|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Activity | Population mean (min) | Doer  mean (min)\* | Activity | Population mean (min) | Doer  mean (min)\* |
| Sleeping | 504 | 506 | Child care | 18 | 79 |
| Working | 194 | 424 | Active sports | 16 | 88 |
| Electronic media | 143 | 184 | Outdoor recreation | 11 | 134 |
| Travel | 109 | 118 | Cultural events | 10 | 143 |
| Eating | 89 | 93 | Errands | 8 | 41 |
| Socializing | 56 | 115 | Car repair | 6 | 48 |
| Personal care | 50 | 58 | Hobbies | 5 | 114 |
| Reading/writing | 48 | 104 | Bars/lounges | 4 | 101 |
| Education | 46 | 237 | Animal care | 3 | 33 |
| Cooking | 38 | 73 | Singing/dancing | 3 | 106 |
| House cleaning | 34 | 87 | Other | 2 | 29 |
| Shopping | 25 | 66 | Dry cleaners | 1 | 73 |
| Yard work | 20 | 111 | Services | 1 | 83 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Code | Activity | Code | Activity |
| 11 | Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting | 53 | Real Estate & Rental & Leasing |
| 21 | Mining | 54 | Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services |
| 22 | Utilities | 55 | Management of Companies and Enterprises |
| 23 | Construction | 56 | Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services |
| 31-33 | Manufacturing | 61 | Educational Services |
| 42 | Wholesale Trade | 62 | Health Care and Social Assistance |
| 44-45 | Retail Trade | 71 | Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation |
| 48-49 | Transportation & Warehousing | 72 | Accommodation and Food Services |
| 51 | Information | 81 | Other Services  (except Public Administration) |
| 52 | Finance and Insurance | 92 | Public Administration |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Week 1 | | | | Week 2 and beyond | | | |
| Emer-gency Shelter | Temp-orary Shelter | Temp-orary Housing | Perm-anent Housing | Emer-gency Shelter | Temp-orary Shelter | Temp-orary Housing | Perm-anent Housing |
| Emergency  Shelter | .60 | .40 | .00 | .00 | .50 | .50 | .00 | .00 |
| Temporary  Shelter | .00 | .90 | .10 | .00 | .00 | .90 | .10 | .00 |
| Temporary  Housing | .00 | .00 | .95 | .05 | .00 | .00 | .95 | .05 |
| Permanent  Housing | .03 | .05 | .00 | .92 | .00 | .00 | .00 | 1.00 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Problem Perceived To Be Large | Anglo | Black | Hispanic | Total |
| Dealing with mortgage companies about insurance money | 68 | 49 | 68 | 64\* |
| Dealing with building inspectors | 52 | 38 | 76 | 63\* |
| Living in damaged home | 59 | 63 | 59 | 60 |
| Neighborhood conditions | 55 | 60 | 39 | 47\* |
| Living in temporary quarters | 45 | 61 | 38 | 46\* |
| Dealing with insurance companies | 33 | 26 | 48 | 40\* |
| Dealing with contractors | 38 | 18 | 45 | 37\* |
| Unemployment | 11 | 29 | 30 | 25\* |
| Household finances | 14 | 40 | 20 | 22\* |
| Neighborhood crime | 34 | 23 | 16 | 22\* |
| Transportation | 2 | 28 | 17 | 16\* |
| Job relocation | 7 | 21 | 17 | 15 |
| Dealing with agencies | 11 | 20 | 13 | 15 |
| Behavioral problems with children | 19 | 18 | 10 | 14 |
| Family violence | 17 | 11 | 5 | 9\* |
| Gain of member(s) | 14 | 0 | 4 | 5\* |
| Loss of member(s) | 4 | 0 | 13 | 4 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Businesses Change (%) | | Employees Change (%) | | Sales Volume Change (%) | |
| Industry | Florida City | Homestead | Florida City | Homestead | Florida City | Homestead |
| Agriculture | -71 | +4 | -92 | +74 | -93 | +66 |
| Construction | 0 | -20 | +12 | -20 | +12 | -59 |
| Manufacturing | 0 | -12 | -67 | -19 | -59 | -32 |
| Transportation/  communication | -50 | +9 | -100 | +4 | -26 | +51 |
| Wholesale trade | -60 | -4 | -50 | +6 | -84 | +57 |
| Retail trade | -64 | -2 | -84 | +16 | -84 | -5 |
| Finance/  insurance/real estate | -20 | 0 | -59 | -1 | -32 | -32 |
| Business services | -63 | +6 | -94 | -5 | -65 | -14 |
| Professional services | -45 | -3 | -73 | +16 | -69 | +1 |
| Public administration | -50 | +38 | -69 | +7 | n/a\* | n/a\* |

*any* insurance because they cannot afford quality insurance or were denied access to it because of “redlining” (Peacock & Girard, 1997).

In addition to these institutional problems, there are cognitive obstacles to developing a comprehensive hazard insurance program. Building on earlier hazards research (see Burton, et al., 1993, for a summary) and psychological research on judgment and decisionmaking (see Slovic, et al., 1974, for an early statement and Baron, 2000, or Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002, for more recent summaries), researchers have identified numerous logical deficiencies in the ways people process information in laboratory studies of risk.

One important issue concerns what economists call moral hazard and psychologists refer to as a felt lack of personal responsibility for protection. The concept of moral hazard/felt responsibility for personal protection has important policy implications because the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee (1994) report concluded federal disaster relief policy creates this condition by relieving households of the responsibility for providing their own disaster recovery resources. This might be a significant reason why only 20% of structures affected by the 1993 Mississippi floods were insured. However, there appears to be no data on the extent to which households explicitly consider the availability of disaster relief in making decisions about whether to purchase hazard insurance and adopt other hazard adjustments.

