Implementation and Optimization of the Number Theoretic Transform

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Lattice-Based Cryptography

Lattices

Linear combinations of vectors with integer coefficients:

$$L = \mathcal{L}(b_1, \dots, b_t) = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^t x_i b_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}$$

- Some problems are believed to be computationally hard:
 - SVP: find the shortest element in L
 - CVP: find a point of L closest to a given $x \in \mathbb{Z}^m$

Lattice-Based Crypto

- Cryptographic algorithms (public key encryption, digital signatures, homomorphic encryption, etc.), whose security relies on the hardness of lattice problems.
- As far as we know, they're secure against quantum computers
- They are becoming increasingly practical

Basic Setting

General *q*-ary Lattices

- $\circ q$ is a small prime number (e.g., q = 12289)
- \circ Algorithms are based on linear algebra computations using matrices with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_q
- \circ Secret and public keys are matrices in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n imes m}$

Practical Instantiations

Use matrices with a special structure (e.g., anticirculant matrices)

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & \dots & a_n \\ -a_n & a_0 & \dots & a_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -a_1 & -a_2 & \dots & a_o \end{bmatrix}$$

 This reduces key sizes and algorithms can be implemented using polynomial operations.

Example: Abstract BLISS

Algorithm 1: Signature Verification

Input: Message μ

Public key $A \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{n \times m}$

Signature (z,c) where $z \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ and $c \in \mathbb{Z}^n$

Output: Accept or Reject

if $||z|| > B_2$ then Reject

if $||z||_{\infty} \geqslant q/4$ then Reject

if $c = H(Az + qc \mod 2q, \mu)$ then Accept else Reject

Concrete BLISS

```
Algorithm 2: Signature Verification Input : Message \mu Public key a_1 a polynomial of degree \leqslant n-1 in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1) Signature (z_1,z_2,c) triple of polynomials Output: Accept or Reject if ||(z_1|2^dz_2)|| > B_2 then Reject if ||(z_1|2^dz_2)||_{\infty} > B_{\infty} then Reject if c = H(\lfloor (2\zeta a_1.z_1 + \zeta qc) \mod 2q \rceil_d + z_2 \mod p, \mu) then Accept else Reject end
```

Anticirculant Matrices and Polynomials

Correspondence

Given an anticirculant matrix

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_1 & \dots & a_n \\ -a_n & a_0 & \dots & a_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -a_1 & -a_2 & \dots & a_o \end{bmatrix}$$

we can construct the polynomial

$$p(A) = a_0 + a_1 X + \ldots + a_{n-1} X^{n-1}$$

(so p(A) is a polynomial a degree at most n-1, with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_q).

 \circ Conversely, we can map any polynomial p of this form to an anticirculant matrix M(p).

Anticirculant Matrices and Polynomials

Nice Property

• The product of two anticirculant matrices is the same thing as the product of their polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$:

$$p(A \times B) = p(A).p(B)$$

$$M(p_1.p_2) = M(p_1) \times M(p_2)$$

Fast computation of products in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$ is then important in lattice-based crypto.

Products in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$

Definition

 \circ Given two polynomials f and g (of degree at most n-1):

$$f = a_0 + a_1 X + \dots + a_{n-1} X^{n-1}$$

$$g = b_0 + b_1 X + \dots + b_{n-1} X^{n-1}$$

then their product is $h = c_0 + c_1 X + \ldots + c_{n-1} X^{n-1}$, where

$$c_i = \left(\sum_{j+k=i} a_j b_k - \sum_{j+k=n+i} a_j b_k\right) \bmod q$$

Example in $\mathbb{Z}_{17}[X]/(X^4+1)$

$$(3+X^3)(6X+X^2) = 18X + 3X^2 + 6X^4 + X^5 = 18X + 3X^2 - 6 - X$$

= $-6 + 17X + 3X^2 = -6 + 3X^2$.

