Shanghai: “Capital of the Coming Era”?

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Our environment is the source of our subjectivity; our culture, derived from manipulation and navigation of the spaces that we inhabit. The physical form of the city is that of an archive of past societies, folkways, and varieties of experience, each building, street, and intersection summarizing in built form the history of its inhabitants. The creation of new spaces, new interfaces for human beings to experience the world, is then of deep cultural significance. Urban space constructs the subject. It is for this reason that it is worth interrogating new spaces under construction: not for technical, economic or architectural motives, but because it is space that will give our actions a platform. Resident in Shanghai, I have watched the city changing rapidly, intentionally, and utilizing an explicitly utopian logic of urbanism. Shanghai today represents the ideal of the city as completely malleable space, a space where the most grandiose projects can be executed, where natural laws and perhaps even human laws are subject to suspension–in total, the most completely experimental urban landscape of the contemporary world. The long avenues and narrow lanes of the city are the seedbeds of an imagined future. Writing of the new high-rises that have cropped up in Shanghai since the 1980s, the novelist Wang Anyi writes "When you first arrive here, the place seems to lack a heart because it so carefree—but that is because it hasn't yet had time to build up a reservoir of recollections; its mind is blank and has not begun to feel the need to call on its memory."[1] It is during the next generation that the still-fresh structure of this city, at once ancient and new, will coagulate into a new vantage point, a space that filters the outside world through its own identity.

Shanghai's arrogance is legendary; the city has long been famous within China for hubristic glamour, and its construction today could literally be described as castles with their foundation in sand, if not outright watery mud;[2] huge complexes of buildings have been known to topple over immediately upon construction.[3] However, my intention is not so facile as simply to satirize the

dreams of a city, for I partake of them. My work in Shanghai may be described as opportunism, idealism, pragmatism, or a mixture of the three; in fact, the dynamics of the city itself represent the same hybrid value system. The labyrinthine space of the city under construction has been inspirational as a structure, here analogous to the text of the dissertation itself—language is a utopian structure just as much as a city, a parallel that is central to my conception of space. Out of the watery mud of the Yangtze river delta, from the miserable shacks that I passed en route to the metro every day in the southern suburbs to the lush environs of Huaihai Road, where I make my home today, the city of Shanghai appears to me to be a *Gesamtkunstwerk*, bringing together all of the elements of the human experience in a way that is spectacular in every sense. From a context that is decidedly less than promising, indeed, a cradle of exploitation and sorrow, Shanghai has risen to become perhaps the primary paradigm for transformative urbanism today. This capacity to imagine a paradise in a slum is, perhaps, "human, all too human," but Shanghai's ability to reimagine itself demands respect. The city that I live in, my own life and experience, and the text of this thesis are marked by an intrinsic similarity. My own work as well as the work taking place in Shanghai today reveals a utopian tendency that is, moreover, discernible as a unifying motif throughout the trajectory of human events. This thesis is an attempt to fuse literary practice, spatial practice, and research practice in a tribute to the melancholy and vital settlement that joins the terrain of an ancient civilization with the sea, the past with present, and the dreamed space of an urban future with the doldrums of everyday life.

The Context of Urban Renewal

The word Shanghai (上海) is difficult to pin down. Literally, it denotes geography, naming the city as "halfway to the sea," "accessing the sea," or situated on the river delta—in fact, the land that the city is built on today did not exist until relatively recently in geological time: the soil is a residue of the Yellow River's deposits. Shanghai, then, is the borderland of the Middle Kingdom (中国), turned more towards the sea than to the capital. When Shanghai was first named a treaty port, assuming the architectural as well as cultural position of a modernist city, it was forever marked as an entry point for the foreign, the new, and the strange. Shanghai was defined by this rupture, the logic of the modernist city grafted onto a water town on the Yangtze River. This synthesis has

proven remarkably durable, and the city of today lives within the shadow of this history. Shanghai as entry point for modernism was the transformative agent of twentieth-century Chinese history. It was a center from which dangerous, new ideas, prompted by the experience of metropolitan life, were disseminated. The first meeting of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai in 1921; the writer who revolutionized Chinese literature by using vernacular language, Lu Xun, lived in Shanghai, where a park in Hongkou district is named after him; and many of the leaders of the Cultural Revolution, notably the Gang of Four, hailed from Shanghai. In China, as elsewhere, the sinister potential of the dark back streets of the city was the catalyst for sweeping social change. The activities of the past twenty years, instead of denying or modifying this modernist heritage, substantiate it, embroider upon it, and enlarge upon it. In fact, Shanghai's current trajectory of growth is dictated by history, counted down by the ticking of the clock of the Bund's Custom House just as much as by the Shanghai World Expo clock.[4] Shanghai was born as an experimental zone, its foundation a fissure in Chinese space, a chink through which the outside world would pour in; and in Shanghai as elsewhere, "nothing disappears completely . . . in space what came earlier continues to underpin what follows."[5] The unique *mélange* of cultures—not only the meeting of East and West, but also of diverse subgroups of Chinese people, from different regions, with different lifestyles and languages—is being perpetuated and replayed today. During Shanghai's golden age, the city was conceived as a portal to, simultaneously, the future and the rest of the world, a stage for cultural interventions both spatial (for example, the introduction of foreign architectural typologies) and temporal (the innovation of new technologies).[6] Today, the city is experiencing a renaissance, courtesy of China's new strength in the global economic market since the 1978 reform and opening. As an accumulation of wealth, foreign residents, and social innovation, it occupies much the same role as before. Today, the city seems to match perfectly Anne Querrien's concept of the metropolis: "The social ideal of the metropolis is a democracy in which citizens of various origins stand at an equal distance from each other . . . however, in its quest for a world market, the metropolis encourages a limitless economic expansionism which completely overrides this ideal."[7] While indisputably having given the city a kitschy veneer, this tendency inadvertently helps to dismantle ancient structures of domination simply by carelessly failing to take account of them.

Urban Space as Epistemological Technology

Shanghai's position within China was, and is, as a mediating node between itself and the outside world. Shanghai, the city on the sea, is conceived of as a port for new and strange ideas from outside to emerge within China. Paradoxically, by remaining dynamic, its role within China has been inert: today's Shanghai occupies the same functional role within China as the Shanghai of eighty years ago. It is this legacy of rupture between China and the West that makes Shanghai the avant-garde city of the twenty-first century: the epoch will be defined by a conflict that was Shanghai's foundation over a century ago.

