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## Secure Classification as a Service

Levelled Homomorphic, Post-Quantum Secure Machine Learning Inference  
based on the CKKS Encryption Scheme

### BACHELOR'S THESIS

Bachelor's degree programmes:  
*Physics and Information & Computer Engineering*

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Graz, March 2022

# Abstract

Abstract of your thesis (at most one page)

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**Keywords:** FHE, ML, image classification, neural network, Private AI, PPML, Confidential Computing

**Technologies:** Microsoft SEAL (C++, nodejs), Tensorflow Keras, Numpy, xtensor, Docker, msgpack, React, Materialize, Nginx

**Languages:** C++, Python, JavaScript

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The most well-known and widely used asymmetric ('public-key') cryptographic scheme, published by the trio RIVEST-SHAMIR-ADLEMAN in 1977 and known as *RSA*, is based on the hardness assumption of the integer factorisation problem (factorising a large 2-composite number into its two prime factors  $p$  and  $q$  is hard). As of today, this factorisation problem has not been proven to be in NP, yet it is suspected that it might indeed be NP-complete (i.e. *NP-hard* while still being in NP) when modelled using a traditional Turing machine. Since the advent of quantum computation, this situation changed as a whole with Peter SHOR's algorithm, threatening the security of many cryptosystems, for instance RSA which is still widely used today despite its known problems.

As it stands, lattice-based cryptography presents a solution to a politically and socially problematic situation in which few parties world-wide, with access to a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, may be able to decrypt most of today's digital communication. *Lattice Cryptography* is based on other mathematical problems, shown to be sufficiently hard on quantum computers and traditional ones alike, most notably *LWE* which this thesis will discuss in detail.

Many new cryptosystems have been developed on top of LWE, two of which this following thesis will focus on specifically: *BFV* and *CKKS*; whose security is still unaffected by efficient quantum algorithms. Yet, it is not only their security prospect that makes these encryption schemes attractive, but first and foremost their defining *homomorphic* property which allows for computations on the encrypted data. A *fully* homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was first introduced by Craig GENTRY in 2009, using a bootstrapping approach. The *levelled* homomorphic *Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan* (BGV) encryption scheme is implemented in Microsoft SEAL and allows for integer arithmetic, up to a few multiplication 'levels' deep. The *Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren* (BFV) scheme is very similar to it and described in a bit more detail in [section 3.4](#). And finally, building upon concepts introduced in the former, the *Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song* (CKKS) scheme allows for approximative floating-point arithmetic that finally facilitates machine-learning applications.

Machine Learning allows a computer to 'learn' from specifically structured data using linear regression or similar methods, and to apply this 'knowledge' to new, unknown inputs. In its simplest form, or even using a multi-layered neural network, this only requires two different operations on numbers (or even better, vectors): addition and multiplication. Using an *Homomorphic Encryption* (HE) scheme such as the ones mentioned above and described in [chapter 3](#), both are given and PPML (Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning) applications are born!

The present thesis not only focusses on theoretical remarks but also includes a publicly available implementation of an [HE](#) classification server written in C++ and a compact graphical user interface to interact with.




Figure 1.1: The user interface of the demonstrator, users can draw a digit by hand, select one of two communication means (plain or encrypted) and finally let the server handle the classification to obtain a prediction (including a visual of associated probabilities).

The following [chapter 2](#) and [chapter 3](#) aim to introduce most of the necessary theory to understand the homomorphic encryption schemes used in practice today, as well as the simple machine learning approaches involved in securely classifying images as a service.

Next, [chapter 4](#) then focusses on the concrete system at hand, how the classification of handwritten digits (using the MNIST dataset) works in detail and what challenges arise when dealing with a system which acts not only on plain, but also encrypted data. The subsequent [chapter 5](#) analyses the neural network performance in terms of its accuracy, digit-wise precision and recall, documents benchmarks of runtime, message size and accuracy and finally includes a visualisation of the ciphertext (containing all information about the original image).

# Chapter 2

## Background

The discussion of the homomorphic encryption schemes following in [chapter 3](#) requires some mathematical background that will be introduced here, aiming for a consistent overview rather than full completeness. The last two sections introduce same background on Machine Learning and provide an outlook on Quantum Computation and why it affects cryptography today.