**Non Governmental Organizations and Community Based Organizations**

The role of NGOs such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Mennonite Disaster Service is widely publicized and the role of CBOs such as local churches and service organizations is increasingly recognized. These organizations provide housing, food, clothing, medicine, and financial assistance to disaster victims. In most cases, the *existing* government social service agencies are supplemented by NGOs that *expand* their membership to perform the tasks they are expected to perform during disaster recovery (Dynes, 1970). By contrast, existing CBOs typically *extend* themselves beyond their normal tasks to perform novel activities. In addition, there are situations in which existing, expanding, and extending organizations cannot successfully meet the recovery needs of disaster victims. In such cases, government agencies, NGOs, and CBOs form an *Unmet Needs Committee,* which is an *emergent* organization that is designed to serve those whose needs are not being addressed by existing programs.

In some cases, the need for such emergent organizations arises from political organization and activism by population segments that believe they are being neglected (Morrow & Peacock, 1997; Phillips, 1993a). Local authorities should anticipate recovery demands, plan for an *Unmet Needs Committee,* and communicate its existence throughout the community. When emergent organizations do arise, they can be incorporated into the ongoing recovery management process in order to learn from their knowledge about the unmet needs and ensure that there is an equitable distribution of disaster recovery resources. For a more detailed discussion of NGO activities in disaster recovery, see Smith (2004).

# Local Government Recovery Functions

After a disaster, local government needs to perform many tasks very quickly, and many of these must be performed simultaneously. It is therefore critical to plan for disaster recovery, as well as for disaster response (Schwab, et al., 1998). The line between emergency response and disaster recovery is not clear because some sectors of the community might be in response mode while others are moving into recovery, and some organizations will be carrying on both types of activity at the same time. This means that there will be little time to plan for disaster recovery once the emergency response has begun. By planning for recovery before disaster strikes, resources can be allocated more effectively and efficiently, increasing the probability of a rapid and full recovery. The following discussion is based on the concept of preimpact planning for disaster recovery because a lack of planning will delay decisions about the allocation of recovery resources and the procedures by which they will be used. A lack of preimpact planning can also increase the probability of conflicts arising due to competition over scarce resources during the recovery period.

The previous sections of this chapter have described the tasks that households and businesses perform during disaster recovery and the resources they use to implement this recovery. When households and businesses lack the knowledge of how to recover or the resources needed to recover, government can provide assistance. Local government must also perform specific tasks during disaster recovery, some of which involve restoring services it performed before the disaster (e.g., providing functioning roads, street lights and signs, and traffic control devices). In addition, local government must rebuild any critical facilities (e.g., police and fire stations) that were damaged or destroyed. Finally, local government has a heightened need to perform its regulatory functions regarding land use and building construction. These two functions require rapid action under conditions of a greatly multiplied workload, so special provisions are required to expedite the procedures for reviewing and approving the (re)development of private property.

In approaching the task of preimpact recovery planning, a community must overcome three major misconceptions about disaster recovery. The first misconception is that the entire recovery effort can be improvised after the emergency response is complete. In fact, a timely and effective disaster recovery requires a significant amount of data collection and planning that will delay the recovery if they are postponed until after the emergency response is over. It is important to recognize that the disaster response phase’s uncertainty and urgency about human safety has been replaced by households’ and businesses’ urgency to return to normal patterns of functioning and government agencies’ uncertainty about how to organize the community to accomplish this.

The second misconception is that there will be ample time to collect data and plan the recovery during the emergency response. It is true that some recovery relevant data must be collected during the emergency response. However, an assessment of “lessons learned” from the disaster impact should be used to guide a recovery process that has been designed before the disaster strikes. Finally, the third misconception is that the objective of disaster recovery should be to restore the community to the conditions that existed before the disaster. As noted earlier, this will simply reproduce the community’s existing disaster vulnerability.

In many ways, the process of preparedness for disaster recovery is quite similar to the process of preparedness for emergency response. Thus, the community should establish a Recovery/Mitigation Committee before disaster strikes that will establish a vision of community disaster recovery and articulate the basic strategies that will be implemented before and after disaster impact. In addition, the committee should assign each recovery function to a specific organization, develop a Recovery Operations Plan (ROP), and acquire any necessary resources to implement it. Finally, the committee should conduct the training and tabletop exercises needed to ensure the ROP can be implemented effectively.

*The Recovery/Mitigation Committee*

The LEMC’s Recovery/Mitigation Committee can be an important part of an effective, rapid disaster recovery process. As noted in Chapter 3, this committee should be established before a disaster during the preimpact recovery planning process. Personnel should be designated to serve on this committee, including a chairperson and a lead agency, usually the local planning department. The jurisdiction’s Chief Administrative Officer, usually the city mayor or the county executive, should publish a planning directive, and the Recovery/Mitigation Committee chairperson should establish a planning schedule. Many government agencies should participate in the Recovery/Mitigation Committee, including the directors of the local planning, building, public works, engineering, parks and recreation, economic development, finance, housing, and social services departments, as well as the jurisdiction’s PIO (Schwab, et al., 1998). In addition, there should be representatives from local utility companies, other local business organizations, religious and charitable organizations, and representatives of neighborhood associations.

The Recovery/Mitigation Committee should examine the findings from the community HVA to identify the locations having the highest levels of hazard exposure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. The committee should begin to work with the rest of the community, and especially with those at greatest risk, to formulate a vision of the disaster recovery it intends to implement.

Next, the committee should develop an ROP that integrates the likely disaster impacts, community goals, and public and private sector capabilities within the community. In addition, the ROP should identify external sources of assistance (federal, state, NGO), recognize their loan/grant requirements, and integrate these into a comprehensive program of disaster assistance. The committee should also develop a financial plan for responding to the disaster. Bolin (1993) reported that city revenues from a heavily damaged central business district were 5% of total revenues before the earthquake, declined sharply in the year after the earthquake, and took about four years to return to previous level. This clearly affects the jurisdiction’s tax revenues.

Moreover, the committee should establish agreements with NGOs and CBOs (especially local churches, neighborhood associations, and other citizens’ groups) for support in disaster recovery because these organizations provide financial and in-kind support, as well as legal and technical assistance. After a disaster strikes, the Recovery/Mitigation Committee should ensure that organizations respond within the scope of their responsibilities to implement the ROP.

