuable studies of the Kenya trade union movement. See his "State and the Development of the Trade Unions," in Hyden, Jackson, and Okumu, *op.cit.*, pp. 252-295, and his "Patrons, Clients, and Unions: The Labour Movement and Political Conflict in Kenya," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 9 (March 1972), pp. 13-27.

[39] Mboya held a number of important Cabinet posts and he was Secretary General of KANU until his assassination in 1969. He was Minister of Labour in the first government formed as a KANU-KADU coalition in 1962. He had risen to power through the labor movement. He introduced the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act in 1964 when he was Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The bill made the ousting of incumbent leaders and the formation of splinter unions more difficult. Sandbrook, "State and the Development of Trade Unions," p. 279. Mboya suggested that it was preferable to deal administratively with the 1968 municipal elections rather than ban the KPU or not permit the election to take place. Thus opposition and party factionalism were controlled through Civil Service manipulation of candidate nominations.

had responded to felt needs. They had gone bankrupt trying to take on tasks which people wanted carried out. The overwhelming demand in the rural areas has been for expansion of schooling opportunities. Farmers have sold off their grade cattle and mortgaged land in order to get school fees.[40] People are willing to make great sacrifices to send their children to school because they think education is essential for a chance to increase one's income. Even though people are becoming increasingly aware of the secondary and primary school-leaver problem and know that graduates of lower schools will not necessarily get good jobs, the possibility that they may get such a job is still compelling.[41]

Kenya has a severe unemployment problem and a low-level trained manpower glut. The Civil Service now has to come to grips with the education-employment-rural-urban migration imbalances. Thus the school issue provides a good illustration of the problem for the Civil Service in trying to channel demands at the local level.

[40] Moris, "Agrarian Revolution," p. 212. Even in a sample of employed and unemployed in Nairobi and Mombasa and in peri-urban areas nearby, education was mentioned as a most important problem by 40 percent. This was second only to unemployment, mentioned by 33 percent. From Raymond Hopkins, unpublished "Code Book for the Kenyan Study of Social Mobilization and Political Participation," (1971), p. ii. I am grateful to Professor Hopkins for the use of this study.

[41] The phenomenon is parallel to the one Harris and Todaro have drawn our attention to in rural-urban migration patterns. The migrant to the city plays a lottery. He knows the chances of getting a job in the city may be against him, but the alternative of staying on the land is bleak and taking a chance on a job is worth it because the return is so great if a job is obtained. See John Harris and Michael P. Todaro, "Urban Unemployment in East Africa: An Economic Analysis of Policy Alternatives," *East African Economic Review*, Vol. 4 (1968), pp. 17-36.

C. Harambee Schools: Local Demands and Government Response

Kenya has had a remarkable expansion of primary and secondary school places since independence. Government first stimulated and then tried to control a phenomenon remarkable in its own right: the Harambee or self-help secondary school development.

President Kenyatta once said that it took the British seventy years to build 141 secondary schools in Kenya. "In the three years in which we came to power, the number has increased by 141."[42] Indeed, the Kenyatta Government can point to a great expansion in both primary and secondary school enrollment. In 1960, there were 725,865 students in the first through eighth primary years and there were 17,157 who had made it to that eighth year. In 1965, the numbers were over 1 million and over 150,000 respectively.[43] Kenya shifted to a seven-year primary school program and by 1970 had 1.3 million in primary school and 160,000 in the last year of primary school. The number of students in secondary school forms I-IV was also increasing: from 5,409 in 1965 to 31,796 in 1968 and 60,700 in 1970.[44]

The expansion of the school system was by no means an unmixed blessing. During the period of school ex-

[42] Cited by Kenneth Prewitt, "Schooling, Stratification and Equality: Notes for Research," IDS Paper, Nairobi, n.d., p. 15.

[43] Figures are from Sheldon Weeks, *Divergence in Educational Development* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1967), p. 25, Table I. In 1965, approximately 150,000 students took the Kenya Primary Examination: 117,663 were from Primary VII and 32,485 were remaining from Primary VIII.