**Notational Conventions** Let  $\mathbb{N}$  denote the natural numbers without 0, i.e.  $\mathbb{N} = \{n \in \mathbb{Z} \mid n > 0\}$ . For a probability distribution  $\chi$  over a set  $R$ , let sampling a value  $x \in R$  from the probability distribution be denoted by  $x \leftarrow \chi$ . For  $a \in \mathbb{R}$  a real number, denote rounding down (floor)  $a$  by  $\lfloor a \rfloor \in \mathbb{Z}$ , rounding up (ceil) by  $\lceil a \rceil \in \mathbb{Z}$  and rounding to the nearest integer by  $\lfloor a \rceil \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

### 2.1 Polynomial Rings and Modular Arithmetic

As the algebraic structure underlying almost every single symbol following in the next chapters, we recall the definition of a ring:

#### 2.1.1 Definition (Ring)

A tuple  $(R, +, \cdot)$  consisting of a set  $R$ , an addition operation  $+$  and a multiplication operation  $\cdot$  is referred to as a ring, given that it satisfies the following *ring axioms*:

- Addition is closed:  $a + b \in R \quad \forall a, b \in R$ .
- Addition is commutative:  $a + b = b + a \quad \forall a, b \in R$ .
- Addition is associative:  $(a + b) + c = a + (b + c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$ .
- There exists an element  $0 \in R$  such that  $a + 0 = a \quad \forall a \in R$ .
- An additive inverse  $-a$  of each element  $a$  in  $R$  exists, such that  $a + (-a) = 0$ .
- Multiplication is associative:  $(a \cdot b) \cdot c = a \cdot (b \cdot c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$ .
- Multiplication is closed:  $a \cdot b \in R \quad \forall a, b \in R$ .
- There exists an element  $1 \in R$ , referred to as the identity element, or multiplicative identity of  $R$ , such that  $a \cdot 1 = a \quad \forall a \in R$ .
- Multiplication  $\cdot$  is distributive w.r.t. addition  $+$ ,  
i.e.  $a \cdot (b + c) = (a \cdot b) + (a \cdot c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$  from the left and  
i.e.  $(b + c) \cdot a = (b \cdot a) + (c \cdot a) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$  from the right.

Where the first 5 properties can be summarised as  $(R, +)$  forming an Abelian group. If multiplication is additionally commutative, we refer to the ring as *commutative*:

- Multiplication is commutative:  $a \cdot b = b \cdot a \quad \forall a, b \in R$ .

Acting as the logical extension of a group, a ring can be considered the intermediary step towards a field (which also defines subtraction and division). An example of a ring would be the integers themselves, or the integers modulo  $t$ :  $\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$ , sometimes also denoted as  $\mathbb{Z}_t$ .

Given two groups  $(G, +)$  and a subgroup  $(N, +)$ , we can construct another group  $G/N$  as follows, referred to as a quotient group, or factor group:

### 2.1.2 Definition (Quotient Group / Ring)

A quotient group  $(G/N, +)$  (pronounced 'G mod N') over the original group  $G$  and a normal subgroup  $N$  of  $G$  with a standard element operation  $+$  can be defined using the left cosets

$$g + N := \{g + n \mid n \in N\} \subseteq G$$

of  $N$  in  $G$ . The corresponding set  $G/N$  is defined as

$$G/N := \{g + N \mid g \in G\}$$

whereas the standard operation  $+$  :  $G/N \times G/N \mapsto G/N$  can be extended from the original group  $G$  as follows:

$$(g + N) + (h + N) := (g + h)N$$

The quotient set  $G/N$  can therefore be identified as the set of all possible left cosets  $g + N$  that in union reconstruct the original group  $G$ .

As a highly relevant structure to cryptography and a great example of a quotient group, we would like to consider the ring of integers modulo a given modulus  $q \in \mathbb{N}$ .

