Safeguarding Digital Infomation Through Innovative Research and Education

Improving Scalable, Automated Baremetal Malware Analysis

Adam Allred Paul Royal

Agenda

- Baremetal Malware Analysis
 - Motivation, Hardware, Technologies
- Improving Baremetal Malware Analysis
 - Reliability Testing
- Conclusion/Future Work



an introduction to

BAREMETAL MALWARE ANALYSIS

Malware Analysis Detection

Analysis environment detection has become

commoditized

Tejin Cripter 2014 v1.8		
☐ Anti-SandBoxie	☐ Anti-ThreatExpert	ReAlign Sections (EOF)
☐ Anti-Virtual PC	☐ Anti-JoeBox	🗖 (M1)
☐ Anti-IDA Debugger	☐ Anti-VMWare	☑ (M2) - ReAlign
☐ Anti-CWS and box	☐ Anti-Debugger 2	Random EOF Place
☐ Anti-Norman Sandbox	☐ Anti-Panda SandBox	☐ Anti-Wine (Linux)
☐ Anti-VirtualBox	Anti-Deep Freeze	☐ Anti-Xen VM
☐ Anti-Virtual Machine (Max)	☐ Anti-Returnil V.S	☐ Anti-Shadow User Pro
☐ Anti-SunBelt SandBox	☐ Anti-Mal Defender	Anti-Clean Slate
☐ Delay Execution 0	☐ Anti System Safety Monitor	☐ Disable Windows Firewall
Anti-Anubis	☐ Anti- SandBox-Fortres	Anti-Malwr + (Cuckoo)
Options Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Final Step About		



Detection Cont' d

- In-Guest Tools
 - No higher privilege
 - Exception handling issues
- Emulation (QEMU)
 - No identical instruction execution semantics
- Hardware virtualization extensions
 - Non-privileged side effects



Detecting QEMU

IRETD with 0x26 prefix

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    unsigned int handler =
        (unsigned int) seh_handler;
    printf("Attempting QEMU detection.\n");
     _asm("movl %0, %%eax\n\t"
         "push! %%eax\n\t"::
        "r" (handler): "%eax");
     asm("pushl %fs:0\n\t"
         "movl %esp, %fs:0\n\t");
     asm(".byte 0x26, 0xcf");
     __asm("movl %esp, %eax");
      _asm("movl %eax, %fs:0");
    __asm("addl $8, %esp");
    return EXIT SUCCESS;
```



Why Transparency?

- Analysis environment detection commoditized
- Detection vulnerability trend does not suggest decrease over time
- Certain types of detection vulnerabilities automatically discoverable



Baremetal Challenges

- Conceptual
 - Physicalizing virtual machine
- Scalability
 - Cost of hardware
 - Efficiency of processing
- Automation
 - Managing system state
 - Ensuring longevity of hardware



Baremetal Cluster Hardware

- Baremetal Controller
 - Standard 1U Single Socket Server
- Baremetal Non-Virtual Machine (NVM)
 - Inexpensive Half-depth 1U Server
- Cluster Networking
 - Inexpensive Cisco switch
 - 24 10/100Mb ports, 2 1Gb ports



Initial Cluster Technologies

- Linux Device Mapper
 - Create Copy-on-Write block device
- ATA over Ethernet
 - Make CoW device available over network
- g Preboot eXecution Environment
 - Boot NVM into OS on network CoW device
- Intelligent Platform Management Interface
 - Manage NVM system state



NVMTrace

- Software controller for automated baremetal malware analysis
 - Executes each sample in its own sterile, isolated non-virtual machine
- Provides access to NVM disk contents and network traffic
 - Use with your favorite network traffic and disk forensic tools



GTISC NVMTrace Deployment





GTISC Deployment Cont'd





evaluation and enhancement of

BAREMETAL MALWARE ANALYSIS

NVMTrace Reliability Testing

- Anecdotal observation indicated potential issue in sample processing
- Subsequent investigation revealed occasional hang during Windows boot
- ATA over Ethernet suspected



ATA over Ethernet (AoE)

- Simple (12 page specification)
 - TFTP-like connection
- Unreliable
 - No packet retransmission, checksumming
- Network analysis confirmed AoE traffic ceases at hang
 - Packet loss or corruption impedes node execution



iSCSI

- Proposed as replacement for AoE
 - Provides reliable transport via TCP
- Candidate implementation must handle atypical use
 - Constant iSCSI LUN add/remove
- Evaluated several iSCSI implementation candidates that did not work
 - SCST, STGT, Open-iSCSI
- Eventually tried LIO, which did work



Results

- > 99% of samples in well-known malware set successfully processed using LIO
 - Verified via multiple rounds of testing
- Additional testing with separate, ~200,000 sample dataset
 - Represented 24 hours of real-world collection
 - Virtualization-based processing results used as reference
 - Results reaffirm > 99% success rate
- Subsequent stable production use for months



Conclusion

- Analysis environment detection commoditized, increasingly popular
 - Virtualization still a valuable analysis tool, but can be supplemented
- Advances in hardware make scalable baremetal malware analysis possible
- Baremetal analysis systems must be carefully engineered for reliability



Future Work

- Increase cluster density via Supermicro MicroClouds
 - Yields three-fold increase in processing density
- Real-time disk forensics
 - Examine controller-NVM iSCSI network traffic
 - Record disk-level events as they occur



Acknowledgements

- Artem Dinaburg
 - Environment detection
- Robert Edmonds
 - System architecture
- David Dagon
 - System concept



Questions?

NVMTrace Source Code,

Build Instructions

http://code.google.com/p/nvmtrace