*Envisioning a Community Recovery Strategy*

The Recovery/Mitigation Committee needs to work with the community before and after a disaster to articulate a vision of community disaster recovery. The recovery process needs to strike a balance between corporate centered and community based economic development (Bingham, 2000). According to a *corporate centered economic development*, usually advocated by the local business community, government provides resources such as land and money to the private sector to invest without any restrictions. This market based strategy tends to produce results that are good in aggregate but produces an inequitable recovery. By contrast, *community based economic development* involves active participation by government to ensure that the benefits of recovery will also be shared by economically disadvantaged segments of the community.

The short term recovery following a major disaster can generate an economic boom as state and federal money flows into the community to reconstruct damaged buildings and infrastructure. These funds are used to pay for construction materials and the construction workforce and, to the extent that the materials and labor are acquired locally, they generate local revenues. In addition, the building suppliers hire additional workers and these, along with the construction workers, spend their wages on places to live, food to eat, and entertainment. Unless there are undamaged communities within commuting distance that can compete for this money, it will all be spent within the community.

Communities must also consider the long term economic consequences of disaster recovery. What will happen after the reconstruction boom is over? They can attract new businesses if they have a skilled labor pool and good schools—especially colleges whose faculty and students can support knowledge based industries. Other assets include low crime rates, low cost of living, good housing, and environmental amenities such as mountains, rivers, or lakes (Blakely, 2000). A community can also enhance its economic base if it can attract businesses that are compatible with the ones that are already there. Such firms can be identified by asking existing firms to identify their suppliers and distributors. These new firms might be attracted by the newer buildings and enhanced infrastructure that has been produced during disaster reconstruction.

If a disaster stricken community does not already have such assets, they can invest in four fundamental components of economic development—locality development, business development, human resources development, and community development. *Locality development* enhances a community’s existing physical assets by improving roads or establishing parks on river and lakefronts. *Business development* involves efforts to retain existing businesses or attract new ones. Although it is not easy, this can be accomplished working with businesses to identify their critical needs. In some cases, this might involve establishing a business incubator that allows startup companies to obtain low cost space and share meetings rooms. *Human resources development* expands the skilled workforce, possibly through customized worker training. Finally, *community development* utilizes NGOs, CBOs, and local firms that will hire current residents of the community whose household incomes are below the poverty level. For example, a comprehensive program for developing small businesses, affordable housing, community health clinics, and inexpensive child care can help to eliminate some of what new businesses might consider to be one of the risks of relocating to the community.

*Developing a Recovery Operations Plan*

As was the case with emergency response, the demands of disaster recovery imply that specific functions be performed. Table 11-6 identifies four principal disaster recovery functions—disaster assessment, short term recovery, long term reconstruction, and recovery management. The recovery phase’s disaster assessment function should be integrated with the emergency response phase’s emergency assessment function in identifying the physical impacts of the disaster. Short term recovery focuses on the immediate tasks of securing the impact area, housing victims, and establishing conditions under which households and businesses can begin the process of recovery. Long term reconstruction actually implements the reconstruction of the disaster impact area and manages the disaster’s psychological, demographic, economic, and political impacts. Finally, recovery management monitors the performance of the disaster assessment, short term recovery, and long term reconstruction functions. It also ensures they are coordinated and provides the resources needed to accomplish them. The following section describes each of these functions in greater detail.

**Table 11-6**.Disaster Recovery Functions.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Disaster Assessment* |  |
| Rapid assessment | Victims’ needs assessments |
| Preliminary damage assessment | “Lessons learned” |
| Site assessment |  |
| *Short Term Recovery* |  |
| Impact area security | Emergency demolition |
| Temporary shelter/housing | Repair permitting |
| Infrastructure restoration | Donations management |
| Debris management | Disaster assistance |
| *Long Term Reconstruction* |  |
| Hazard source control and area protection | Infrastructure resilience |
| Land use practices | Historic preservation |
| Building construction practices | Environmental recovery |
| Public health/mental health recovery | Disaster memorialization |
| Economic development |  |
| *Recovery Management* |  |
| Agency notification and mobilization | Public information |
| Mobilization of recovery facilities and equipment | Recovery legal authority and financing |
| Internal direction and control | Administrative and logistical support |
| External coordination | Documentation |

*Disaster Assessment*

Disaster assessment includes both physical and social impact assessment. Physical impact assessment, which is usually called *damage assessment*, must address residential, commercial, and industrial buildings. In addition, there is a need to conduct damage assessment for infrastructure such as water, sewer, electric power, fuel, transportation, and telecommunications systems. Finally, damage assessment also must address critical facilities such as hospitals, police stations, and fire stations. In addition, there is a need for social impact assessment, usually called victims’ needs assessment to assure that the available recovery programs are meeting victims’ needs. Finally, “lessons learned” examines the disaster’s physical and social impacts to identify ways in which the mitigation actions can be taken to reduce the community’s hazard vulnerability.

*Damage assessment*. There are three basic types of damage assessment (FEMA, 1995c). The first type, *rapid assessment*, is usually conducted during the emergency response, preferably within the first 24 hours (Schwab, et al., 1998). The purpose of rapid assessment is to identify the areas affected by the disaster and the approximate magnitude of the disaster’s physical impacts. It is especially important to assess the need for lifesaving activities very quickly, so rapid assessment should be completed within one to three hours after disaster impact. In turn, this allows emergency managers to determine where there are collapsed buildings requiring search and rescue operations and whether there is a potential for secondary impacts such as hazmat releases after an earthquake. Rapid assessment also provides information about the status of infrastructure and critical facilities, as well as whether there is likely to be a need for assistance from other local jurisdictions or other levels of government. A rapid assessment is performed by available police, fire, and public works personnel—both on shift and recalled to duty—to conduct assessments in predetermined geographic sectors of the community. Supplementary data can be provided for a rapid assessment from the private sector organizations that own or operate lifelines and critical facilities.