### 2.1.1 Lemma (Ring of Integers Modulo $q$ : $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ )

Using equivalence classes  $\bar{x}_q$  modulo  $q$  referred to as congruence classes, define the commutative quotient ring of integers modulo  $q$  as  $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)$  with two operations  $+$  and  $\cdot$  and

$$\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z} = \{\bar{x}_q \mid x \in \mathbb{Z}, 0 \leq x < q\}$$

where  $q\mathbb{Z} = \{qx \mid x \in \mathbb{Z}\} \triangleleft \mathbb{Z}$  denotes the  $q^{\text{th}}$  multiplicative coset<sup>a</sup> of the integers and

$$\bar{x}_q = \{y \equiv x \pmod{q} \mid y \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

is the set of all multiples of  $q$  with remainder  $x$ . Note that many operations that resulting groups, rings or fields are commonly equipped with, such as addition or multiplication, propagate to an equivalent definition in the ring of integers modulo  $q$  by considering their result as a congruence class instead of it, which in turn is again an element of  $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ .

<sup>a</sup>from the left and from the right, therefore  $q\mathbb{Z}$  is called a normal subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}$



This ring is of specific importance in discrete mathematics and can be regarded as a formalisation of modular arithmetic, much of which we will require at a later point in this chapter.

As a first step towards the first central result, [Corollary 2.1.1](#), we formally introduce polynomial rings and how to carry out addition and multiplication between them.

### 2.1.3 Definition (Polynomial Ring over $\mathbb{Z}$ )

On the set of all complex-valued polynomials with integer coefficients (a function space)

$$\mathbb{Z}[X] = \left\{ p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} a_k x^k, a_k \in \mathbb{Z} \forall k \geq 0 \right\},$$

we can define a commutative ring  $(\mathbb{Z}[X], +, \cdot)$  equipped with the standard addition  $+$  and multiplication  $\cdot$  operations (as an extension over the field  $\mathbb{C}$ ) of polynomials.

To further elaborate on the polynomial ring operations:

- In their coefficient representations  $\mathbf{p} = (p_j)_{j \in \mathbb{N}} = (p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots)$  (which are sequences) and  $\mathbf{q} = (q_j)_{j \in \mathbb{N}} = (q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots)$ , an addition of two polynomials  $p, q \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$  is equivalent to the element-wise addition of their coefficient sequences

$$\begin{aligned} (p + q)(X) &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k X^k + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} q_k X^k = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (p_k + q_k) X^k \\ &= \langle (\mathbf{p} + \mathbf{q}), \{X^0, X^1, X^2, \dots\}^T \rangle \end{aligned}$$

which indeed satisfies the additive [ring axioms](#) due to the existing structure of the underlying field  $\mathbb{C}$ .

- The multiplication operation can be defined using a discrete convolution of the coefficient vectors

$$r(X) = (p \cdot q)(X) = \left( \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k X^k \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} q_l X^l \right) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} p_k q_l X^{k+l} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} r_k X^k$$

with the arising coefficients  $(r_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$  determined by the discrete convolution

$$r_k = \sum_{l=0}^k p_l q_{k-l} \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{p} * \mathbf{q}$$

in this context also referred to as the CAUCHY-product. Therefore,

$$(p \cdot q)(X) = \langle (\mathbf{p} * \mathbf{q}), \{X^0, X^1, X^2, \dots\}^T \rangle.$$

Again, this generally applicable approach satisfies the multiplicative [ring axioms](#) and even satisfies commutativity due to the existing structure of the underlying field  $\mathbb{C}$  and the symmetry of convolutions.

Where  $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$  denotes the dot (scalar) product between two vectors.

Polynomials with degree  $\geq 1$  over the complex numbers can always be factorised using their roots due to the fundamental theorem of algebra. Polynomials over the integers however, cannot always be factorised further, yielding the definition of an irreducible polynomial.

### 2.1.4 Definition (Irreducible Polynomials)

A polynomial is called irreducible *iff* it cannot be written as a product of other polynomials *while staying in the same coefficient space*.

## 2.1.1 Cyclotomic Polynomials

Due to their interesting structure and efficient computability, in the schemes introduced in the following chapter, certain polynomials ([Corollary 2.1.1](#)) are chosen as representations of plaintexts and ciphertexts. An important concept is that of cyclotomic ('circle-cutting') polynomials, which we will discuss in a bit more detail here.