Primitive Roots of Unity in \mathbb{Z}_q

 $\omega \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is a primitive n-th root of unity if

- $\circ \omega^n = 1$
- $\circ \omega^i \neq 1$ for any i such that 0 < i < n.

Example: 722 is a primitive 16-th root of unity in \mathbb{Z}_q for q = 12289

Properties

- \circ Primitive n-th roots of unity exist iff n divides q-1 (for q prime)
- \circ If n is a power of two then ω is a primitive n-th root of unity iff $\omega^{n/2}=-1$.
- \circ If ω is a primitive n-th root of unity and $s \in \mathbb{Z}$ then we have

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \omega^{si} = \begin{cases} n \text{ if } n \text{ divides } s \\ 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The Number-Theoretic Transform

Definition

- \circ We assume a fixed ω that's an n-th root of unity in \mathbb{Z}_q .
- \circ Given (a_0,\ldots,a_{n-1}) in \mathbb{Z}_q^n then $\operatorname{NTT}(a_0,\ldots,a_{n-1})$ is the tuple $(\tilde{a}_0,\ldots,\tilde{a}_{n-1})$ defined by

$$\tilde{a}_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j \omega^{ij}.$$

 \circ If we define $f(X) = a_0 + a_1 X + \ldots + a_{n-1} X^{n-1}$ then \tilde{a}_i is just $f(\omega^i)$.

Note this is bijection:

o Given any $(\tilde{a}_0, \dots, \tilde{a}_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, there's a unique tuple $(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ such that $\operatorname{NTT}(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) = (\tilde{a}_0, \dots, \tilde{a}_{n-1})$.

Inverse Transform

Inverse

- \circ Since ω is an n-th root of unity, ω^{-1} is one too.
- \circ Given any $(\tilde{a}_0,\ldots,\tilde{a}_{n-1})$ in \mathbb{Z}_q^n , we define $\operatorname{INTT}(\tilde{a}_0,\ldots,\tilde{a}_{n-1})=(a_0',\ldots,a_{n-1}')$ where

$$a'_i = n^{-1} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \tilde{a}_j \omega^{-ij} = n^{-1} f(\omega^{-i}).$$

Then we have

INTT(NTT(
$$a_0, ..., a_{n-1}$$
)) = $(a_0, ..., a_{n-1})$
NTT(INTT($a_0, ..., a_{n-1}$)) = $(a_0, ..., a_{n-1})$.

NTT and INTT are inverses of each other.

Note: NTT is almost its own inverse:

$$NTT(NTT(a_0, ..., a_{n-1})) = n \times (a_0, a_{n-1}, ..., a_1).$$

NTT and Products of Polynomials

Products in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$

 \circ If f and g have degree less than m=n/2:

$$f = a_0 + a_1 X + \dots + a_{m-1} X^{m-1}$$

$$g = b_0 + b_1 X + \dots + b_{m-1} X^{m-1}$$

their product h = fg has degree less than n:

$$h = c_0 + c_1 X + \ldots + c_{n-1} X^{n-1}$$

NTT-Based Computation

Compute

$$(\tilde{a}_0, \dots, \tilde{a}_{n-1}) = \text{NTT}(a_0, \dots, a_{m-1}, 0, \dots, 0)$$

 $(\tilde{b}_0, \dots, \tilde{b}_{n-1}) = \text{NTT}(b_0, \dots, b_{m-1}, 0, \dots, 0)$

- \circ Compute the element-wise products: $\tilde{c}_i = \tilde{a}_i \tilde{b}_i$
- \circ Then we have $(c_0,\ldots,c_{n-1})=\mathrm{INTT}(\tilde{c}_0,\ldots,\tilde{c}_{n-1})$

Products in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$

Issue

- \circ The previous approach does not work in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$ in general.
- \circ For example, we may have $(f.g)(\omega^i) \neq f(\omega^i)g(\omega^i)$

Solution

- Introduce a new constant ψ such that $\psi^2 = \omega$.
- \circ Then ψ is a primitive 2n-th root of unity, so 2n must divide q-1.
- \circ Then one can compute f.g by multiplying by powers of ψ and ψ^{-1}

