





I would like to thank all the people that walked along with me in this incredible journey. Thank you for having constantly supported me, and for the immeasurable amount of love you gave to me.

I want to thank my brother, who is my biggest source of inspiration and motivation. Thank you for having always been there for me and for the time you decided to patiently spend with me, since I was a kid. Thanks to my parents who always and unconditionally supported me. And thanks to my friends: your patience, your love and respect, and, on top of everything, your presence in the worst and in the best moments gave me the strength to go through every challenge. I cannot think of my life without you. Many thanks to my cousins and my relatives, your love, your attention and comprehension have always been crucial for me.

I want to thank Bocconi University, this incredible institution that allowed me to dream bigger and bigger, to expand my knowledge, to meet incredible professors, to build lifelong relationship, to live incredible experiences. Bocconi truly made my life, and I cannot be more grateful to have joined this university and the degree program of BESS. Thanks to my colleagues that contributed to make this journey unique. And thanks to my professors, for their incredible preparation and availability. In particular, I would like to thank Professor lovino for having patiently accepted to supervise my Final Work.

A special thanks is for Roberto Bertazzoni, my biggest ally and guardian angel. Thanks to his generosity, I could live this experience in Bocconi without burdening my family with significant economic sacrifices. Thanks for your help and for your trust. Your act of kindness allowed me to live these years with more tranquility and if today I have the chance to graduate and to follow incredible ambitions, it is also thanks to you.



# **Table of Contents**

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1 Background and Motivation	2
1.2 Research Objectives and Structure	3
<b>2. Theoretical Framework</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1 The Problems of "Mainstream" Macroeconomics	4
2.2 Behavioral Macroeconomics	6
2.3 Review of Relevant Literature	8
2.4 The Behavioral Macroeconomic Model of De Grauwe	9
2.4.1 Overview	9
2.4.2 The Premise	11
2.4.3 The Model	13
2.4.4 The Implications	17
<b>3. Empirical Analysis</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1 Data Sources and Methodology	21
3.2 Results	23
<b>4. Discussion and conclusion</b>	<b>32</b>
4.1 Summary and Interpretation of the main findings	32
4.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research	36
4.3 Conclusion	37
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Appendix A – Results of the Empirical Analysis</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Appendix B – Taylor Rule Estimations</b>	<b>60</b>

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background and Motivation

The primary motivation for this work is rooted in the innovative insights provided by two seminal papers: "Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior" by George A. Akerlof (2002) and "Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics" by Paul De Grauwe (2012). These works challenge the traditional assumptions of macroeconomic models and advocate for a paradigm shift towards a more behavioral approach.

In his seminal paper, "Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior," George A. Akerlof (2002) explores the concept of behavioral macroeconomics, which he describes as a dream to develop macroeconomics in the original spirit of John Maynard Keynes' General Theory. Akerlof argues that macroeconomics should no longer suffer from the "ad hockery" of the neoclassical synthesis, which had overridden the role in the work of Keynes of psychological and sociological factors. He advocates for strengthening macroeconomic theory by incorporating assumptions that reflect the observation of these elements.

In "Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics" by De Grauwe (2012), on the other hand, the critique of mainstream macroeconomic models is related to the assumption that agents have superior cognitive abilities, making them capable of solving complex problems. De Grauwe argues that these models are implausible and have failed empirically. Instead, he proposes a behavioral model where agents have limited cognitive abilities, forcing them to use simple rules or heuristics. The author introduces rationality as the willingness of agents to learn by switching to alternative rules to improve their performance in forecasting the evolution of macroeconomic variables. This perspective acknowledges the cognitive limitations of individuals and the potential for systematic errors in decision-making, leading to a richer dynamics that aligns more closely with observed economic behaviors.

## **1.2 Research Objectives and Structure**

The primary objective of this work is to provide an empirical validation of the behavioral macroeconomic model proposed by De Grauwe (2012). In particular, it aims to answer the following questions:

How well do the predictions of De Grauwe's model align with the empirical data from various economies?

This research question aims to provide empirical support to De Grauwe's model by investigating whether the observed distributions of key macroeconomic variables in different economies exhibit the non-normal characteristics predicted by the model. In addition, the correlations among “animal spirits” and output gap, inflation and interest rate are investigated across different countries.

How does the timing of a policy shock affect its transmission into the economy? The behavioral model suggests that the timing of the shock matters a great deal, but this could be empirically tested across different economic contexts and policy types.

This work will continue in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework), where the field of behavioral macroeconomics is presented after a critique of mainstream macroeconomics. It follows a review of relevant literature, giving an overview of the academic context of the discipline. Afterward, the chapter aims to illustrate the Behavioral Macroeconomic Model presented in the work of De Grauwe (2012), detailing its fundamental assumptions, mechanisms, and implications for monetary policy. In Chapter 3 (Empirical Analysis), there is a description of the data sources and methodology used in the study. The results are presented, comparing the distributions obtained from the behavioral model with those from real-world data. Estimations of the Taylor Rule for different countries are also provided to verify if the results obtained by the behavioral model are similar to real-world ones. In Chapter 4 (Discussion and Conclusion), there are a summary of the main findings, an acknowledgment of the limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. A conclusion follows.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 The Problems of "Mainstream" Macroeconomics**

Mainstream macroeconomics has been subject to numerous critiques, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. These critiques often focus on the limitations of the rational expectations (RE) and efficient markets hypotheses, two critical pillars of mainstream macroeconomic thought.

Paul Romer's "The Trouble with Macroeconomics" (2016) strongly critiques modern macroeconomics. Romer argues that the field has gone back over the last three decades, with a significant part of the problem being the over-reliance on mathematical consistency at the expense of empirical relevance. He suggests that this has led to a disregard for the importance of real-world details and resulted in detached models.

Romer also criticizes the lack of accountability in the field, where economists often make assumptions without providing a solid basis for them. This fact allowed for the proliferation of models based on unproven or even disproven premises. Romer calls for a shift towards a more empirical approach in macroeconomics, where theories are constantly tested and refined based on real-world observations. He believes this would lead to more accurate models and policy recommendations.

In "Narrative Economics" (2017), Robert Shiller critiques traditional economics for its lack of attention to the role of narratives in shaping economic behavior. He argues that narratives, stories people tell to make sense of their experiences, are crucial in influencing economic decisions and outcomes. Narratives can spread and change over time, much like diseases or memes, and can significantly impact the economy.

Shiller suggests that economists should pay more attention to these narratives and incorporate them into their models and theories. He believes that doing so could lead to a better understanding of economic phenomena and improve the accuracy of economic predictions. The author also argues that advances in psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence could be used to understand better the structure and impact of narratives in economics. In this way, he suggests, economists

will be helped to move beyond traditional models and better understand the various kinds of drivers that move economic events.

In "What's Wrong with Economic Models?" (2012) by Woodford, the author points out the lack of attention to financial intermediation and the role of banks in mainstream economic models. The latter, he argues, often abstract from many aspects of people's current circumstances, and instead, they involve heroic specificity about unknown aspects of the future. These models, therefore, are not representative of the actual world and can lead to inaccurate predictions and policy recommendations.

Woodford also criticizes the postulate of RE, which "*is often presented as if it were a simple consequence of an aspiration to internal consistency in one's model and/or explanation of people's choices in terms of individual rationality*" (Woodford, 2012). However, he argues that it is not a necessary implication of these methodological commitments. He points out that believing in the validity of one's own model and assuming that people make rational choices does not necessarily mean that these choices will align with what is deemed correct by someone who, like an economist, trusts the predictions of that model.

In "Where Modern Macroeconomics Went Wrong" (2018), Joseph Stiglitz provides a comprehensive critique of traditional economics, particularly the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models that have come to dominate the discipline. Stiglitz argues that these models fail to serve the functions which a well-designed macroeconomic model should perform. He points out that the standard model is intellectually incoherent and implicitly encourages society to move in a direction that would undermine both efficiency and well-being. The author also criticizes these kinds of models for their inability to explain how even a moderate shock has significant consequences on the economy.

Stiglitz highlights the weaknesses of these models, stating that they often incorporate features in an ad hoc manner, which results in the loss of elegance and weakens the claims that they are based on solid microfoundations. He also criticizes the complexity of these models, making it challenging to interpret what is really happening. Furthermore, the author points out that the models often impose several restrictions that directly contradict empirical evidence. He argues that "*if a model has been*

*rejected along some dimensions, then a statistic that measures the goodness-of-fit along other dimensions is meaningless*" (Stiglitz, 2018).

Stiglitz also criticizes the reliance on DSGE models for policy recommendations. He argues that these models provide a poor basis for policy, and even minor modifications are unlikely to be helpful. He suggests that models should incorporate insights from information economics and behavioral economics. Also, they should better represent the financial sector and the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises. He concludes by stating that the challenge for economists is to develop increasingly sophisticated models that incorporate the various insights provided by a range of 'partial' models that help us understand the essential fluctuations in our economy.

## 2.2 Behavioral Macroeconomics

The critiques of traditional macroeconomics have led to a growing recognition of the need for a more descriptive approach to macroeconomics. This approach acknowledges the limitations of the RE and efficient markets hypotheses and seeks to incorporate more "behavioral" assumptions into macroeconomic models.

One of the key insights from behavioral economics is that individuals often deviate from the rational, optimizing behavior assumed in traditional economic models. For example, individuals may be subject to cognitive biases, have limited willpower, or base their decisions on rules of thumb rather than a detailed analysis of all available information. These traits can have significant macroeconomic implications, affecting everything from consumption and investment decisions to labor market outcomes.

Another important insight from behavioral economics is the concept of bounded rationality. This concept, introduced by Herbert Simon, suggests that individuals' rationality is limited by the availability of information, their cognitive limitations, and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions. This notion contrasts with the assumption of perfect rationality in mainstream economic models, where individuals are assumed to have unlimited computational abilities.

However, the development of behavioral macroeconomic models is still in its early stages, and much work remains to be done in this area.

George Akerlof is a renowned economist known for his significant contributions to the field of behavioral economics and information asymmetry. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001, along with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, "for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information". On top of the already cited Nobel Prize Lecture ("Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior", 2002), another relevant contribution to the field is given in "Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism" in collaboration with Robert Shiller (2009). The book provides a comprehensive exploration of the role of human psychology in economic decision-making. They argue that to understand how economies truly function, we must consider the thought patterns that animate people's ideas and feelings, their "animal spirits". They assert that economic events are primarily mental in nature and that variations in individual feelings, impressions, and passions matter in the aggregate.

The authors critique mainstream macroeconomics for often falling back on the most tortured and artificial interpretations of economic events. They argue that economic events are often assumed to be driven by inscrutable technical factors or erratic government action, ignoring that the origins of these events are found in our everyday thinking.

Akerlof and Shiller argue that the recent economic turmoil can be understood in terms of "animal spirits". They suggest that the public, the government, and most economists had been reassured by an economic theory that guaranteed that nothing terrible could happen. However, in their opinion, that theory needed to be revised because it ignored the importance of ideas in the conduct of the economy and the role of animal spirits.