An important polynomial is

$$p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(x) = x^n - 1$$

. Its roots, found by solving  $p(x) = 0$  for  $x$ , yielding  $x^n = 1 \Leftrightarrow x_k = \sqrt[n]{1}$  are referred to as the  $n^{\text{th}}$  roots of unity, of which there are multiple for each  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

### 2.1.2 Lemma (The $n^{\text{th}}$ roots of unity)

For some integer  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , the  $n$  complex roots  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \mathbb{C}$  of unity can be found as

$$x_k = e^{2\pi i \frac{k}{n}} \quad k \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$$

with  $i$  the imaginary unit. Using EULER's identity, their real and imaginary components can be explicitly found as  $x_k = \cos\left(2\pi \frac{k}{n}\right) + i \sin\left(2\pi \frac{k}{n}\right)$ .

An  $n^{\text{th}}$  root of unity  $y$  is referred to as *primitive*, *iff* there exists no  $m < n$  for which that root  $y$  is also an  $m^{\text{th}}$  root of unity, i.e.  $y^m \neq 1$ . An equivalent indicator is when  $\gcd(m, n) = 1$ .

Due to the fact that for any  $k, l \in \mathbb{Z}$ , their product  $x_k \cdot x_l$  is also a root of unity, and  $x_{k+jn} = x_k \forall j \in \mathbb{Z}$ , they clearly comprise a cyclic Abelian group over the complex numbers  $\mathbb{C}$  under multiplication with (for instance) the first root  $x_1 = e^{2\pi i \frac{1}{n}}$  as its generator.

### 2.1.5 Definition (Cyclotomic Polynomial)

Given the  $n^{\text{th}}$  roots of unity  $\{x_k\}$ , we can define the  $n^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial  $\Phi_n \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$  as the product over all primitive roots of unity

$$\Phi_n(x) = \prod_{\substack{k=1 \\ x_k \text{ primitive}}}^n (x - x_k)$$

It is unique for each given  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

The number of primitive roots of unity is given by  $\varphi(n)$ , denoting Euler's totient function which counts the natural numbers  $m$  less than  $n$  who do not share a common divisor  $\neq 1$ ,

i.e.  $\gcd(m, n) = 1$ .  $\varphi(n)$  therefore also counts the number of primitive roots of unity for  $n$ , consequently also yielding the degree of the  $n^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial.

An important aspect of cyclotomic polynomials is that they are irreducible over their coefficient space, the integers  $\mathbb{Z}$ .

### 2.1.1 Remark (Irreducibility of Cyclotomic Polynomials)

Cyclotomic polynomials are always irreducible.

This enables us to *uniquely* define a quotient ring with cyclotomic polynomials as moduli, later. In theory, there are multiple equivalent definitions of said ring, but by convention we choose the cyclotomic polynomial because it cannot be simplified further. The proof for [Remark 2.1.1](#) is quite cumbersome, but can be found in [Serge 2002](#).

### 2.1.1 Theorem ( $2^{k\text{th}}$ cyclotomic polynomial)

The  $m^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial, where  $m = 2n = 2^k$  ( $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ) is a power of 2, can be identified as

$$\Phi_m(x) = x^n + 1.$$

Its degree is  $n$ , consistent with  $\varphi(2^k) = 2^{k-1} \forall k \in \mathbb{N}$ .

Find a short but illustrative proof of [Theorem 2.1.1](#) in the [Appendix](#).

### 2.1.6 Definition (Ring of Polynomials of highest degree $N - 1$ )

One can construct the quotient ring  $(R, +, \cdot)$  as

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$$

where  $(X^N + 1)$  denotes the set of all polynomial multiples of the polynomial  $p \in \mathbb{Z}[X], p(x) = x^N + 1$ , so

$$(X^N + 1) = \{q : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, q(x) = r(x) \cdot (x^N + 1) \mid r \in \mathbb{Z}[X]\}$$

The elements of  $R$  are then polynomials with integer coefficients of maximum degree  $N - 1$ .

If  $N$  is a power of 2, according to [Theorem 2.1.1](#),  $R$  is the set of integer-coefficient polynomials reduced modulo  $\Phi_d(X)$  the  $d^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial with  $N = \varphi(d) = \frac{d}{2}$ .

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\Phi_d(X) = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1).$$

Since every cyclotomic polynomial is irreducible, this is a unique representation of  $R$  without any possible further simplifications.