Products in
$$\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n+1)$$

Preprocess

 \circ Multiply all coefficients of f and g by powers of ψ :

$$a_i' = a_i \psi^i$$
 and $b_i' = b_i \psi^i$

NTT Steps

$$(\tilde{a}'_0, \dots, \tilde{a}'_{n-1}) = \text{NTT}(a'_0, \dots, a'_{n-1})$$

 $(\tilde{b}'_0, \dots, \tilde{b}'_{n-1}) = \text{NTT}(b_0, \dots, b'_{n-1})$
 $\tilde{c}_i = \tilde{a}_i \tilde{b}_i \quad \text{for } i = 0, \dots, n-1$
 $(c'_0, \dots, c'_{n-1}) = \text{INTT}(\tilde{c}_0, \dots, \tilde{c}_{n-1})$

Post processing

 \circ Multiply by powers of ψ^{-1} :

$$(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{n-1}) = (c'_0, c'_1 \psi^{-1}, \dots, c'_{n-1} \psi^{-(n-1)})$$

Fast NTT Computation

Input

- $\circ f = a_0 + a_1 X + \ldots + a_{n-1} X^{n-1}$ polynomial
- $\circ \omega$: primitive n-th root of unity
- $\circ q$ is prime and n is a power of two

Output

$$\tilde{a}_0 = f(1)
\tilde{a}_1 = f(\omega)
\vdots
\tilde{a}_{n-1} = f(\omega^{n-1})$$

There are algorithms for computing this with $O(n \log n)$ multiplications in \mathbb{Z}_q

The Cooley-Tukey Method

Idea

 \circ Write f(X) as $g(X^2) + Xh(X^2)$ by splitting even and odd powers of X:

$$g(X) = a_0 + a_2X + \dots + a_{n-2}X^{n/2-1}$$

 $h(X) = a_1 + a_3X + \dots + a_{n-1}X^{n/2-1}$

- \circ Recursively compute the NTT of g and h, using ω^2 as n/2-th root of unity.
- \circ From the results of these two subproblems, compute the coefficients $\tilde{a}_i = f(\omega^i)$.

Cooley-Tukey Details

Main Step

- \circ The recursive computations give $g(1),g(\omega^2),\ldots,g(\omega^n)$ and $h(1),h(\omega^2),\ldots,h(\omega^n)$
- \circ To compute \tilde{a}_i from them:
 - For $0 \le i < n/2$, we have

$$\tilde{a}_i = f(\omega^i) = g(\omega^{2i}) + \omega^i h(\omega^{2i})$$

– For $n/2 \leqslant i < n$, we set j = i - n/2, and we get

$$\tilde{a}_i = g(\omega^{2i}) + \omega^i h(\omega^{2i})
= g(\omega^{n+2j}) + \omega^{j+n/2} h(\omega^{n+2j})
= g(\omega^{2j}) - \omega^j h(\omega^{2j})$$

because $\omega^n = 1$ and $\omega^{n/2} = -1$.

The Gentleman-Sande Method

Idea

 \circ By definition of NTT, we want to compute n sums of n terms:

$$\tilde{a}_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j \omega^{ij}.$$

 \circ Split the problem into two subproblems of size n/2

$$ilde{a}_{2k}=\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1}b_j\omega^{2kj}$$
 and $ilde{a}_{2k+1}=\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1}c_j\omega^{2kj}$

 \circ Recursively solve the subproblems to get $\tilde{b}_0,\ldots,\tilde{b}_{n/2-1}$ and $\tilde{c}_0,\ldots,\tilde{c}_{n/2-1}$ and we're done:

$$\tilde{a}_{2k} = \tilde{b}_k \text{ for } k = 0, \dots, n/2 - 1$$

 $\tilde{a}_{2k+1} = \tilde{c}_k \text{ for } k = 0, \dots, n/2 - 1$

Gentleman-Sande Details

Deomposition Into Two Subproblems

 \circ For each coefficient \tilde{a}_i , we split the sum into two halves:

$$\tilde{a}_{i} = \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} a_{j}\omega^{ij} + \sum_{j=n/2}^{n-1} a_{j}\omega^{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} a_{j}\omega^{ij} + a_{n/2+j}\omega^{i(n/2+j)}$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} (a_{j} + a_{n/2+j}\omega^{in/2})\omega^{ij}$$