[44] *Ibid.* The number who received certificate passes at the end of Form IV went from 649 to 4,557 and then to 9,100 in 1970.

pansion, two critical things were happening in the wage sector. Although the economy expanded, wage employment off the land declined in absolute numbers. And, while the number of students who were sitting the Kenya Primary Examination (KPE) for entrance into secondary school went up tenfold, jobs which KPE matriculates could get in 1964 now required some secondary schooling.[45] Even though primary and secondary schooling was not free in Kenya, the employment problem did not lessen the pressures for schooling. It pushed them upward if anything into a greater demand for secondary schooling. Many of the primary school students were at the same time not getting a satisfactory education. The rapid expansion of the primary schools led to a situation where in 1965, 35 percent of primary school teachers were themselves untrained; three-quarters of these 35 percent had not gone into secondary school.

The expansion of primary schooling led to another difficult problem. The number of secondary school places was insufficient to absorb would-be entrants. Moreover,

[45] The problem of school expansion in East Africa has been dealt with by a number of people. Weeks, *op.cit.*; L. Gray Cowan, *The Costs of Learning: The Politics of Primary Education in Kenya* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1970); John Anderson, "Education for Self Reliance," IDS Discussion Paper No. 67, Nairobi, September 1968; James Sheffield, ed., *Education, Employment and Rural Development* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967). Tanzania, more than Kenya, has tried to cope with the education problem by stressing curricular changes and the need to develop an education system suitable for those who will remain on the land. Neither teachers nor parents seem to like this any better in Tanzania than they would in Kenya. There has developed recently in Kenya a village polytechnic movement which might develop into an alternative to Kenya's present formal education system in rural areas.

the number of places available in secondary schools was uneven across the country. The Kikuyu areas where the pressure was greatest had places for only 7.1 percent of those who might have possibly graduated from primary school. Nairobi had more places (for 37 percent) and so did the backward areas because, while the latter did not have many schools, they also did not have the pressures that Nairobi and Central Province (Kikuyuland) had.[46] Government planned that about 10 percent of those who sat the KPE would go on to secondary schools which were aided by the Government. Parents and students had other ideas. Many students repeated the primary examination, hoping for better scores a second or third time around. Some have gone back to Standard VII or even Standard VI. Some private schools have sprung up. But the main development has been the growth of the Harambee school system.

"Harambee" has been translated as "Let's pull together."[47] President Kenyatta begins, ends, and liberally punctuates his speeches with "Harambee," and it has become a slogan for Kenyans. Kenyans pull together to build unaided secondary schools in rural areas and then they try to get Government to accredit them, send teach-

[46] The undeveloped Northeastern Province had places for 35 percent of the primary school-leavers; Coast Province, 18.6 percent; Eastern, 6.7 percent; Nyanza (the Luo area), 6.6 percent; Western, 9.1 percent; and Rift Valley, 8.9 percent. These figures are from James Sheffield, *Education in the Republic of Kenya* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 24.

[47] In 1963, Kenyatta made a speech in which he referred to Karambee, a Kikuyu term for pulling together. This has come to be known as Harambee in Kenya. See W. B. Mukuria, "Harambee Secondary Schools—An Aspect of Self-Help Projects in Kikuyu Division, Kenya," The University of East Africa, University Examinations, Dar es Salaam, 1969.

ers, help with salaries, or best of all, take over the Harambee school entirely. The Harambee schools have been largely a Kikuyu phenomena, but not exclusively so. In very densely settled areas outside Kikuyuland where land is scarce and there is a high premium put on education so that children will be able to leave the district, Harambee schools have been built, e.g., in Kakamega district among the Luyha. The idea is that children will get schooling, become wage earners, and return with fresh capital. They usually do send money back if they obtain jobs.