As promised above, we will require [Lemma 2.1.1](#) for the fundamental structure underlying the [HE](#) schemes described in the next chapter, defining ourselves a ring with coefficients in said quotient ring  $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ .

### 2.1.1 Corollary (Polynomial Ring modulo $q$ )

Further modifying  $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$  to only take coefficients mod  $q$ , we obtain two equivalent definitions for the same ring:

$$R_q = R/qR = (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[X]/(X^N + 1)$$

which contains polynomials with integer coefficients modulo  $q$  of degree  $N - 1$ . Explicitly stated, the set can be written as:

$$R/qR = \{p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} a_k x^k \mid a_k \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}\}$$

This bounded polynomial ring is central to understanding objects in the next chapter and [Corollary 2.1.1](#) can be regarded as the central result of this section.

## 2.2 Lattice Cryptography

Lattice-based cryptography takes a different approach to encryption than classical factorisation or the discrete logarithm problem, as it is based on different problems, namely ones on [lattices](#). The goal of any mathematical encryption scheme is to leave a potential attacker with a computationally hard, at best infeasible, problem to solve when attempting to decrypt messages without a secret key. This section will start with three basic problems, SVP, GapSVP and SIS and move on to [Learning With Errors \(LWE\)](#) and [Learning With Errors on Rings \(RLWE\)](#). To illustrate the connection of these problems to lattices, we take a closer look at them before considering further details of LWE. Most notably, lattice problems are conjectured to be secure against quantum computers ([Corrigan-Gibbs, S. Kim and Wu 2018](#)).

### 2.2.1 Definition (Lattice)

A lattice  $(\mathcal{L}, +, \cdot)$  is a vector field over the integers  $(\mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)$ , defined using a set of  $n$  basis vectors  $\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n \in \mathbb{R}^n$ , that can be introduced as a set

$$\mathcal{L} = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^m c_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid c_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$$

equipped with at least vector addition  $+: \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathcal{L}$  and scalar multiplication  $\cdot: \mathbb{Z} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathcal{L}$ . As an extension of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ , the Euclidean norm  $\|\cdot\|$  is also defined and the standard Euclidean metric  $d: \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ , yielding a metric space  $(\mathcal{L}, d)$ , can be obtained by the norm of a vector difference, denoted  $\|(\cdot) - (\cdot)\|$ .

Its *minimum distance*  $\lambda_{\min}$  is defined as the smallest Euclidean distance between two points  $\mathbf{p}_1$  and  $\mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}$

$$\lambda_{\min} = \min_{\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}} d(\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2) = \min_{\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}} \|\mathbf{p}_1 - \mathbf{p}_2\|,$$

which can be equivalently thought of as the minimal length of any non-zero vector in the lattice  $\mathcal{L}$ , because of  $\mathbf{0}$  always being an element of the lattice which can be chosen as  $\mathbf{p}_1$  and the translational symmetry between fundamental lattice volumes (or regions).

The three problems frequently showing up in cryptography are stated below, each taking a different approach in their own interesting way.

### 2.2.2 Definition (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP))

Given a lattice  $\mathcal{L}$  constructed from  $n$  basis vectors, find the shortest non-zero lattice vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L} \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ , i.e. find  $\mathbf{x}$  such that  $\|\mathbf{x}\| = \lambda_{\min}$  ([Peikert 2016](#)).

Based on SVP, one can construct GapSVP, an approximative version with advantages for usage in practical problems.

Placeholder

Figure 2.1: Illustration of a standard lattice  $\mathcal{L}$  over the integers  $\mathbb{Z}$  with two basis vectors  $\mathbf{b}_1$  and  $\mathbf{b}_2$ , c.f. [Definition 2.2.1](#). The shortest vector problem in this case is solved by  $\mathbf{x} = 0\mathbf{b}_1 \pm 1\mathbf{b}_2$ .

### 2.2.3 Definition (Decisional Approximate SVP (GapSVP))

Given a lattice  $\mathcal{L}$  and some pre-defined function  $\gamma : \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  depending on the lattice dimension  $n$  (constant for a given  $\mathcal{L}$ ) with  $\gamma(n) \geq 1$ , the decisional approximate shortest vector problem is distinguishing between  $\lambda_{\min} \leq 1$  and  $\lambda_{\min} > \gamma(n)$ . For other cases, it is up to the algorithm what to return.