The second type of assessment is the *preliminary damage assessment*, which is designed to produce counts of destroyed, severely damaged, moderately damaged, and slightly damaged structures. This level of assessment should be completed within a 3-4 days, depending on the size and accessibility of the impact area and the number and prior training of the damage assessment teams. The data from the preliminary damage assessment are used to support requests for state and federal disaster declarations. A preliminary damage assessment is performed by having local government personnel perform *windshield surveys* by driving along all of the streets in the impact area (as the name suggests, they do not get out of their cars). Inspectors tally counts of damaged structures, with residential structures being classified by income levels and structural categories (single family, mobile home, multifamily residential structures). Buildings can then be tagged red, yellow, or green depending on the level of damage and occupant safety, with red tagged buildings being unsuitable for occupancy. A preliminary damage assessment should also include estimates of percentages of households with insurance coverage because this will affect the speed with which affected individuals and communities are able to replace their housing.

Finally, a *site assessment* is meant to produce detailed estimates of the cost to repair or replace each affected structure. This information is used to support requests for federal assistance to the owners of the damaged property. It includes estimates of losses to residential properties in order to understand both the level of need for temporary shelter and temporary housing and for repair assistance. Losses to commercial and industrial structures are assessed in order to understand the level of need for repair assistance and economic injury assistance. Losses to public property must be assessed in order for the community to apply for repair assistance. Site assessments require technically trained personnel such as architects, structural engineers, and building inspectors for multistory structures such as apartment buildings. These personnel can usually be drawn from city staff, but additional personnel might be recruited from other local organizations or obtained from outside the community (e.g., through mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions or memoranda of agreement with professional societies). Skilled construction professionals can be supplemented by volunteers who can conduct site assessments for most single family residences if they have been trained in the use of well designed checklists. A site assessment might take weeks to complete, depending on the size and accessibility of the impact area as well as the number and training level of the assessment personnel. These methods of damage assessment can be compared to the procedures of cost estimation that are used in routine construction projects, as shown in Table 11-7.

**Table 11-7**. Types of Postdisaster Damage Assessments.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Damage Assessment | Routine Construction Cost Estimation |
| Rapid Damage Assessment |  |
| Preliminary Damage Assessment |  |
| Site Assessment | Preliminary Cost Estimate |
|  | Detailed Cost Estimate |

In preparing for the necessary damage assessments, staff from local government departments should be assigned to Damage Assessment Teams (DATs). Their numbers should be augmented as needed by staff from local private sector organizations and neighboring jurisdictions through memoranda of agreement (MOAs) or other contractual arrangements. All DAT members should be trained in a common assessment procedure in order to speed up the process and generate results that are comparable across all DATs within the jurisdiction.

*Victims’ needs assessment*. The effects of disasters are not confined to physical damage. In addition, affected communities must assess the needs of those individuals and groups who have lost property, been injured, or lost family members. This procedure, called a *victims’ needs assessment*, should begin during the preimpact recovery planning process. The first step is to identify the community’s vulnerable segments, which may be defined as specific locations and neighborhoods, or types of households and businesses. The local jurisdiction should assign staff to Victims’ Needs Assessment Teams (VNATs) and supplement them with staff from other organizations. These supplementary staff should be assigned by contract with NGOs and CBOs and trained together with the government staff in methods of victims’ needs assessment.

The need for public assistance to finance household and business recovery is inversely related to the savings rate. That is, the lower the savings rate, the higher the need for public assistance. Unfortunately, the savings rate in the US has been extremely low for the past decade, so the VNATs should be prepared to find large numbers of households and businesses needing recovery assistance. In addition to housing needs, VNATs should also be prepared to identify households’ needs for employment and other economic assistance (e.g., food, clothing, and other basic needs), as well as their psychological needs. If they are given adequate preimpact training, VNAT team members will be knowledgeable about the availability of local, state, federal, and NGO disaster recovery programs. In turn, this will enable them to accurately diagnose victims’ needs and refer them to the appropriate recovery programs.

*“Lessons learned”*. Unless the Recovery/Mitigation Committee establishes evaluation procedures, few lessons are likely to be learned and applied to improving the community’s resilience. Therefore, it should establish a “Lessons Learned” subcommittee, procedures for studying the event, and a well defined scope for its report. The recovery team should use the damage assessment as an opportunity to determine what are the ways, if any, that the jurisdiction should modify its land use plan, building code, and other community operations in the light of the disaster impact. Other issues to be considered should include infrastructure location and replacement, the capital improvements program, and the provisions of the ROP itself. The delivery date of the report should be set fairly early in the recovery process, perhaps 30 days after the disaster, so its recommendations can be incorporated into the recovery process. This should be an adequate amount of time to collect data, deliberate the implications, and make recommendations for policy revision if the jurisdiction has declared a 30 day moratorium on reconstruction.

*Short Term Recovery*

*Impact area security and reentry.* First, there is a need to maintain security in the impact area to ensure residents do not return before it is safe to do so and also to protect vulnerable property from the threat of looting. Addressing these issues requires jurisdictions to develop procedures for residents’ reentry. Unfortunately, there is little research on ending evacuations to guide the planning process (Stallings, 1991), but there is anecdotal evidence of problems that have arisen after disasters. The available evidence indicates a need to provide for temporary reentry to remove essential items (e.g., clothing and medications) and permanent reentry for continuous habitation. In both cases, hazardous conditions must have abated sufficiently to allow people to enter safely. In some cases, hazard abatement might include the demolition of severely damaged buildings and the removal of heavy debris. In addition, proper identification listing a local address is needed to ensure only residents or authorized reconstruction personnel are allowed to enter. Finally, a jurisdiction must establish basic habitability criteria, such as the restoration of transportation and sewer systems. It is possible to allow people to return before electric power is available because some people have their own generators, but the criteria should be established ahead of time. If the disaster has had a regional impact, reentry should be coordinated with neighboring jurisdictions.

*Temporary population shelter/housing*. As indicated in the discussion of households’ housing recovery, victims first find temporary shelter in the homes of friends and relatives, commercial facilities such hotels and motels, or mass care facilities such as auditoriums and gymnasiums. The evidence is clear that the majority of evacuees prefer the homes of friends and relatives. Among those whose friends and relatives are either too far away or are themselves victims, the more affluent choose commercial facilities and the poor—usually 10-25% of the evacuees—stay in mass care facilities (Mileti, et al., 1992).