Anderson and Mukuria have traced the origins of self-help activities in Kenya back to age-grade structures and patterns of communal government and responsibility which were featured in many of Kenya's traditional societies.[48] Some Kikuyu had rebelled against the colonial educational system and had established their own schools through the Independent African School movement in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1960s, Kenyan leaders went to the rural areas and told the people that self-help activities should be taken up. People responded by building secondary schools.

The Harambee schools grew rapidly, although not all unaided schools are Harambee schools. Thus by 1967, there were 361 unaided schools, up from 32 in 1963 and 201 in 1966. Of these, 247 were considered Harambee. The other 114 were commercial, private, tutorial, or special religious schools. In 1968, growth slowed and there were 369 unaided schools. During this period,

[48] Anderson, *op.cit.* and Mukuria, *op.cit.* The latter notes that Kikuyu traditionally did cooperative work in cultivating, thatching, etc., known as *Ngwatio* which has a connotation of communalism and mutuality.

Government-maintained secondary schools went to 232 in 1968.[49]

The Harambee schools have been an expensive proposition for rural people. It has been estimated that 53 percent of self-help contributions went for educational projects. The valuation of self-help is notoriously tricky. It is estimated that in Central Province more than $2 million was collected for self-help in a year. The total county council collection from Graduated Personal Tax was about $1.5 million in the same year. The Harambee schools have also been expensive as compared to Government schools. They charge as much as $120 in fees as compared with $65 in Government-approved boarding schools and $28 in Government-maintained and assisted day schools. School fees and donations to schools appear to be the largest charge against most family budgets in progressive Kikuyu areas. I have already mentioned that cattle may be sold off to pay costs; plowing and spraying may be delayed too. The educational services performed by the Harambee schools, however, have been variable. The output of the Harambee schools depends on how well planned they are, whether money continues to flow in for salaries after school construction has occurred, and how well administered the school is.

The administration of Harambee schools is by committee. Usually, a small group of influential people will call a meeting. Chiefs, headmasters, religious leaders will attend. They and prominent traders or local civil servants or better-off farmers will form the committee.[50] Committees may waive school fees but sometimes they refuse to

[49] Sheffield, *Education*, p. 27.

[50] Anderson, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

do so for the poor. Yet everyone may pay contributions to the Harambee school. If fees are not waived for the poor, the inequalities are exacerbated. Thus the question of who will attend Harambee schools and who will pay fees becomes a highly charged one. The importance of the Harambee schools is underscored. Consider that of the 147,000 primary school-leavers in 1967, only 15,000 had found places in Government-aided secondary schools and 12,000 had found places in Harambee schools, while 6,000 found places in other unaided schools, 15,000 repeated primary school, 4,000 were in some further training and only 20,000 were estimated to have found permanent employment, while 75,000 did not find employment.[51]

The Harambee schools have become a major political concern in the rural areas also because they become the focus for political rivalries between leaders of local communities and because local leaders try to intervene with political leaders and the Ministry of Education at the center in order to strengthen themselves in their localities. There will be a struggle over where the school is sited. And once a decision is made to proceed with a school, the control of its committee may be contentious. Some schools have come to grief because of infighting over the school committee. Different factions will support or oppose schools depending on what positions their opponents take. Or even more common, if one prominent leader is supporting a Harambee school, others will feel compelled to do

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 3. We can see their importance by looking at figures from one important division—the Kikuyu division in Central Province. In 1967, 2,287 students sat for the Kenya Primary Examination. Eighty got into Government-aided secondary schools. Two hundred and seventy more entered Harambee schools. Two hundred repeated. Mukuria, *op.cit.*

the same for a new school. In one case, Bildad Kaggia, a prominent leader in Muran'ga District opposed the building of Harambee schools on the grounds that schools were the responsibility of Government and that it was not clear how the secondary school-leavers would be absorbed, given Government's failure to deal with unemployment. His major opponent in the district, J. K. Kiano, a Cabinet member and at the time Minister of Education, claimed that Kaggia opposed self-help and Harambee schools simply to be obstructionist. Kiano claimed that small-holder interests were the same as those of the wealthy—a claim frequently made by regime spokesmen, and that Harambee schools were a concrete expression of the commonality of interest. Indeed, elite support for the Harambee schools was often put in terms of the need for unity. And the schools did help bring a level of participation on the part of small farmers that elites found useful.[52]