Today, the area constituting Greater Shanghai is the largest subnational entity in the world;[8] it is upon the immense human capital of past and present that elaborate dreams of the future rely. Political innovation has often been pioneered by municipal authorities seeking pragmatic solutions to unanticipated problems of scale and distribution: the city is an unwitting laboratory for social change. A central question for observers of Shanghai's growth, then, is whether Shanghainese today are creating a model for urban life the world around. Will Shanghai usher in a new conception of space, or at least, a new urbanism, equivalent to that of nineteenth-century Paris as seen by Walter Benjamin, or those of twentieth-century Manhattan as read by Rem Koolhaas?[9] The settlement of Shanghai was the original rupture from the 5,000 years of traditional Chinese lifestyles, and the city remains the original template for hybrid culture in China. The recent explosive growth summons memories of the luxurious past; a past abruptly terminated by a violent revolution that found its roots within the cosmopolitanized slum districts of the metropolis. The reopening of this Pandora's Box is an event of world-historical significance.

Expo 2010

Shanghai, 2010: large swathes of the city have been transformed for the International Expo. For the past twenty years, Shanghai's authorities have been altering the urban landscape with ambitious infrastructure projects and showy buildings seeking to enhance the city's status abroad and domestically. Simultaneously, the vast economic and cultural changes taking place in China, led by the vanguard city of Shanghai,[10] seem to be altering both the nature of the social contract itself and the ways in which urban space is inhabited. The Expo is the current incarnation of this process and

has not only entailed construction of a contemporary architecture theme park, but also invaded the discourse of daily life in the city through omnipresent advertising and various changes vaguely described as "preparing for the Expo," which range from slum clearance to infrastructure construction to language education and a greater attention to petty crimes. The slogan of the Expo, 城市让生活更美好, or "Better City, Better Life," seems to highlight the ways in which urban planning has been linked to the utopian nature of the landscape emerging in China. The municipal authorities in charge of the Expo say quite frankly that they see their city as the essential terrain of the future, and read local developments as of cardinal importance: "The theme of the Exposition 2010 Shanghai is 'Better City, Better Life.' The topic has its origin in the thousands of years of human civilization."[11] The Expo is both symbol and centerpiece of a narrative of localized urban progress. The discourse of universality used by the Expo would perhaps only be possible in Shanghai; other Chinese cities lack Shanghai's total commitment to the outside world. This discourse is actively being constructed within the paradigm of the Expo. The stones of this utopian edifice have been recuperated from the ruins of the cosmopolitan Shanghai of the 1930s via nostalgia; a memory of the city's past greatness pervades contemporary image-making. This base is fragile, though, for the history is problematic, and Shanghai is, moreover, undeniably more dynamic, cosmopolitan, and central to the global discourse than ever before, surpassing its former greatness even as it lives in the shadow thereof. The Expo fuses this legacy with a contemporaneity so fresh that it almost seems to be the future rather than the present. Pavilions to sustainability, urbanization, and the other banalities of the early twenty-first century abound, but in practice, there is no space for these solutions in Shanghai's present. The Expo is by definition unsustainable, because it will be largely dismantled after it has run its course. The elaborately fantasized vision of Shanghai offered by the Expo reflects Shanghai's self-image as an upwardly mobile global city; the reality of it, while encouraging, helps us to identify the weak points in this discourse. The Expo is a lens through which we can understand developments in contemporary Shanghai more broadly.

Shanghai Renaissance

Shanghai emerged from the crucible of colonial development, a paradigm subsequently rechristened globalization. The mix of different cultures under the sign of economic utility was the environment

of the Shanghai that incubated Chinese modernity, Shanghai's "golden age" of the 1930s. The cosmopolitan environment of 1920s Shanghai was as ethnically diverse as contemporary London or Paris—ethnic groups from all over China met one another for the first time in the modernist city. The space of innovative Western technologies and lifestyles proved liberating for some, such as the writer Lu Xun, who based himself there. The same environment motivated others, such as the Chinese Communist Party, founded in a Shanghai alley in 1921, to find a new kind of liberation. Shanghai's colonial past is the dominant vernacular of the city center. Shanghai's past is today, as it was at the time, simultaneously liberating and horrifying, and the architectural relics it left behind have been better preserved than those in any other Chinese city. The famous Bund waterfront is, for example, nearly entirely preserved, recalling a colonial past as prosperous and dynamic as it was chaotic and oppressive. If, in other cities, the dynamic is straightforwardly modern versus ancient, Shanghai has already seen a utopian modernity emerge, only to fail. Perhaps ironically, this bittersweet legacy has been preserved, especially the spaces most marked by melancholy, such as the Jewish ghetto of Hongkou district, certain great mansions of the French Concession, and the buildings of the Bund. The colonial legacy extends beyond the built environment, though, as Shanghai today cultivates links with the outside world that echo its past glory. If most of China is "new" today, Shanghai is better described as experiencing a renaissance, and the relations with capital and foreigners that were once simultaneously a source of status and angst at the same time have resurfaced along similar lines. Shanghai cannot claim political centrality, and its claim to be China's first city is based on the openness to the outside world that is a remnant of colonialism. The dynamic created by colonialism remains a source of tension, creative and otherwise, in today's postcolonial Shanghai.

Shanghai as Symbolic Space

Shanghai has always been a central symbolic space within China.[12] If Beijing has long been identified as the space of tradition, the symbolic center of China, Shanghai has always been the symbolic outlier of China, a space fundamentally out of step with the rest of the country, because ahead of it. To use Anne Querrien's terms, Shanghai "offers its own mode of space-time to those for whom the principles of a sovereign people and a nation state do not apply."[13] Though some have

characterized the city as "Westernizing," this doesn't quite make sense, because the changes taking place adopt neither the logic nor the form of any major Western city. It would be more sensible to say that, without necessarily coming closer to a Western model, Shanghai is escaping the confines of the Chinese model of urbanism, and in the process of doing so transforming that model—it is the avant-garde space of China's "first tier,"[14] whose achievements are scrutinized with astonishment by planners in second- and third-tier cities. The authorities would like to control private space, but in practice, they have greater power over public space. Mega-events like the recent Beijing Olympics or the Shanghai Expo are used to blur this distinction, because a communal effort is needed to secure the superficial benefits of the spectacularized event, even as the infrastructural and legal legacy of the event continues indefinitely.[15] The difference between the two events attests to the strengths and characters of the two different spaces: while the Olympics brought all of the massive power of the state to bear, the Expo found funds from a consortium of national and local authorities as well as corporate sponsors and even foreign governments. Shanghai's networks are its strength, even as Beijing's centralizing tendencies, apparently an opposite approach, served a similar objective in 2008.