Mass care facilities must accommodate differences due to age (elderly and children), ethnicity, and physical limitations (e.g., mobility). Such facilities make it difficult to accommodate household differences in such behaviors as personal sanitation, privacy, child rearing, and hours and loudness of social interaction. They also place increased demands on time for other tasks, which reduces time for child care, resulting in loss of control over children. Lack of personal space and privacy consistently generate ethnic and class tensions among those in mass shelters and closely spaced semiprivate shelters such as tents (Yelvington, 1997). Operation of mass care facilities can be especially complex after major disasters in urban areas. In such cases, there will be a need for a large contingent of local multilingual volunteers to assist in multiethnic communities and enough people to provide continued staffing for a long duration displacement. Emergency managers can expect thousands of volunteers in first few weeks, but there are likely to be dramatic drops in volunteerism after the second week (Yelvington, 1997). Crowding and stress make it important to maintain transparency in making decisions about facility operation and to establish procedures for coping with predisaster homeless, construction workers, and others who do not qualify for shelter and housing (Bolin, 1993).

The incentives for moving from temporary shelter to temporary housing should be obvious. “Doubling up” with friends and relatives eventually causes friction in interpersonal relationships, commercial facilities are a drain on family finances, and mass care facilities are crowded, noisy, and lack the privacy to which people are accustomed. When the number of displaced households is less than the vacancy rate for affordable housing within commuting time of jobs, the existing housing market can accommodate the relocation. To the degree that there are few vacancies, the rental rates are high, or the commuting time is excessive (either because of the travel distance or because crowded routes decrease average driving speed), government is likely to be called upon to increase the stock of temporary housing by bringing in mobile homes.

The ROP should recognize that the need for temporary housing increases in importance as the size of the socially vulnerable population increases, especially when there is a limited amount of affordable housing outside the impact area. The number of displaced households will be compounded by those evicted from undamaged homes because they lost their jobs and could not make rental or mortgage payments. In a major urban area struck by a large scope disaster, this could be thousands of mobile homes. Where will these be located—on victims’ lots (utilities already installed, maintains neighborhood integrity, allows supervision of reconstruction) or in mobile home parks? If trailer parks are established, local officials should try to reduce social friction by locating people within kin and friendship networks to the greatest extent possible.

*Temporary business operation*. Just as households need temporary housing, so too do businesses need temporary operating locations when their normal locations have been severely damaged or destroyed. Many small businesses have customers who are loyal enough to travel an extra distance, but loyalty does have its limits. Consequently, government might need to permit the establishment of temporary business operations in parking lots or other open spaces that are close to the displaced businesses’ normal locations. The ROP should also identify sites for temporary housing and temporary business operations, which may be needed for as much as a year (and even longer in some cases).

*Infrastructure restoration*. There are often many households and businesses that cannot resume normal functioning simply because of the lack of potable water, sewer, electric power, fuel, telecommunications, or transportation—not because of damage to their homes or places of business. Consequently, there is a need to inspect and repair any damage to pipelines and power lines, as well as streets, bridges, street signs, and street lights. In addition to returning these households and businesses to normal functioning, restoration of infrastructure to these areas also provides places where emergency workers and construction crews can live while they are rebuilding the structures that have been damaged or destroyed. On the other hand, generating a rapid economic recovery might suggest a different set of priorities—emphasizing the restoration of infrastructure for the area’s dominant export industries. Thus, there are likely to be conflicting priorities and few easy decisions. Consequently, priorities must be established in the preimpact recovery plan with links to the damage assessment procedures that allow the recovery managers to adapt the predetermined infrastructure restoration priorities to the needs of each specific situation.

*Critical facility operation*. It should be quite obvious that there will be a need to quickly repair critical facilities such as hospitals, police stations, and fire stations. However, a community’s public infrastructure is also served by other critical facilities such as water treatment plants, transit bus barns, public works equipment yards, and government offices. There is also privately operated infrastructure that includes electric power stations, television and radio facilities (both stations and broadcast towers), and telephone switching facilities. An inventory of these facilities should be available from the hazard/vulnerability analysis.

*Debris management*. Most of the natural disasters, and explosions among the technological disasters, can destroy a substantial number of structures. In turn, this can produce an enormous amount of debris that must be removed. Debris management should designate temporary sites for sorting recyclable from nonrecyclable materials, with the latter being moved to permanent sites for disposal. Debris management is complicated in situations where evidence must be gathered in a systematic manner as in investigations of accidents (e.g., National Transportation Safety Board investigations of airline crashes or train derailments) or when the site is be considered a possible crime scene (e.g., the bombing of the Murrah Federal building Oklahoma City). In such cases, debris removal is likely to be delayed, so temporary sorting sites will be needed to separate out material evidence from useless debris. Ultimately, a catastrophic event such as the World Trade Center collapse or Hurricane Katrina can produce millions of tons of debris that can overwhelm landfill capacity.

*Emergency demolition*. It is likely that some structures will be damaged severely enough to pose a threat of collapse, so procedures are needed to rapidly assess their stability and determine if they should be reinforced and rebuilt or demolished. This assessment clearly requires competent structural engineering assistance, but historic preservationists should also be consulted if the building has cultural significance (Donaldson, 1998). Indeed, historic structures should be surveyed and inventoried before disaster strikes and postimpact damage assessment procedures should be developed to avoid unnecessary demolition of damaged historic structures (Kariotis, 1998; Kimmelman, 1998). The ROP should establish policies that include criteria for emergency demolition of severely damaged structures and adequate notification for owners who might have evacuated. In addition, the implementing procedures should contain samples of the contracts to be signed with demolition companies. These contracts require the involvement of the jurisdiction’s legal counsel to ensure the administrative process respects personal property rights.