Sometimes KANU has organizational reality only when it becomes involved in local self-help projects. In some divisions, KANU will be highly organized around Harambee school projects, water projects, dispensaries, and clinics. The grass-roots strength may be great. Elsewhere, KANU may have no reality at the grass roots and not be involved at all in local projects.[53]

The Civil Service is given a difficult task in this con-

[52] For a discussion of factionalism in Muran'ga District and the role of Kaggia, there is an unpublished study by Geoffrey Lamb, "Politics and Administration in Muran'ga District Kenya," University of Sussex, 1968. I have benefited from this study.

[53] Mukuria, *op.cit.*, examined two localities and found that KANU was highly organized in one whereas in the other community 75 percent of the people questioned wondered whether KANU existed there at all. Party officials were not known locally to members of Harambee schools' committees and information

text. Government is now worried about the spread of Harambee schools and especially about political competition over the schools and proliferation of them through "leaders' " competition to get their own schools started. Before Harambee schools are allowed to start, often a large deposit must be made so that teachers' salaries can be covered. This is a rule of the Ministry of Education. Officers of that Ministry in the districts spend a good deal of time on the unaided school question. They are pressured to recommend that Government take over Harambee Schools. Community development officers have also been told to try to control the spread of the schools. And provincial planning officers have had as their main mission a rationalization of self-help projects as well as the locating of new African businesses and trading depots. If local, district, and even national political leaders become involved in pressuring the representatives of the central ministries or intervene at the central level, then the provincial administration invariably comes into play.

After spending much time and effort promulgating the idea of local participation in self-help and Harambee schools, provincial and district commissioners now must act to control spontaneous activities. Yet there are costs in trying to limit the strong self-help drive. There is political reaction against it and it risks curtailing local economic initiatives. Moreover, some provincial administrators and community development officers are themselves highly sympathetic to the self-help drive. Provincial planning officers sometimes see their Civil Service colleagues as naive about development and as part of

about Government came from veterinary and agricultural officers and officials in the provincial administration.

the problem of rational planning when they refuse to try to channel or stem the flow of social service demands.[54]

What the Harambee school issue above all illustrates is that for important parts of Kenya the problem is not one of mobilizing people to want more or to invest time and money in self-improvement. Moreover, the investment in time and money for schooling cuts across poorer and better-off farmers and cuts across ethnic lines although it is most evident in Kikuyu areas. The present regime, after first fostering local participation around the building of Harambee schools is now nervous about the consequences for its budget. Yet it is sensitive to the pressures to take over unaided schools and concerned about the cycle of education, migration, and unemployment in the towns. It has preferred local participation through concrete self-help projects to participation in competitive politics expressed electorally. Of course, politics still gets expressed through the local projects.

The Kenyan regime appears correct in thinking it knows what large numbers of people want without having to have a strong party organization channeling demands upward. The problem for Government is not mobilizing people in the central core areas through exhortation and organizational means. Government's problem is in handling local demands which may be parochial from its point of view. It wants to control the demands without creating political opposition or communal apathy. It also has a problem in that many demands and pressures come from the ethnic group which is its major support—Kikuyus—and thus are seen as threatening by other ethnic groups.

[54] From interviews with planning officers, provincial administrators, and provincial trade officers in 1968-69.

D. The Civil Service as a Class?

I have argued that Government hopes to control and channel demands through its Civil Service. We should return briefly to a critique of the Civil Service more fundamental perhaps than the question of whether it is the institution best suited to developmental tasks.