Power Dynamics in Spatial Practice

In contemporary China, the most forceful language that the government can speak is the language of controlling urban space itself, and the space of Shanghai is itself symbolic of the future of China. Reshaping central Shanghai can be thus read as an attempt to reshape the imagined future, a self-conscious effort that touches upon sustainability, urbanization, diversity, and so on.[16] The Expo is a microcosm of this tendency, itself occupying a patch of profitable land that will be redeveloped for luxury housing after it ends. The language of the Expo's buildings, notwithstanding that it is a language spoken by power to justify itself, is compelling, especially in that it seeks to appropriate the cultural space of optimism about the future for the state. Though the anticipated 70 million visitors, 95 percent of whom will be Chinese,[18] constitute the main audience for Shanghai's Expo, it has also been a display to the world of the opulence of a city that is striving to become the capital city of a reality it has yet to define. This metropolis will not become the capital city of a place, but rather, like Paris in the nineteenth century, of an epoch, defining its time by reshaping it.[19] The Expo

is both symbolic of and central to this process; in seeking to frame Shanghai as the urban space of the future, substantial revision of the past and present might be necessary. The economic function of this project is potentially long-term. Shanghai has long pursued the strategy of creating a visible set of monuments that anticipate economic prosperity (rather than inspiring it, as in Rem Koolhaas's narration of Manhattan).[20] In Shanghai, the skyline was constructed before the economic base that is normally reflected by a skyline came into existence, a testament to the unique role of the state in Chinese society, which has wished into existence a new economy while remaining in control of it in a way that differentiates it from Western capitalisms. Though Shanghai's size and economic significance are unmistakable, its role in a China full of enormous cities isn't purely functional; Jeffrey Wasserstrom describes its role as being "as much symbol as physical city."[21] In a country so vast that many cities seem to be merely warehouses for their huge numbers of inhabitants, Shanghai is in addition a symbolic space, recuperating the legacy of its colonial history to stake a claim, not to being China's capital, but rather to being its definitive metropolis, the urban space that defines itself as "city" and everywhere else as suburb.

The Context of "City"

A city is much more than buildings; it is a way of social relations, a way of understanding the world, a language, a rich bank of memories and images; as Henri Lefebvre puts it, "a space is not a thing but rather a set of relations among things."[22] This set of relations was Shanghai's greatest asset prior to 1992, when the physical structure of the city was hopelessly decayed and drab—the city's glamorous past, more than any tangible resources, proved the key to its new prominence. However, cities are often read or understood based on their spatial manifestations; architecture becomes the language of the contemporary because it is much more malleable to change and somehow expresses more clearly the realities of power in the contemporary city; space "socially appears as the intangible outcome of history, society, and culture, all of which are supposedly combined within it."[23] Shanghai has built so many monuments to its own grandeur that a previously irrelevant zone, Pudong, to the east of the old center, has become a museum of them,[24] and in so doing, a center of the city. However, it is less so in reality than in representation; after all, skylines are invisible to those who walk among them, so best placed on the other side of the river from the main life of the

city, where they can be appreciated as a stunning view; views are meant to be viewed, not inhabited.[25] These buildings express an aspiration to clearly visible urbanity.

Shanghai's authorities, with their frequent interventions, seem to be trying to assert control over the vast and relatively unregulated space of the city. The symbols that power has been scrambling to erect to itself have ramifications domestically as well as internationally; these buildings create an image of power and stability that is read differently by potential citizens and potential investors.[26] As the art historian Hubert Damisch asserts, "in today's China, architecture functions as one of the most visible instruments . . . of 'modernization,' ostensibly proving to the world and the Chinese masses that the Chinese can be 'modern,' that they know how to build and maintain very tall buildings."[27] The message is more sophisticated than this, but it hints at the fact that, in contrast to a "delirious" Manhattan, Shanghai has been constructed deliberately, centrally, with cool reason and extensive rationales, and without a clear or direct economic utility—attested to by the acres of light and space between the buildings, which attain to Manhattan's heights without the density that inspired those heights.

Wenming: Civic Intervention by the State

Shanghai isn't being gentrified, it is itself gentrifying people, drawing them in from the countryside and rapidly transforming them into *wenming*,[28] or civilized/Westernized urbanites.[29] As Eileen Chang puts it, "the people of Shanghai have been distilled out of Chinese tradition by the pressures of modern life."[30] These changes aren't taking place at random, though; as William Kirby recently observed, "In China . . . the government is responsible at the end of the day for almost everything."[31] The radical changes that ordinary people in China are going through may seem chaotic to them, and in fact to those who unleashed them, but are in fact part of a highly ambitious plan to completely change the urban fabric, and in so doing, the fabric of everyday life itself. A moderator of a recent debate posited: "When the economic limits were taken off 30 years ago, did anybody imagine that there would be hundred-story buildings in Shanghai and subway lines and cars everywhere? The process feels almost experimental."[32] An experiment, to be sure; in fact, for some who know the city, its very existence seems like one of the most inspiring experiments of the

contemporary era, notwithstanding that the very volatile quality of the city's growth hints at the possibility of catastrophic failure.

Branding Space

The Shanghai Urban Planning Museum is surely one of the most eloquent testaments to the existence of the "Better City, Better Life" narrative long before the Expo—it opened in 2000, two years before the Expo was announced. In this museum, the city itself is on display; the entire zone of the city limits is displayed in miniature in an auditorium lit by floodlights. The visitor may note the contrast between the muggy clamor of People's Park, immediately outside the downtown location of the museum, and the tranquil, unproblematic city on display; in fact, what is on display is not the actual city, but the ideal form—a display of the city in 2020 is also on display, a gesture only possible in a city where the future is seen as entirely malleable and subject to manipulation and quality control, entirely a "product," to echo Lefebvre. The transformation of the city into a symbol enshrined in a museum can only be thought of as a canny attempt at branding. "Branding is all about boiling down perceptions to their essentials. Nobody is more self-conscious than the brand stewards themselves about the artificiality of brand construction. A brand is no different from any other discursive construct . . . to rise above the information clutter, a brand's DNA is crystallized into a few pithy campaign concepts."[33] In Shanghai, these concepts are: futuristic skyline; enormous highways lit by neon; and now, the Expo. The production of space in the most literal and self-aware sense has a long history in China; a recent book about architectural innovation in contemporary Beijing tells us:

> In 1414 [Emperor] Yongle . . . [traveled to Beijing] accompanied by a group of artists, poets, and painters, who were given the task of executing a series of views, accompanied by poetic descriptions. The 8 Views had no realistic intentions. Instead, the politically intelligent and careful objective was to compose an artificial image of the places that would legitimize Beijing as capital. Even the names of the views made no references to anything that is urban, or barren, or under construction, nothing at all recalling the dusty reality of the Beijing of that time.[34]

For most residents of Shanghai, these new buildings have no more presence in their daily lives than the luscious gardens of the 8 Views commissioned by Yongle did for the Beijingers of the time; nor are they any more accurate as samples of typical urban scenes. However, in a city where any building is liable to be torn down and replaced with a new one, buildings that represent the future are somehow more telling than those belonging to a present undergoing demolition. These buildings are compelling if only because they symbolize the desires of a power strong enough to alter the cityscape at will; if they ostensibly symbolize government ministries or banks, they actually represent violent, dominating force (a distinction that might seem semantic to those whose homes have been demolished by those same governmental and financial warlords). "The element of repression in [the monument] and the element of exaltation could scarcely be disentangled; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the repressive element was metamorphosized into exaltation . . . it replaces a brutal reality with a materially realized appearance,"[35] Lefebvre writes—a summary of the Shanghainese situation that seems potently accurate.