### 2.2.4 Definition (Short Integer Solution (SIS) Problem)

For  $m$  given vectors  $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$  that comprise the columns of a matrix  $A \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^{n \times n}$  and an upper bound  $\beta$ , find a solution vector  $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  such that

$$A\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \quad \text{with} \quad \|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \beta.$$

Note that without the last requirement  $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \beta$ , the SIS problem can be easily solved through Gaussian elimination or similar algorithms, however they rarely yield a short (or *the* shortest) solution. It can be shown that solving SIS is at least as hard as solving GapSVP with appropriate parameters ([Ajtai 1996](#)).

Using the above problems, multiple cryptographic primitives can be constructed due to the proven hardness that also propagates to quantum computers. Examples include collision resistant hash functions, signatures, pseudorandom functions or even Regev's public-key cryptosystem ([Peikert 2016](#)).

## 2.2.1 Learning with Errors (LWE)

Next, we would like to consider [LWE](#), a computing problem that is believed to be sufficiently hard to be used in cryptography and, most notably, is not yet solvable in linear time by a quantum algorithm (c.f. [section 2.4](#)). Its hardness assumptions are related to GapSVP and were first formally proven by Regev, for which he received the 2018 Gödel prize.

**2.2.5 Definition (LWE-Distribution  $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$ )**

Given a prime  $p \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , we choose some secret  $\mathbf{s} \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n$ . In order to sample a value from the LWE distribution  $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$ :

- Draw a random vector  $\mathbf{a} \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n$  from the multivariate uniform distribution with its domain in the integers up to  $p$ .
- Given another probability distribution  $\chi_{\text{error}}$  over the integers modulo  $p$ , sample a scalar 'error term'  $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$  from it.
- Set  $b = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{a} + \mu$ , with  $\cdot$  denoting the standard vector product.
- Output the pair  $(\mathbf{a}, b) \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n \times (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ .

The general approach useful to cryptography is to sample an element from the LWE-distribution and construct two problems out of it, *search*-LWE and *decision*-LWE.

**2.2.6 Definition (LWE-Problem - Search Version)**

Given  $m$  independent samples  $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$  from  $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$ , find the secret  $\mathbf{s}$ .

**2.2.7 Definition (LWE-Problem - Decision Version)**

Given  $m$  samples  $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$ , distinguish (with non-negligible advantage) whether they were drawn from  $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$  or from the uniform distribution  $u$  over  $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n \times (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$ .

In their above definitions, Regev showed that the two problems are equivalent.

**2.2.1 Theorem (Hardness of LWE)**

If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves either search-LWE or decision-LWE then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest vector problem (GapSVP) in the worst case (Regev 2010).

He also provided a construction of a public-key cryptosystem based on them, i.e. an asymmetric cryptographic system for at least two parties that includes a public and corresponding private key.

Public-key cryptosystems are fundamentally different from symmetric systems, which only require one single key for encryption and decryption at the same time, known by all involved parties. Often times, public-key schemes (rather slow) are used to exchange keys for subsequent symmetric encryption (rather fast) of large plaintexts, for instance in the [Transport Layer Security \(TLS\)](#) protocol (Rescorla 2018).

**2.2.2 Learning with Errors on Rings (RLWE)**

Very similar to [Definition 2.2.5](#), the Ring-LWE distribution is derived as follows (Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev 2010):

### 2.2.1 Corollary (RLWE-Distribution $B_{s,\chi_{error}}$ )

Given a quotient **ring**  $(R/qR, +, \cdot)$ , we choose some secret  $s \in R/qR$ . In order to sample a value from the RLWE distribution  $B_{s,\chi_{error}}$ :

- Uniformly randomly draw an element  $a \in R/qR$
- Given another probability distribution  $\chi_{error}$  over the ring elements, sample an 'error term'  $\mu \in R/qR$  from it.
- Set  $b = s \cdot a + \mu$ , with  $\cdot$  denoting the ring multiplication operation.
- Output the pair  $(a, b) \in R/qR \times R/qR$ .

In the exact same manner as **above**, the search and decision problems can be constructed.

