



Armors Labs

Monstropoly Token

Smart Contract Audit

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Monstropoly Token Audit Summary

Project name : Monstropoly Token Contract

Project address: None

Code URL : <https://github.com/Monstropoly/monstropoly-contracts>

Commit : 820de08e856528054ba22dbba7b8b6c1f6b94716

Project target : Monstropoly Token Contract Audit

Test result : PASSED

Audit Info

Audit NO : 0X202112120026

Audit Team : Armors Labs

Audit Proofreading: <https://armors.io/#project-cases>

Monstropoly Token Audit

The Monstropoly Token team asked us to review and audit their Monstropoly Token contract. We looked at the code and now publish our results.

Here is our assessment and recommendations, in order of importance.

Document information

| Name | Auditor | Version | Date |
|-------------------------|---|---------|------------|
| Monstropoly Token Audit | Rock, Sophia, Rushairer, Rico, David, Alice | 1.0.0 | 2021-12-12 |

Audit results

Warning:

This contract **is** an upgraded erc20 contract **with** suspended **transaction**.

Notices :

1. The project code has been open source **in** GitHub, but it has **not** been publicized **to** the blockchain browser.
2. The contract allows the administrator **to** stop **or** open all **user** transfers.
3. The project is allowed **to** restrict the limit of single transfer **for** non white list users.

Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the Monstropoly Token contract. The above should not be construed as investment advice.

Based on the widely recognized security status of the current underlying blockchain and smart contract, this audit report is valid for 3 months from the date of output.

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Audited target file

| file | md5 |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| MonstropolyERC20.sol | 0d2ed3bc91f4a31f61f84613a19b959b |
| UUPSUpgradeableByRole.sol | 5495cb77d5db97482d5294aa939e28c4 |
| AccessControlProxyPausable.sol | 829397c92b08bb7632e63c6cc7db81c1 |
| IMonstropolyERC20.sol | ff7005d1ca038f4b88c79ff57df6e9d2 |
| IMonstropolyDeployer.sol | e14d06059424a1028443885ea2f7f374 |

Vulnerability analysis

Vulnerability distribution

| vulnerability level | number |
|---------------------|--------|
| Critical severity | 0 |
| High severity | 0 |
| Medium severity | 0 |
| Low severity | 0 |

Summary of audit results

| Vulnerability | status |
|---------------|--------|
|---------------|--------|

| Vulnerability | status |
|---|--------|
| Re-Entrancy | safe |
| Arithmetic Over/Under Flows | safe |
| Unexpected Blockchain Currency | safe |
| Delegatecall | safe |
| Default Visibilities | safe |
| Entropy Illusion | safe |
| External Contract Referencing | safe |
| Short Address/Parameter Attack | safe |
| Unchecked CALL Return Values | safe |
| Race Conditions / Front Running | safe |
| Denial Of Service (DOS) | safe |
| Block Timestamp Manipulation | safe |
| Constructors with Care | safe |
| Uninitialised Storage Pointers | safe |
| Floating Points and Numerical Precision | safe |
| tx.origin Authentication | safe |
| Permission restrictions | safe |

Contract file

MonstropolyERC20.sol

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicensed
pragma solidity 0.8.9;

import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/ERC20Upgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20SnapshotUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/src/BaseRelayRecipient.sol";
import "../utils/AccessControlProxyPausable.sol";
import "../utils/UUPSUpgradeableByRole.sol";
import "../shared/IMonstropolyDeployer.sol";

contract MonstropolyERC20 is ERC20Upgradeable, ERC20SnapshotUpgradeable, AccessControlProxyPausable,
    string public override versionRecipient = "2.4.0";
    bytes32 public constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
    bytes32 public constant ANTIBOT_ROLE = keccak256("ANTIBOT_ROLE");

    uint256 public burned;
    uint256 public cap;
    uint256 private _maxBalanceWhenAntiBot;
    bool private _isAntibot;
    bool private _isAntiBotInitialized;

