

Framework

Hypervisor

Build virtualization solutions on top of a lightweight hypervisor, without third-party kernel extensions.

(macOS 10.10+

Overview

Hypervisor provides C APIs so you can interact with virtualization technologies in user space, without writing kernel extensions (KEXTs). As a result, the apps you create using this framework are suitable for distribution on the Mac App Store.

Use this framework to create and control hardware-facilitated virtual machines and virtual processors (VMs and vCPUs) from your entitled, sandboxed, user-space process. Hypervisor abstracts virtual machines as processes, and virtual processors as threads.



Framework

Virtualization

Create virtual machines and run macOS and Linux-based operating systems.


(macOS 11.0+)

Overview

The Virtualization framework provides high-level APIs for creating and managing virtual machines (VM) on Apple silicon and Intel-based Mac computers. Use this framework to boot and run macOS or Linux-based operating systems in custom environments that you define. The framework supports the Virtual I/O Device (VIRTIO) specification, which defines standard interfaces for many device types, including network, socket, serial port, storage, entropy, and memory-balloon devices.

To set up a VM, configure a VZVirtualMachineConfiguration. If you're creating a macOS guest also configure a VZMacPlatformConfiguration, and then add the devices you want to expose to the guest operating system. Then, create a VZVirtualMachineConfiguration object with your configuration data, and use that VM object to start, pause, and resume the VM environment. To interact with the guest, you create a VZVirtualMachineView with the VZVirtualMachine object to display and interact with the graphical content in a window.






- 苹果大力发展自己的虚拟机技术栈
 - 新特性
 - 新代码
 - 新的攻击面

https://www.infoq.com/news/2022/06/apple-virtualization-framework/





- 一套苹果自主开发的虚拟机Hypervisor框架,并开放给其他厂商使用,提高虚拟机的性能。
 - VMware计划支持该特性
 - Parallels Desktop已经在正式发布的版本中支持!



审计目标 3 :Apple Hypervisor






- 在物理机的环境中应用层程序通过IOKit与显卡驱动通讯完成渲染
 - macOS/iOS的常规攻击面
- 苹果是如何实现自己的虚拟显卡实现更高的效率的呢?
 - 是否会引入新的漏洞呢?
 - 是否可以用来实现虚拟机逃逸呢?



prl_vm_app **Guest Process**







com.apple.driver.AppleParavirtGPU.kext

```
if (! 77 )
  v8 = *(unsigned int *)a2;
  goto LABEL 10;
   = *(unsigned int *)(v7 + 24);
v8 = *(unsigned int *)a2;
if ( ( DWORD) v6 != ( DWORD) v8 )
ABEL 10:
   os log internal(
    &dword 0,
    (os log t)APVLog,
    OS LOG TYPE ERROR,
     "%s: Invalid object index: %d handleID: %d argID: %d\n",
     "deleteObject",
    *(unsigned int *)(a2 + 4),
    v6,
    v8);
  v18 = (IOLock **)a1->AppleParavirtAccelerator;
  (*((void ( fastcall **)(IOLock **, void *, QWORD))*v18 + 267))(v18, &unk 141BD, OLL);
  IOGraphicsAccelerator2::unlock busy((IOGraphicsAccelerator2 *)v18);
  IOLockUnlock(v18[17]);
  return 0xE00002C2;
```

- 存在明显的代码质量问题
 - 错误的条件检测导致崩溃
- 混乱的代码更值得深入挖掘
 - 代码没有经过充分测试
 - 甚至可能只是一个能跑通的"半成品"