The authors propose that "animal spirits" such as confidence, fairness, corruption, money illusion, and stories are real motivations for real people and are ubiquitous in capitalist economies. They argue that these "animal spirits" are crucial in answering eight basic questions regarding capitalist economies: Why do depressions occur? Why do central banks have real powers? Why do we have involuntary unemployment? Why is there a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment? Why is saving so variable? Why do stock markets fluctuate so wildly? Why are the cycles in the housing market so large? And why is there continued minority poverty?

In summary, the work of Akerlof and Shiller provides a compelling argument for the importance of behavioral factors in understanding economic phenomena. They argue that a correct view of how the economy works is essential in making both personal decisions (such as how much we should save, where we should invest, what house we should buy, and whether we can trust our employer to pay our pension) and public decisions. Their work underscores the need for a shift in the narrative of who people are and who they should be in the context of economic decision-making.

### **2.3 Review of Relevant Literature**

The literature on behavioral macroeconomic models provides a rich backdrop against which to understand the current state of macroeconomic modeling and policy-making.

Behavioral macroeconomic models have been proposed as a way to address the limitations of traditional models, particularly their inability to account for “extreme” movements of the key macroeconomic variables (booms and busts) and sudden changes in market sentiment (De Grauwe, 2012). These models incorporate agents with bounded rationality, which can lead to the formation of bubbles and market overreactions.

The role of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy has been discussed, with an emphasis on understanding the behavior of economic agents for effective policy-making (Yellen, 2007). Similarly, the role of financial intermediation in the economy has been highlighted, suggesting that understanding the behavior of financial intermediaries is crucial for macroeconomic modeling and policy-making (Levine, 2009; Fontanier, 2022).

The role of wage rigidity in macroeconomic models has been discussed, arguing that understanding the behavior of workers and firms in setting wages is crucial for macroeconomic modeling (Driscoll & Holden, 2014). The role of fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy has also been discussed, suggesting that understanding the behavior of government and its interaction with the economy is crucial for effective policy-making (Blanchard, 2017).

In the paper by Bao et al. (2013), a behavioral macroeconomic model that incorporates heterogeneous agents and market frictions is presented. The paper shows how these

factors can lead to complex economic dynamics. Also, the authors suggest that high-efficiency levels in learning-to-optimize experiments should be treated with caution; even if efficiency metrics indicate that subjects are doing well on the optimization task, the implicit price forecasts may be far from rational.

Hommes (2018) further emphasizes the importance of a complex systems approach in behavioral and experimental macroeconomics, arguing that this approach can provide valuable insights into policy analysis. This work is further expanded in Hommes et al. (2019), where the authors delve deeper into the management of heterogeneous and unanchored expectations, particularly in the context of monetary policy.

On the other hand, De Grauwe (2012) and De Grauwe and Ji (2017) have focused on the role of "animal spirits" or psychological factors in macroeconomics. They argue that mainstream macroeconomic models, dominated by the paradigm of the "homo economicus," fail to account for the impact of these psychological factors on economic behavior. Their work proposes a behavioral macroeconomic model that incorporates these factors, leading to endogenous business cycle fluctuations. They also explore the trade-off between output and inflation and how the flexibility of the economy moderates it.

These works collectively underscore the importance of incorporating behavioral factors and acknowledging the heterogeneity of expectations in macroeconomic models. They also highlight the need for a more nuanced understanding of the trade-offs faced by monetary authorities in managing the economy.

## **2.4 The Behavioral Macroeconomic Model of De Grauwe**

### **2.4.1 Overview**

In this section, "Lectures on behavioral macroeconomics" (2012) by De Grauwe will be further explored. The author argues that the traditional models failed to predict the financial crisis due to their inability to account for the complexity of human behavior. He proposes a model that treats the economy as a complex adaptive system, where agents' perceptions and decisions can lead to economic booms and busts.

De Grauwe's model is grounded in the understanding that agents do not fully comprehend the world they live in. This cognitive limitation leads them to use simple rules or "heuristics" to guide their behavior. This approach is not because they are irrational but because the complexity of the world is overwhelming. According to De Grauwe, using heuristics is a rational response of agents aware of their limited capacity to understand the world.

One of the significant implications of De Grauwe's model is the introduction of heterogeneity in the use and processing of information. Unlike DSGE models, which assume a representative agent to describe how all agents in the model process information, De Grauwe's model acknowledges the dynamics of interacting agents with limited understanding but often with different strongly held beliefs. This heterogeneity, he argues, is what drives the business cycle.

De Grauwe's model also highlights the concept of "anchoring" effects, where agents are highly selective in how they use information due to their limited understanding. They tend to concentrate on the information they understand or new information in their minds. This anchoring effect explains why agents often extrapolate recent movements in prices.

The book of De Grauwe can be thought to be crucial for several reasons. Firstly, De Grauwe's work is a seminal contribution to the field of behavioral macroeconomics, offering a comprehensive and innovative perspective on how macroeconomic phenomena can be understood through the lens of behavioral economics. His critique of mainstream macroeconomic models and the introduction of a behavioral macroeconomic model provide a valuable theoretical framework for this survey and further research in the field. Secondly, his model, which incorporates elements of bounded rationality and the concept of "animal spirits," offers a unique approach to understanding the non-normal distributions of macroeconomic variables and provides unique insights into the conduct of monetary policy. Lastly, a thorough understanding of De Grauwe's book provides an important opportunity for more aware investigations of real data, as the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 aims to do. This kind of surveys allows to build upon his ideas and contribute to the ongoing discourse in the field. For this reason, the discussion will now delve into the contents of the book, explaining synthetically the insights of each chapter.

#### *2.4.2 The Premise*

De Grauwe's work begins with a reflection on the state of macroeconomics prior to the 2007 financial crisis. The period was marked by macroeconomic stability, low and stable inflation, high and sustained economic growth, and low volatility of many economic and financial variables. This stability was largely attributed to the insights provided by modern macroeconomic theory, which was based on the concept of the rational agent who continuously optimizes his utility using all available information.

However, the financial and economic upheavals following the crash in the US subprime market have undermined this idyllic view of stability created in a world of entirely rational and fully informed agents. These upheavals have also strengthened the view of those who have argued that macroeconomics must consider departures from rationality, particularly from the assumption of RE.

De Grauwe argues that it is possible to depart from the traditional formulation of rationality without having to wander into the territory of irrationality. He suggests that once we accept that individuals have cognitive limitations and are incapable of understanding the full complexity of the world, it is possible to develop models based on a different notion of rationality. This leads to richer macroeconomic dynamics that come closer to the observed dynamics of output and inflation than the ones produced by the mainstream macroeconomic models.

A discussion follows on the New Keynesian Macroeconomic model (DSGE-model). The model is characterized by its micro-foundations, rational expectations, and the assumption of price stickiness.

In more detail, consumers are assumed to maximize their utilities and produce their profits in a dynamic, multi-period context. Secondly, consumers and producers are assumed to have RE: they make forecasts using all available information, including the information embedded in the model. The assumption of RE also implies that agents know the actual statistical distribution of all shocks hitting the economy. They then use this information in their optimization procedure. Since consumers and producers use the same information, we can take one representative consumer and producer to model the whole economy. There is no heterogeneity among economic agents. Thirdly, and this is the New Keynesian feature, it is assumed that prices do

not adjust instantaneously. Although firms continuously optimize, there are institutional constraints on the speed with which they can adjust prices to their optimal level. This feature contrasts with the New Classical model (sometimes called the "Real Business Cycle" model), which assumes perfect price flexibility.

The author critiques this assumption following a close pattern to the academic works already discussed in section 2.1. In fact, he notes that while macroeconomic theory enthusiastically embraced the view that agents fully understand the structure of the underlying models in which they operate, other sciences like psychology and neurology increasingly uncovered the cognitive limitations of individuals. This cognitive problem leads agents to use simple rules ("heuristics") to guide their behavior.

Then, according to the author, the lack of heterogeneity in the use and processing of information in these models makes the latter of less interest when used to analyze short-term and medium-term macroeconomic problems.

Also, the author notes that DSGE models fail to predict dynamics that come close to the observed output movements, except when the step is taken to assume that the unexplained dynamics in the error terms is an exogenous force driving an otherwise correct model.

De Grauwe calls for a shift from top-down models, where one or more agents fully understand the system, to bottom-up models, where each individual understands only a small part of the whole. The author suggests that it might be preferable to admit that heuristics guide agents' behavior and to incorporate these heuristics into the model from the start rather than to pretend that agents are entirely rational but rely in a nontransparent way on statistical tricks to improve the fit of the model.

### 2.4.3 The Model

De Grauwe then presents his behavioral model. The model built in this chapter uses the same equations as the standard macroeconomic model previously discussed, including an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation, and a Taylor rule equation, here reported:

$$\text{AD: } y_t = a_1 E_t y_{t+1} + (1 - a_1) y_{t-1} + a_2 (r_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} + \varepsilon_t)$$

$$\text{AS: } \pi_t = b_1 E_t \pi_{t+1} + (1 - b_1) \pi_{t-1} + b_2 y_t + \eta_t$$

$$\text{TR: } r_t = c_1 (\pi_t - \pi^*) + c_2 y_t + c_3 r_{t-1} + u_t$$

Where  $y_{it}$  is the output gap in period  $t$ ,  $r_{it}$  is the nominal interest rate,  $\pi_t$  is the rate of inflation,  $\pi^*$  and  $\varepsilon_t$ ,  $\eta_t$ , and  $u_t$  are white noise disturbance terms. In addition, the Taylor Rule presents a "smoothing" behavior, given by the lagged interest rate ( $r_{t-1}$ ).

The difference between the New Keynesian and the Behavioral lies in how agents use information to make forecasts. In the Behavioral model, agents are assumed to use simple rules or heuristics to forecast the future.

De Grauwe emphasizes that agents using simple rules of behavior are not foolish. They use simple rules because the real world is too complex to understand fully, but they are willing to learn from their mistakes. They regularly subject the rules they use to some criterion of success. This can be done in two ways: statistical learning and "adaptive" learning. Statistical learning, pioneered by Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), assumes that agents learn as econometricians do. They estimate a regression equation explaining the variable forecasted by several exogenous variables. This equation is then used to make forecasts. When new data become available, the equation is re-estimated, updating the forecasting rule each time new information becomes available.

Instead, adaptive learning, also referred to as "trial and error" learning, is a process where agents use simple forecasting rules and subject these rules to a "fitness" test. In this context, agents endogenously select the forecasting rules that have delivered the highest performance in the past. If a rule performs well, they keep it; if not, they switch to another rule. This process is iterative and continuous, allowing agents to learn from their past mistakes and adjust their behavior accordingly.

In this model, agents are assumed to use two types of forecasting rules: a “fundamentalist” one and an “extrapolative” one. For the first rule, agents estimate the steady state value of the output gap, normalized at 0, and use this to forecast the future output gap. The second rule does not presuppose that agents know the steady state output gap. Instead, they extrapolate the previously observed output gap into the future (the rules are also valid for inflation).

