

# **Labor Economics: Introduction to Theory**

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## **1. Labor Supply**

## **2. Labor Demand**

## **3. Market Equilibrium**

- Compensating Wage Differentials

# Labor Supply

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# Consumer's Problem

- In most markets, people (consumers) provide the demand
- Labor is special: people provide the supply in the market
- An individual needs to choose how they will participate in the market:
  - Whether to work (**extensive margin**)
  - How much to work (**intensive margin**)
- Our framework: utility maximization (just like in Intermediate Micro!)

# Labor-Leisure Problem

- Standard approach: consumer chooses between two goods  $(x_1, x_2)$  to maximize their utility  $u(\cdot)$  given the prices  $(p_1, p_2)$  and their income  $(M)$

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x_1, x_2} \quad & u(x_1, x_2) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 = M \end{aligned}$$

- Here: consumer chooses between consumption  $(c)$  and leisure  $(\ell)$ 
  - Consumer's income: earnings from labor ( $L$  = hours of work).
  - There are  $T$  hours in a time period (week), so  $\ell + L = T$
  - Let hourly wage be  $w$ . Normalize price of consumption as \$1.


# Labor-Leisure Problem

- Budget constraint:  $1 \cdot c = wL = w(T - \ell)$ 
  - Re-write BC as  $c + w\ell = wT$
  - Leisure has a price of  $w$  (opportunity cost of not working)
  - Can also let them have non-labor income ( $V$ ), which they get no matter how much they work
- Consumer's problem becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c, \ell} \quad & u(c, \ell) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c + w\ell = wT + V \end{aligned}$$

# Budget Line

**Figure 1:** Budget Line



Source: GB, Figure 2.5

# Optimal Choice


- An interior solution is found where:

$$MRS = \frac{MU_1}{MU_2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$$
$$\therefore \frac{MU_\ell}{MU_c} = w$$

- This is the **tangency condition**
  - $MRS$  = rate at which you are willing to give up 1 hour of leisure for an extra unit of consumption
  - Price ratio = rate at which the market values 1 hour of leisure relative to consumption
  - Optimality: your internal valuation of leisure relative to consumption matches the market's valuation



**Figure 2:** Interior Solution




Source: GB, Figure 2.6

# Changes to Non-Labor Income

- Suppose  $V$  increases to  $V + \Delta$ .
  - At every level of  $\ell$ , I get  $\Delta$  more dollars to use on consumption
  - Parallel shift of the budget line
- Assuming that leisure is a normal good, I should increase consumption and leisure

# Changes to Non-Labor Income

**Figure 3:** Increase of Non-Labor Income (Leisure Normal)



Source: GB, Figure 2.7

# Changes to Prices


- In standard setting, changing the price of a good has two effects: (e.g. for a price increase)
  1. **Substitution Effect:** the good has become relatively more expensive  $\implies$  switch away to substitute goods (and buy less complements)
  2. **Income Effect:** prices overall have risen, so I feel poorer overall  $\implies$  reduce consumption of normal goods
- Price affects relative income, but it does not affect the (nominal) value of income itself. If  $p_1 \uparrow$ :
  - BL slope  $\left(-\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right)$  falls, i.e. increases in absolute value (steeper)
  - BL x-intercept  $\left(\frac{M}{p_1}\right)$  falls
  - BL y-intercept  $\left(\frac{M}{p_2}\right)$  remains unchanged

## Changes to Wage

- Consider the wage (i.e. price of leisure) changing. If  $w \uparrow$ :
  - BL slope ( $-\frac{w}{1}$ ) falls, i.e. increases in absolute value (steeper)
  - BL x-intercept ( $T$ ) remains unchanged
  - BL y-intercept ( $wT + V$ ) increases
- It's a bit ambiguous!
  - Wage increase make leisure more costly  $\implies$  SE says you should reduce leisure
  - But it also makes you richer  $\implies$  IE says you should increase leisure

# Changes to Wage Income


**Figure 4:** Increase of Wage




Source: GB, Figure 2.8

# Changes to Wage Income

**Figure 5:** Increase of Wage



(a) Income Effect Dominates



(b) Substitution Effect Dominates

Source: GB, Figure 2.9

# Reservation Wage

- In Intermediate Micro, you sometimes had “corner” solutions (i.e. consume only one good)
  - Only with Perfect Substitutes and Quasi-Linear utility functions
- Here, a “corner” involves using all time on leisure, i.e. not working
  - The budget line is cut-off. At  $\ell = T$ , you have zero earnings but can still use your non-labor income  $V$  for consumption
  - This is always an option for you (**outside option**)




# Reservation Wage

- Thought experiment: suppose  $V = \$100$ . You leave your house looking for a job and go to the marketplace to see the current wage  $w$ .
  - You observe  $w = 1\text{¢}$   $\rightarrow$  How insulting! Go home and enjoy your  $\$100$
  - You observe  $w = \$100$   $\rightarrow$  Wow! Definitely going to be working
- Extending this reasoning, there must be some specific wage  $\tilde{w}$  such that you are indifferent between working and not working
  - Call this the **reservation wage**
  - Your reservation wage depends on your preferences + outside option (how do you answers to the thought experiment change if  $V = 0$ ?)