Civics or Politics?

In the Chinese political landscape that has emerged since 1989, the state has cynically claimed credit for the new prosperity and futuristic cities in order to postpone and foreclose upon political change. Opposition is dismissed less as unjustified and more as irrelevant in a cityscape changing so rapidly. Both domestic and foreign observers have suggested that democratic consensus-building is simply too slow and cumbersome to navigate such rapid changes.[36] Subtly posed in this formulation is another proposition, replacing politics as the sphere of potential social change by technology and the future, with their implicitly redemptive qualities. The debate about changing the urban fabric somehow aligns state power with civilized values/the future, and resistance to state power with peasantry/lack of education/malignant traditional values, exemplified by the burgeoning use of the term *wenming*. The narrative of the past fifteen years, and of the Expo in particular, seems to be precisely that liberation will come through economic change and the greater access to technology that it will provide, and not through political change, which at best is acknowledged as an unfortunate side-effect. The Shanghai Expo authorities tell us that "Our motto is: 'Keeping in mind

the next 60 years' development while preparing for the six months' Exposition,'"[37] as if the Expo (and of course, the modernity that it represents) will somehow transform the very texture of daily life in a magical way. Can we really take this modernity, which has clearly made real changes to the lives of average citizens in stark, material terms, at face value?

Better City, Better Life

城市让生活更美好 is the omnipresent slogan of the expo, seen on TV, on the subway, on billboards in the street, and near the statues of the blue mascot Haibao distributed all around Shanghai and the Sinosphere. The official English translation is "Better city, better life"; in Chinese, the phrase is literally: "City, then life, becomes better." The changes of the city are first labeled as improvements in themselves, and then we are told that they will actually make our lives more magical/good. In the space of Shanghai, long notorious among locals and foreigners as one of intrigue, chaos, dazzling wealth, and abysmal slums, an antiseptic new hero has been seen presenting this slogan to the people, explicitly seeking to stay on message about Shanghai's "real" character all the while. "The blue colour represents many elements—such as the ocean, the future and technology—which are consistent with characteristics of the host city."[38] This figure, selected in a competition that many locals insist must have been rigged, crystallizes the tediousness that Shanghai authorities seek to cultivate in escaping the seedy legacy that is in fact the city's greatest asset. Baudelaire felt that the creation of a cliché was the greatest objective of an artist,[39] and all those who are bored and not shocked by Haibao must acknowledge the artful nature that has inserted him into the urban fabric. The genius of Haibao is to successfully personify Shanghai not, as previously, as a Whore of the Orient, but as an inoffensive and even boring cartoon character. The model for city planners is somewhere between Manhattan and Singapore; but Manhattan was a spontaneous response to very different economic and social conditions, and Shanghai is and always has been infinitely more vibrant, diverse, and chaotic than Singapore. Even today, in both absolute and proportional terms, the foreign population of Shanghai is higher than that of nearly any other East Asian city.[40] Those who love the city and Chinese culture can have no wish to see a great city model itself on the sterile and hyper-controlled ones that inspire so much admiration in those who wish to do what has for 5,000 years proved impossible, namely, make China boring. Haibao points

the way to a new mode of citizenship, one that invites diversity, sustainability, and anything else currently in fashion, while keeping close, homogenizing control over it all—a Shanghai melting pot with a lid firmly clamped over it.

Reconciling the City into a Totality

"The current campaigns for the Expo play upon this Shanghainese notion that it is the center of Chinese urban modernity," Gina Anne Russo writes;[41] and that is exactly why it is a topic worthy of examination. Shanghai's growth is directed explicitly at becoming a great city, a world city, and the Expo is the centerpiece of that plan. The slightly feeble, stale feel of the project, which has not attracted as many people as anticipated, is hardly surprising. Shanghai is without a doubt a wonderful and astounding city, but the city on show is a bowdlerized version of itself, with all of the charm removed. Did the state really expect 70 million to willingly pay to watch its homage to itself? Better that they visit the old neighborhoods before they are finally demolished (or, what's worse, façadized, like Xintiandi). However, the framework of Shanghai's developments offers a clear context for what will be the greatest realization of it so far, as well as flagging the future hoped for by those in control. The Expo invites countries from all over the world to join under the umbrella of a benevolent Chinese state capitalism that welcomes everyone, always provided that they don't embarrass the hosts.[42] The city has undergone countless changes initiated in order to prepare for the Expo and show it off in the light in which it would prefer to be seen: the construction of large infrastructure projects, notably including the expansion of the Metro; the re-education of peasants to get them to conform to new social standards of personal comportment; and a relentless clean-up campaign. Shanghai, somewhat like the Paris it was once compared to, has two competing versions of itself separated by a river; the west, called Puxi, shows off colonial buildings, while Pudong, to the east, shows the face of the future. The Expo, which centers on a bridge across the Huangpu River, will spread into both districts, recuperating the past with a gesture as retro as a World's Fair, with a colonial architecture to match, even as it beckons towards the future, an uncharted zone that is being constantly remade. If Shanghai truly is the capital of the coming era, then perhaps it is precisely this new space that constitutes the great experiment taking place there; "the pursuit of symbols of progress is at work."[43] Shanghai's multiple identities are presumed as a totality by the

Expo, occupying as it does all of the different symbolic spaces of the city, old and new; the Expo site presents Shanghai as a unity, perhaps the largest urban space ever presented as such. The Expo, then, exhibits a space even as it changes it for its own purposes, exposing as well as expositing, not to mention depositing, because the impact of the event, irrespective of whether it is ultimately judged a success or a failure, will no doubt shape the psychology of the city for years to come.[44] The possibility also hovers that, hidden beneath the blaring, unsubtle rhetoric the state has crafted to suit its own purposes, an inspiring urban form really is taking shape, whether due to or despite the machinations of planners. Surely, the real interest in Shanghai is not in the superficial forms of buildings that may be transient in any case, but in the shifting community that they are the shadow and echo of, the aspirations of a city that, though formless, may be more substantial than buildings that vanish within a few years.

Preservation

Shanghai is heaving with construction: there are roadworks everywhere, the Metro system has just become the world's largest, and new tower blocks rise and fall in the suburbs like mushrooms. In Shanghai, truly, "the façade of the metropolis can no longer mask the scenes of carnage haunting it from morning to night . . . [it] would not be moving so fast if it did not have to constantly outrun its own collapse."[45] While this frantic renovation strikes outsiders as perforce "new," Shanghai has always been the port of call for the new in China; the superficial changes to its exoskeleton don't necessarily correlate to modification of the city's underlying spatial logic. The function of Shanghai within the greater architectural/cultural relic of China has remained completely inert: having always fetishized the new, the city continues to sanctify a vision of cosmopolitan urbanism.