### 2.2.2 Corollary (RLWE-Search Problem)

Given  $m$  independent samples  $(a_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$  from  $B_{s,\chi_{error}}$ , find the secret  $s$ .

### 2.2.3 Corollary (RLWE-Decision Problem)

Given  $m$  samples  $(a_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$ , distinguish (with non-negligible advantage) whether they were drawn from  $B_{s,\chi_{error}}$  or from the uniform distribution  $u$  over  $R/qR \times R/qR$ .

The main advantage of RLWE over LWE is that is conceptually similar and yet simple to formalise over an arbitrarily chosen **ring**  $(R, +, \cdot)$  which allows for a vast amount of applications and interesting constructions.



## 2.3 Machine Learning

Undoubtedly one of the most prevalent concepts in today's computing world, **Machine Learning (ML)** has shaped how computers think and how we interact with them significantly. As Shafi GOLDWASSER puts it, 'Machine Learning is somewhere in the intersection of Artificial Intelligence, Statistics and Theoretical Computer Science' (Goldwasser 2018).

Within the scope of this thesis, the basics of neural networks and associated learning methods shall be covered, limited to the category of supervised learning problems (as opposed to unsupervised learning problems). Supervised learning refers to the machine *training* an algorithm to match some input data (features) with corresponding output data (targets), often related to pattern recognition. The trained algorithm can then be utilised to match fresh input data with a prediction of the targets.

A popular subset of applications to **ML** are classification problems, predominantly image classification, which was not as easily possible before without a human eye due to the lack of computing power. Classification problems can be formulated quickly, the goal is to computationally categorize input data (for instance, images) into a predefined set of classes (for instance, cats and dogs). The primary concept behind **Machine Learning** is not at all new, linear regression was already employed by GAUSS and LEGENDRE in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century; the term 'Neural Network' was coined by MCCULLOCH and PITTS in 1943. Much media attention was earned in the 2000-2010 decade when larger image classification problems became feasible with the increasing computational power of modern computers, up until the advent of Deep Learning (Bishop and Nasrabadi 2007). Keep in mind however, that Machine Learning in this form is nothing more than glorified statistical regression.

### 2.3.1 Definition (Linear Regression)

Given an input vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ , the goal of linear regression is to predict the value of a target  $t \in \mathbb{R}$ , according to some model  $M$ .

To illustrate the concept, we will focus on a simple learning method, namely that of gradient descent. In supervised learning problems, this technique first requires us to introduce a loss (error) function  $L : \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ , usually MSE (mean-squared-error), which has comparably nice convergence properties due to its parabolic shape:

$$L(\mathbf{w}) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i (t_i - \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{x}_i)$$

where  $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  represents the weights. When  $L(\mathbf{w}^*) = 0$ , this means we have found the perfect weights, since our predictions exactly match the targets (labels)  $t_i$ . This is not always possible, so we aim for the minimum error between predictions and targets. In other words, our goal is to find

$$\mathbf{w}^* = \arg \min_{\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{R}^n} L(\mathbf{w})$$

given a dataset  $\{\mathbf{x}_i, t_i\}$ .

### 2.3.1 Gradient Descent

Placeholder

Figure 2.2: Illustration of Gradient Descent, adapted from ([user194703 2020](#)).

To make up for numerical problems and potentially slow convergence, gradient descent can be replaced by more sophisticated methods such as Conjugate Gradient (with convergence guarantees within a certain boundary) or by adding in momentum to the distance travelled in each GD iteration.

### 2.3.2 Multi-Layered Neural Networks

Placeholder

Figure 2.3: A neural network

To better understand the implications and possibilities of a large neural network, consider the following universal approximation theorem:

#### 2.3.1 Theorem (Universal Approximation)

If the neural network has at least one hidden layer, proper nonlinear activation functions and enough data and hidden units, it can approximate any continuous function  $y(x, w) : \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  arbitrarily well on a compact domain ([Hornik, Stinchcombe and White 1989](#)).

Matrix -> Activation Function

- Matrix Multiplication (Dense Layer)
- Convolutional Layer
- Sigmoid Activation
- Max Pooling

## 2.4 Post-Quantum Security

Placeholder

Figure 2.4: Illustration of a wave function  $\psi : \mathbb{R}^2 \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  as commonly used in quantum mechanics.