The two rules are:

$$\text{Fundamentalist: } E_t^f y_{t+1} = 0$$

$$\text{Extrapolative: } E_t^e y_{t+1} = y_{t-1}$$

The market forecast is then obtained as a weighted average of the two:

$$E_t y_{t+1} = \alpha_{f,t} E_t^f y_{t+1} + \alpha_{c,t} E_t^e = \alpha_{f,t} 0 + \alpha_{c,t} y_{t-1} \text{ and } \alpha_{f,t} + \alpha_{c,t} = 1$$

As mentioned before, agents are assumed not to be fools. They are willing to learn, i.e., they continuously evaluate their forecast performance. Indeed, rational behavior is defined as this willingness to learn and change one's behavior. Thus agents in the model can be said to be rational, but not in the sense of having rational expectations. The latter assumption has been rejected because it is an implausible assumption about individuals' capacity to understand the world. Instead, in the model, agents are rational in the sense that they learn from their mistakes. The concept of "bounded rationality" is used to characterize this behavior.

Agents are assumed to evaluate the performance of their forecasts by computing the mean squared forecasting errors for each rule:

$$U_{f,t} = - \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \omega_t [y_{t-k-1} - E_{f,t-k-2} y_{t-k-1}]^2$$

$$U_{e,t} = - \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \omega_t [y_{t-k-1} - E_{e,t-k-2} y_{t-k-1}]^2$$

In addition, agents are assumed to give less importance to errors made far in the past; this is modeled by  $\omega_t$ , a geometrically declining weight.

In this model of "bounded rationality," agents are not simply comparing these two utilities (performances) to choose one of the two rules. In fact, as psychologists have found out, individuals are influenced by their state of mind when choosing between two options. This factor is hardly predictable and is formalized by adding a deterministic component to the above-presented utilities. Hence, this is the probability of choosing the fundamentalist rule:

$$\alpha_{f,t} = P[U_{f,t} + \varepsilon_{f,t} > U_{e,t} + \varepsilon_{e,t}]$$

De Grauwe then assumes that the random variables  $\varepsilon_{f,t}$  and  $\varepsilon_{e,t}$  are logistically distributed, relying on Anderson, Palma, and Thisse (1992). Therefore:

$$\alpha_{f,t} = \frac{\exp(\gamma U_{f,t})}{\exp(\gamma U_{f,t}) + \exp(\gamma U_{e,t})}, \alpha_{e,t} = 1 - \alpha_{f,t}$$

The parameter  $\gamma$  can be interpreted as the expression of the willingness to learn from past performance. It is directly related to the variance of the random components. If the variance is very high,  $\gamma$  approaches 0. In that case, the probability of being a fundamentalist (or extrapolator) is exactly 0.5. When  $\gamma = \infty$ , the variance of the random components is zero, and utility is entirely deterministic. In this case, the probability of using a fundamentalist rule is either 1 or 0.

The selection mechanism in adaptive learning acts as a disciplining device on the kind of rules that are acceptable. Not every rule is acceptable; it has to perform well. This mechanism is similar to the disciplining role of rational expectations in traditional models but without assuming that agents have superior cognitive capacities. In the context of forecasting inflation or output gap, agents compute past forecasting errors and apply weights to these past forecast errors. These weights decline as the past recedes, indicating a degree of forgetting. This willingness to learn from past performance and avoid making systematic mistakes ensures that the market forecasts are unbiased.

Then, the concept of "animal spirits" is explained, a term introduced by Keynes (1936) to describe waves of optimism and pessimism that have a self-fulfilling nature and drive the movements of investment and output. It is shown how these waves of optimism and pessimism can lead to movements in the output gap that are not

normally distributed, deviating significantly from a normal distribution with excess kurtosis. This non-normality is attributed to the dynamics of "animal spirits," where beliefs get correlated, and optimism breeds optimism, pessimism breeds pessimism. This can lead to situations where everybody has become either optimist or pessimist, characterized by extreme positive or negative movements in the output gap (booms and busts).

According to the author, waves of optimism and pessimism have important implications for the nature of uncertainty in macroeconomic models. It critiques mainstream macroeconomic and finance models for producing movements in output and asset prices that are normally distributed, arguing that this is due to the fact that these models assume that the shocks hitting the economy are normally distributed. The chapter argues that in the real world, the movements in the output gap are not normally distributed and that the behavioral macroeconomic model also produces movements of output that are not normally distributed.

Another fundamental assumption of the model is related to the conditions for animal spirits to arise, namely, the willingness to learn and the capacity to forget of agents.

As mentioned above, the willingness to learn is represented by the intensity of choice parameter,  $\gamma$ . This parameter determines the intensity with which agents switch from one rule to the other when the performances of these rules change. When  $\gamma$  is zero, the switching mechanism is purely stochastic, learning nothing from past mistakes. As  $\gamma$  increases, agents become increasingly sensitive to past performances of the rule they use and are, therefore, increasingly willing to learn from past errors. Animal spirits arise in an environment where agents learn from their mistakes. Surprisingly, animal spirits arise not because agents are irrational. On the contrary, animal spirits can only emerge if agents are sufficiently rational.

The capacity to forget is represented by the weights that agents apply to past forecast errors when testing the performance of the forecasting rules. These weights decline as the past recedes, and these weights are assumed to decline exponentially. If agents are assumed to assign the same weight to all past observations (infinite memory), animal spirits do not arise. Hence, some "forgetfulness" (a cognitive limitation) is necessary to have animal spirits.

In summary, animal spirits only emerge if agents behave rationally, in the sense that they are willing to learn from mistakes, and if, at the same time, they have a form of cognitive limitation, such as a capacity to forget.

#### *2.4.4 The Implications*

After having presented the behavioral model, the discussion in the book follows by analyzing the impact of various types of shocks on the economy and how they are transmitted through different economic systems. First, the author focuses on the transmission of monetary policy if the parameters of the model are known with precision. Then, monetary and fiscal shocks are discussed, mainly focusing on the transmission under perfect credibility of inflation targeting. The author argues that when the inflation-targeting regime is perfectly credible, the power of animal spirits to shape the business cycle is greatly diminished. This raises the question of whether a perfectly credible inflation-targeting regime may not also significantly affect the transmission of shocks.

The author then analyzes this question by computing the impulse responses to exogenous shocks under the assumption that perfect credibility of inflation targeting prevails. The impulse response functions describe the path of one of the endogenous variables of the model following the occurrence of the shock. Two series are estimated. One is without the shock (the baseline series); the other is the series with the shock. Then the first is subtracted from the second one. The new obtained series is the impulse response that shows how the endogenous variable that embodies the shock evolves relative to the benchmark.

The author first shows the impulse responses to a positive productivity shock. The results show that the short-term impact of the productivity shock on output is significantly reduced in a regime of perfect credibility. This is because the amplification effect of exogenous shocks disappears in the absence of animal spirits. Under perfect credibility, the time it takes for the endogenous variables (output gap, inflation, interest rate) to return to their long-term values is much shorter than under imperfect credibility. Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the short-term effects of exogenous shocks is significantly reduced under perfect credibility.

The chapter on monetary policy implications begins by stating that a central bank that cares about inflation should also be concerned with output stabilization. Strict inflation targeting, where the central bank only cares about inflation, is never optimal. This is illustrated through a simulation of the model under perfect credibility and assuming that the central bank ceases to stabilize output stabilization ( $c_2=0$  in the Taylor Rule). In the simulation, animal spirits work with full force, leading to pronounced fat tails and large extreme values for the output gap, i.e., large booms and busts. In fact, output variability intensifies the waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits), which in turn feed back on output volatility. These large waves lead to higher inflation variability. As the output coefficient ( $c_2$ ) in the Taylor rule increases from 0 to 1, output variability tends to decrease, indicating that output variability decreases as inflation targeting becomes less strict. However, this decline in output variability comes at the cost of more inflation variability.

Interestingly, under the behavioral model, the relationship between output and inflation variability is non-linear, with inflation variability first declining as the output coefficient increases from zero. Inflation variability increases only when the output coefficient increases beyond a specific value (in a range of 0.6-0.8). Thus, the central bank can reduce both output and inflation variability when it moves away from strict inflation targeting ( $c_2=0$ ) and engages in some output stabilization. However, too much output stabilization increases inflation variability.

This type of dynamics is because, by stabilizing output, the central bank also reduces the amplitude of the waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits), thereby stabilizing output and inflation. Inflation credibility is maximized when  $c_2$  is in a range between 0.5 and 1. Beyond that range, further attempts to stabilize output reduce inflation credibility. The optimal values of  $c_2$  are in a range often found in econometric studies of the Taylor equation, suggesting that central banks seem to apply a degree of output stabilization that is consistent with the theory of animal spirits.

In the following chapter, De Grauwe discusses the impact of price flexibility on the nature of business cycles. Two indicators of the capacity of the behavioral model to generate endogenous business cycles are computed: the autocorrelation coefficient of the output gap and the correlation coefficient between the output gap and animal spirits. The results show that as flexibility increases, the degree of autocorrelation of

output declines. This decline is associated with a decline in the correlation between output and animal spirits. Thus, an increase in price flexibility reduces and even eliminates the occurrence of animal spirits, thereby eliminating an important source of business cycle movements. It also contributes to less volatility in output.

However, the increase in flexibility comes at a price. When flexibility increases, inflation volatility also increases. For low levels of flexibility, the movements of output are dominated by the movements of animal spirits, while the effect of exogenous demand and supply shocks on output is relatively small. As flexibility increases, the influence of exogenous shocks on output increases while the animal spirits become less critical. The chapter concludes by discussing the drastically different macroeconomic regimes produced by flexibility, which also translate into very different monetary policy regimes. The impulse responses to analogous interest rate shocks illustrate these differences.

Afterward, the relationship between stock prices, monetary policy, and macroeconomic stability is analyzed. The author discusses how "animal spirits" can lead to periods of bullish and bearish behavior in the stock market. He also mentions that the model under discussion can create bubbles and crashes in the stock market. "Leaning against the wind" strategies in monetary policy are then discussed. These strategies involve using monetary policy to counteract the cyclical behavior of the economy. The author suggests that these strategies do not improve macroeconomic stability when inflation targeting has no credibility.

Then, De Grauwe presents an overview of possible extensions of the model, including introducing different forecasting rules and considering agents using fundamentalist rules. He also explores the implications of allowing agents to use biased rules (either optimistic or pessimistic) and others to use an unbiased estimate of the equilibrium output gap. The paper also contains a section on the monetary policy trade-offs in the three-agent model, which exhibits the same non-linearity as in the basic model. This non-linearity is interpreted to mean that there is scope for active stabilization of the output gap. The author concludes by highlighting the need for further research, particularly in the area of agent-based models that use a large number of agents with an extensive menu of heuristics.

In the last chapter of the book, named "Empirical Issues," De Grauwe outlines three predictions of the model:

1. The correlation between output movements and animal spirits or waves of optimism and pessimism.
2. A temporary decline in output and inflation due to an increase in interest rates. However, these effects are time-dependent and depend on market sentiments, leading to different impulse responses depending on the timing of the shock.
3. The non-normality of the effects of policy shocks are not deviations from the rule, but rather, they are the rule. This contrasts DSGE models, which attribute deviations from normality to special events occurring outside the model.

The author criticizes the traditional empirical testing approach in macroeconomics, which involves estimating an econometric model that embodies the equations of the theoretical model and then performing dynamic simulations given the exogenous variables. Instead, the author proposes an approach of indirect inference, where the predictions of the theoretical model are directly confronted with the data.