Recuperation and Revisionism

"[The] city is a condensation of dead customs and creeds and living customs and creeds," Victor Hugo observes. "A pile of mud or stones, if you like—but above all, a moral entity."[46] Every place offers a unique interface with the larger reality of the world, and in the most sophisticated cities, that interface rises to the level of a technology. The city as theater of events, as discrete set of

images and histories, inspires analogous actions, thus offering the genesis of continuity. Shanghai's genealogy, a heritage of Chinese modernism, has been utilized to justify the future. A system of spatial relations that dates to the 1920s remains unchanged: the building site is Shanghainese vernacular architecture. Shanghai's exuberant pace of what appears to be change conceals the fact that, while the city is moving in a rapid tempo, the dynamic of urban change is in line with its golden age in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is in the interests of city planners is to curate this collection, delicately removing objectionable memories, imposing their way of seeing things upon everyone else, minimizing the chaotic opportunity given by urban life. In the crudest form, this involves simply tearing down the buildings and displacing the residents. An alternative and perhaps cannier strategy is to recuperate the legacy of working-class life, retaining the buildings while hollowing out the communities that once made their homes there, removing the taint of their struggles, solidarity, and history, replacing them with historical theme parks. As we shall see, this has happened in Shanghai at several sites, notably Xintiandi and Tianzifang (also known as Taikang Road). This approach does not truly solve the problems caused by inequality, though, but only temporarily displaces them. Central to preservation efforts is the architectural typology of the Shanghainese *lilong***,** essentially a short alley leading off a main street, lined with buildings divided into flats, much like contemporaneous developments in London. Simply put, Shanghai's history is condensed in the form and space of the lilong: memory, cultural practice, and folkways collect around the lilong until, oversaturated, they collapse of their own accord, a metaphor for the changes in Shanghai's society within the past twenty years.

Lilong—the Shape of a Decayed Modernism

The respect in which "the people of Shanghai have been distilled from Chinese tradition by the pressures of everyday life"[47] is visible in the dominant architectural typology of the city as it emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the lilong-style house was a model imported from Europe, yet the ways in which the Chinese inhabitants perceived social space made the buildings so different from their Victorian counterparts as to be unrecognizable. When these buildings were constructed in Shanghai, built by Chinese laborers, rented out by Chinese landlords, with bricks made from Jiangsu mud, the form was rapidly modified to suit local tastes. In the lilong,

as compared to European equivalents, the distinction between public and private was much more permeable; neighbors sat out in the lane all day chatting, cooking, eating food, and struggling through shortages and hardships together. However, it was also a real innovation. For perhaps the first time in Chinese history, ordinary Chinese people from different parts of the country (as opposed to officials or scholars) got to know one another in the Shanghai of the period. Village ways that had evolved over millennia slowly changed in contact with others, not only with foreigners but with Chinese who spoke, ate, dressed, thought, and lived differently. Mutual trust was necessary. Corrupt police forces and turbulent conditions meant that community policing was the only policing. An entire generation's experience of life was conditioned by what Gregory Bracken has called the "benevolent panopticon" of the lilong.[48] Everyone always knew what everyone else was doing, complicating child-rearing, romantic relationships, and family life. The lilong was a node of information within the greater network of the city. Each one had a distinctive culture, and it's no surprise that some fostered subversive organizations; the first Chinese Communist Party meeting was held in a lilong, and many of the Shanghainese artists and writers who introduced a revolution in Chinese cultural production also found the community space congenial for sharing ideas. Shanghai resisted the Japanese invasion far more effectively than other Chinese cities due to the contorted nature of its alleyways; these lanes, difficult enough to know well even for locals, made for a menacing labyrinthine fortress. As Kazuo Ishiguro writes of the lilongs during wartime, "I often had the impression we were moving not through a slum district, but some vast, ruined mansion with endless rooms."[49] It would be a mistake to romanticize these spaces; cramped living conditions were enforced by poverty and created by callous semi-colonial town planners, and the Communist movement was inspired to change society by the harsh conditions that they found themselves in. The cramped conditions could strangle happiness: the difficulty of making love in a community where every sound is audible to the neighbors has been a major theme of Shanghai's writers for decades.[50] However, for many, the lilongs crystallize Shanghai's history. The space they provided sheltered the refugees of countless wars and upheavals:

> Those hidden hearts had largely relied upon the cover of darkness provided by the city to survive. Although they existed in secret, unknown to most, they were the greater part of what kept the city alive—its life force. . . . the city's brilliant lights that sparkled during the night,

and the bustling activities carried out during the day, all had their foundations in these secrets."[51]

The city, like the lilong, is a product of the pressures of poverty, constant population growth, and a semi-colonial legacy; one of the greatest achievements of Shanghainese has been to reconceptualize the world, rearranging it, with the lilong taken as the basic unit. The lilong community, however, is extremely dangerous to established orders, as the Chinese Communist Party knows better than anyone—they themselves fomented a revolution from within the backstreets of the lilongs. They have been seedbeds for insurrection. Whether under Chiang-Kai Shek's Nationalists, the Japanese occupiers, during the Cultural Revolution, or, notionally, within the past fifteen years, a spirit completely opposed to the state ideology has transformed Shanghai. "[The Bund] was designed to look down over everything, impressing viewers with an air of tyrannical power. Fortunately, behind these magnificent buildings was an expanse of narrow streets and alleys that led to the longtang houses, whose spirit was democratic," Wang Anyi writes.[52] This oppositional spirit was formed, as the lilong itself was, by oppression. The lilongs are being demolished for hygienic reasons; it seems clear that the germs of communal life are the underlying motive for this, because the families evacuated from the lilongs are moved into tower blocks of the type that has proved so socially destructive within the Western world. Social atomization, though, optimizes the ability of the state to enact control, and as such, it is perceived to be desirable. Today, the lilong communities are rapidly disappearing. Their disappearance indicates that the conditions that created them have also disappeared. The lilongs were in their essence the physical manifestation of conditions of inequality; as the terms of that inequality have changed, the structures that monumentalize it have evolved as well. What was once a new and strange space formed to fit the needs of the moment has, with the passing of time, become both obsolete and beloved, replaced by a new form, which nonetheless follows the pattern of growth that fostered the lilongs in the first place: foreign architectural forms, high real estate values, shoddy construction values. Or, as for Lefebvre, "nothing disappears completely . . . in space what came earlier continues to underpin what follows."[53]

