Breaking the Links: Exploiting the Linker

"I thought this was common knowledge (it's known amongst my circle Unix admins of my generation, mid-40's +), but it doesn't appear to be well documented any more." - Anonymous

Who am I?


Tim Brown

- ∞ pentester at Portcullis for 6 years
- ∞ 16 years working with *NIX
- ∞ contributor to a variety of F/OSS projects
- ∞ previous research on KDE and Vista

Introduction

- ∞ What is the linker?
- ∞ The linker attack surface
- ∞ Real world exploitation
- ∞ Auditing shell scripts, binaries and source

What is the linker? ∞ The link editor ∞ The runtime linker < stdio.h int man (int argc char** arg



Environment

- ∞ Solaris 10 supports 23 environment variables
- Debian GNU/Linux (eglibc) supports 17 environment variables
- ∞ FreeBSD 8.1 supports 13 environment variables
- Only 3 common to Solaris 10, Debian GNU/Linux (eglibc) and FreeBSD 8.1

#include <stdio.h> int main(int argc, char** argain (int argc, char**) if (argc <= 0)

Auditing scripts

- ∞ Unsafe concatenation
 - ∞ touch ./libc.so.6 && sudo ... (@kees_cook mentioned this technique on Twitter)
 - ∞ grep "LD_" ...

Auditing binaries

- ∞ DT_RPATH and DT_RUNPATH
 - ∞ objdump -x ..., readelf -a ..., scanelf (from PaX) and elfdump (from Sun)

How about source?

- Build scripts honouring LD_RUN_PATH
- ∞ Compiler and linker flags
 - ∞ gcc -WI,-R,...
 - ∞ Id [-rpath|-rpath-link]=...
 - ∞ ld -R ...

Further research

- ∞ Other linkers
- ∞ Statically linked binaries
- ∞ Libraries depending on libraries
- ∞ Real world consequences
- ∞ Single stepping SetUID processes
- ∞ Hardening future linkers
- ∞ Linker scripts