com.apple.driver.AppleParavirtGPU.kext

```
_fastcall AppleParavirtAccelerator::setupFIFO(AppleParavirtAccelerator *this)
// [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
*((_DWORD *)this + 903) = 0;
                             ptor::withOptions(0x890u, (vm_size_t)&loc_10000, 1uLL);
*((_QWORD *)this + 447) = v2;
if ( v2 )
 if ( ((unsigned int (__fastcall *)(IOBufferMemoryDescriptor *, _QWORD))v2->baseclass_0.baseclass_0.baseclass_0._vftable[3].taggedRelease_0)(
          OLL) )
    LODWORD(v1) = 0;
      (os log t) APVLog,
       "%s: Failed to prepare FIFO memory allocation.\n",
       "setupFIFO");
        = (*( int64 (_fastcall **)(_QWORD, _QWORD))(**((_QWORD **)this + 447) + 512LL))(*((_QWORD *)this + 447), 0LL);
    *(( QWORD *)this + 448) = v3;
     *((_MORD *)this + 902) = (*(__int64 (__fastcall **)(__int64))(*(_QWORD *)v3 + 296LL))(v3) - 4096;
     v4 = *((_QWORD *)this + 448);
      *((_QWORD *)v1 + 450) = (*(__int64 (__fastcall **)(_int64))(*(_QWORD *)v4 + 280LL))(v4);
*((_QWORD *)v1 + 449) = (*(__int64 (__fastcall **)(_QWORD))(**((_QWORD **)v1 + 448) + 280LL))(*((_QWORD *)v1 + 448))

+ 4096;
      bzero(*((void **)v1 + 450), 0x1000uLL);
      *(_DWORD *)(*((_OWORD *)v1 + 453) + 48LL) = IOMemoryDescriptor::getPhysicalAddress(*((IOMemoryDescriptor **)v1 + 447)) >> 12;
      v5 = (*(_int66 (_fastcall **)(_QWORD))(**((_QWORD **)v1 + 447) + 456LL))(*((_QWORD *)v1 + 447));
v6 = (_DWORD *)*((_QWORD *)v1 + 453);
      v6[1] = v5;
v6[4] = 4096;
       *v6 = 1;
      LOBYTE(v1) = 1;
        os_log_internal(&dword_0, (os_log_t)APVLog, OS_LOG_TYPE_ERROR, "%s: Failed to map the FIFO.\n", "setupFIFO");
  LODWORD(v1) = 0;
     "%s: Failed to get FIFO memory allocation.\n",
     "setupFIFO");
return (unsigned int)v1;
```

- FIFO 是虚拟显卡与HOST通讯的主要手段
 - 分析FIFO请求的数据结构
 - 通过内核的Inline Hook嗅探请求的数据
 - 通过dumb fuzzing 确定攻击面
- 通过崩溃帮助我们迅速定位攻击面的代码



```
void cdecl -[PGFIFO processFifo](PGFIFO *self, SEL a2)
 // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
 v27 = *( QWORD *) stack chk guard;
 v3 = (unsigned int)-[PGFIFO commandLength](self, "commandLength");
 v19 = malloc(v3);
 if (!v19)
   abort();
 v18 = (unsigned int)-[PGFIFO commandLength](self, "commandLength");
 v25 = "CmdDeprecated:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
 while ( !self-> quiesced )
   -[PGFIFO latchCommandOffset](self, "latchCommandOffset");
   if ( (unsigned int8)-[PGFIFO getFifoBytes:into:](self, "getFifoBytes:into:", 0xCLL, header) )
     if ( *(unsigned int *)&header[4] < 0xCuLL | | *( DWORD *)&header[4] > v18 )
       v8 = PGHostLog;
       v4 = 2;
       if ( os log type enabled(PGHostLog, OS LOG TYPE ERROR) )
         sub 7FFF6F806A3E(buf, &buf[1], v8);
       goto LABEL 21;
```




```
case 0x34:
 v14 = "CmdInvalidateResources:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x35:
 v14 = "CmdSynchronizeResources:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x36:
 v14 = "CmdDeleteIOSurfaceBacking2:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x37:
 v14 = "CmdExecIndirect2:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x38:
  v14 = "CmdDefineTask2:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x39:
 v14 = "CmdMapMemory2:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
case 0x3A:
  v14 = "CmdGetDeviceInfo:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
 v14 = "CmdGetComputeInfo:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
 v14 = "CmdReplacePhysical:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  goto LABEL 31;
 v14 = "CmdDelay:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:";
  objc msgSend 0(self, v14, header, *(unsigned int *)&header[8], v19, v7);
```