Nostalgia for the Present

Shanghai was always defined by its tendency to evolve rapidly, and today, structures that were once new imports are now redolent with nostalgia, a sentiment of longing for a present already becoming past. Lilong nostalgia has been a main theme during the past two decades in literature, film, and photography by artists of great stature, such as Wang Anyi and Zhang Yimou. Such nostalgia is arguably a dominant form only in cultures facing rapid and traumatic change; the more distant the recent past is, the more appealing; the closer it is, the more vivid the hardships endured are. The demise of the lilongs and, more important, the way of life that they fostered, is widely seen as a cultural catastrophe by Shanghai residents, even if on an individual level they might prefer more modern housing units. The impracticality of the crumbling lilongs as housing for a city that is rapidly expanding is paradoxically what makes them so romantic; there is no danger of the wish for a lilong to be fulfilled. If the lilong was in fact a feasible space, this nostalgia would likely be defused—this wish is conditioned by an immunity to dealing with the potential consequences of its fulfillment. In mourning the buildings, the rapid passage of time is commemorated. The death of communities that had been demolished by social forces long before the buildings that housed them lies at the core of this trauma. For Christopher Bollas, an architectural unconscious is composed of "not only the countless mental forces that went into the creation of these buildings, then settled into the background of shared public awareness, but also the barely noticed idiosyncratic associations the buildings evoke as we move through a familiar city."[54] This unconscious is one of the things that creates citizens, a shared devotion to buildings that both symbolize and constitute a way of life. It is, of course, not the buildings that do this themselves; they are only representatives of that life, and when it flees, they lose their meaning.

Shanghai's Paradoxical Preservation Success

Despite its status as China's center of architectural experimentation, Shanghai has been significantly more successful than other cities, notably Beijing, in preserving the architecture of its past, notably the buildings of the Bund and the lilongs.[55] This is perhaps because whereas in Beijing, the conflict is simply between the old and the new, and opposition to the new can be cast as reactionary, the buildings declared obsolete in Shanghai were in their time themselves emblems of the modern,

giving pause to Ozymandian city planners who expect utopia to emerge from their blueprints. The lilongs were in their time the ornaments of a developmental model with no time for justice; paradoxically, what has been preserved best of all in Shanghai is the tendency, as visible in the 1930s as it is today, to sacrifice the communities established by the city's poor to utopian dreams realized through architecture. Nonetheless, Shanghai's planners have a greater sense of uneasiness about the new, because the context of the city leaves them more jaded and familiar with that discourse.

Shanghai authorities are, however, mindful of the value of the legacy of their past. Indeed, the reason that Shanghai has reassumed such a central role is because it has long occupied a space within Chinese culture as a portal to modernity. To demolish the emblems of that symbolism would be to risk destroying the legacy as well. China has many enormous cities; Shanghai's claim to being China's door to the future is grounded in the past; a tradition of subverting tradition is the city's most valuable heritage. The city planners have sometimes confused architectural infrastructure with city, assuming that if you build it, they will come; this in fact did happen in Pudong. However, an urban fabric is a much more precious and difficult to obtain commodity than a set of disconnected, soulless buildings, and Shanghai's vitality comes with the communities that are so menacing to the state.[56] This is the difficult calculation that is simplified by Western human rights activists as being "undemocratic"; allowing Chinese people to determine their own fate has always been deemed impossible and inconvenient, by foreign nations just as much as by the Chinese state. To allow these communities within the heart of a city devoted to innovation is to risk the unpredictable, a dangerous proposition to those comfortable with the status quo. If Beijing's diktats are easily accepted in spaces where civilization, emanating from the state, is counterposed to feudal conditions, this is not so in Shanghai, perhaps the only space in China confident that it is more sophisticated than the capital. For this reason, a subtle strategy of preservation built into the structure of urban change has been pursued.

Shanghai's Expo inaugurated a massive set of changes within the urban structure, notably installing new transportation links, boosting the status of the Pudong district yet further, and microtuning civil law to ensure "harmony" (和谐) within the city. One of the most dramatic changes has been the emphasis placed on preservation of historic buildings, placing Shanghai in the avant-garde of Chinese cities in recognizing the value to tourism of having an "old town." One of

the Expo's four cardinal goals has been to "facilitate the conservation of the heritage of our cities."[57] This is unevenly pursued, and a large part of the city's working class heritage will be demolished, as is poignantly recorded in a recent Ph.D. thesis by Yun Liu, a Shanghai native:

> Expo 2010 Shanghai is planned to be on the site of former industrial area . . . those high chimneys, cooling towers, giant structures in the steel mills and gasworks were part of a significant industrial period in the city and are storytellers in themselves. . . . I grew up watching industrial symbols in the city being demolished, and I don't want to see one more valuable symbol being torn down on the expo site.[58]

The industrial legacy of the city is a dangerous and toxic one; in the new city, consumption has been given priority over production, and the model for preservation is a lilong-turned-mall, Xintiandi. New Heaven Earth Xintiandi's three characters (新天地) mean New Heaven Earth respectively, but it's called New World in the English translations, and normally, non-Chinese mispronounce the Chinese name in lieu of using such a bizarrely utopian name for a shopping mall —it jars one's sensibility and perhaps requires a language more optimistic about consumerism to call it such a thing. Built in 2001 by the American architect Benjamin Woods, it renovated a lilong using a process often called façadization, in the process converting what was essentially a slum neighborhood in central Shanghai into a leisure zone. I avoided it when possible, but was once invited to an opening of a "chocolateria," featuring Shanghai's gay cognoscenti drinking cocoa martinis. Of course, the original inhabitants are more or less prohibited from entry by private security guards; the sight of the poor is nearly always disturbing, whether the excuse is their dirt, their strange clothes, or simply having one's disrespectful stare reciprocated in kind. The Communist Party was founded in the lilong that became Xintiandi; they chose it because it was under French administration and therefore perceived as more lax than the International (Anglo-American) or Chinese zones—at the time. Just as they are as today, the strategies of the Communist Party and the mafia were sometimes hard to differentiate, and navigating between the three legal jurisdictions was a common way to evade the police.

This legacy has, needless to say, been curated into irrelevance; the house where the CCP was founded is a museum, and there is a lilong museum across the way,[59] in fact everything to

commemorate the working class, except for them themselves; such an intrusion would be messy, besmirching a loving portrait of working-class struggle that depicts it as a finished, completed process. The hygienized Xintiandi's faint resemblance to what it once was could fool only an outsider; as Bracken comments, "Xintiandi is popular because the two groups of people who use it see it in a very different light: the foreigners think it is typically Chinese while the Chinese see it as foreign."[60] This slippery zone was embraced by the Chinese Communist Party for its ability to transcend normal legal and spatial categories in the 1920s, and it is today as well. While some seem to feel it is a success, this zone is incredibly and predictably vulgar. As the Comité invisible observe: "This taste for the 'authentic,' and the control that goes with it, accompanies the petty bourgeoisie in its colonization of working class neighborhoods. Pushed out of city centers, they find on the frontiers the kind of 'neighborhood' feeling' they missed. . . . By chasing out the poor people . . . by making it tidy, by getting rid of all the germs, [they] wipe out the very thing [they] came looking for."[61] Xintiandi's intervention can be understood as an attempt to revise a cultural history, to recuperate it, indeed to curate it into the ground, transforming a working-class movement into history by placing it in the museum and making sure that a gift shop is nearby. However, the community called Shanghai, no matter what architecture houses it, will remain itself, as the structural conditions of oppression and excitement have not disappeared (on the same logic, recuperation of old architecture, as Xintiandi, which does not replicate the same communal form, is meaningless gibberish spouted into the conversation of city life). There are now "alternative" Xintiandis, vaguely more artsy, notably the area near Taikang Road, called Tianzifang. This is a simulacrum of alternative culture: it might have, instead of a Starbucks, a fair-trade tea house, but that does very little for the local inhabitants, who, according to a friend in Shanghai, "made their dissatisfaction known earlier this year, unusually, by putting signs out in their second-floor windows saying a bunch of stuff in Chinese and then just the word "shit."[62]