    mapping(address => bool) public whitelisted;
```

```

function initialize() public initializer {
    cap = 500000000 ether;
    _maxBalanceWhenAntiBot = 10000 ether;
    _ERC20_init("MPOLY Token", "MPOLY");
    _ERC20Snapshot_init();
    _AccessControlProxyPausable_init(msg.sender);
    _mint(IMonstropolyDeployer(config).get(keccak256("DISTRIBUTION_VAULT")), cap);
}

function _msgSender() internal override(BaseRelayRecipient, ContextUpgradeable) view returns (address) {
    return BaseRelayRecipient._msgSender();
}

function _msgData() internal override(BaseRelayRecipient, ContextUpgradeable) view returns (bytes) {
    return BaseRelayRecipient._msgData();
}

function setTrustedForwarder(address _forwarder) public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    _setTrustedForwarder(_forwarder);
}

function approveAll(address to) public {
    uint256 total = balanceOf(_msgSender());
    _approve(_msgSender(), to, total);
}

function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) {
    _mint(to, amount);
}

function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal override {
    require(ERC20Upgradeable.totalSupply() + amount + burned <= cap, "MonstropolyERC20: cap excee");
    super._mint(account, amount);
}

function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal override {
    burned += amount;
    super._burn(account, amount);
}

function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) public {
    require(_msgSender() == account || allowance(account, _msgSender()) >= amount, "MonstropolyERC20: burnFrom: allowance");
    _burn(account, amount);
}

function snapshot() external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    _snapshot();
}

function stopAntiBot() external onlyRole(ANTIBOT_ROLE) {
    _isAntiBot = false;
}

function startAntiBot() external onlyRole(ANTIBOT_ROLE) {
    require(!_isAntiBotInitialized, "MonstropolyERC20: antiBot not startable anymore");
    _isAntiBotInitialized = true;
    _isAntiBot = true;
}

function setAntiBotMaxBalance(uint256 _max) external onlyRole(ANTIBOT_ROLE) {
    require(_max >= 10000 ether, "MonstropolyERC20: max must be >= 10k");
    _maxBalanceWhenAntiBot = _max;
}

function whitelist(address[] calldata _list) external onlyRole(ANTIBOT_ROLE) {
    for(uint256 i; i < _list.length; i++) {

```



```

        whitelisted[_list[i]] = true;
    }
}

function unwhitelist(address[] calldata _list) external onlyRole(ANTIBOT_ROLE) {
    for(uint256 i; i < _list.length; i++) {
        whitelisted[_list[i]] = false;
    }
}

function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
    internal
    whenNotPaused
    override(ERC20Upgradeable, ERC20SnapshotUpgradeable)
{
    _antiBotMaxBalance(to, amount);
    super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
}

function _antiBotMaxBalance(address _addr, uint256 _amount) internal view {
    if((_isAntibot) && (!whitelisted[_addr])){
        uint256 _balance = balanceOf(_addr);
        uint256 _nextBalance = _balance + _amount;
        require(_nextBalance <= _maxBalanceWhenAntiBot, "MonstropolyERC20: Maxbalance for antibot");
    }
}
}

```

UUPSUpgradeableByRole.sol

```

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicensed
pragma solidity 0.8.9;

import "@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol";
import "../utils/AccessControlProxyPausable.sol";

contract UUPSUpgradeableByRole is AccessControlProxyPausable, UUPSUpgradeable {

    bytes32 public constant UPGRADER_ROLE = keccak256("UPGRADER_ROLE");

    function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation)
        internal
        onlyRole(UPGRADER_ROLE)
        override
    {}
}

```

AccessControlProxyPausable.sol

```

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/IAccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/StringsUpgradeable.sol";

abstract contract AccessControlProxyPausable is PausableUpgradeable {

    address public config;

    bytes32 public constant DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x00;
    bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ROLE = keccak256("PAUSER_ROLE");
}

```