Gentleman-Sande Details (continued)

Decomposition Into Two Subproblems

 \circ For i=2k, we have $\omega^{in/2}=\omega^{nk}=1$, so

$$\tilde{a}_{2k} = \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} (a_j + a_{n/2+j}) \omega^{2kj}$$

 \circ For i=2k+1, we have $\omega^{in/2}=\omega^{nk+n/2}=-1$, so

$$\tilde{a}_{2k+1} = \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} (a_j - a_{n/2+j}) \omega^{(2k+1)j}$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} ((a_j - a_{n/2+j}) \omega^j) \omega^{2kj}$$

 \circ Two subproblems are given by $(b_0,\ldots,b_{n/2-1})$ and $(c_0,\ldots,c_{n/2-1})$ where

$$b_j = a_j + a_{n/2+j}$$

$$c_j = (a_j - a_{n/2+j})\omega^j$$

Real Implementation

Efficient, Non-recursive Algorithms

- \circ All computations are done in place and update an array of n integers
- \circ All the coefficients ω^i are precomputed and stored in a constant table
- \circ Multiplication of the input by powers of ψ can be integrated into the Cooley-Tukey algorithm
- \circ Multiplication of the output by powers of ψ^{-1} can be integrated into the Gentleman-Sande algorithm

Bitreversed Permutations

Side effect:

- If the input is in standard order, the in-place updates cause the output to be produced in *bitreversed* order:
 - Input: coefficient a_i stored at index i
 - Output: coefficient \tilde{a}_i stored at index $\mathrm{bitrev}_k(i)$
- Alternatively, we can have input in bitreverse order and output in standard order
 - Input: coefficient a_i stored at index $\operatorname{bitrev}_k(i)$
 - Output: coefficient \tilde{a}_i stored at index i

where $\operatorname{bitrev}_k(i)$ takes the *k*-bit representation of *j* and reverses all the bits.

For example $bitrev_4(5) = bitrev_4(0b0101) = 0b1010 = 10$.

Example C Code

```
#define Q 12289

void muIntt_ct_rev2std(int32_t *a, uint32_t n, const uint16_t *p) {
    uint32_t j, s, t;
    int32_t x, w;

for (t=1; t<n; t <<= 1) {
        for (j=0; j<t; j++) {
            w = p[t + j]; // w = psi_t * omega_t^j for (s=j; s<n; s += t + t) {
            x = a[s + t] * w;
            a[s + t] = (a[s] - x) % Q;
            a[s] = (a[s] + x) % Q;
        }
    }
}</pre>
```

Accelerating Reductions Modulo q

Issue

 \circ General reduction modulo q requires integer division, which is very slow. On Intel Haswell, a 32bit DIV has a latency of 22-29 clock ticks, that's about 10 times slower than a 32bit MUL

Possible Optimizations

- Reduce the number of mod q operations (e.g., do them lazily)
- \circ Replace mod q operations by faster code since q is a fixed constant (e.g., Harvey, 2013)
- Montgomery's encoding (Montgomery, 1983)

Example Low-level Optimizations

```
// (x - y) % Q
static inline int32_t sub_mod(int32_t x, int32_t y) {
    x -= y;
    return x + ((x >> 14) & Q);
}

// (x + y) % Q
static inline int32_t add_mod(int32_t x, int32_t y) {
    x += y - Q;
    return x + ((x >> 14) & Q);
}

// integer division assuming 0 <= x < (Q-1)^2
static inline uint32_t divq(int32_t x) {
    return (((uint64_t) x) * 178942409) >> 41;
}

// mod
static inline int32_t modq(int32_t x) {
    return x - divq(x) * Q;
}
```