To test his results, De Grauwe uses survey-based consumer and/or business sentiment indicators as empirical counterparts of the concept of animal spirits. The author discusses the Michigan Consumer Confidence indicator in the US and similar indicators in other countries. These indicators are based on questions about how individuals perceive present and future economic conditions and are used as tools for analyzing the business cycle and as predictive instruments.

Then, distribution graphs of the output gap for the US, UK, and Germany are shown. The graphs show that the output gap is not normally distributed and exhibits fat tails, which is consistent with the predictions of the behavioral model.

In summary, the behavioral model makes predictions that stand the test of confrontation with the data. However, the author acknowledges that the empirical tests discussed in the chapter are preliminary and that more empirical testing will be necessary to elevate the behavioral model to the status of a serious alternative to mainstream macroeconomic models. This is exactly what motivates the empirical analysis of the following chapter.

### **3. Empirical Analysis**

#### **3.1 Data Sources and Methodology**

This section will focus on the collection and analysis of data. In the first part of the empirical analysis, data about the output gap, Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), and inflation were gathered and analyzed. That was done to verify if the results of the simulation of the model in De Grauwe (2012) have empirical validation, mainly to check if distributions of key macroeconomic variables are non-normal and if the correlation among them and "animal spirits" are similar to the simulations of the behavioral model. In addition, in this work, expected inflation fluctuations are taken into account. The distributions of the variables and the correlations among them are computed for all the available time frequencies (annual, quarterly, and monthly data).

All the results of this part are available in Appendix A.

In the second part of the empirical analysis, the Taylor Rule was estimated implementing a linear regression model to check if the sign and the magnitude of the coefficient on the output gap and inflation deviation correspond to the analysis of De Grauwe (2012), seen in the previous chapter. Strong Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) hypotheses have been assumed, namely linearity, endogeneity of regressors, homoskedasticity, no autocorrelation, no multicollinearity and normality of the error term. Furthermore, these estimations have been repeated using expected inflation deviation to see if the model can be improved. The inflation target was assumed to be 2% for the FED, the ECB, and the BoE all over the period analyzed. The output gap target is, instead, assumed to be 0. The full results of this analysis are in Appendix B.

Quarter data are used, and the output gap (for which only annual frequency is available) is assumed to be constant throughout the same solar year. For each country, the Taylor rule has been estimated across three time periods: first, on the whole available timespan; second, on all periods before 2008 (excluded for the US, included for the other countries) and lastly, from 2009 until 2020. This is done to understand if significant differences in the conduct of monetary policy are present for the period before and after the Great Recession. Instead, post-pandemic data are excluded from the estimation of post-great recession Taylor Rule because the large fluctuations of


the variables can significantly impact the results on the smaller timespan, even because there are not enough observations for the recovery after the crisis to understand if and how monetary policy drivers have changed. For US and European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Greece), estimations with inflation expectations are also available.

Data have been collected on the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The main source was the OECD Statistics Database. Output gap data are measured as a percentage of the yearly potential output. Inflation is measured as the rate of growth of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) with respect to the same period one year before. For EU countries, the rate of growth of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) was taken. Data were available on an annual, quarterly, and monthly basis. Data on inflation expectations were gathered based on the Livingston Survey for the US and from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for EU countries. The mean expected growth rate of the CPI (HICP for EU Countries) after a year from the survey was used. In Livingston, data were available on a semestral basis (when quarter data was needed, it was assumed a constant value throughout each semester). For EU data, there was an annual and quarterly availability. Data about the short-term interest rate on an annual and quarterly basis have been gathered. EURIBOR was used for the EU, Federal Funds Target Rate for the US.


To measure "animal spirits", as De Grauwe (2012) did to test his model, an index of market sentiment is used, namely the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI). Data have been sourced from the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment for the United States. For the European Union, the data was part of the Joint Harmonised EU Programme on Business and Consumer Surveys. Data on CCI were observed monthly, and when aggregated, the mean was taken. In particular, the OECD standardized one has been used. When the index has a value greater than 100, we can call that moment in time "optimistic", otherwise, it is "pessimistic".

## 3.2 Results


The main results are reported here. First, the distribution of the US annual output gap.




The same for France:




Here is the reported CCI data, in this order: monthly data for Greece, quarterly for the US, and annual data for Italy.






Period: 1960Q1 : 2023Q2  
 Observations: 254  
 Mean: 99.99282329396321  
 Median: 100.5233  
 Max: 102.84463333333333  
 Min: 96.30723333333333  
 Standard Deviation: 1.483743768850  
 Skewness: -0.5295755251587305  
 Kurtosis: -0.5294717434637022  
 Jarque\_beraResult(  
 statistic=14.84865337063391,  
 pvalue=0.0005965624157220351)




Period: 1973 : 2023  
 Observations: 51  
 Mean: 99.9966137745098  
 Median: 100.30048666666666  
 Max: 102.909675  
 Min: 95.56572833333333  
 Standard Deviation: 1.925387417944  
 Skewness: -0.6614621164409756  
 Kurtosis: -0.1727167383998096  
 Jarque\_beraResult(  
 statistic=3.658500408487683,  
 pvalue=0.16053389029053944)


For inflation data, monthly distributions are available for Japan, quarters for the US, and annual for the UK. The graphs and the statistics are shown in the same order:




Period: 1956 : 2021  
 Observations: 786  
 Mean: 2.842131754707379  
 Median: 1.7  
 Max: 24.9  
 Min: -2.5  
 Standard Deviation: 4.077883560987086  
 Skewness: 2.3977464272655453  
 Kurtosis: 8.387790954477612  
 Jarque\_beraResult(  
 statistic=3021.0681211761275,  
 pvalue=0.0)




Period: 1956Q1 : 2023Q1  
 Observations: 269  
 Mean: 3.6780621439776953  
 Median: 2.991773  
 Max: 14.5056  
 Min: -1.62336  
 Standard Deviation: 2.789780040628  
 Skewness: 1.575808585397751  
 Kurtosis: 2.6309707614896083  
 Jarque\_beraResult(  
 statistic=183.5495150590166,  
 pvalue=0.0)




Now, the correlation between the output gap and the measure for "animal spirits," both on an annual basis, for the US (on the left) and Japan:




Below is the correlation between inflation and CCI. In this order, monthly observations are reported for the US (on the left), quarterly for Greece, and annually for the UK.




It follows the correlation between the index of market sentiment and inflation expectations. The country presented here is for the US on an annual basis and for Germany and Italy on a quarterly basis.



corr: -0.44566605057560227




corr: -0.43879300380265285



corr: -0.18178981687116888

Lastly, the movements of interest rate and CCI, output gap, and expected inflation are investigated. Specifically, the correlation between short-term interest rate and CCI on a quarterly basis is shown for the UK and on an annual basis for US and Germany. Then, the correlation between the output gap and interest rate (on an annual basis) is shown for the US. Furthermore, the correlation between expected inflation and interest rate is presented for EU countries (quarter basis) and the US (annual basis).



For the second part of the empirical analysis, data are presented for US and Germany.

The linear regression results on the whole available timespan for the US are:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	92
Model	404.610062	3	134.870021	F(3, 88)	=	853.40
Residual	13.9073412	88	.158037968	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	418.517404	91	4.59909235	R-squared	=	0.9668
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9656
				Root MSE	=	.39754
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.7983124	.0298699	26.73	0.000	.7389523	.8576726
infl_dev	.0479152	.0485686	0.99	0.327	-.0486046	.144435
output_gap	.3005165	.0438259	6.86	0.000	.2134217	.3876113
_cons	.8446838	.1418177	5.96	0.000	.5628509	1.126517

For Germany:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	105
Model	317.767597	3	105.922532	F(3, 101)	=	1022.31
Residual	10.4647037	101	.103610928	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	328.232301	104	3.15607981	R-squared	=	0.9681
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9672
				Root MSE	=	.32189

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.9724459	.0184257	52.78	0.000	.9358943 1.008998
infl_dev	.0926537	.0176236	5.26	0.000	.0576932 .1276143
output_gap	.0500277	.0188314	2.66	0.009	.0126712 .0873842
_cons	.0712487	.0450359	1.58	0.117	-.0180905 .1605879

Afterward, the regression parameters are presented for the data observed before the Great Recession (until the end of 2007 for the US and until the end of the following year for Germany). Data on the US are in the upper panel:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	153
Model	1124.83533	3	374.94511	F(3, 149)	=	2233.37
Residual	25.0145869	149	.167883133	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1149.84992	152	7.56480209	R-squared	=	0.9782
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9778
				Root MSE	=	.40974

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.854193	.0187357	45.59	0.000	.817171 .891215
infl_dev	.0497347	.024428	2.04	0.044	.0014647 .0980047
output_gap	.2001691	.0299644	6.68	0.000	.1409591 .259379
_cons	.560986	.0908326	6.18	0.000	.3814995 .7404725

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48
Model	35.383452	3	11.794484	F(3, 44)	=	140.92
Residual	3.6825525	44	.083694375	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	39.0660045	47	.831191585	R-squared	=	0.9057
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8993
				Root MSE	=	.2893

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.7230018	.0797677	9.06	0.000	.5622406 .8837631
infl_dev	.0509492	.0664167	0.77	0.447	-.0829049 .1848032
output_gap	.1610445	.0522351	3.08	0.004	.0557716 .2663173
_cons	.9506023	.2639106	3.60	0.001	.4187255 1.482479

The results for after the Great Recession follow (US above, Germany below):

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	49
Model	57.4603831	3	19.153461	F(3, 45)	=	334.71
Residual	2.57504544	45	.057223232	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	60.0354286	48	1.2507381	R-squared	=	0.9571
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9542
				Root MSE	=	.23921
 interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.6667403	.0355606	18.75	0.000	.5951177	.738363
infl_dev	.075365	.0299923	2.51	0.016	.0149575	.1357725
output_gap	.1823173	.0291719	6.25	0.000	.1235621	.2410725
_cons	.6896341	.0955387	7.22	0.000	.4972092	.8820589
 . reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44
Model	15.6432864	3	5.21442879	F(3, 40)	=	95.11
Residual	2.19292762	40	.054823191	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	17.836214	43	.414795674	R-squared	=	0.8771
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8678
				Root MSE	=	.23414
 interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.6082164	.0684463	8.89	0.000	.4698812	.7465516
infl_dev	.1809059	.0682161	2.65	0.011	.0430361	.3187757
output_gap	-.056703	.0403935	-1.40	0.168	-.1383415	.0249354
_cons	.1678455	.072776	2.31	0.026	.0207597	.3149314

Now, the same estimations, but with inflation expectations measures in place of observed inflation. Again, US data are in the upper panel.