- 逆向工作从虚拟机内核来到的了Host 的应用层程序
- FIFO请求种多而且复杂,意味着巨大的攻击面
- 根据崩溃日志的调用栈,继续分析 CmdExecIndirect2函数


```
void __cdecl -[PGFIFO CmdExecIndirect2:stampValue:withPayload:payloadSize:](PGFIFO *self, SEL a2, $AB56C86F963
 // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND
  v42[0] = 0LL;
 v42[2] = 0x3810000000LL;
v42[3] = " ";
  context = objc autoreleasePoolPush();
 if ( fifo_length <= 0xB )
    if ( os log type enabled(PGHostLog, OS_LOG_TYPE_ERROR) )
sub 7FFF6F806488((uint8 t *)&buf, v31);
    goto LABEL 27;
      int = *(unsigned int *)(fifo_input + 4);
 if ( 24 * count == 24 * ( DWORD) count )
     v10 = 16LL * *(unsigned int *)(fifo_input + 8);
    if ( v10 == 16 * *(_DWORD *)(fifo_input + 8) )
       v11 = 24 * count + 12;
       v12 = \underline{CFADD}_{(\underline{DWORD})v11, (\underline{DWORD})v10);
      if ( v11 == (v11 & 0xFFFFFFFC) && !v12 )
         if ( v13 <= fifo length )
             v14 = -[_PGDevice getTaskID:](self->_device, "getTaskID:", *(unsigned int *)fifo_input);
            objc retain 0(v14);
            objc retain 0(v14);
            v43[\overline{0}] = 0L\overline{L};
            v43[2] = 0x2020000000LL;
            v43[3] = 0LL;
            buf = OLL;
            v45 = (int64) \& buf;
            v46 = 0x3052000000LL;
            v47 = sub_7FFF6F800300
            v49 = Sul-Travovous;
v16 = -[ PGDevice execQueue](self->_device, "execQueue");
v49 = objc_msgSend_0(v16, "commandBuffer");
v17 = MTLTraceEnabledSPI(__int64)v16);
            if ( v17 )
              v60 = -[ PGDevice deviceTraceId](self-> device, "deviceTraceId");
              v18 = *(unsigned int *)fifo input;
v19 = (unsigned int)objc msgSend 0(self, "stampIndex");
kdebug trace(0x85310401LL, v60, v18, v19, v59);
            objc msqSend stret(
               (__int64)&a1,
               (SEL) v14
              "prepareResources:count:",
             *(unsigned int *)(fifo_input + 4));
v54 = fifo_input + 12;
            v58[0] = *(_DWORD *)((char *)&a1 + 1);
*(_DWORD *)((char *)v58 + 3) = HIDWORD(a1);
```

```
objc msgSend stret(
   int64)&a1,
  (SEL) v14,
   'prepareResources:count:",
  fifo input + 12,
  *(unsigned int *)(fifo input + 4));
v54 = fifo input + 12;
LOBYTE(v60) = a1;
v58[0] = *(DWORD *)((char *)&a1 + 1);
*( DWORD *)((char *)v58 + 3) = HIDWORD(a1);
v56 = v51:
v57 = v52;
if ( (unsigned int8)MTLTraceEnabledSPI(( int64)&a1) )
  v55 = -[ PGDevice deviceTraceId](self-> device, "deviceTraceId");
  v20 = *(unsigned int *)fifo input;
  v21 = (unsigned int)objc_msgSend_0(self, "stampIndex");
  kdebug trace (2234582018LL, ( int64)v55, v20, v21, v59);
if ( (v60 & 1) != 0 )
  objc msgSend 0(*(id *)(v45 + 40), "encodeWaitForEvent:value:", v56, v57);
*( QWORD *) 34.gap0 = NSConcreteStackBlock;
*( QWORD *)&\sqrt{34}.gap0[8] = 0xC2000000LL;
*( QWORD *)&v34.gap0[16] = sub 7FFF6F80032A;
*( QWORD *)&v34.gap0[24] = &unk /FFF8/016648;
   .ret = v43:
v34.fifo input = fifo input;
v34.fifo channel = self;
v34.fifo payload = fifo input + 24 * count + 12;
.device = V14;
v34.stampvalue = v62;
v34.gword38 = &buf;
LOBYTE(v34.qword58) = v60;
*( DWORD *)((char *)&\sqrt{36}.gword58 + 1) = \sqrt{58}[0];
HIDWORD(vis.qword58) = *(DWORD *)((char *)v58 + 3);
v34.qword60 = v56;
v34.qword68 = v57;
v34.qword40 = v42;
objc_msgSend_0(v14, "runBlock:", & v34);
```















