

**DIGITAL FORENSICS & INCIDENT RESPONSE**  
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By,

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### Step 1:

Downloaded the Exercise from  
[http://www.adeleda.com/epita/dfir\\_digital\\_forensics\\_and\\_incident\\_response/exercises/poupees\\_russes.txt](http://www.adeleda.com/epita/dfir_digital_forensics_and_incident_response/exercises/poupees_russes.txt)

### Step 2:

- Identified the file format RZIP by this command


**File poupees\_russes.txt**

- Moved the file into rz format by this command

**mv poupees\_russes.txt poupees\_russes.rz**

- Decompressed the rzip file by this command

**rzip -d poupees\_russes.rz**



```
root@Mr-Brisk: ~/Downloads
File Actions Edit View Help
root@Mr-Brisk: ~/Downloads x
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
poupees_russes.txt
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# file poupees_russes.txt
poupees_russes.txt: rzip compressed data - version 2.1 (15185973 bytes)
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# mv poupees_russes.txt poupees_russes.rz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
poupees_russes.rz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# rzip -d poupees_russes.rz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
poupees_russes
```

### Step 3:

- Identified the file format LHarc by this command

**File poupees\_russes**

- Moved the file into lha format by this command

**mv poupees\_russes poupees\_russes.lha**

- Melted the lha file by this command

**lha -x poupees\_russes.lha**

[illegible]

**Step 3:**

- After the decompression, there is a new file name FS.tar and unzipped by following command

```
tar -xvf FS.tar
```

- It's again bzip2 formatted file , its unzipped by

```
bzip2 -d FS.bz
```

```
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS.tar  poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# tar -xvf FS.tar
FS
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# file FS
FS: bzip2 compressed data, block size = 900k
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# mv FS FS.bz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# bzip2 -d FS.bz

root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads#
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS  FS.tar  poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# file FS
FS: gzip compressed data, was "FS", last modified: Wed Jun 30 01:42:18 2010, max compression, from
Unix, original size modulo 2^32 65560576
```

**Step 4:**

- It's again gzip formatted file, its unzipped by

```
gzip -d FS.gz
```

- Its unzipped into Linux file system data

```
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# mv FS FS.gz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS.gz FS.tar poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# gzip -d FS.gz
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS FS.tar poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# file FS
FS: Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem data, UUID=c8a4643d-d89b-43db-bae8-6192db41dcc1 (large files)
```

### Step 5:

- Created the directory JK to mount the file system

```
mkdir jk
```

- Mounted the file in jk directory by following command

```
mount-o loop ./FS ./jk/
```

- After mounting, there is **forensic\_image** file in UCL compressed data format.

To decompress this format , found the file in

<http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/ucl/> and some idea in (DefCon CTF 2008 Qualifiers) page <https://nopsr.us/ctf2008qual/walk-forensics.html>

- Downloaded uclpack is moved into jk directory and gave executable access by Chmod and started decompression by following command

```
./uclpack -d forensic_image CTF
```

- The decompressed UCL file is in tar format.

```
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# mkdir jk
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS FS.tar jk poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# mount -o loop ./FS ./jk/
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# ls
FS FS.tar jk poupees_russes.lha
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads# cd jk/
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# ls
forensic_image lost+found
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# file forensic_image
forensic_image: UCL compressed data
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# ls
forensic_image lost+found uclpack
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# chmod +x uclpack
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# ./uclpack -d forensic_image CTF

UCL data compression library (v1.03, Jul 20 2004).
Copyright (C) 1996-2004 Markus Franz Xaver Johannes Oberhumer
http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/ucl/

uclpack: block-size is 262144 bytes
uclpack: decompressed 15723366 into 31989760 bytes
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# ls
CTF forensic_image lost+found uclpack
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# file CTF
CTF: POSIX tar archive (GNU)
```

*Step 6: Again, the Tar format is unzipped by following command*

```
tar -xvf CTF.tar
```

```
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# file CTF
CTF: POSIX tar archive (GNU)
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# mv CTF CTF.tar
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# tar -xvf CTF.tar
```

- During unzipping, it seems there is no space on the device, but, we can see joe folder

```
tar: joe/.local: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.local/share: Cannot mkdir: No such file or directory
joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/
tar: joe/.local: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata: Cannot mkdir: No such file or directory
joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home-dbd603fd.log
tar: joe/.local: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home-dbd603fd.log: Cannot open: No such file or directory
joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home
tar: joe/.local: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home: Cannot open: No such file or directory
joe/.blueproximity/
tar: joe/.blueproximity: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
joe/.blueproximity/standard.conf
tar: joe/.blueproximity: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.blueproximity/standard.conf: Cannot open: No such file or directory
joe/.gstreamer-0.10/
tar: joe/.gstreamer-0.10: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
joe/.gstreamer-0.10/registry.i486.bin
tar: joe/.gstreamer-0.10: Cannot mkdir: No space left on device
tar: joe/.gstreamer-0.10/registry.i486.bin: Cannot open: No such file or directory
tar: Exiting with failure status due to previous errors
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# ls
CTF.tar  forensic_image  joe  lost+found  uclpack
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk# cd joe/
root@Mr-Brisk:~/Downloads/jk/joe# ls
Downloads      gppg-stuff.txt  JoeHackerPrivate.gpg  network_sniff.pcap  Public
examples.desktop  'Joe Hacker.asc'  Music                  Pictures
```

**Step-9:**

- And, we can see **network-sniff.pcap** so, its time to investigate the packets.

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 46) · network_sniff.pcap
```

GET /flagg.jpg HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.penfest.ca  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.4) Gecko/20100611 Firefox/3.6.4 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate  
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,\*;q=0.7  
Keep-Alive: 115  
Connection: keep-alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 01:05:16 GMT  
Server: Apache mod\_fcgid/2.3.5 mod\_auth\_passthrough/2.1 mod\_bwlimited/1.4 FrontPage/5.0.2.2635  
Last-Modified: Wed, 30 Jun 2010 01:04:26 GMT  
ETag: "46cc02b-94a5-48a34ef62ba80"  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Length: 38053  
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
Content-Type: image/jpeg

.....JFIF.....H.H.....4This is your Flag: Seeing is not always believing!...C.....C.....  
.....A.....  
..&6...%\$!(7#159Ewe." )AHh.x.....?..."  
"" "" .....W.'@.&....vWL.9...Eccc...'.Y.f...../. ....x....BG.2d...Z...  
Packet 2292: 1 client pkt, 28 server pkts, 1 turn. Click to select

**CTF!!!**

*By exporting this packet by export its objects, we are almost there I guess*

Steganography is the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended recipient, suspects the existence of the message

if u seek a flag, you're almost there...