# Reservation Wage

**Figure 6:** Reservation Wage Illustration



Source: GB, Figure 2.10


# Labor Supply

- Usually, we use the consumer's utility maximization problem (UMP) to solve for demand
  - Intuitively solve UMP for every possible price and see what is the optimal quantity
- We can do this here. For every possible  $w$ , solve for the optimal leisure  $\ell^*$ 
  - This gives us leisure demand  $\ell(w)$ , the optimal hours of leisure as a function of the wage
  - Since  $L = T - \ell$ , then  $L(w) = T - \ell(w)$  is the **labor supply curve**


# Labor Supply

- Demand for a product follows the law of demand: downward sloping
- Labor supply (and likewise leisure demand) are more tricky:
  - From  $w = 0$  to  $w = \tilde{w}$ , the reservation wage: zero labor (not worth it to work)
  - For low  $w > \tilde{w}$ :  $SE > IE$ , so labor increases with  $w$  (most people)
  - At some point,  $w \gg \tilde{w}$ :  $IE > SE$ , so labor decreases with  $w$  (too rich to work)
- This gives us a backward bending supply curve

**Figure 7:** Backward Bending Labor Supply Curve



(a) Optimal Consumption Bundles



(b) Relation between Optimal Hours of Work and the Wage Rate

# Market Labor Supply

- As usual, we aggregate individual supply curves “horizontally” to get the market supply curve

$$\underbrace{L(w)}_{\text{Total hours people are willing to work at wage } w} = L_1(w) + \dots + \underbrace{L_i(w)}_{\text{Number of hours person } i \text{ is willing to work at wage } w} + \dots + L_N(w)$$

- We are often interested in what happens to labor supply if  $w$  changes
  - This is the **labor supply elasticity**: if  $w$  increases by 1%, how much does labor supply change by (as % change)

$$\sigma = \frac{\% \Delta \text{ in Labor Supply}}{\% \Delta \text{ in Wage}} = \frac{dL}{dw} \cdot \frac{w}{L}$$

- If  $|\sigma| > 1$ , we say labor supply is elastic (very response to wage). If  $|\sigma| < 1$ , it is inelastic

# Labor Demand

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# The Firm's Problem

- The firm wants to choose its inputs, labor ( $L$ ) and capital ( $K$ ), to maximize profits
  - Subject to prices of its inputs ( $w, r$ ), the price of its output ( $p$ ), and its production function,  $f(K, L)$
  - Key: assuming price taker of *all* prices

$$\max_{K, L} pf(K, L) - wL - rK$$

- In the short run, often assume that capital is fixed  $\implies$  to get more output, firms need to hire more workers
- In the long run, all inputs are variables  $\implies$  firm can substitute capital for labor



# The Firm's Problem

- SR optimization. Take FOC (derivative) with respect to  $L$ :

$$p \frac{\partial f}{\partial L} - w = 0$$

$$p \cdot MP_L = w$$

- $MP_L$  is the **marginal product of labor**: how much extra output do you get from hiring an additional unit of labor
- Intuition for optimal  $L$ : hire workers until the extra revenue ( $p \cdot MP_L$ ) that you get from the last unit is equal to the cost of hiring them ( $w$ )
  - Common shorthand: “workers are paid their marginal product”

## Short Run Demand Curve

- In the optimality condition,  $p \cdot MP_L = w$ , firms cannot choose prices ( $p$ ) or wages ( $w$ )
- The only thing they can choose is  $L$ , which in turn determines  $MP_L$ . They choose  $L$  so that the condition holds
- But as  $w$  changes, then the  $L$  needs to be re-chosen to keep the equality true
- Doing this for every  $w$  gives us the short-run labor demand curve  $L(w)$

Market Demand

Long Run Demand

# Labor Demand Elasticity

- Analogous to labor supply, we can define the labor demand elasticity

$$\delta = \frac{\% \Delta \text{ in Labor Demand}}{\% \Delta \text{ in Wage}}$$

- Since the firm's problems differ, we define  $\delta$  for both the short-run and long-run demands
  - Firms have more flexibility in LR  $\implies \delta_{LR} > \delta_{SR}$  (LR more elastic)