Host Guest

com.apple.driver.Apple
HV

com.apple.kext.AMDRa
deonX6000





- Guest Process通过共享内存的方式使用Host的显卡完成渲染
- 攻击面1: com.apple.driver.AppleParavirtGPU.kext
- 攻击面2: ParavirtualizedGraphics.Framework、MetalSerializer.Framework



```
fastcall sub 7FFF6F80032A(struct 032a *a1)
// [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
*(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a1->ret + 8LL) + 24LL) = malloc(16LL * *(unsigned int *)(a1->fifo_input + 8));
if ( *( QWORD *)(*( QWORD *)(a1->ret + 8LL) + 24LL) )
  v2 = a1->fifo channel;
 v23 = (unsigned int)objc_msgSend_0(v2, "currentCommandOffset");
  v3 = *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a1->ret + 8LL) + 24LL) + 8LL * *(unsigned int *)(a1->fifo_input + 8);
  if ( *(_DWORD *)(a1->fifo_input + 8) )
    v4 = 8LL:
    v5 = 0LL;
      v6 = a1->fifo_payload;
      v7 = *(QWORD *)(v6 + v4);
      *(_QWORD *)(v3 + 8 * v5) = v7;
      v2 = a1 -> device;
      *( QWORD *)(*( QWORD *)(*( QWORD *)(a1->ret + 8LL) + 24LL) + 8 * v5++) = objc msgSend 0(
                                                                                     "mappedAddressForOffset:length:",
                                                                                     *(QWORD *)(v6 + v4 - 8),
      v4 += 16LL;
    while ( v5 < *(unsigned int *)(a1->fifo input + 8) );
  if ( (unsigned int8)MTLTraceEnabledSPI(( int64)v2) )
    v8 = -[_PGDevice deviceTraceId](a1->fifo_channel->_device, "deviceTraceId");
    v9 = *(unsigned int *)al->fifo_input;
    v10 = (unsigned int)objc_msgSend_0(al->fifo_channel, "stampIndex");
    kdebug_trace(0x85310405LL, (__int64)v8, v9, v10, a1->stampvalue);
  v11 = objc_msgSend_0(al->device, "deserializer");
  objc_msgSend_0(
    "decodeSegments:lengths:count:into:",
   *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a1->ret + 8LL) + 24LL),
    *(unsigned int *)(a1->fifo input + 8),
    *( QWORD *)(*( QWORD *)(a1->qword38 + 8LL) + 40LL));
  if ( (unsigned int8)MTLTraceEnabledSPI(( int64)v11) )
    v12 = -[_PGDevice deviceTraceId](a1->fifo_channel->_device, "deviceTraceId");
    v13 = *(unsigned int *)al->fifo_input;
    v14 = (unsigned int)objc msgSend (al->fifo_channel, "stampIndex"); kdebug_trace(0x85310406LL, (_int64)v12, v13, v14, al->stampvalue);
```

- Guest的数据会被decodeSegments函数解析
- 通过Frida编写被动Fuzz工具,在应用 层发起fuzz
- 获得大量崩溃
 - 几乎瞬间就会崩溃
- 人工审计介入

```
cdecl -[MTLDeserializer decodeSegmentWithHeader:withIterator:withDecoder:into:](MTLDeserializer *self, SEL a2, __int64 a3, id a4, id a5, id a6
// [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS, PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND
 v9 = *(_BYTE *)(a3 + 4);
if ( v9 l= (unsigned __int8)objc_msgSend_0(a5, "type") )
   __objc_exception_throw(v10);
 if ( lv6 )
   0LL);
goto LABEL_16;
else if (!a5)
 switch ( *(_BYTE *)(a3 + 4) )
     v13 = &OBJC_CLASS___MTLDeserializerRenderDe
goto LABEL_11;
   goto LABEL_11;
case 3:
        3 = &OBJC_CLASS__MTLDeserializerEventDec
      it = j obje_alloc((Class)vi3);
vi5 = obje_asgand (vi4, 'nittWithDeserializer:commandBuffer:", self, a6);
b6 = obje_asgand (vi4, 'nittWithDeserializer:commandBuffer:", self, a6);
bc6 = obje_astorelease(vi5);
     ugSend O(v6. "decodeWithHeader:withIterator:". a3. a4)
```

```
cdecl -[MTLDeserializerComputeDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
   [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
v8 = "decodeUseHeaps:withIterator:";
     "decodeUseResources:withIterator:";
   = "decodeBarrierResources:withIterator:";
    = "decodeBarrierScope:withIterator:";
      "decodeWaitForFence:withIterator:";
      "decodeUpdateFence:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetThreadgroupMemoryLength:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetStageInRegionIndirect:withIterator:";
v16 = "decodeSetStageInRegion:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetPipelineState:withIterator:";
   = "decodeSetBufferOffset:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetTextures:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetSamplersLODClamp:withIterator:";
      "decodeSetSamplers:withIterator:";
v22 = "decodeSetBuffers:withIterator:";
v23 = "decodeDispatchThreads:withIterator:";
v24 = "decodeDispatchThreadgroupsIndirect:withIterator:";
v25 = "decodeDispatchThreadgroups:withIterator:";
while ((unsigned int64)objc msgSend 0(a4, "bytesLeft") >= 8
 objc_msgSend_0(a4, "readBytes:into:", 8LL, &sel);
  switch ( sel )
    case 0xC8:
      objc_msgSend_0(self, v25, &sel, a4);
```