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	152
Model	1124.25953	3	374.753178	F(3, 148)	=	2302.41
Residual	24.0892736	148	.162765362	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1148.34881	151	7.60495898	R-squared	=	0.9790
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9786
				Root MSE	=	.40344
 interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.8220329	.0212655	38.66	0.000	.7800097	.8640561
exp_infl_dev	.1579307	.0589766	2.68	0.008	.0413857	.2744757
output_gap	.2078345	.0279105	7.45	0.000	.1526799	.262989
_cons	.6055646	.0846101	7.16	0.000	.4383648	.7727645

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	94
Model	282.751914	3	94.2506381	F(3, 90)	=	670.88
	12.6439662	90	.140488514	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	295.395881	93	3.17629979	R-squared	=	0.9572
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9558
				Root MSE	=	.37482
interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.9563294	.0286443	33.39	0.000	.8994224	1.013236
exp_infl_dev	.0288249	.1465101	0.20	0.844	-.262243	.3198928
output_gap	.0579867	.0223656	2.59	0.011	.0135535	.1024199
_cons	.0900843	.1010912	0.89	0.375	-.1107509	.2909196

Pre-Great Recession:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	92
Model	404.810722	3	134.936907	F(3, 88)	=	866.33
	13.706682	88	.15575775	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	418.517404	91	4.59909235	R-squared	=	0.9672
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9661
				Root MSE	=	.39466
interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.7762897	.0350674	22.14	0.000	.7066006	.8459787
exp_infl_dev	.1086288	.0720075	1.51	0.135	-.034471	.2517285
output_gap	.3030059	.0431297	7.03	0.000	.2172947	.388717
_cons	.8949111	.1454114	6.15	0.000	.6059366	1.183886

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48
Model	78.9343476	3	26.3114492	F(3, 44)	=	235.51
	4.91576022	44	.111721823	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	83.8501078	47	1.78404485	R-squared	=	0.9414
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9374
				Root MSE	=	.33425
interest_rate						
	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
prev_int_rate	.8031995	.058358	13.76	0.000	.6855867	.9208124
exp_infl_dev	-.3098849	.2294289	-1.35	0.184	-.7722685	.1524987
output_gap	.1843642	.0322332	5.72	0.000	.1194025	.249326
_cons	.5040569	.2226229	2.26	0.029	.0553899	.952724

And Post-Great Recession:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	49
Model	57.1697174	3	19.0565725	F(3, 45)	=	299.24
Residual	2.86571114	45	.06368247	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	60.0354286	48	1.2507381	R-squared	=	0.9523
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9491
				Root MSE	=	.25235

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.6944871	.0361602	19.21	0.000	.6216567 .7673174
exp_infl_dev	.1214617	.1153121	1.05	0.298	-.1107887 .3537121
output_gap	.1777504	.0340555	5.22	0.000	.1091591 .2463417
_cons	.6322984	.1079098	5.86	0.000	.4149569 .8496398

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44
Model	7.3880476	3	2.46268253	F(3, 40)	=	110.10
Residual	.894678621	40	.022366966	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	8.28272622	43	.19262154	R-squared	=	0.8920
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8839
				Root MSE	=	.14956

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.7766196	.0562585	13.80	0.000	.6629169 .8903222
exp_infl_dev	.175547	.09846	1.78	0.082	-.023448 .374542
output_gap	-.0053977	.0147974	-0.36	0.717	-.0353043 .024509
_cons	.062666	.060048	1.04	0.303	-.0586957 .1840276

## **4. Discussion and conclusion**

### **4.1 Summary and Interpretation of the main findings**

The empirical findings of this study provide a partial validation for the results of De Grauwe's behavioral macroeconomic model, as presented in his "Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics" (2012). De Grauwe's model simulations generate non-normal distributions of macroeconomic variables, including the output gap, inflation, and animal spirits.

The empirical analysis available in the previous chapter largely aligns with these results. For instance, the Jarque-Bera test results indicate that the normality assumption cannot be rejected for the distribution of the output gap in the US. Similar results are observed for other countries (all the results are available in Appendix A), with the notable exception of France, where the null hypothesis of normal distributions can be rejected with a 99.9% level of confidence. This also applies to the UK.

However, the situation differs when considering the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) data. For every country, monthly and quarterly CCI data distributions can be assumed to deviate significantly from a normal distribution. This is different for annual data, where the normality assumption cannot be rejected for any country at a significant confidence level.

In the case of inflation data, the insights of De Grauwe find a solid empirical foundation. For every country analyzed, the normality assumption for the distributions of observed inflation can be rejected with a highly significant level of confidence. The only notable exception is the annual inflation in Greece.

Positive correlations exist between the output gap and the market sentiment index, which is used as a measure of animal spirits. However, the correlation coefficient is lower than that of De Grauwe's model simulations (around 0.85). This suggests that De Grauwe's model may overestimate the importance of the output gap and animal spirits in determining and affecting each other's fluctuations. It should be noted, however, that real-world data is often subject to a significant amount of noise, which could, in turn, affect these correlations.

The correlation between inflation and the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) and between expected inflation and CCI can be analyzed together. A non-trivial correlation is observed across all countries under study, even considering different frequencies for the macroeconomic variables under analysis. However, weaker correlations are noted for Italy and Greece.

A striking feature of the relationship between inflation (both actual and expected) and the market sentiment index is the variation in the sign of the correlations across different countries. This variation underscores the fact that empirical analyses and findings can differ significantly across different economic contexts. It also raises questions about the validity of this part of the theoretical framework provided by De Grauwe, who did not specify whether the correlation between inflation and animal spirits should be positive or negative.

De Grauwe's analysis of this relationship in his model simulations primarily addresses the issue of Central Bank credibility. In this context, animal spirits are examined as the proportion of agents using extrapolative rules, regardless of whether they form positive or negative expectations about inflation deviation from its target.

Our analysis in Chapter 3 reveals that periods of sudden optimism or pessimism (such as those observed in the US during the 1970s and 1980s) are typically correlated with higher deviations in inflation, assuming a Central Bank inflation target of around 2%. However, this correlation appears weak when considering the impact of the sudden change in CCI during the Great Recession across different countries. Despite significant movements in CCI, inflation and inflation expectations did not change abruptly and remained relatively close to the target.

This observation leads us to hypothesize that inflation may be a determinant of CCI (or animal spirits), but the reverse causality claim may not hold. This hypothesis should be further tested during the 2020 crisis when inflation and inflation expectations underwent significant changes. However, more data is needed to comprehensively understand the situation and further validate the proposed causality link hypothesis.

The short-term interest rate movements and the CCI exhibit a strong correlation, with a few notable exceptions, such as the quarterly data for the UK. It is also worth noting that the correlation coefficient for Germany is negative.

A strong correlation is observed for US data when examining the correlation between the interest rate and output gap fluctuations. However, the correlation coefficient is smaller in magnitude for other countries. As for the relationship between the short-term interest rate and inflation expectations, robust correlation coefficients are found for the US and EU countries. The correlation for Japan's interest rate data is significantly weak, likely due to the relatively short timespan for which data are present.

Analyzing the relationship between the interest rate and the macroeconomic variables under consideration provides valuable insights into the conduct of monetary policy across different countries and over time. For instance, the strong relationship with inflation expectations suggests that a movement in either the interest rate or expected inflation significantly affects the other variable. Historical episodes, such as the Volcker deflation in the US at the end of the 1970s, demonstrate that monetary policy can substantially impact the economy. Following a high and sustained inflation period, a rise in interest rates led to deflation.

It is intriguing to consider whether a change in the interest rate can influence the economy through its impact on animal spirits. However, it is challenging to make a definitive statement on this matter. While solid correlations are observed in all countries, Germany's negative relationship is a significant exception. Furthermore, it's evident from the graphs that the CCI often fluctuates independently of the interest rate, particularly after the Great Recession.

One of the more compelling insights from De Grauwe's work relates to the timing of monetary policy. However, it is difficult to substantiate this from the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables. In the aftermath of the significant recession caused by the COVID-19 crisis, it would be of particular interest to conduct the same analysis. This would help us understand whether market confidence prior to a "shock" can provide any indication of the depth of the ensuing crisis or the recovery time from it.

In the second part of the empirical analysis, the validity of the model provided by the Taylor Rule is confirmed, as evidenced by the satisfaction of the F-Test on each occasion. However, the estimated parameters are not always significant, particularly those related to the deviation of inflation from its target and expected inflation deviations. It is noteworthy that only in the estimation of the post-Great Recession Taylor Rule for Germany the output gap coefficient is not significant.

For the purposes of this study, the estimations do not yield parameter magnitudes that closely align with those presented by De Grauwe. Nevertheless, the significance of the output coefficient in most estimations confirms a certain degree of output stabilization. To better understand the magnitude of these coefficients, further estimations considering different model specifications may be necessary. Also, the OLS assumptions, here taken as given, should be tested to avoid structural issues.

It is unclear whether there was a change in the conduct of monetary policy following the Great Recession. More data are needed to understand the behavior of central banks better. Additionally, it would be insightful to determine how the coefficients of inflation and output deviations changed in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

In conclusion, the empirical findings of this study provide a nuanced view of the behavioral macroeconomic model proposed by De Grauwe. While the model's predictions are partially validated, particularly in the case of inflation data, the empirical distributions of other macroeconomic variables, such as the output gap and CCI data, do not always align with the model's predictions. While existent, the correlations between these variables and market sentiment indices are not as strong as the model suggests. This discrepancy may be due to the inherent noise in real-world data and the varying economic contexts across different countries. Furthermore, the relationship between short-term interest rates and these variables provides interesting insights into the conduct of monetary policy. However, the impact of interest rate changes on the economy through animal spirits is unclear. The Taylor Rule model has been validated in this context, but further research is needed to fully understand the behavior of central banks, especially in the aftermath of significant economic events such as the Great Recession and the COVID-19 crisis.

## **4.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research**

While this work has tried to validate De Grauwe's behavioral macroeconomic model empirically, it is essential to acknowledge its limitations and identify possibilities for future research.

One of the main limitations of the study lies in the simplicity of De Grauwe's model itself. The model's emphasis on the behavioral aspect, particularly the role of the output gap and animal spirits in determining macroeconomic fluctuations, appears to be overestimated when confronted with real-world data. The empirical findings suggest that the correlation between these variables and market sentiment indices while existing, is not as strong as the model suggests. This could be due to the inherent noise in real-world data and the varying economic contexts across different countries.

The possibility of developing a model where agents employ a variety of heuristics rather than relying on a single forecasting rule presents an intriguing avenue for future research. In such a model, agents could choose to adhere to a specific forecasting rule indefinitely, particularly if they have previously experienced significant forecasting errors using a different rule. This approach would introduce a new layer of complexity to the model, allowing for the possibility that agents, while capable of forgetting past errors, may not forget everything. This "selective memory" could significantly influence their future decision-making processes and forecasting behaviors. This approach could potentially offer a more realistic representation of economic dynamics and provide more accurate predictions of economic fluctuations.

In terms of empirical work, the study was limited by the data available, particularly in the aftermath of significant economic events such as the COVID-19 crisis. More data, especially from this period, would provide valuable insights and allow for a more thorough investigation of the impact of such events and the recovery process.

The limitations identified in this work, both in the theoretical model and the empirical analysis, underscore the complexity of economic behavior and the challenges of accurately modeling and predicting it. Future research should possibly aim to develop more complex models that incorporate a wider range of heuristics and to conduct more comprehensive empirical analyses using extensive and diverse datasets.

### 4.3 Conclusion

This work tried to empirically validate De Grauwe's behavioral macroeconomic model. This theoretical framework diverges from traditional macroeconomic models by incorporating elements of bounded rationality and the concept of "animal spirits." The model's unique approach to understanding the non-normal distributions of macroeconomic variables and their implications for monetary policy led this study.