# Market Equilibrium

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# Single Market Equilibrium

- We bring together the market demand and market supply to calculate the equilibrium
- Wages will adjust until quantity of labor demanded equals the quantity supplied
- Properties of the competitive market:
  - Single wage ( $w^*$ ). All workers receive the same wage
  - No unemployment. Everyone willing to work at  $w^*$  or lower gets a job
  - Efficient: it maximizes **gains from trade** (consumer + producer surplus)

**Figure 8:** Labor Market




Source: GB, Figure 4.1

# Multiple Market Equilibrium


- Realistically, we have more than one market
  - Same industry, different locations
  - Same location, different industries
- Suppose two markets (North and South)
  - Workers in both regions have same skills (i.e. they are perfect substitutes)
  - Exists a wage differential ( $w_{North} > w_{South}$ )
  - Is this an equilibrium? Does it depend on the cost of migration?

# Multiple Market Equilibrium

**Figure 9:** Two Labor Markets with Migration



(a) The Northern Labor Market



(b) The Southern Labor Market

Source: GB, Figure 4.2



# **Market Equilibrium**

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## **Compensating Wage Differentials**


# Multiple Market Equilibrium

- Even with multiple markets, still get a single wage  $w^*$  in the market
  - Key assumption: all jobs are alike and all workers are alike
- Reality: jobs and workers are different, we observe variation in wages
- Rationalization: **compensating wage differentials**

# Job Difficulty

- Suppose that each job can be characterized by how much effort ( $e$ ) it takes to perform
  - “Effort” captures how difficult a job is due to risk, long hours, benefits etc
  - Workers dislike effort (it is a bad)
  - Firms’ profit increases with effort
- We can plot indifference and iso-profit curves on a effort-wage axis
  - If  $e \uparrow$ , then  $u \downarrow$  and  $\pi \uparrow$  (for fixed  $w$ )
  - If  $w \uparrow$ , then  $u \uparrow$  and  $\pi \downarrow$  (for fixed  $e$ )
  - To ensure indifference, upward sloping ICs and IPs
  - ICs increasing in  $u$  towards NW, IPs increasing in  $\pi$  towards SE

**Figure 10:** Indifference and Iso-Profit Curves




Source: GB, Figure 5.1, 5.5

# Hedonic Wage Function

- In standard model, everyone is alike. Here, people and firms differ and there is matching
  - Firms choose their optimal wage-effort combination based on their production function
  - Workers choose the firm that offers them the best contract based on their preferences
- In equilibrium: firms are on their zero-profit iso-profit line
  - If  $\pi > 0$ , another firm can offer a better wage to employee and they will leave
  - If  $\pi < 0$ , firm will decrease wage to lower costs
- We can look at how  $w$  varies with  $e$  in equilibrium - this gives the **hedonic wage function**

# Hedonic Wage Function

**Figure 11:** Hedonic Wage Function



Source: GB, Figure 5.6

# Compensating Wage Differentials

- Hedonic wage function is upward sloping: receive higher wages for tougher jobs
- **Compensating wage differentials** arise to compensate workers for non-wage characteristics of a job
  - Interpretation: how much do I have to pay the marginal worker (last hired) to join my firm, in equilibrium?
  - Key assumptions: perfect information and mobility

# Towards Empirics

- Our simple model has given us a **testable implication**
  - A relationship or outcome that we can check if it holds in real life
  - This is the sign of a good model
- In this case: tougher jobs should be paid more, *all else equal*
  - The “all else equal” makes things difficult. Rarely holds in real life
  - Comparing college prof to coal miner - not great
  - Comparing college prof in NYC to college prof in Boise, ID - much better (but not perfect)



# Gender Gap

- Let's look at two papers that study the **gender pay gap**
- We observe that women earn less than men, on average
- One possible explanation: women have stronger preferences for positive job attributes (e.g. able to work from home, flexible hours) and so accept lower wages
- Fits into the compensating differentials story
- Get around “all else equal” by doing experiments (we'll talk a lot about this later in the class)

## **Preference for the Workplace, Investment in Human Capital, and Gender**



Matthew  
**Wiswall**



Basit  
**Zafar**

***QJE, 2017***

- Surveyed NYU students in May 2012
  - Sample: 247 people; 65% female; average age was 21.5
- Offered choices between hypothetical jobs with different qualities
  - From this, they estimate the average **willingness-to-pay** for each job attribute
  - Interpretation: if you increase the job attribute by one unit, how much more do you have to pay me to keep me indifferent? (slope of the indifference curve!)