- Guest端输入的数据会被docdeXXX函数解析成各种显卡渲染时需要用到的数据
- [MTLDeserializerComputeDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator]负责解析Guest输入的数据
 - a3是可控的data,a4是data的长度

```
cdecl -[MTLDeserializerComputeDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
   [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
   = "decodeUseHeaps:withIterator:";
v9 = "decodeUseResources:withIterator:";
    = "decodeBarrierResources:withIterator:";
    = "decodeBarrierScope:withIterator:";
    = "decodeWaitForFence:withIterator:";
    = "decodeUpdateFence:withIterator:";
    = "decodeSetThreadgroupMemoryLength:withIterator:";
= "decodeSetStageInRegionIndirect:withIterator:";
    = "decodeSetStageInRegion:withIterator:";
v17 = "decodeSetPipelineState:withIterator:";
    = "decodeSetBufferOffset:withIterator:";
v19 = "decodeSetTextures:withIterator:";
v20 = "decodeSetSamplersLODClamp:withIterator:";
v21 = "decodeSetSamplers:withIterator:";
    = "decodeSetBuffers:withIterator:";
v23 = "decodeDispatchThreads:withIterator:";
v24 = "decodeDispatchThreadgroupsIndirect:withIterator:";
v25 = "decodeDispatchThreadgroups:withIterator:";
while ( (unsigned int64)objc msgSend 0(a4, "bytesLeft") >= 8 )
  objc msgSend 0(a4, "readBytes:into:", 8LL, &sel);
   switch ( sel )
     case 0xC8:
       objc_msgSend_0(self, v25, &sel, a4);
```

- 到这里之后的工作其实并没有什么难度了,就是简单的代码审计
- 其中的一个decode中发现了明显的越界写漏洞
- 通过这个漏洞顺利实现虚拟机逃逸的目标

```
void __cdecl -[GFX10_MtlComputeCmdEncoder setThreadgroupMemoryLength:atIndex:](GFX10
{
   self->m_members.dynamicThreadgroupMemoryLength[a4] = a3;
   amdMtl_GFX10_SRDMgrBindThreadGroupLength(self->m_members.rsrcMgr + 0xA8, a4, a3);
}
```



但你真的看"懂"这个漏洞了吗???

```
cdecl -[ MTLDeserializer decodeSegmentWithHeader:withIterator:withDecoder:into:]( MTLDeserializer *self, SEL a2, int64 a3, id a4, id a5, id a6)
  // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
  v6 = a5;
  if ( *( BYTE *)(a3 + 5) )
    if ( v9 != (unsigned __int8)objc_msgSend_0(a5, "type") )
      v10 = objc_msgSend_0(
&OBJC_CLASS___NSException,
               "exceptionWithName:reason:userInfo:",
               CFSTR("InvalidEncoder"),
               CFSTR("Encoder type doesn't match for continuation"),
               0LL);
LABEL 16:
         objc_exception_throw(v10);
      v10 = objc_msgSend_0(
    &OBJC_CLASS__NSException,
    "exceptionWithName:reason:userInfo:",
               CFSTR("InvalidContinuation"),
               CFSTR("Previous stage didn't specify continuation"),
      goto LABEL 16;
  else if ( !a5 )
    switch ( *(_BYTE *)(a3 + 4) )
        v13 = &OBJC CLASS MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder;
        goto LABEL_11;
      case 1:
        v13 = &OBJC CLASS MTLDeserializerComputeDecoder;
        goto LABEL 11;
        v13 = &OBJC CLASS MTLDeserializerBlitDecoder;
        goto LABEL 11;
      case 3:
         v13 = &OBJC CLASS MTLDeserializerEventDecoder;
LABEL 11:
        v14 = j_objc_alloc((Class)v13);
v15 = objc_msgSend_0(v14, "initWithDeserializer:commandBuffer:", self, a6);
         v6 = j__objc_autorelease(v15);
        break;
      default:
        v10 = objc_msgSend_0(
&OBJC_CLASS___NSException,
                  "exceptionWithName:reason:userInfo:",
                 CFSTR("InvalidEncoder"),
                 CFSTR("Invalid encoder type"),
         goto LABEL 16;
 objc_msgSend_0(v6, "decodeWithHeader:withIterator:", a3, a4);
```