Improved C Code

```
void muIntt_ct_rev2std(int32_t *a, uint32_t n, const uint16_t *p) {
    uint32_t j, s, t;
    int32_t x, w;

for (t=1; t<n; t <<= 1) {
    for (j=0; j<t; j++) {
        w = p[t + j]; // w = psi_t * omega_t^j
        for (s=j; s<n; s += t + t) {
            x = modq(a[s + t] * w); // (a[s+t] * w) mod Q
            a[s + t] = sub_mod((a[s], x);
            a[s] = add_mod(a[s], x);
        }
    }
}</pre>
```

Longa and Naehrig's Reduction, 2016

Properties of the Modulus q

 \circ We know that 2n divides q-1 and $n=2^t$ is a power of two, so we can write q as

$$q = k.2^m + 1$$

where m is at least t+1 and k is an odd number.

 \circ For well-chosen q, the constant k is small. For example $12289 = 3.2^{12} + 1$.

Reduction

 \circ For an integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}$

$$red(x) = k.(x \mod 2^m) - (x/2^m)$$

That's cheap to compute:

```
static inline int32_t red(int32_t x) {
  return 3 * (x & 4095) - (x >> 12);
}
```

Properties of the Reduction

Main Property: $red(x) = kx \mod q$

- \circ We can replace $x \mod q$ by red(x) in the algorithms
- \circ We're off by a factor of k but in most cases we can precompute a correction
- Example in Cooley Tukey
 - We evaluate $\omega^i a_{s+t} \bmod q$ where ω^i is precomputed and stored in a table
 - We can precompute $c = k^{-1}\omega^i \mod q$ instead and then

$$red(ca_{s+t}) = kca_{s+t} \bmod q = kk^{-1}\omega^i a_{s+t} \bmod q = \omega^i a_{s+t} \bmod q$$

Second Property: |red(cx)| grows slowly

$$0 \leqslant c \leqslant q - 1 \implies |\operatorname{red}(cx)| \leqslant k|x| + (q - k)$$

Only Issue: Prevent Numerical Overflows

Risk of Overflows

- \circ Typical parameters: q is 12289 (k=3 and m=12) and n=512 or n=1024
- The NTT computations require then 9 or 10 iterations
- \circ The input can be assumed to be small $|a_i| \leqslant q-1$
- \circ Even though the elements a[i] grow slowly, there maybe a risk of overflow after 8 iterations for CT or 6 iterations for GS

To Prevent This

 \circ Apply one round of reduction to all elements of array a after 7 or 5 iterations

Example C Code

Improvements to Longa & Naehrig's Implementation

More Precise Analysis

- \circ The bounds used by Longa & Naehrig to estimate |a[i]| can be made more precise
- \circ The |a[i]|s grow more slowly than what Longa & Naehrig computed

Use Negative Coefficients

- \circ The algorithms used tables of constants in [0, q-1]
- \circ It's better to shift these constants to $\left[-\frac{q}{2},\frac{q}{2}-1\right]$
- \circ If we do that, there's no risk of overflow for $n \leqslant 1024$.

Current Status

GitHub Repository

- All our code is at https://github.com/SRI-CSL/Bliss
- This includes an implementation of the BLISS-B signature scheme and several NTT computations written in C

On-going Work

 NTT implementations in assembler to use vector instructions of Intel x86-64 (AVX2)

Future Work

Abstract Interpretation

- \circ Computing bounds on $|red(a_ic)|$ by hand is tedious and error-prone
- The hand-computed bounds are always somewhat imprecise (pessimistic)
- We can get exact bounds by using abstract interpretation and interval analysis
- This should lead to more efficient and higher-assurance implementations

Synthesis/Compilation

 It should be possible to take automatically rewrite a procedure that uses mod q operations into an equivalent procedure that uses the reduction approach, with appropriate corrections, and reductions to prevent numerical overflows

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