```

modifier onlyRole(bytes32 role) {
    address account = msg.sender;
    require(hasRole(role, account), string(
        abi.encodePacked(
            "AccessControlProxyPausable: account ",
            StringsUpgradeable.toHexString(uint160(account), 20),
            " is missing role ",
            StringsUpgradeable.toHexString(uint256(role), 32)
        )
    ));
}

function hasRole(bytes32 role, address account) public view returns (bool) {
    IAccessControlUpgradeable manager = IAccessControlUpgradeable(config);
    return manager.hasRole(role, account);
}

function __AccessControlProxyPausable_init(address config_) internal initializer {
    __Pausable_init();
    __AccessControlProxyPausable_init_unchained(config_);
}

function __AccessControlProxyPausable_init_unchained(address config_) internal initializer {
    config = config_;
}

function pause() public onlyRole(PAUSER_ROLE){
    _pause();
}

function unpause() public onlyRole(PAUSER_ROLE){
    _unpause();
}

function updateManager(address config_) public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    config = config_;
}
}

```

IMonstropolyERC20.sol

```

pragma solidity 0.8.9;

interface IMonstropolyERC20 {
    function transferFrom(
        address sender,
        address recipient,
        uint256 amount
    ) external returns (bool);
    function transfer(address account, uint256 amount) external;
    function balanceOf(address account) external view returns (uint256);
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) external view returns (uint256);
    function burn(uint256 amount) external;
    function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external;
    function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external;
}

```

IMonstropolyDeployer.sol

```

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicensed
pragma solidity 0.8.9;

```



