### fwd:cloudsec 2024

GCP and AWS identity federation Lessons learned from the field as well as cross-cloud forensics and incident response

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
Senior Security engineer Spotify

#### **Marcus Hallberg**

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#### Who we are?



**Attila Dulovics**Senior Security engineer
Spotify

 Engineer, who is a fan of codified solutions, passionate about multi cloud.
 Secret skill: Hungarian language.



**Marcus Hallberg**Senior Security engineer
Spotify

 Passion for cloud security, forensics and automation. Secret skill: Swedish folk dancing.



**5** GCP Regions

4096 nodes/cluster

+4000 services


+60 000 service accounts




#### Agenda

- Why did we look into Cross Cloud Identity Federation?
- 2. What strategy did we follow?
- 3. Highlights and Hiccups (Unexpected Road Bumps)
- I. Identity federation for cross cloud incident response and forensics

# Why did we look into Cross Cloud identity Federation?





## What was our motivation?

- Reduce the risk of unnecessary static credential usage in our environment
  - GCP projects >5000
  - AWS Account >80
  - Active AWS access key >100
  - Service account >60000
    - Service Account keys ~40000
- Enable a keyless authn/z for Spotify's service-to-service authentication in a cross-cloud environment

## What strategy did we follow?

#### Our "playlist" for introducing Identity **Federation**

- Acquiring Knowledge
- **Build Capability**
- Make Adaptation Appealing
- **Ensure Support**

## 1. Acquiring knowledge

#### **Questions to answer**

- What do we need to configure?
- What is the actual developer pain points?
- What threats should we consider?

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#### Threats to consider

- Spoofing
- Privilege escalation
- Non-repudiation

#### **AWS Trust policy snippet**

```
"Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
        "accounts.google.com:oaud":

GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_OAUD_DEFINED_AUDIENCE,
        "accounts.google.com:email":

GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL,
        "accounts.google.com:sub":

GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL_UNIQUE_ID
}
```

#### **Workload Identity configuration decisions**

- Mapping IAM role as "service identity"
- Dedicated Identity provider and pools for each AWS account

## 2. Build capability

#### Requirements about our solution

- Focus on developer pain points
- Wide Applicability
- Low Maintenance
- Smooth Implementation

## idxchange & whippet

#### idxchange support GCP->AWS

- Python CLI tool and library
  - Used as part of base image,
  - o Import as a library support application
- Relay on GCP service Identity (SA)

#### whippet support AWS-> GCP

 Simple CLI tool to generate blueprint with baked best practices of IAMWorkloadIdentityPool and IAMWorkforcePool Provider in Kubernetes Config Connecter

## 3. Adaptation 4. Support

#### **Make Adaptation Appealing**

- Eliminate the need of Credential Rotation
- Reduced Configuration Overhead
- Simplified IAM Management for federated Identities

#### **Ensure Support**

- Clear documentation
- Tool offering for supporting teams and developers
- **Enhanced Logging**

## Highlights and Hiccups (Unexpected Road Bumps)

### Hiccups 🧟

A.k.a Unexpected Road Bumps

#### Moderate Adaptation

GCP to AWS: 212 federated roles,
 AWS to GCP: 3 federations.

#### Unexpected challenges:

#### **GCP to AWS:**

- Pre-existing OpenID Connect
- Custom CredentialProvider issue in Apache Beam
- o JIB Usage

#### AWS to GCP:

AWS Fargate Workload compatibility with google auth library

#### Highlights

#### Simplified AWS organization wide access from GCP

Significantly simplified the process for accessing AWS accounts from GCP environment for supporting teams (1 steps instead of 3)


#### Proven Value Over Time

 Demonstrated long-term benefits, enhancing our Service-to-Service authentication in multi cloud environment

# Identity federation for cross cloud incident response and forensics

#### Setup

- 1. GSA with identity pool or static keys.
- 2. Dedicated IAM roles.
- 3. AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.



#### **AWS Trust policy example**

```
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
     "Federated": "accounts.google.com"
 },
"Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition": {
   "StringEquals": {
"accounts.google.com:oaud": GCP SERVICE ACCOUNT_OAUD_DEFINED_AUDIENCE,
"accounts.google.com:email": GCP SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EMAIL,
"accounts.google.com:sub": GCP SERVICE ACCOUNT EMAIL UNIQUE ID
```

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```
$ curl -v \
                                                      --header "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
                                                        --data "Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity" \
                                                        --data "Version=2011-06-15" \
                                                        --data "DurationSeconds=3600" \
                                                        --data "RoleSessionName=YOUR AWS SESSION NAME THAT YOU DECIDE" \
                                                        --data "RoleArn=AWS ROLE ARN HERE" \
Identity federation methods
                                                        --data "WebIdentityToken=YOUR WEB IDENTITY TOKEN \
                                                      POST https://sts.amazonaws.com
    APIs with HTTP requests
      Cloud SDKs
      Cloud CLIs
                                                $ aws sts assume-role-with-web-identity \
                                                    --role-arn YOUR AWS ROLE ARN \
                                                    --role-session-name YOUR AWS SESSION NAME THAT YOU DECIDE \
                                                    --web-identity-token $(gcloud auth print-identity-token
                                                --impersonate-service-account=YOUR GCP SA EMAIL
```

--audiences=THE OAUD AUDIENCE --include-email)