Evolved Conditions, Evolving Folkways

Writing of the new high-rises that have cropped up in Shanghai since the 1980s, the novelist Wang Anyi writes: "When you first arrive here, the place seems to lack a heart because it so carefree—but that is because it hasn't yet had time to build up a reservoir of recollections; its mind is blank and

has not begun to feel the need to call on its memory."[63] Surely, the future of the lilong community that is so beloved, mourned as it passes even as it inspired fear and revulsion in its heyday, will be inherited neither in the few remaining slum-like lilongs, nor the refurbished lilongs rented to foreigners and slumming locals, and certainly not in Xintiandi, but rather in the folkways of the new Shanghai. The lilong structures, foreign in design, shoddy in construction, flooding during rain, drafty in the wind, crowded always, are nothing to mourn, and the community that they allowed to flourish will exist as long as people find that they cannot live entirely for themselves, but need the help and love of others, and are willing to extend similar care in return. The lilongs have come and, while not yet entirely gone, are going—but the framework of communal life within the space of the modern Chinese metropolis that they pioneered lives on. This model is of ever-greater importance in a China that, even as it rapidly urbanizes, finds most city dwellers fed up with the problems of overpopulation, pollution, and loneliness that exist in their cities.[64] A true historical preservation of Shanghai will survey the collection of past events without meddling, without arranging or organizing, and leaving the vast reservoir of human experience accessible both to inhabitants and to observers. The city's heritage is the struggle between imported modernist economic and architectural methods and an insistent communal feeling that defies them. In replaying this conflict today, Shanghai has a chance to find a happier ending than the violent revolution that emerged from and eventually engulfed the city once before. Innovation in the bygone Shanghai came from all directions: from the rich, from the foreigners, and from the working classes, all of whom created the city, which rewrote its history of class conflict over all of China. Preservation efforts in Shanghai are intended to preserve buildings, but also to commemorate these struggles, to make sure that they are not forgotten.

A City by the Sea

Shanghai's identity can be conceived of in many different ways: an endless regurgitation of people and space by the predatory forces of capital, the dregs remaining constituting the city; a place where the river meets the sea; a place where the future meets the present. Modernity is Shanghai's heritage, and the city today occupies the same role as it did eighty years ago. The renovation of the city should not distract from the much deeper continuities. This continuity, however, is not perforce

a space of stillness, but of an unchanged pace of acceleration; Shanghai's pace is breathtaking, spontaneously combusting into revolution once already. This brutal inertia can best be challenged, not by further acceleration, but by a voluntary reduction of speed, the privileging of memory.

"There is something to be said for illusions. Though lacking substance, illusions can serve as the basis on which more substantive structures can be built,"[65] Wang Anyi writes, and the suspiciousness with which we, whether as residents of Shanghai or not, view these maneuvers must be tempered by our recognition that they are, after all, aspirations for a better life and symbols thereof that have helped to galvanize the greatest poverty-relief program in human history. The goal of the Expo is to create for economic as well as symbolic reasons, a dream city, which is never fully present, and invites the spectator to realize it himself. "Nothing in Shanghai was in the least like the picture I had formed of it . . . yet I am convinced that there exists a Shanghai corresponding to the city of our dreams, perhaps excelling it,"[66] Jean Cocteau wrote in 1936; who could not be similarly inspired by this eccentric city that aspires, perhaps legitimately, to cast itself as the central actor in the history of our time? The city as structure waiting for our exploits exists, with an eerily ghostlike quality—these great buildings have not yet come into their destiny, and invite our own intervention in the fiction they seek to convey, namely, that "Shanghai has a right to be called the cultural capital of a different era, the coming era."[67]

Acknowledgments

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Notes

The style followed in this thesis is that of the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition. American spelling has been used.

1. Anyi Wang, *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow: A Novel of Shanghai,* translated by Michael Berry and Susan Chan Egan, Weatherhead Books on Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 367.

2. The city is "built on ground so porous that one American engineer described it as not much more solid than dirty water." Gregory Bracken, "Thinking Shanghai: A Foucauldian Interrogation of the Postsocialist Metropolis" (Ph.D. diss., Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands, 2009), p. 58.

3. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5685963/Nine-held-over-Shanghai-building-collapse.html (accessed 17 September 2010).

4. Hung Wu explores the significance of adopting the Western system of time, as symbolized by the Bund's clock tower. See Hung Wu, *Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space* (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), and id., "Monumentality of Time: Giant Clocks, the Drum Towers, the Clock Towers," in *Monuments and Memory, Made and Unmade*, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Margaret Rose Olin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 1–2.

5. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 229.

6. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai, 1850–2010: A History in Fragments* (London: Routledge, 2009).

7. Anne Querrien, "The Metropolis and the Capital," in *Zone 1/2* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 219–221.

8. "Created in 1983, the Shanghai economic zone is the biggest subnational planning entity in the world, encompassing the metropolis and 5 adjoining provinces with an aggregate population almost as large as that of the US." Mike Davis, *Planet of the Slums* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 7.

9. See Walter Benjamin, *Paris, capitale du XIXe siècle: Le livre des passages,* translation of *Das Passagen-Werk* by Jean Lacoste from the German original ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 3rd ed (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1997); Rem Koolhaas*, Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for*

Manhattan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

10. "Shanghai is central to China's 'official imagination of modernity'. Innovations are 'culturally legitimate,'" according to Anthony D. King, *Spaces of Global Cultures: Architecture, Urbanism, Identity* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 125.

11. http://www.expo2010.cn/expo/expoenglish/ps/regulations/userobject1ai42658.html (accessed 17 September 2010).

12. "Shanghai and Beijing seem to have a similar urban resonance within China, as do Paris, London and New York in their national contexts." *Shanghai: Architecture and Urbanism for Modern China,* ed. Peter G. Rowe and Seng Kuan (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), p. 21.

13. Querrien, *The Metropolis and the Capital*, p. 220.

14. The Chinese government routinely describes Chinese cities as existing in a tier system, where Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou are first-tier, cities such as Xi'an and Nanjing are second-tier, and so on.