```
interface IMonstropolyDeployer {
    function addr(bytes32) external view returns (address);
    function get(bytes32) external view returns (address);
    function set(string memory , address) external;
}
```

Analysis of audit results

Re-Entrancy

- **Description:**

One of the features of smart contracts is the ability to call and utilise code of other external contracts. Contracts also typically handle Blockchain Currency, and as such often send Blockchain Currency to various external user addresses. The operation of calling external contracts, or sending Blockchain Currency to an address, requires the contract to submit an external call. These external calls can be hijacked by attackers whereby they force the contract to execute further code (i.e. through a fallback function) , including calls back into itself. Thus the code execution "re-enters" the contract. Attacks of this kind were used in the infamous DAO hack.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Arithmetic Over/Under Flows

- **Description:**

The Virtual Machine (EVM) specifies fixed-size data types for integers. This means that an integer variable, only has a certain range of numbers it can represent. A uint8 for example, can only store numbers in the range [0,255]. Trying to store 256 into a uint8 will result in 0. If care is not taken, variables in Solidity can be exploited if user input is unchecked and calculations are performed which result in numbers that lie outside the range of the data type that stores them.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Unexpected Blockchain Currency

- **Description:**

Typically when Blockchain Currency is sent to a contract, it must execute either the fallback function, or another function described in the contract. There are two exceptions to this, where Blockchain Currency can exist in a contract without having executed any code. Contracts which rely on code execution for every Blockchain Currency sent to the contract can be vulnerable to attacks where Blockchain Currency is forcibly sent to a contract.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:** no.

Delegatecall

- **Description:**

The CALL and DELEGATECALL opcodes are useful in allowing developers to modularise their code. Standard external message calls to contracts are handled by the CALL opcode whereby code is run in the context of the external contract/function. The DELEGATECALL opcode is identical to the standard message call, except that the code executed at the targeted address is run in the context of the calling contract along with the fact that msg.sender and msg.value remain unchanged. This feature enables the implementation of libraries whereby developers can create reusable code for future contracts.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:** no.

Default Visibilities

- **Description:**

Functions in Solidity have visibility specifiers which dictate how functions are allowed to be called. The visibility determines whether a function can be called externally by users, by other derived contracts, only internally or only externally. There are four visibility specifiers, which are described in detail in the Solidity Docs. Functions default to public allowing users to call them externally. Incorrect use of visibility specifiers can lead to some devastating vulnerabilities in smart contracts as will be discussed in this section.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Entropy Illusion

- **Description:**

All transactions on the blockchain are deterministic state transition operations. Meaning that every transaction modifies the global state of the ecosystem and it does so in a calculable way with no uncertainty. This ultimately means that inside the blockchain ecosystem there is no source of entropy or randomness. There is no rand() function in Solidity. Achieving decentralised entropy (randomness) is a well established problem and many ideas have been proposed to address this (see for example, RandDAO or using a chain of Hashes as described by Vitalik in this post).

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

External Contract Referencing

- **Description:**

One of the benefits of the global computer is the ability to re-use code and interact with contracts already deployed on the network. As a result, a large number of contracts reference external contracts and in general operation use external message calls to interact with these contracts. These external message calls can mask malicious actors intentions in some non-obvious ways, which we will discuss.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Unsolved TODO comments

- **Description:**

Check for Unsolved TODO comments

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Short Address/Parameter Attack

- **Description:**

This attack is not specifically performed on Solidity contracts themselves but on third party applications that may interact with them. I add this attack for completeness and to be aware of how parameters can be manipulated in contracts.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Unchecked CALL Return Values

- **Description:**

There a number of ways of performing external calls in solidity. Sending Blockchain Currency to external accounts is commonly performed via the transfer() method. However, the send() function can also be used and, for more versatile external calls, the CALL opcode can be directly employed in solidity. The call() and send() functions return a boolean indicating if the call succeeded or failed. Thus these functions have a simple caveat, in that the transaction that executes these functions will not revert if the external call (intialised by call() or send()) fails, rather the call() or send() will simply return false. A common pitfall arises when the return value is not checked, rather the developer expects a revert to occur.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Race Conditions / Front Running

- **Description:**

The combination of external calls to other contracts and the multi-user nature of the underlying blockchain gives rise to a variety of potential Solidity pitfalls whereby users race code execution to obtain unexpected states. Re-Entrancy is one example of such a race condition. In this section we will talk more generally about different kinds of race conditions that can occur on the blockchain. There is a variety of good posts on this subject, a few are: Wiki - Safety, DASP - Front-Running and the Consensus - Smart Contract Best Practices.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Denial Of Service (DOS)

- **Description:**

This category is very broad, but fundamentally consists of attacks where users can leave the contract inoperable for a small period of time, or in some cases, permanently. This can trap Blockchain Currency in these contracts forever, as was the case with the Second Parity MultiSig hack

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Block Timestamp Manipulation

- **Description:**

Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the Entropy Illusion section for further details), locking funds for periods of time and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miner's have the ability to adjust timestamps slightly which can prove to be quite dangerous if block timestamps are used incorrectly in smart contracts.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Constructors with Care

- **Description:**

Constructors are special functions which often perform critical, privileged tasks when initialising contracts. Before solidity v0.4.22 constructors were defined as functions that had the same name as the contract that

contained them. Thus, when a contract name gets changed in development, if the constructor name isn't changed, it becomes a normal, callable function. As you can imagine, this can (and has) lead to some interesting contract hacks.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Unintialised Storage Pointers

- **Description:**

The EVM stores data either as storage or as memory. Understanding exactly how this is done and the default types for local variables of functions is highly recommended when developing contracts. This is because it is possible to produce vulnerable contracts by inappropriately initialising variables.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Floating Points and Numerical Precision

- **Description:**

As of this writing (Solidity v0.4.24), fixed point or floating point numbers are not supported. This means that floating point representations must be made with the integer types in Solidity. This can lead to errors/vulnerabilities if not implemented correctly.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

tx.origin Authentication

- **Description:**

Solidity has a global variable, tx.origin which traverses the entire call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction). Using this variable for authentication in smart contracts leaves the contract vulnerable to a phishing-like attack.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.

Permission restrictions

- **Description:**

Contract managers who can control liquidity or pledge pools, etc., or impose unreasonable restrictions on other users.

- **Detection results:**

PASSED!

- **Security suggestion:**

no.





armors.io

contact@armors.io