The distributions of key macroeconomic variables were found to deviate from normality in several instances, confirming De Grauwe's theoretical findings. However, the normality assumption could not be rejected universally, indicating that the model's predictions may not hold consistently across different economic contexts. Furthermore, the study revealed a positive correlation between the output gap and the market sentiment index, a proxy for "animal spirits." This supported the significant role of animal spirits in driving economic fluctuations. However, the correlation was weaker than the model's simulations suggested, indicating that the model might overestimate the influence of these variables in determining economic fluctuations.

The findings make the reader understand the inherent challenges in applying theoretical models to real-world data. Even a model like De Grauwe's, which is grounded in behavioral economics and is relatively simpler than mainstream models, encounters difficulties when confronted with the complexities of real-world economic data. The economic context of each country, shaped by its unique policy environment, institutional structures, and historical experiences, can significantly influence the behavior of macroeconomic variables, complicating the task of empirical validation.


Despite these challenges, this work confirms the value of De Grauwe's behavioral macroeconomic model as a theoretical tool for understanding economic fluctuations. While the model may not perfectly predict the behavior of real-world macroeconomic variables, it provides a valuable framework for conceptualizing the role of animal spirits and bounded rationality in economic dynamics. The model's emphasis on non-normal distributions of macroeconomic variables offers a compelling alternative to mainstream macroeconomic models, which often too hastily assume normally distributed variables and fully rational agents.

# Bibliography


- Akerlof, G. A. (2002). Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior. *American Economic Review*, 92(3), 411-433
- De Grauwe, P. (2012). *Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics*. Princeton University Press.
- Romer, P. (2016). The Trouble with Macroeconomics. *The American Economist*, 20(1), 1-20
- Shiller, R. (2017). Narrative Economics. *American Economic Review*, 107(4), 967-1004
- Woodford, M. (2012). What's Wrong with Economic Models? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(1), 3-28
- Stiglitz, J. (2018). Where Modern Macroeconomics Went Wrong. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 34(1-2), 70-106
- Akerlof, G., and Shiller, R., (2009). *Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism*, Princeton University Press.
- Yellen, J. (2007). Implications of Behavioral Economics for Monetary Policy. *The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco*.
- Levine, R. (2009). Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. In *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Volume 1, Part A, pp. 865–934.
- Fontanier, B. (2022). The Role of Financial Intermediation in Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation of Microfinance in the Developing World. *Journal of Economic Development*.
- Driscoll, J. C., & Holden, S. (2014). Behavioral Economics and Labor Market Policy. *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 3(1), 1–21.
- Blanchard, O. (2017). The Role of Fiscal Policy, and Government Debt and Deficits. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Bao, T., Hommes, C., Sonnemans, J., & Tuinstra, J. (2013). Individual Expectations, Limited Rationality, and Aggregate Outcomes. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 37(8), 1471-1482.
- Hommes, C. (2018). Behavioral and Experimental Macroeconomics and Policy Analysis: A Complex Systems Approach. *Journal of Macroeconomics*, pp. 59, 5–25.
- Hommes, C., Massaro, D., & Salle, I. (2019). Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design at the Zero Lower Bound - Evidence from the Lab. *Economic Journal*, 129(620), 2191-2215.
- De Grauwe, P., & Ji, Y. (2017). Animal Spirits and the International Transmission of Business Cycles. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 81, 86-98.
- Sargent, T. (1993). *Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, G. W., & Honkapohja, S. (2001). *Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., & Thisse, J. F. (1992). *Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

# Appendix A – Results of the Empirical Analysis


United States:




Period: 1985 : 2024  
 Observations: 40  
 Mean: -0.5848054885309623  
 Median: -0.528322093576167  
 Max: 3.28945657931188  
 Min: -4.88412437161886  
 Standard Deviation: 1.885196220482  
 Skewness: -0.26280969536377996  
 Kurtosis: -0.20600141007151374  
 Jarque\_beraResult (statistic=0.6049571233392901, pvalue=0.7389843306793344)







Period: 1960: 2023  
 Observations: 760  
 Mean: 99.99999948684196  
 Median: 100.49019999999999  
 Max: 102.89  
 Min: 96.08473  
 Standard Deviation: 1.487134081074  
 Skewness: -0.5386067647822662  
 Kurtosis: -0.5015786220939882  
 Jarque\_beraResult (statistic=44.713896191629075, pvalue=1.9520940419681665e-10)




Period: 1960Q1 : 2023Q2  
 Observations: 254  
 Mean: 99.99282329396321  
 Median: 100.5233  
 Max: 102.84463333333333  
 Min: 96.30723333333333  
 Standard Deviation: 1.483743768850  
 Skewness: -0.5295755251587305  
 Kurtosis: -0.5294717434637022  
 Jarque\_beraResult (statistic=14.84865337063391, pvalue=0.0005965624157220351)




Period: 1960 : 2023  
 Observations: 64  
 Mean: 99.97208365885417  
 Median: 100.26752041666666  
 Max: 102.56290833333333  
 Min: 96.7535975  
 Standard Deviation: 1.446004283  
 Skewness: -0.46745058923820165  
 Kurtosis: -0.6241580132555398  
 Jarque\_beraResult (statistic=3.414731035334095, pvalue=0.18134290855320778)







corr: -0.564640654505981




corr: -0.5697632305181483




corr: -0.5824738078085799




corr: -0.44566605057560227




corr: 0.3953509341086551



corr: 0.4270491504163415




corr: 0.8342417709943758



corr: 0.732819964585463


## Germany:



```

Period: 1991 : 2024
Observations: 34
Mean: -0.32236490451375727
Median: -0.3332641621099365
Max: 3.48937708760628
Min: -4.65642185040223
Standard Deviation: 1.795541788062
Skewness: -0.11849649288708826
Kurtosis: -0.037320655757196786
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=0.13127541292308398,
pvalue=0.9364700798990038)


```



```

Period: 1973 : 2023
Observations: 604
Mean: 100.0000008278146
Median: 100.18825
Max: 103.7203
Min: 95.8793
Standard Deviation: 1.581599730566
Skewness: -0.39205690787477226
Kurtosis: -0.25828740770760916
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=17.17817354334823,
pvalue=0.0001861259855877595)


```



```

Period: 1973Q1 : 2023Q2
Observations: 202
Mean: 99.99650762376245
Median: 100.17157
Max: 103.54506666666667
Min: 96.01001333333333
Standard Deviation: 1.572358082944
Skewness: -0.385355894051372
Kurtosis: -0.27259373861143743
Jarque_beraResult(statistic=5.6600
40292408981,
pvalue=0.05901166479640596)





```




```

Period: 1973 : 2023
Observations: 51
Mean: 99.978986372549
Median: 100.11982833333333
Max: 102.70249166666667
Min: 96.51100416666667
Standard Deviation: 1.495438942527
Skewness: -0.36486111652172
Kurtosis: -0.380129906866955
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=1.513629403740023,
pvalue=0.46915845902719144)


```




corr: 0.44211520237026114




corr: -0.30251239071005553




corr: -0.3091354796648426




corr: -0.2469895743570168




corr: -0.43879300380265285




corr: -0.466939170781212




corr: -0.40690058784303423




corr: -0.4535084858946735




corr: 0.2819615466655948



France:






```

Period: 1973 : 2023
Observations: 51
Mean: 99.95815300653597
Median: 100.04343
Max: 105.3154333333333
Min: 95.96296666666666
Standard Deviation: 1.715519150098
Skewness: 0.21546599448898127
Kurtosis: 1.0122242079741457
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=1.7325422055023767,
pvalue=0.4205166928432704)


```



```

Period: 1997 : 2023
Observations: 317
Mean: 1.7176656151419554
Median: 1.6
Max: 7.3
Min: -0.8
Standard Deviation: 1.387809804112
Skewness: 1.8485737410068757
Kurtosis: 4.888703868783274
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=482.27807985555035,
pvalue=0.0)


```



```

Period: 1997Q1 : 2023Q2
Observations: 106
Mean: 1.7325471698113208
Median: 1.5333333333333332
Max: 7.0
Min: -0.4666666666666673
Standard Deviation: 1.398404953187
Skewness: 1.8965615555813624
Kurtosis: 4.998597986202583
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=159.72613411608444,
pvalue=0.0)


```




```

Period: 1996 : 2022
Observations: 27
Mean: 1.6555555555555557
Median: 1.8
Max: 5.9
Min: 0.1
Standard Deviation: 1.155033577046
Skewness: 1.780954688109498
Kurtosis: 6.186261696697772
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=39.545763244277,
pvalue=2.586703296003634e-09)


```




corr: 0.434506314497801




corr: -0.3219216896498525




corr: -0.3442536434343438




corr: -0.27258186943194657




corr: -0.25806007178827733




corr: -0.4169409243573116






corr: 0.3890377719517636








corr: 0.40822933103036446




## Italy:









corr: 0.37831535453832926




corr: -0.1909330537882259




corr: -0.18711563873730536




corr: -0.1597905315202495




corr: -0.12686442680815718




corr: -0.18178981687116888






corr: 0.3983319827969095








corr: 0.4380241403719528




Greece:









corr: 0.5465235357149822




corr: 0.24044718849601915




corr: 0.24461520428589734




corr: 0.3314396897036187




corr: 0.174605752658979




corr: -0.0018140455596834292






corr: 0.5711938101300612








corr: 0.6020954797716008




## United Kingdom:








## Japan:



```

Period: 1985 : 2024
Observations: 40
Mean: -0.03940093891573572
Median: 0.083059074404007
Max: 4.38933347164145
Min: -5.16790183789893
Standard Deviation: 2.141327063568833
Skewness: -0.17311318641039158
Kurtosis: -0.16809754010094569
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=0.329138419843807,
pvalue=0.8482590469703117)


```



```

Period: 1982 : 2023
Observations: 493
Mean: 99.99999862068971
Median: 100.0497
Max: 102.409
Min: 95.45394
Standard Deviation: 1.429712919315144
Skewness: -0.5100720102495189
Kurtosis: -0.06286477010384228
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=21.361215375925124,
pvalue=2.298640306430677e-05)





```




```

Period: 1982Q2 : 2023Q2
Observations: 165
Mean: 99.99270400000003
Median: 100.05097
Max: 102.3843
Min: 95.67483
Standard Deviation: 1.425389411210525
Skewness: -0.48348705247628027
Kurtosis: -0.09919893192391305
Jarque_beraResult(
statistic=6.43219979758539,
pvalue=0.04011119130103502)