- f -[MTLDeserializerBlitDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
- f -[MTLDeserializerEventDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
- f -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
- f -[MTLDeserializerComputeDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]

```
oid cdecl -[MTLDeserializerBlitDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:]
// [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
v21 = a3;
v22 = self;
v10 = "decodeCopyFromTextureToTextureWithNumSliceLevel:withIterator:";
v11 = "decodeBlitWaitForFence:withIterator:";
v12 = "decodeBlitUpdateFence:withIterator:";
v13 = "decodeSynchronizeTextureImage:withIterator:";
v8 = "decodeOptimizeImage:withIterator:";
v7 = "decodeSynchronizeResource:withIterator:";
v9 = "decodeOptimize:withIterator:";
v14 = "decodeGenerateMipmaps:withIterator:";
v15 = "decodeFillBuffer:withIterator:";
v16 = "decodeCopyFromTextureToTextureWithOptions:withIterator:";
v17 = "decodeCopyFromTextureToTexture:withIterator:";
v18 = "decodeCopyFromTextureToBuffer:withIterator:";
v19 = "decodeCopyFromBufferToBuffer:withIterator:";
v20 = "decodeCopyFromBufferToTexture:withIterator:";
```


- Decoder不止一种
- 所有的Decode函数都是攻击面
- 其他Decode函数中确实又发现了大量漏洞

```
void cdecl -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeWithHeader:withIterator:](MTLDeseri
 // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
 if ( !*(BYTE *)(a3 + 5) )
   v5 = -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder newDescriptor:](self, "newDescriptor:", a4);
   v6 = objc msgSend 0(self->commandBuffer, "renderCommandEncoderWithDescriptor:", v
   self->renderEncoder = (MTLRenderCommandEncoderSPI *)objc retain 0(v6);
   objc release 0(v5);
 while ( (unsigned int64)objc msgSend 0(a4, "bytesLeft") >= 8 )
   objc msgSend 0(a4, "readBytes:into:", 8LL, v9);
   switch (v9[\overline{0}])
       -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeDrawPrimitives64:withIterator:](
          "decodeDrawPrimitives64:withIterator:",
         a4);
       break:
       -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeDrawPrimitives16:withIterator:](
          "decodeDrawPrimitives16:withIterator:",
         a4);
       break:
       -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeDrawInstancedPrimitives64:withIterator:]
          "decodeDrawInstancedPrimitives64:withIterator:",
         a4);
       break;
        -[MTLDeserializerRenderDecoder decodeDrawInstancedPrimitives16:withIterator:]
          "decodeDrawInstancedPrimitives16:withIterator:",
         a4);
```



这个"锅"谁来背?

- 漏洞本身是存在于苹果的代码中
 - 所有使用这个特性的虚拟机产品都会受这个漏洞的影响
- 但当时只有Parallels Desktop的用户受到该 漏洞的影响
- 这个漏洞该如何披露
- 进行一次社会实验





漏洞上报&&修复

Additional recognition

Kernel

We would like to acknowledge Tao Huang for their assistance.

Metal

We would like to acknowledge Tao Huang for their assistance.

Hello,

Our development team has accessed the issue. This vulnerability is not isolated to Parallels Desktop itself but an issue in Apple's Hypervisor (that provides paravirtualization for MacOS) that's used on the both sides, host and guest. This is directly related to MacOS 12.0.1, in which Apple has already fixed.

Thank you,



议题小结

- 如何选择合适的研究目标
- 漏洞挖掘的思路与大致流程
- Parallels Hypervisor虚拟机逃逸的技术细节
- Apple Hypervisor虚拟机逃逸的技术细节



从Parallels Desktop逃逸到macOS逃逸之旅到此结束

特别感谢研究工作中提供帮助的同事和朋友



谢谢!