*Repair permitting*. The ROP should contain criteria for determining which structures will be eligible for reoccupancy based upon the percent damage to the different elements of the building—foundation, wall, and roof systems, exterior walls, interior walls, floors and flooring materials, plumbing, electrical systems, HVAC systems. The large number of requests for building repair permits following a disaster can overwhelm a local code enforcement department (Schwab, et al., 1998). In preparation for this eventuality, the permit office staff should be augmented with staff from other jurisdictions and the private sector as needed. In addition, the ROP should establish an emergency permitting process that includes 10 day moratorium on minor repairs and a 30 day moratorium on permits for substantial repairs involving 50% or more of the preimpact property assessment. This allows time for the city to acquire enough staff to evaluate the properties and areas involved and establish policies for improving the building stock as needed. Of course, exemptions may be needed for reconstruction of critical facilities. The process should be streamlined as much as possible by, for example, placing permit staff in a DAC. The streamlined process should be continued for a limited time period, often 90 days after impact, that has been defined in the ROP. Local jurisdictions should consider deferring application fees during this period.

ROPs for urban areas should anticipate the possibility of developers purchasing many damaged single family residences in the expectation of replacing them with apartment buildings. To avoid this problem, one city established a five month moratorium on applications for construction of new apartments. It also established restrictions on new buildings to ensure a Design Review Board could exclude building designs that were incompatible with the character of the neighborhoods in which they were to be constructed.

*Donations management*. Major disasters frequently produce an outpouring of material (rather than financial) assistance from households and businesses outside the impact area. There is usually a substantial amount of useful material in these donations, but there also is a substantial amount of junk. Dynes (1970) and others have listed donations such as women’s formal gowns, parkas (after summer disasters in the South), outdated medicines, and other items that impede the recovery by diverting personnel to the task of sorting through the donations. Even useful items must be sorted. For example, donated clothing must be sorted by category, gender appropriateness, and size. It is common for victims to reject food donations because these items are incompatible with local tastes and to refuse specific types of temporary housing because the buildings are incompatible with local cultural preferences or climatic conditions. Another problem with donations is that an influx of useful material resources precludes the need to buy from local businesses, thus threatening their revenues. Thus, in most cases, financial donations are preferable to material donations. Since material donations will inevitably arrive, local emergency managers need procedures to manage them. One important component of a donations management procedure is to establish a staging area outside the impact area where incoming donations can be received, sorted, and prepared for delivery to locations where they will be made available to disaster victims.

*Disaster assistance*. Under normal circumstances, people rarely need to visit government agencies. Moreover, when they do make these visits, they only need to visit one agency. During disaster recovery, however, people often need to contact multiple agencies within a short period of time. Moreover, the large number of other people attempting to visit each of those agencies and the small number of staff available to process the contacts results in long lines. In some disasters, these problems have been compounded by the periodic movement of agencies field offices from one location to another during the course of the disaster recovery. Consequently, it is important for local emergency managers to provide “one-stop shopping” so victims can resolve all of their needs at a single location that is maintained throughout the short term recovery period. It is also important that the location be readily accessible by public transportation and that additional staff be recruited and trained to minimize victims’ processing delays. The ROP should also designate DAC sites that are capable of housing financial aid assistance (including grants, loans, and tax deductions/deferrals), in-kind assistance (food, clothes, bedding), and legal and technical assistance. The ROP should identify primary and augmentation staff for all of these sites, including the donations management, debris sorting, debris disposal sites, and the DACs.

*Long Term Reconstruction*

As Chapter 3 indicated, a disaster usually opens a window of opportunity for changes in environmental hazard management policy (Prater & Lindell, 2000). If the Recovery/Mitigation Committee has “done its homework”, it will already have assessed the community’s hazard exposure, physical vulnerability, and social vulnerability. In addition, it will be well prepared with suggestions for ways in which to reduce future risks by integrating hazard mitigation into disaster recovery (Schwab, et al., 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004). Finally, the committee should identify sources of funding for the mitigation projects they propose.

*Hazard source control and area protection*. The Recovery/Mitigation Committee should have begun to examine the prospects for hazard source control and area protection before a disaster strikes and continue this effort in the immediate aftermath. As indicated in Chapter 7, these mitigation strategies are not feasible for some hazards. The committee should anticipate induced growth in the protected area if hazard source control or area protection measures are implemented. However, linking the new source control or area protection measures to changes in the land use and building construction practices within the affected areas can avoid the expected increase in future vulnerability.

*Land use practices*. Implementation of long term reconstruction planning means setting in motion any changes in land use policies that were developed during the preimpact recovery planning process. This is also an opportune time to reexamine the community’s existing land use plans and to pass new ordinances that will reduce hazard exposure. Alternative land uses can reduce the total population and property at risk, sometimes by reducing development in high hazard areas. This can be accomplished by purchasing private property, purchasing development rights, relocating public facilities and other infrastructure away from hazardous areas, and redirecting new capital improvements away from hazardous areas. Road width and access regulations might also need to be established or revised at this stage. Lot restrictions can be used to reduce population densities by downzoning and setbacks can be used to maximize distances from hazards. Landscaping and vegetation requirements can be established to reduce the potential for flooding, landslides, or fires. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ROP should provide guidance on the reconstruction of *nonconforming uses*, which are structures that do not meet the zoning requirements for their geographic areas. Usually these are older structures whose construction preceded the establishment of the current zoning requirements and, thus, are “grandfathered”.

*Building construction practices*. The ROP should also address the implementation of new mitigation requirements such as elevating structures located in floodplains. Other building codes can also reduce the physical impact of a disaster on structures located in risk areas. These include increasing disaster resistance of the building structure and increasing the resistance of “soft spots” in the structure. In addition to addressing new code requirements, the ROP should also address the building construction process. In particular, virtually every disaster produces complaints about out of area building contractors who receive advance payment for work that never performed. Thus, the ROP should address the need to monitor them—especially by registering out-of-area contractors and providing contract advice to owners of damaged property. Care should be taken to ensure regulation of outside contractors and construction workers does not impede the ability of NGOs such as Habitat for Humanity to use volunteer labor from out of the area to assist in the reconstruction effort. The ROP needs to balance the legitimate interests of local contractors against the needs of the community for rapid provision of affordable housing for low income residents (Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997).