15. For example, the temporary car ban in Beijing has been extended indefinitely. http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-03/15/content_19610542.htm (accessed 17 September 2010).

16. As in the Urban Planet pavilion. http://en.expo2010.cn/c/en_qy_tpl_275.htm (accessed 17 September 2010).

17. , accessed 2010-09-5.

18. A figure that at this point seems impossibly optimistic: http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010-05/528554.html (accessed 17 September 2010).

19. This concept is hinted at in Hans Eijkelboom's book *Paris—New York—Shanghai: A Book about the Past, Present, and (Possibly) Future Capital of the World* (New York: Aperture, 2007), which plays precisely on Benjamin's concept of Paris as the capital city of the nineteenth century in describing Shanghai's role for the twenty-first.

20. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*.

21. Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai*, p. 13.

22. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p. 81.

23. Ibid., p. 93

24. Pudong's "abrupt metamorphosis from farmland to financial capital" is described by Jay Pridmore in *Shanghai: The Architecture of China's Great Urban Center* (New York: Abrams, 2008),

p. 10. Pudong might be termed a "museum" of them because these buildings are beautiful objects more meant for display than utility, and many remain vacant or useless in practical terms.

25. "Such buildings were conceived from a bird's-eye view, but slighted the ground-level experience of the city and its buildings as perceived by citizens in the street," Alex Krieger is quoted as saying in "Architecture and Urbanism: Shanghai and Beyond" (panel discussion), http://harvardmagazine.com/extras/architecture-and-urbanism (accessed 17 September 2010).

26. "Much of the admiration for Shanghai is based on visual evidence. Just look at Shanghai's impressive and imposing skyline and the conclusion is obvious," Yasheng Huang writes in *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 177, in a chapter primarily about how Shanghai's skyline is, in fact, belied by the city's somewhat meager economic performance.

27. Hubert Damisch, *Skyline: The Narcissistic City* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 84. His chapter from which this is taken hints at Westerners' ideas about Shanghai in its title, "The Scene of the Life of the Future."

28. "Wenming is difficult to define. Most dictionaries say it means "civilized," but this definition carries as many problematic connotations in Chinese as it does in English. Leo Lee, in his book Shanghai Modern*: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945* (Beijing: Ren min wen xue chu ban she, 2010), traces the development of this word in modern Chinese. The term was originally borrowed from the Japanese, who used the same characters (pronounced differently of course) in the late nineteenth century to define behavior that was specifically "modern" and "Western," thus maintaining the same connotations as "civilized" in English.

29. Recalling Virilio's citation of Vauban's military structures: "A totality of mechanisms able to receive a defined form, . . . to transform it and finally to return it in a more appropriate form." Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics*, trans. Mark Polizzotti (Boston, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), p. 36.

30. Eileen Chang, *Lust, Caution and Other Stories* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).

31. http://harvardmagazine.com/2010/03/changing-challenging-china (accessed 17 September 2010). The same article notes that seventeen of the thirty-one regional party chiefs in China have a background in the media; image management has become management in a country where the substance is constantly in flux.

32. Ibid.

33. Jing Wang, *Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 136.

34. Claudio Greco, *Beijing: The New City* (Milan: Skira Books, 2008), p. 37.

35. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, pp. 220–221.

36. "One-party autocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages," Tom Friedman writes, for example, in the *New York Times,* http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html (accessed 17 September 2010).

37. http://english.sina.com/china/2010/0209/303830.html (accessed 17 September 2010).

38. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jeff-Wasserstrom/2980 (accessed 17 September 2010).

39. "Créer un poncif, c'est le génie. Je dois créer un poncif," Baudelaire writes in "Fusée," XIII, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Claude Pichois, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 1: 662.

40. With the possible exception of Hong Kong, a city formed as a replacement for a lost 1930s Shanghai by refugees from the 1949 Revolution.

41. www.thechinabeat.org/?cat=180 (accessed 17 September 2010).

42. The Americans, perhaps aware that the elephant being slowly tugged out of the room is their own dwindling hegemony, resentfully refused to make an entry until the last minute, when they offered a hideous structure most resembling a Walmart—the truest expression of Sino-American cooperation so far.

43. Rowe, *Shanghai*, p. 34.

44. The only consolation for an architectural critic in contemporary Shanghai is the delicious certainty that sometime soon, perhaps within less than a decade, it will all be replaced by something else anyhow. Most of the structures of the Expo, from the impressive offerings fielded by the United Kingdom and Romania to the hideosities from the United States and North Korea, will be demolished after it is finished.

45. Comité invisible, *The Coming Insurrection,* Semiotext(e) Intervention Series, 1 (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e); Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), p. 53

46. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, translated by Julie P. Rose (London: Modern Library, 2008), p. 487.

47. Eileen Chang, *Lust, Caution and Other Stories* (London: Penguin Books, 2007)

48. Bracken, "Thinking Shanghai," p. 151.

49. Kazuo Ishiguro, *When We Were Orphans* (London: Faber & Faber, 2000), p. 240.

50. Deborah Pellow, "No Place to Live, No Place to Love: Coping in Shanghai," in *Urban Anthropology in China*, ed. Gregory Eliyu Guldin and Aidan Southall (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1993).

51. Wang, *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, p. 282.

52. Ibid., p. 274.

53. Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, p. 229.

54. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n05/jonathan-lear/sharing-secrets (accessed 17 September 2010).

55. "Shanghai is much better than Beijing at issuing and implementing preservation regulations on historic architecture," said Ruan Yisan, a former professor of urban planning at Tongji University of Shanghai and director of the National Research Center for Historic Cities." http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/arts/design/02shanghai.html?pagewanted=1&tntemail1=y&emc=tnt (accessed May 30, 2010).

56. "If any city has a chance, it's Shanghai. . . . But the city can't just build its way to greatness. The bigger question is, How does it rebuild a sense of community that's been lost in tearing down the old and building up the new?" http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/03/shanghai/larmer-text/4 (accessed 17 September 2010).

57. http://www.travelchinaguide.com/cityguides/shanghai/worldexpo/knowledge.htm (accessed 30 May 2010).

58. Yun Liu, "Expo 2010: Adaptive Reuse of Shanghai's Post-Industrial Landscape" (Ph.D. diss., University of Guelph, Ontario, 2008), p. 4.

59. http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2010/201004/20100408/article_433520.htm (accessed June 3, 2010).

60. Bracken, "Thinking Shanghai," p. 77.

61. Comité invisible, *The Coming Insurrection*, p. 53.

62. Private correspondence with Ryan Carter, 3 June 2010.

63. Wang, *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, p. 367.

64. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/6991168.html (accessed 3 June 2010

65. Wang, *The Song of Everlasting Sorrow*, p. 202.

66. Cited in Wasserstrom, *Global Shanghai*, p. 136.

67. Ibid., p. 13.

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