**Table 1:** Average WTP Estimates

|                               | WTP (% of earnings) |      |       |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|------|-------|
|                               | Overall             | Men  | Women |
| Percent chance of being fired | 2.8                 | 0.6  | 4.0   |
| Bonus as % of earnings        | −1.4                | −0.9 | −1.7  |
| Percent of men at jobs        | 0.1                 | 0.1  | 0.0   |
| Annual % raise in earnings    | −1.6                | −3.4 | −0.6  |
| Hours per week of work        | 1.1                 | 0.8  | 1.3   |
| Part-time option available    | −5.1                | −1.1 | −7.3  |

Source: Wiswall and Zafar (2017), Table 6

# Main Results

- WTP estimates show that women do indeed value non-monetary job characteristics more than men
- Do a follow-up survey (71 respondents) to see what jobs they actually end up taking four years later
  - WTP results do predict actual workplace choices!
  - e.g. people who valued flexible work options in the college survey were more likely to have jobs with greater flexibility
- Estimate that at least one quarter of the gender gap in early career earnings is explained by these average gender differences in preferences

## Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements



Alexandre  
**Mas**



Amanda  
**Pallais**

***AER, 2017***

# Paper Overview

- Posted advertisements for a telephone interviewer positions at a call center in 68 metro areas
  - Sample: 3,245 people; 75% female; average age was 33
- Asked applicants for preference between two positions: a standard 9-5 job vs. one of five alternatives
  - Alternatives:
    - flexible schedule, flexible hours (choose number of hours)
    - work from home, combined flexible (choose schedule + hours)
    - employer discretion (employer decides with short notice)
  - Wages also varied

**Table 2:** Average WTP Estimates

|                          | WTP (% of earnings) |      |       |
|--------------------------|---------------------|------|-------|
|                          | Overall             | Men  | Women |
| Flexible schedule        | −2.8                | −0.9 | −3.4  |
| Flexible number of hours | 1.3                 | 2.0  | 1.1   |
| Work from home           | −7.8                | −4.0 | −9.4  |
| Combined flexible        | −6.9                | −0.2 | −9.2  |
| Employer discretion      | 20.1                | 12.4 | 25.1  |

*Source: Mas and Pallais (2017), Table 5 and 10*

[level WTPs divided by \$17 following footnote 29]



# Main Results

- Results suggest that that women have stronger preference for flexibility than men, but...
- Find that there is little gender gap in *actual* work arrangements (using survey data)
  - Conclude that this cannot explain the gender wage gap
  - “The differences in observed work arrangements are not large enough to lead to significant gender gaps even with substantial compensating wage differentials.”

## Next Steps

- Two papers, published in the same year (2017), both at top journals... with quite different results
  - Everything comes out cleanly in theoretical models
  - Real world is much more complicated!
- Next step: dive more into empirical work

# Appendix


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# Market Demand Curve


- Usually, we just sum individual curves horizontally. More complicated here!
- Suppose  $w \downarrow$ . Then every firm will want to hire more workers:  
 $L \uparrow (*)$
- But if firms hire more workers, then their output increases:  
 $q \uparrow$ 
  - Higher supply in the market drives down the price of the output:  $p \downarrow$
- Lower prices mean that firms will want to hire less workers:  
 $L \downarrow$
- In the end, labor increases but by less than you would initially think (\*)

# Aggregating Demand

**Figure A1:** Industry Short-Run Demand Curve



(a) Individual Firms



(b) Industry

Source: GB, Figure 3.4

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## Long Run Demand Curve


- In the LR, firm can choose any mix of  $K$  and  $L$ .
  - More options to respond to price changes!
- If  $w \downarrow$ , then current mix of  $K, L$  will be cheaper - but it won't be optimal
  - Substitute  $K$  with  $L$  to get the same output for cheaper - still not optimal!
  - Since costs are lower, firm will want to expand. Hire more  $L$  for sure
  - Will they also hire more  $K$ ?

# Substitution and Scale Effects

- Just like for consumers, a change in input prices has two effects:
  1. **Substitution Effect:** If  $w$  falls, then labor is relatively cheaper and, holding output constant, the firm will switch from capital to labor (i.e. have a more labor intensive production)
  2. **Scale Effect:** If  $w$  falls, costs overall are lower, so the firm wants to expand its production by increasing the levels of both inputs
- Therefore, for a decrease in wage:
  - $K \uparrow$  if scale effect dominates the substitution effect
  - $K \downarrow$  if substitution effect dominates the scale effect

# Decomposition of Wage Decrease

**Figure A2:** Effect Decomposition





## References

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## References

- Mas, A. and A. Pallais (2017). “Valuing alternative work arrangements”. In: *American Economic Review* 107.12, pp. 3722–3759.
- Wiswall, M. and B. Zafar (2017). “Preference for the Workplace, Investment in Human Capital, and Gender”. In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133.1, pp. 457–507.