The aforementioned Commission of Inquiry on the public service from time to time alluded to fundamental problems of accountability of the Civil Service and the matter of civil servants' private rather than public behavior. One of the main tasks was to consider whether Civil Service remuneration made sense in the light of cost of living, market pressures, growth of GDP, and the capacity of the country to meet costs of possible increases —all in the context of income distribution between persons and regions.[55] The conclusion reached by the Commission was that an increase in wages of public sector employees was unavoidable because of pressures built up during the last few years. However, the Commission recommended that public sector wage increases should be accompanied by an intensification of existing Government policies for rural development; a policy which should reverse the internal terms of trade that have been increasingly unfavorable to farmers. It also recommended changes in the tax system so that more labor-intensive technologies would be encouraged.[56]

More frontal assaults have been made on the Civil Service which have shared the Commission's concern for rural development but which have also described both civil servants and politicians as parasites living off the peasantry. Indeed, critics of urban-based elites have

[55] Ndegwa Commission, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

argued that tensions between civil servants and politicians obscure the class interest that they both share, as opposed to rural people. In Kenya, the argument has been made that the top Government leaders have taken power from the National Assembly and given it to civil servants and that the administrative officers have in general assumed the role of party. This argument has been made by MPs and unhappy middle-level KANU officials.[57] Others would go even further and argue that the basic cleavage is between the "haves" and "have nots" in Kenya and Africa as a whole and that middle-level KANU politicians and anyone with a wage income is a "have."

A deliberately balanced view of the Kenya Civil Service would have to include positive aspects: the Governmental system has remained relatively stable, the Kenya bureaucracy spreads the authority of the state through the countryside; at the least it has not hindered respectable economic growth.[58] Moreover, the Kenya Civil Service delivers real services. Taxes are collected by the provincial administration; Kenya has the broadest agricultural extension service in Africa. It would be very hard to measure how high the cost of these services is to society as a whole either in their specifics or in the aggregate.[59] Moreover, while Kenya has had a strong Civil

[57] See for example the remarks of M. Seroney, an MP in *East African Standard* (Nairobi) March 18, 1971. Even the National Executive Officer of KANU asserted that KANU was dead and that administrative officers in the provincial administration had taken over. *East African Standard*, March 18, 1971, as cited by Nellis, in *Is the Kenyan Bureaucracy Developmental?*

[58] See Nellis, *Who Pays Taxes in Kenya?* and Ndegwa Commission, *op.cit.*, p. 398.

[59] Nellis, in *op.cit.*, has questioned whether the provincial administration collection of graduated personal tax amounts to a net gain in Kenya. Hans Ruthenberg, *African Agricultural Pro-*

Service by African standards, it is given great tasks. Even if one should decide that the Kenyan Civil Service is swollen in terms of Kenya's budget, the Civil Service operates out of weakness in terms of low ratios of personnel to total population, and where in general the state is highly constrained in its ability to intervene in economic and social life.[60]

The argument that a bureaucratic-executive alliance exists in Kenya must be taken seriously but it seems questionable that we can treat the Kenyan Civil Service exclusively or even largely in class terms, although it is obviously a privileged group in Kenya.[61] Okumu has seen this alliance in terms of a convergence of interests among members of a new middle class. Conflicts which might arise between the Civil Service and other structures, he says, are mediated by the basic convergence of

duction: Development Policy in Kenya, 1952-1965 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1966) has argued that Kenya cannot support the high cost of its agricultural extension network. Moris, in "Agrarian Revolution," states a similar view.

[60] Bienen, "Economic Environment." Also see Guy Hunter, "Development Administration in East Africa," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 12. Hunter notes that as of the mid-1960s, in Kenya the ratio of agricultural extension workers to farming units was 1:700. In Holland it was 1:250, with a much more densely settled population and easier transportation.