```





## Appendix B – Taylor Rule Estimations

United States:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	92	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	153
Model	404.610062	3	134.870021	F(3, 88)	=	853.40	Model	1124.83533	3	374.94511	F(3, 149)	=	2233.37
Residual	13.9073412	88	.158037968	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	25.0145869	149	.167883133	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	418.517404	91	4.59909235	R-squared	=	0.9668				R-squared	=	0.9782	
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9656				Adj R-squared	=	0.9778	
				Root MSE	=	.39754				Root MSE	=	.40974	
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.7983124	.0298699	26.73	0.000	.7389523 .8576726	prev_int_rate	.854193	.0187357	45.59	0.000	.817171 .891215		
infl_dev	.0479152	.0485686	0.99	0.327	-.0486046 .144435	infl_dev	.0497347	.0244248	2.04	0.044	.0014647 .0980047		
output_gap	.3005165	.0438259	6.86	0.000	.2134217 .3876113	output_gap	.2001691	.0299644	6.68	0.000	.1409591 .259379		
_cons	.8446838	.1418177	5.96	0.000	.5628509 1.126517	_cons	.560986	.0908326	6.18	0.000	.3814995 .7404725		
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	49	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	152
Model	57.4603831	3	19.153461	F(3, 45)	=	334.71	Model	1124.25953	3	374.753178	F(3, 148)	=	2302.41
Residual	2.57504544	45	.057223232	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	24.0892736	148	.162765362	R-squared	=	0.9790
Total	60.0354286	48	1.2507381	R-squared	=	0.9542				Adj R-squared	=	0.9786	
				Root MSE	=	.23921				Root MSE	=	.40344	
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.6667403	.0355606	18.75	0.000	.5951177 .7383299	prev_int_rate	.8220329	.0212655	38.66	0.000	.7800097 .8640561		
infl_dev	.075365	.0299923	2.51	0.016	.0149575 .1357725	exp_infl_dev	.1579307	.0589766	2.68	0.008	.0413857 .2744757		
output_gap	.1823173	.0291719	6.25	0.000	.1235621 .2410725	output_gap	.2078345	.0279105	7.45	0.000	.1526799 .262989		
_cons	.6896341	.0955387	7.22	0.000	.4972092 .8820589	_cons	.6055646	.0846101	7.16	0.000	.4383648 .7727645		
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	92	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	49
Model	404.810722	3	134.936907	F(3, 88)	=	866.33	Model	57.1697174	3	19.0565725	F(3, 45)	=	299.24
Residual	13.706682	88	.15575775	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	2.86571114	45	.06368247	R-squared	=	0.9523
Total	418.517404	91	4.59909235	R-squared	=	0.9661				Adj R-squared	=	0.9491	
				Root MSE	=	.39466				Root MSE	=	.25235	
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.7762897	.0350674	22.14	0.000	.7066006 .8459787	prev_int_rate	.6944871	.0361602	19.21	0.000	.6216567 .7673174		
exp_infl_dev	.1086288	.0720075	1.51	0.135	-.034471 .2517285	exp_infl_dev	.1214617	.1153121	1.05	0.298	-.1107887 .3537121		
output_gap	.3030059	.0431297	7.03	0.000	.2172947 .3887117	output_gap	.1777504	.0340555	5.22	0.000	.1091591 .2463417		
_cons	.8949111	.1454114	6.15	0.000	.6059366 1.183886	_cons	.6322984	.1079098	5.86	0.000	.4149569 .8496398		

Germany:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	105	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48
Model	317.767597	3	105.922532	F(3, 101)	=	1022.31	Model	35.383452	3	11.794484	F(3, 44)	=	140.92
Residual	10.4647037	101	.103610928	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	3.6825525	44	.083694375	R-squared	=	0.9057
Total	328.232301	104	3.15607981	R-squared	=	0.9672				Adj R-squared	=	0.8993	
				Root MSE	=	.32189				Root MSE	=	.2893	
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.9724459	.0184257	52.78	0.000	.9358943 1.008998	prev_int_rate	.7230018	.0797677	9.06	0.000	.5622406 .8837631		
infl_dev	.0926537	.0176236	5.26	0.000	.0576932 .1276143	exp_infl_dev	.0509492	.0664167	0.77	0.447	-.0829049 .1848032		
output_gap	.0500277	.0188314	2.66	0.009	.0126712 .0873842	output_gap	.1610445	.0522351	3.08	0.004	.0557716 .2663173		
_cons	.0712487	.0450359	1.58	0.117	-.0180905 .1605879	_cons	.9506023	.2639106	3.60	0.001	.4187255 1.4824749		
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	94
Model	15.6432864	3	5.21442879	F(3, 40)	=	95.11	Model	282.751914	3	94.2506381	F(3, 98)	=	670.88
Residual	2.19292762	40	.054823191	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	12.6439662	90	.140488514	R-squared	=	0.9572
Total	17.836214	43	.414795674	R-squared	=	0.8678				Adj R-squared	=	0.9558	
				Root MSE	=	.23414				Root MSE	=	.37482	
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.6082164	.0684463	8.89	0.000	.4698812 .7465516	prev_int_rate	.9563294	.0286443	33.39	0.000	.8994224 1.013236		
infl_dev	.1809059	.0682161	2.65	0.011	.0430361 .3187757	exp_infl_dev	.0288249	.1465101	0.20	0.844	-.262243 .3198928		
output_gap	-.056703	.0403935	-1.40	0.168	-.1383415 .0249354	output_gap	.0579867	.0223656	2.59	0.011	.0135535 .1024199		
_cons	.1678455	.072776	2.31	0.026	.0207597 .3149314	_cons	.0900843	.1010912	0.89	0.375	-.1107509 .2909196		

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44				
Model		78.9343476	3	26.3114492	F(3, 44)	= 235.51	Model		7.3880476	3	2.46268253	F(3, 40)	= 110.10				
Residual		4.91576022	44	.111721823	Prob > F	= 0.0000	Residual		.894678621	40	.022366966	R-squared	= 0.8920				
Total		83.8501078	47	1.78404485	Adj R-squared	= 0.9374	Total		8.28272622	43	.19262154	Adj R-squared	= 0.8839				
					Root MSE	= .33425						Root MSE	= .14956				
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]						
prev_int_rate	.8031995	.058358	13.76	0.000	.6855867	.9208124	prev_int_rate	.7766196	.0562585	13.80	0.000	.6629169	.8903222				
exp_infl_dev	-.3098849	.2294289	-1.35	0.184	-.7722685	.1524987	exp_infl_dev	.175547	.09846	1.78	0.082	-.023448	.374542				
output_gap	.1843642	.0322332	5.72	0.000	.1194025	.249326	output_gap	-.0053977	.0147974	-0.36	0.717	-.0353043	.024509				
_cons	.5040569	.2226229	2.26	0.029	.0553899	.952724	_cons	.062666	.060048	1.04	0.303	-.0586957	.1840276				

## France:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	105	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48				
Model		319.344595	3	106.448198	F(3, 101)	= 988.98	Model		34.8230731	3	11.607691	F(3, 44)	= 122.71				
Residual		10.8710685	101	.107634341	Prob > F	= 0.0000	Residual		4.16220401	44	.094595546	R-squared	= 0.8932				
Total		330.215664	104	3.17515061	Adj R-squared	= 0.9661	Total		38.9852771	47	.829473981	Adj R-squared	= 0.8860				
					Root MSE	= .32808						Root MSE	= .30756				
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]						
prev_int_rate	.9493219	.0209096	45.40	0.000	.907843	.9908009	prev_int_rate	.9081303	.0526648	17.24	0.000	.8019913	1.014269				
infl_dev	.118208	.0244686	4.83	0.000	.069669	.166747	infl_dev	-.0088644	.0624439	-0.13	0.898	-.1339119	.1177831				
output_gap	.0336551	.0180856	1.86	0.056	-.0022219	.0695321	output_gap	.0095167	.0409094	2.18	0.034	.006906	.1721275				
_cons	.121624	.0497022	2.45	0.016	.0230267	.2202181	_cons	.2367001	.1765534	1.34	0.187	-.11912	.5925201				
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	94				
Model		16.0330126	3	5.34433753	F(3, 40)	= 118.55	Model		282.59149	3	94.1971633	F(3, 90)	= 662.10				
Residual		1.80320139	40	.045080035	Prob > F	= 0.0000	Residual		12.8043908	90	.142271009	R-squared	= 0.9567				
Total		17.836214	43	.414795674	Adj R-squared	= 0.8913	Total		295.395881	93	3.17629979	Adj R-squared	= 0.9552				
					Root MSE	= .21232						Root MSE	= .37719				
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]						
prev_int_rate	.5557058	.0540365	10.28	0.000	.446494	.6649177	prev_int_rate	.9420333	.0316792	29.74	0.000	.879097	1.00497				
infl_dev	.1989577	.0476677	4.17	0.000	.1026176	.2952977	exp_infl_dev	-.0115078	.146046	-0.08	0.937	-.3016537	.2786381				
output_gap	-.1515467	.0485452	-3.12	0.003	-.2496601	-.0534332	output_gap	.0514225	.0219065	2.35	0.021	.0079015	.0949435				
_cons	.163061	.0507979	3.21	0.003	.0603946	.2657275	_cons	.0900178	.1024771	0.88	0.382	-.1135708	.2936064				
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44				
Model		80.2626919	3	26.7542306	F(3, 44)	= 328.14	Model		7.38644867	3	2.46214956	F(3, 40)	= 109.88				
Residual		3.5874159	44	.08153218	Prob > F	= 0.0000	Residual		.896277555	40	.022406939	R-squared	= 0.8918				
Total		83.8501078	47	1.78404485	Adj R-squared	= 0.9543	Total		8.28272622	43	.19262154	Adj R-squared	= 0.8837				
					Root MSE	= .28554						Root MSE	= .34815				
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]						
prev_int_rate	.7553551	.0507595	14.88	0.000	.6530561	.8576541	prev_int_rate	.7118732	.0557922	13.83	0.000	.6591131	.8846334				
exp_infl_dev	-.4374664	.1895609	-2.31	0.026	-.8195012	-.0554313	exp_infl_dev	.1706688	.098967	1.72	0.092	-.029351	.3706885				
output_gap	.3093308	.0395565	7.82	0.000	.2295897	.3809719	output_gap	.0024269	.0097893	0.25	0.805	-.0173581	.0222119				
_cons	.3292679	.1680491	1.96	0.056	-.0094128	.6679485	_cons	.0633972	.0602712	1.05	0.299	-.0584155	.1852098				

## Italy:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	105	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48				
Model		443.282583	3	147.760861	F(3, 101)	= 1316.34	Model		87.3094576	3	29.1931525	F(3, 44)	= 240.10				
Residual		11.33741	101	.112251584	Prob > F	= 0.0000	Residual		5.33328316	44	.121210981	R-squared	= 0.9424				
Total		454.619993	104	4.37134609	Adj R-squared	= 0.9743	Total		92.6427408	47	1.97112214	Adj R-squared	= 0.9385				
					Root MSE	= .33504						Root MSE	= .34815				
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]						
prev_int_rate	.9204659	.0164983	55.79	0.000	.8877377	.9531942	prev_int_rate	.940357	.0373657	25.17	0.000	.8650513	1.015663				
infl_dev	.0747839	.0182776	4.09	0.000	.0385261	.1110418	infl_dev	.029882	.1041927	0.29	0.776	-.1801845	.2398685				
output_gap	.0413632	.01408776	2.94	0.004	.013437	.0692894	output_gap	.0796396	.0351557	2.27	0.028	.008788	.1504912				
_cons	.1256025	.0485152	2.59	0.011	.0293613	.2218437	_cons	.0670665	.1674765	0.40	0.691	-.2704602	.4045932				
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap								
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44				