*Public health/mental health recovery*. Most natural disasters in the US have had minimal public health consequences because the country has few endemic diseases whose incidence is likely to increase after a disaster. Contrary to many people’s beliefs, dead bodies are a public health threat only if those who died had communicable diseases when they were alive. Death itself does not spontaneously generate disease. Waterborne illnesses are a problem if survivors drink from, wash food in, or bathe in water sources that have been contaminated by raw sewage or chemical spills. Of course, such exposures can be avoided by having survivors use bottled water or by evacuating the impact area until infrastructure has been restored. Disease vectors other than ingestion must also be controlled in areas where pests harbor diseases. For example, mosquito control has become increasingly important as mosquito transmitted diseases, such as West Nile virus, have become increasingly prevalent.

Similarly, natural disasters produce minimal mental health consequences. Clinical psychologists found nearly 20 years ago that few victims use formal psychological services in the aftermath of disaster (Gist & Stolz, 1982). Since that time, an extensive research has confirmed that finding (Salzer & Bickman, 1999). This has led many psychologists examine the typical problems victims face and, in so doing, found that the two most prominent are material resource loss (Freedy, et al., 1992) and disruption of social networks (Kaniasty & Norris, 1995). The first of these problems, material resource loss, is addressed by the programs for housing and economic recovery. However, mental health professionals can facilitate the recovery process by acting as victim advocates, especially for victims who are unaccustomed to working with white collar bureaucracies (Salzer & Bickman, 1999). Other recommendations include designing community interventions to provide social support by establishing victim locator systems, facilitating self-help groups, and community organizing (Salzer & Bickman, 1999)

Nonetheless, others have concluded that the failure to seek formal psychological counseling is a potential threat to the mental health of victims and even first responders. In connection with the latter, Mitchell (1983) developed a system called the *Critical Incident Stress Debriefing*, which involves preincident training, individual crisis support, demobilization (e.g., informational debriefings as personnel rotate off duty), defusing (small group discussions about the emotional significance of the event), family support, and referral to other support services (e.g., psychiatric, psychological, legal, career). Despite its proponents claims of empirical support for this method, the most rigorous scientific evaluations have found no evidence of its effectiveness (McNally, Bryant & Ehlers, 2003). One problem seems to be that establishing a rigid schedule for victims to discuss traumatic events disrupts their ability to control the alternation between psychological phases of active processing and avoidance (Pennebaker & Harber, 1993). A related problem is the requirement for group discussion with their professional peers shortly after the event (usually within 12 hours). In the case of emergency responders, this conflicts with their preference for seeking support from spouses and others outside the workplace (Gist, et al., 1999). Thus, there appears to be no scientific justification to plan for anything other than routine referrals for psychological distress.

*Economic development*. The ROP should provide guidance on the economic development of the disaster stricken areas. The basic strategy for redevelopment should have been planned during the process of envisioning the community recovery strategy. Thus, this is the time at which the strategy is implemented. In communities that are highly dependent on tourism, active promotion is needed to assure prospective visitors that all facilities are back in operation.

*Infrastructure resilience*. One opportunity that is likely to arise during disaster recovery is an opportunity to decrease the physical vulnerability of community infrastructure. In most cases, roads and bridges can be strengthened. Similarly, aboveground lines can be undergrounded to reduce their vulnerability to wind and ice. In some cases, pipelines for water, sewer, and fuel and major transmission lines for electric power and telephone can be rerouted to reduce vulnerability. However, most of these lifelines must pass through high hazard exposure areas at some point. For example, all lifelines must cross seismic faults to serve customers on the other side. All of these lifelines are critical to a community’s disaster resilience, so preimpact planning or postimpact improvisation should provide for rerouting and strengthening infrastructure to decrease its vulnerability to future disasters.

*Historic preservation*. The disaster recovery period is an opportune time to examine the physical vulnerability of undamaged historic structures to determine how to protect them from future disasters (Cliver, 1998). The federal government has funds, as do many states, for the preservation of historic buildings. However, the affected community must initiate the process by recognizing the value of these structures and investing time and money into their preservation (Alfaro, 1998).

*Environmental remediation*. Hazmat spills are an increasing problem during natural disasters and the process of cleaning up oil and chemical spills could take months (Lindell & Perry, 1997b; Showalter & Myers, 1994). In most cases, such work will be performed by specialized contractors hired by state or federal government. However, such efforts should be coordinated with local personnel from the department of public health, land use planning, or fire/hazmat response.

*Disaster memorialization*. Disaster recovery is a critical time in the life of a community. In the case of major loss of life or of major damage to a community’s stock of historic buildings, the sense of loss can be tremendous. Communities frequently derive some collective solace from the establishment of a memorial structure or for the definition of a memorial day to be commemorated annually. These disaster memorials can play an important part in the recovery of a community’s sense of identity and pride. Thus, they should be considered when a community has suffered a traumatic event. They must be planned and developed in a carefully designed, transparent, and participatory process in order to be effective instruments of community healing. In most disasters, the Recovery/Mitigation Committee should seek representation from a wide range of religious and secular groups. In some cases, the 9/11 World Trade Center attack being one of many examples, a committee of victims’ families has exerted substantial influence on the memorialization process.

*Recovery Management*

*Agency notification and mobilization*. Unlike the incident management function performed during emergency response, the recovery management function performed during the disaster recovery does not require special procedures for agency notification and mobilization because agencies will be well aware of the disaster by the time recovery is initiated. The rapid assessment noted earlier might seem like a counterexample, but this task is actually part of the emergency response.

*Mobilization of recovery facilities and equipment*. Recovery management does require the mobilization of recovery facilities for donations management, debris management, and disaster assistance (the DACs). As noted earlier, a community with a large population of displaced victims and a small housing vacancy rate might need to develop one or more mobile home parks to provide enough temporary housing. Rapid mobilization of such facilities requires preimpact screening to identify appropriate sites. Site selection criteria should, of course, include suitable zoning and access to utilities such as water/sewer, fuel and electricity. In addition, planners should also focus on sites that have access to public transportation and close proximity to the types of jobs that will be held by a low income population.