[61] The debates about the usefulness of seeing institutions in class terms are many. See Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in North Africa and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1957); Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Coup," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

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appear by function and tribe and grade and level of operation. So far, the political goals set for Kenya by its present leadership have usually coincided with bureaucratic ones in that order and stability have been stressed. The way that the politicians have frequently defined development has often meant administration—getting things done, establishing administrative networks. However, relations with politicians are variable. At the senior levels, ministers resemble senior civil servants more than other politicians by education and income. But senior civil servants are more production-oriented while senior politicians have been responsive to welfare demands. (President Kenyatta on one occasion opted for free outpatient care without consultation with his senior civil servants in the Ministry of Health.)

Politicians have been reluctant to try to stem demands. At the local level, civil servants are given the job of trying to rationalize demands and are not allocated enough resources to accommodate demands. Thus it is at this level that tensions between politicians and civil servants appear clearly. Civil servants will complain that MPs do not involve themselves in local matters and in the next breath say that it is a good thing they do not. When district development advisory committees were set up which were meant to bring together civil servants and political and associational group representatives, civil servants often saw the articulation of demands as a stirring up of land problems or cooperative movement problems. Sometimes district commissioners would attend county council meetings and be received hostilely. At the same time, civil servants will also want to show that "something is being done" in their areas and will press local demands upward, getting into difficulties with bureaucrats in control who have supervisory or integrating roles, e.g., planning

officers. The planning officers will see other civil servants as becoming political people. It is not surprising that planning officers and outside observers will often decry the difficulty of getting local officials, not to say ordinary citizens, "meaningfully involved" in producing integrated programs or plans. What has emerged from attempts to involve local officials and citizens in grass-roots planning are shopping lists of projects wanted.[64] Planning officers get the injunctions to involve local people and administrative machinery for participation is proliferated, but at the same time, the center wants "sensible" and integrated plans to flow upward.[65]

The picture I have sketched so far is one in which Civil Service plays a major role and the society is one with many local associations, self-help units, and strong demands made on central resources.

I have argued that the Civil Service is given the task of channeling these demands and at the same time is the critical institution of social control. By virtue of being the agent for social control in Kenya, the Civil Service is involved frequently in curtailing political participation. When economic and social demands cannot be met, the Civil Service is given the mission of restricting political

[64] Nellis, *ibid.*, implies that meaningful involvement has not taken place when this occurs.

[65] For a discussion of this in Tanzania see Bienen, *Tanzania*, pp. 281-333. In Kenya, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development established an array of administrative structures to get coordination and participation in the late 1960s as Tanzania had done five years earlier. Nairobi, according to Nellis, wanted the planning exercise to be as decentralized as possible, "but the fulcrum of the operation tended to be located between the provincial planning officer and the district development committee" (other civil servants). Nellis, "Administration of Rural Development," p. 12.

formations which push these demands upward. Or when political competition itself threatens stability, the Civil Service imposes limits on it. At the same time, the Civil Service itself pushes demands upward as it communicates grievances from below. The Civil Service gives influence to demands by organizing them for those who become constituents. Members of the provincial administration find themselves doing this as well as officials of the central ministries. Frequently, the civil servants are the only ones in Kenya who can organize demands for people in the rural areas and make them felt at higher levels. The Civil Service becomes a vehicle for political participation as it communicates views and makes rural interests felt at the center through its mechanisms. There is a great sensitivity of the center to rural demands and there is often a congruence between goals of the center and the localities. This is established through the Civil Service which provides information to the center, organizes demands, and funnels benefits downward.

So far, I have concentrated on the role of the Civil Service in coming to grips with interests and demands from below in rural areas. We shall see that it also becomes the focus for demands from middle- and high-level elites who want loans, land benefits, licenses. Since these elites can bring to bear individual influence and better organization of their interests, their relationship to the Civil Service is more clearly one of political reciprocity.

At all levels in Kenya, people must react to the Civil Service. They must deal with it or try to avoid it. The Civil Service is thrust into the political realm also because of the fragmented nature of party in Kenya and because of the relationship of President Kenyatta to KANU. We can see the Civil Service operate in the polit-

ical process as it tries to control and respond to overtly political interests by looking at elections and party factions. A discussion of party politics is necessary for understanding elite participation in politics.