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap										. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	45	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	94						
Model	30.3819096	3	10.1273032	F(3, 41)	=	162.98	Model	283.537054	3	94.5123513	Prob > F	=	0.0000						
Residual	2.54772509	41	.062139636	R-squared	=	0.9226	Residual	11.8588266	90	.13176474	R-squared	=	0.9599						
Total	32.9296347	44	.748400789	Adj R-squared	=	0.9170	Total	295.395881	93	3.17629979	Adj R-squared	=	0.9585						
				Root MSE	=	.24928					Root MSE	=	.36229						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]								
prev_int_rate	.7112998	.0389126	18.28	0.000	.6327142	.7898854 prev_int_rate	.9186585	.0312433	29.40	0.000	.8565882	.9807287							
infl_dev	.0918261	.0380927	2.41	0.020	.0148963	.1687558 exp_infl_dev	-.0140521	.1404694	-0.10	0.921	-.2931191	.2650149							
output_gap	.0114823	.0195963	0.59	0.561	-.0280933	.0510586 output_gap	.0615791	.016997	3.62	0.000	.0278115	.0953466							
_cons	.109524	.0595638	1.84	0.073	-.0107674	.2298155 _cons	.1463904	.10058	1.46	0.149	-.0534293	.3462101							
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap										. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44						
Model	79.0078391	3	26.3359464	F(3, 44)	=	239.31	Model	7.40199226	3	2.46733075	Prob > F	=	0.0000						
Residual	4.84226875	44	.110051563	R-squared	=	0.9423	Residual	.880733957	40	.022018349	R-squared	=	0.8937						
Total	83.8501078	47	1.78404485	Adj R-squared	=	0.9383	Total	8.28272622	43	.19262154	Adj R-squared	=	0.8857						
				Root MSE	=	.33174					Root MSE	=	.14839						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]								
prev_int_rate	.8457226	.0530991	15.93	0.000	.7387084	.9527367 prev_int_rate	.7823943	.0560321	13.96	0.000	.6691493	.8956394							
exp_infl_dev	-.7200539	.2160884	-3.33	0.002	-1.155543	-.2845653 exp_infl_dev	.1660101	.0878702	1.70	0.098	-.0317929	.3638132							
output_gap	.1943773	.0333948	5.82	0.000	.1270746	.26168 output_gap	.0073825	.0084215	0.88	0.386	-.0096379	.0244029							
_cons	.0313245	.1806168	0.17	0.863	-.3326846	.3953337 _cons	.0750235	.0613259	1.22	0.228	-.0489207	.1989677							

## Greece:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap										. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap									
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	105	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48						
Model	1654.54223	3	551.514077	F(3, 101)	=	806.44	Model	781.049491	3	260.34983	Prob > F	=	0.0000						
Residual	69.0725868	101	.683886998	R-squared	=	0.9599	Residual	61.6107331	44	1.40024393	R-squared	=	0.9269						
Total	1723.61482	104	16.5732194	Adj R-squared	=	0.9587	Total	842.660224	47	17.9289409	Adj R-squared	=	0.9219						
				Root MSE	=	.82697					Root MSE	=	1.1833						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]								
prev_int_rate	.9339508	.0215145	43.41	0.000	.8912718	.9766298 prev_int_rate	.9410844	.0448987	20.96	0.000	.8505969	1.031572							
infl_dev	.0652438	.0389537	1.67	0.097	-.0120299	.1425176 infl_dev	.0919599	.1919732	0.48	0.634	-.2949367	.4788565							
output_gap	.0036946	.0221722	0.17	0.868	-.040289	.0476782 output_gap	.0469261	.070446	0.67	0.509	-.0950486	.1889007							
_cons	.0738716	.1128322	0.66	0.511	-.1483703	.2961134 _cons	-.0622233	.4374113	-0.14	0.888	-.9437679	.8193214							
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap										. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48						
Model	16.3031157	3	5.43437191	F(3, 40)	=	141.79	Model	484.835511	3	161.611837	Prob > F	=	0.0000						
Residual	1.53309828	40	.038327457	R-squared	=	0.9140	Residual	14.6091113	44	1.402323459	R-squared	=	0.9707						
Total	17.836214	43	0.414795674	Adj R-squared	=	0.9076	Total	499.444622	43	5.37037228	Adj R-squared	=	0.9698						
				Root MSE	=	.19577					Root MSE	=	.40289						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]								
prev_int_rate	.6354155	.0370218	17.16	0.000	.5605917	.7102393 prev_int_rate	.8905501	.0200227	44.48	0.000	.8507715	.9303287							
infl_dev	.0860125	.018006	4.78	0.000	.0496209	.1224041 exp_infl_dev	.0514374	.1420452	0.36	0.718	-.2307602	.333635							
output_gap	-.0324271	.0091186	-3.56	0.001	-.0508564	-.0139978 output_gap	.0301045	.0109092	2.76	0.007	.0084315	.0517775							
_cons	.0101531	.0510373	0.20	0.843	-.0929972	.1133034 _cons	.183249	.0853005	2.15	0.034	.0137847	.3527133							
. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap										. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate exp_infl_dev output_gap									
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	48	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44						
Model	214.68447	3	71.56149	F(3, 44)	=	310.32	Model	7.46873185	3	2.48957728	Prob > F	=	0.0000						
Residual	10.1468013	44	.230609122	R-squared	=	0.9549	Residual	.813994371	40	.020349859	R-squared	=	0.9017						
Total	224.831271	47	4.78364407	Adj R-squared	=	0.9518	Total	8.28272622	43	.19262154	Adj R-squared	=	0.8944						
				Root MSE	=	.48022					Root MSE	=	.14265						
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]								
prev_int_rate	.8850875	.0296963	29.80	0.000	.8252385	.9449365 prev_int_rate	.8181689	.0573752	14.26	0.000	.7022094	.9341285							
exp_infl_dev	-.7822871	.3336646	-2.34	0.024	-.1454744	-.1098302 exp_infl_dev	.1736181	.0937425	1.85	0.071	-.0158425	.3630786							
output_gap	.0691219	.0259921	2.66	0.011	.0167382	.1215056 output_gap	.0148822	.0073399	2.03	0.049	.0000478	.0297166							
_cons	-.1041225	.1674386	-0.62	0.537	-.4415728	.2333278 _cons	.1413491	.0692937	2.04	0.048	.0013013	.2813968							

## United Kingdom:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	137	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	80
Model	2032.03824	3	677.346081	F(3, 133)	=	3017.08	Model	742.652257	3	247.558752	F(3, 76)	=	963.02
Residual	29.8589836	133	.224503636	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	19.5363067	76	.257056668	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	2061.89723	136	15.161009	R-squared	=	0.9855				R-squared	=	0.9744	
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9852				Adj R-squared	=	0.9734	
				Root MSE	=	.47382	Total	762.188564	79	9.64795651	Root MSE	=	.50701
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.9375226	.0134083	69.92	0.000	.9110016	.9640437	prev_int_rate	.9548833	.0367309	26.00	0.000	.8817274	1.028039
infl_dev	.0444788	.0206509	2.15	0.033	.0036321	.0853255	infl_dev	-.0607496	.0574041	-1.06	0.293	-.1750797	.0535806
output_gap	.0606111	.0156103	3.88	0.000	.0297344	.0914877	output_gap	.0991204	.0263417	3.76	0.000	.0466563	.1515845
_cons	.2943258	.0871304	3.38	0.001	.1219853	.4666662	_cons	.3128121	.2383884	1.31	0.193	-.1619796	.7876037
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.4070667	.0332532	12.24	0.000	.3398594	.4742739	prev_int_rate	.9797545	.0480462	20.39	0.000	.8801128	1.079396
infl_dev	.0432577	.017493	2.47	0.018	.0079031	.0786124	infl_dev	-.0054811	.0209412	-0.26	0.796	-.0489106	.0379483
output_gap	.0030507	.0200817	0.15	0.888	-.0375359	.0436373	output_gap	.0251108	.0074386	3.38	0.003	.0096842	.0405375
_cons	.374616	.0462232	8.10	0.000	.2811954	.4680366	_cons	.0065873	.0513543	0.13	0.899	-.0999149	.1130895

. reg interest\_rate prev\_int\_rate infl\_dev output\_gap

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44
Model	3.34214996	3	1.11404999	F(3, 40)	=	88.10
Residual	.556363419	40	.013909085	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	3.89851338	43	.090663102	R-squared	=	0.8573
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8466
				Root MSE	=	.11794

interest\_rate

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.4070667	.0332532	12.24	0.000	.3398594
infl_dev	.0432577	.017493	2.47	0.018	.0079031
output_gap	.0030507	.0200817	0.15	0.888	-.0375359
_cons	.374616	.0462232	8.10	0.000	.2811954

## Japan:

. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap							. reg interest_rate prev_int_rate infl_dev output_gap						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	76	Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	26
Model	4.53638301	3	1.51212767	F(3, 72)	=	893.69	Model	2.65642744	3	.885475814	F(3, 22)	=	398.78
Residual	.121824025	72	.001692	Prob > F	=	0.0000	Residual	.04885004	22	.002220456	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	4.65820703	75	.062109427	R-squared	=	0.9738				R-squared	=	0.9819	
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9728				Adj R-squared	=	0.9795	
				Root MSE	=	.04113	Total	2.70527748	25	.108211099	Root MSE	=	.04712
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.9980941	.0192864	51.75	0.000	.9596474	1.036541	prev_int_rate	.9797545	.0480462	20.39	0.000	.8801128	1.079396
infl_dev	-.0048499	.005489	-0.88	0.380	-.0157921	.0060923	infl_dev	-.0054811	.0209412	-0.26	0.796	-.0489106	.0379483
output_gap	.0109637	.0024611	4.45	0.000	.0060575	.0158699	output_gap	.0251108	.0074386	3.38	0.003	.0096842	.0405375
_cons	-.0113947	.012222	-0.93	0.354	-.0357589	.0129695	_cons	.0065873	.0513543	0.13	0.899	-.0999149	.1130895
interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]		
prev_int_rate	.8259742	.0482681	17.11	0.000	.7284207	.9235277	prev_int_rate	.9797545	.0480462	20.39	0.000	.8801128	1.079396
infl_dev	.0028922	.0036014	0.80	0.427	-.0043865	.010171	infl_dev	-.0054811	.0209412	-0.26	0.796	-.0489106	.0379483
output_gap	-.0058299	.0043919	-1.33	0.192	-.0147062	.0030465	output_gap	.0251108	.0074386	3.38	0.003	.0096842	.0405375
_cons	.030146	.015378	1.96	0.057	-.0009341	.061226	_cons	.0065873	.0513543	0.13	0.899	-.0999149	.1130895

. reg interest\_rate prev\_int\_rate infl\_dev output\_gap

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	44
Model	1.15994111	3	.386647038	F(3, 40)	=	766.75
Residual	.02017081	40	.00050427	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1.18011192	43	.027444463	R-squared	=	0.9829
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9816
				Root MSE	=	.02246

interest\_rate

interest_rate	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
prev_int_rate	.8259742	.0482681	17.11	0.000	.7284207
infl_dev	.0028922	.0036014	0.80	0.427	-.0043865
output_gap	-.0058299	.0043919	-1.33	0.192	-.0147062
_cons	.030146	.015378	1.96	0.057	-.0009341