

# On the Robustness of Metric Learning: An Adversarial Perspective

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31 may 2022

# Problem statement

Due to the increasing popularity of metric-learning, we should worry about the reliability of the neural networks. This work is related to the adversarial attacks and possible defence mechanisms.

## Goal

The project was based on the article of Huai et al.<sup>1</sup> Our goal was to implement and verify the proposed adversarial attack and defence mechanisms.

## Possible application

Generalization and extension of the proposed method to a wider class of architectures.

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<sup>1</sup>Huai, M., Zheng, T., Miao, C., Yao, L., Zhang, A. (2022). On the Robustness of Metric Learning: An Adversarial Perspective. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD), 16(5), 1-25.

# Metric learning

Set of instances  $\mathcal{X} = \{x_i\}_{i=1}^N \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ . Data is normalized to  $[0, 1]^d$ .

## Goal

Learn mapping  $f: \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$  into feature space, based on which the similarity can be calculated.

The similarity degree:

$$D(x_i, x_j) = \|f(x_i) - f(x_j)\|_2^2.$$

Two instances  $x_i, x_j$  are supposed to be similar iff

$$D(x_i, x_j) \leq \gamma$$

for a priori given  $\gamma$ .

## Adversarial attack (AckMetric)

The pairwise robustness of the given distance metric function  $D$  with respect to the instance pair  $(x_i, x_j)$  is given by

$$\rho(D; (x_i, x_j)) = \min_{\delta_i, \delta_j \in \mathbb{R}^d} \{ \|\delta_i\|_\infty + \|\delta_j\|_\infty : D(x_i + \delta_i, x_j + \delta_j) > \gamma \}.$$

Here minimizers  $\delta_i$  and  $\delta_j$  are called adversarial perturbations. Generation of adversarial perturbations can be reduced to the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} D(x_i + \delta_i, x_j + \delta_j) - \gamma &\longrightarrow \max_{\|\delta_i\|_\infty + \|\delta_j\|_\infty < \varepsilon} \\ \text{s.t. } x_i + \delta_i &\in [0, 1]^d, \quad x_j + \delta_j \in [0, 1]^d. \end{aligned}$$

## Projected gradient descent

$(r + 1)$ -th iteration update:

$$x_k^{r+1} = \Pi_{clip} \left( x_k^r + \xi \operatorname{sign} \left( \frac{\partial D(x_i^r, x_j^r)}{\partial x_k^r} \right) \right),$$
$$k = \operatorname{argmax}_{\{i, j\}} \left\{ \left\| \frac{\partial D(x_i^r, x_j^r)}{\partial x_i^r} \right\|, \left\| \frac{\partial D(x_i^r, x_j^r)}{\partial x_j^r} \right\| \right\}.$$

For linear mapping ( $f(x) = Wx$ ) one can obtain explicit formula

$$x_i^{r+1} = \Pi_{clip} \left( x_i^r + \xi \operatorname{sign} \left( 2W^T W(x_i^r - x_j^r) \right) \right),$$
$$x_j^{r+1} = \Pi_{clip} \left( x_j^r + \xi \operatorname{sign} \left( -2W^T W(x_i^r - x_j^r) \right) \right),$$

which can be applied to arbitrary argument as the derivative norms are equal in this case.

## Upper bound for perturbed distance

For one layer fully connected neural network ( $f(x) = Wx$ ) the following upper bound for  $\|\delta_i\|_\infty \leq \varepsilon$  can be proved:

$$\begin{aligned} D(x_i + \delta_i, x_j) &\leq D(x_i, x_j) + \varepsilon \sup_{s \in [-1,1]^d} \|2W^T W s\| \leq \\ &\leq D(x_i, x_j) + \varepsilon \sup_{s \in [-1,1]^d, t \in [-1,1]^d} 2t^T W^T W s \leq \\ &\leq D(x_i, x_j) + \varepsilon \sup_{t \in [-1,1]^d} 2t^T W^T W t \leq D(x_i, x_j) + 2d\varepsilon\lambda_{max}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\lambda_{max}$  is maximum eigenvalue of  $W^T W$ .

## Proposed defence method

For binary classification problem let  $y_i \in \{-1, 1\}$  denote the class of  $x_i$ , and  $y_{ij} = y_i y_j$ .

Margin loss (no defence):

$$\mathcal{L}_1 = \frac{2}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i < j} (1 + y_{ij}(D(x_i, x_j) - \gamma))^+ \rightarrow \min_W$$

Let  $\lambda_d, \lambda_{d-1}, \dots$  denote top maximum eigenvalues of  $W^T W$ .


Then the robust loss function has the form

$$\mathcal{L}_2 = \mathcal{L}_1 + \sum_{j=1}^k \alpha_j \lambda_{d-k+j} \rightarrow \min_W.$$


# Attack evaluation

Adversarial attack ( $\epsilon = 0.07$ ,  $\gamma = 2$ )





Without perturbation  
 $D(x_1, x_2) = 0.42$



Adversarial noise




Perturbed  
 $D(x_1, x_2) = 2.24$





# Attack evaluation

Adversarial attack ( $\epsilon = 0.09$ ,  $\gamma = 2$ )



# Defence Evaluation