*Internal direction and control*. There is a need for internal direction and control among agencies within the jurisdiction because many aspects of the recovery process require multiagency coordination. Disaster recovery typically involves local government agencies in tasks that are more like their normal duties than is the case for the emergency response. Thus, the ROP’s allocation of recovery functions to agencies will be relatively simple. In addition, disaster recovery does not require an equivalent to the Incident Commander who oversees the emergency response. Instead, different departments will usually be coordinated by the Recovery/Mitigation Committee. Finally, there is less time pressure during the disaster recovery than during the emergency response, so this committee’s meetings can be scheduled for daily or, later, weekly frequency. Nonetheless, decisions about recovery programs must often be made while victims still focused on satisfying basic needs such as food and shelter. Thus, recovery decisions may need to be made before citizens are ready to participate in a planning process (Smith, 2004).

*External coordination*. There is a need for external coordination, especially in presidentially declared disasters, because of the presence of personnel from other jurisdictions and other levels of government. As is the case for internal direction and control, there should be a relatively clear understanding of which agencies will address each disaster response function. In addition, local agencies need to understand what are the restrictions associated with different state, federal, NGO, and CBO programs.

*Public information*. There is also a need for public information, especially to inform disaster victims about recovery policies and procedures. However, there is also a need to inform other citizens about the progress of the recovery. Thus, the ROP should describe the procedure for disseminating public information during disaster recovery. The procedure should describe which agencies will be the source of each type of information, what will be the general content of their messages, and what communication channels they will use. As indicated in Chapter 4, general information about the recovery process and sources of additional information can be distributed through the mass media. Brochures can be targeted at individuals and organizations located in vulnerable zones (before a disaster strikes) or impact areas (after a disaster strikes). Telephone hotlines can be useful for answering questions about the recovery process, and a full time PIO should be on staff at the DAC during short term recovery. Public meetings should be held frequently to involve community residents in the reconstruction planning process.

Research on disaster recovery has reported that some victims believe there is favoritism toward business interests at the expense of households. Similar concerns have arisen in other disasters where historic preservation, neighborhood, and ethnic organizations mobilized public demonstrations, pressured administrators in hearings, and filed lawsuits (Bolin, 1993). These organizations can slow recovery and make it more expensive (Bolin, 1993) unless there is a transparent process as well as clear and consistent answers to questions such as “Who is eligible for assistance?” and “How will land use change in the impact area and how will this affect adjacent areas?”

*Recovery legal authority and financing*. The Recovery/Mitigation Committee needs to obtain legal authority for a wide range of short term recovery actions including a development moratorium, temporary repair permits, demolition regulations, and zoning for temporary housing (Schwab, et al., 1998). They also need to explore the feasibility of an *adequate public facility ordinance* requiring developers to pay for extending infrastructure to locations where it does not already exist, *increased participation in the National Flood Insurance Program*, and revising *annexation procedures* for incorporating additional land. In addition, the Recovery/Mitigation Committee should examine the adequacy of existing zoning tools including *development density controls* that limit the number of lots per acre of developed land, *overlay districts* that add special restrictions to the customary limitations of type (residential, commercial, and industrial) of construction, and *setback requirements* for minimum distances from hazardous terrain or landscape features. In addition to ensuing adequate legal authority, the Recovery/Mitigation Committee must identify financial tools for achieving mitigation objectives. Financing can be obtained by *directing Community Development Block Grant funds* to mitigation activities, *establishing special assessment districts*, and *charging impact fees* for new development— especially when it is in a hazard prone area.

*Administrative and logistical support*. During the recovery period, the pace of operations decreases so the management of specific emergency response and recovery functions does not need to be focused at incident scenes or centralized in the EOC. Thus, the activities performed by the Planning, Logistics, and Administration Sections within the IMS are gradually dispersed back to the jurisdiction’s normal departments listed in Figure 11-2. Nonetheless, special provisions are required to support the additional staff generated by obtaining mutual aid personnel from other jurisdictions and volunteer personnel such as architects and engineers used as building inspectors. Moreover, records accumulated by the Finance Section must be available to provide a justification for expenditures on disaster recovery and hazard mitigation that are reimbursable by state and federal agencies.

*Documentation*. As is the case in the emergency response, documentation is needed during disaster recovery to provide the basis for organizational learning. Maintaining an event log of who took what actions in response to what conditions will provide the Recovery/ Mitigation Committee with the information it needs to produce the “Lessons Learned” document and, later, to revise the ROP. In addition, detailed documentation provides the jurisdiction’s legal counsel with the information that might be needed to defend against any lawsuits.

**Case Study: Disaster Recovery in Wichita Falls**

An F-4 tornado struck Wichita Falls on April 10, 1979 that killed 46 people and injured another 3245 (Bolin, 1982). The tornado also destroyed 2500 homes, seriously damaged 879, and slightly damaged 1659. In addition, it destroyed 1274 apartment units, 85 mobile homes, and 81 businesses. In the aftermath of the storm, nearly one fifth of the city’s population of 100,000 was homeless. Temporary housing began to be delivered after four days, telephone service was restored after nine days, and debris clearance from private lots had begun within two weeks. Although the EOC was deactivated five days after the storm, the emergency declaration was not lifted for a month. By that time, basic services (water, sewer, electric power, fuel, telecommunications, and transportation) were restored. Debris clearance was delayed by the need to obtain permission from property owners who were, understandably, not readily accessible due to relocation elsewhere. Nearly 50% of all homeless families had temporary housing within 45 days after the storm and almost all had temporary housing within 90 days. Most major commercial businesses had resumed operations within 120 days. Housing reconstruction was delayed by Small Business Administration funding problems, some victims’ lack of insurance and inability to qualify for federal aid, and the scarcity of building contractors and building materials. Nearly 90% of the lost housing had been rebuilt by the end of two years, but there were problems in the interim. First, the influx of construction workers increased pressure on the tight housing market. Second, reconstruction in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods was only 30% at 18 months when reconstruction in higher socioeconomic neighborhoods reached 80%. The community faced a number of foreseeable recovery issues for which it was unprepared. First, the city council reversed itself twice on the issue of siting mobile homes on lots where owners were attempting to rebuild. Second, the council imposed rent and price controls, but these only delayed increases that skyrocketed as soon as they were terminated. Third, the city incurred substantial costs for rebuilding infrastructure at a time when its revenues were down because of the losses in the property tax base.