In quantum mechanics, we seek a mathematical description of quantum phenomena, commonly building upon SCHRÖDINGER's formalisms based on wave functions and the basic postulates of quantum mechanics.

The mathematical foundation of quantum mechanics is deeply rooted in functional analysis; An important concept is that of function spaces and, especially, Hilbert spaces. Wave functions  $\psi : \mathbb{R}^3 \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  are usually chosen as elements of the  $\mathcal{L}^2$ -space, the space of square-integrable functions:

$$\mathcal{L}^2 = \left\{ \psi : \mathbb{R}^3 \mapsto \mathbb{R} \mid \|\psi\| < \infty \right\} \quad \text{with } \|\psi\| = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} |\psi(\mathbf{x})|^2 dx.$$

The most popular interpretation / notion of a wave function is that it relates to the probability that a particle is at the current position  $\mathbf{r}$  at time  $t$  at the given time. Namely, this probability is given by  $|\psi(\mathbf{r}, t)|^2$ .

### 2.4.1 Definition (NP-Hardness)

A problem is referred to as *NP-hard* if and only if (iff) it is at least as hard as the hardest problems in the complexity class NP (nondeterministic polynomial time). Formally written,

$$\text{NP} = \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \text{NTIME}(n^k)$$

the union of all decision problems with runtime bounded by  $\mathcal{O}(n^k)$ .

Placeholder

Figure 2.5: Comparison of the Relu activation function vs. its Taylor expansion

# Chapter 3

## Homomorphic Encryption

### 3.1 Basics of Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**HE** makes it possible to operate on data without knowing it. One can distinguish three flavors of it, Partial-, Somewhat- and **Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)**.

For **FHE**, there exist a few schemes in use today with existing implementations.

- **BFV** scheme for integer arithmetic (Fan and Vercauteren 2012, Brakerski 2012).
- **BGV** scheme for integer arithmetic (Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan 2012).
- **CKKS** scheme for (complex) floating point arithmetic (Cheon et al. 2017).
- **Ducas-Micciancio (FHEW)** and **Chillotti-Gama-Georgieva-Izabachene (TFHE)** schemes for Boolean circuit evaluation (Chillotti et al. 2019).

We will first introduce the **BFV** scheme (integer arithmetic) as it represents a fundamental building block behind **CKKS**. Due to the inherent applications, this thesis will focus on the **CKKS** scheme to perform homomorphic operations on (complex-valued) floating point numbers and vectors.

### 3.2 Homomorphic Encryption using RSA

In order to illustrate the basic idea behind **HE**, without distancing ourselves too far from the original goal of introducing basic **HE** operations used in practice, this short section aims to motivate the definition of ring homomorphisms (cf. **Definition 3.2.1**) behind a cryptographic background.

With unpadded RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman 1983), some arithmetic can be performed on the ciphertext - looking at the encrypted ciphertext  $\mathcal{E}(m_1) = (m_1)^r \bmod n$  of the message  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  respectively, the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{E}(m_1) \cdot \mathcal{E}(m_2) &\equiv (m_1)^r (m_2)^r \bmod n \\ &\equiv (m_1 m_2)^r \bmod n \\ &\equiv \mathcal{E}(m_1 \cdot m_2)\end{aligned}$$

The encryption therefore partially fulfills the properties of a ring homomorphism, which in general terms is defined as follows:

### 3.2.1 Definition (Ring Homomorphism)

Given two **rings**  $(R, +, \cdot)$  and  $(S, \oplus, \otimes)$ , we call a mapping  $\varphi : R \rightarrow S$  a ring homomorphism when it satisfies the following conditions:

$$\forall a, b \in R : \varphi(a + b) = \varphi(a) \oplus \varphi(b) \wedge \varphi(a \cdot b) = \varphi(a) \otimes \varphi(b)$$

## 3.3 Gentry's FHE-Scheme and BGV

Gentry 2009

### 3.4 The BFV scheme

Fan and Vercauteren 2012 Brakerski 2012 BFV is based on BGV and they are very similar in their core ideas, one can even convert a BFV ciphertext to an equivalent BGV ciphertext (A. Kim, Polyakov and Zucca 2021).

In this section, we will focus on a slightly altered implementation introduced in Lepoint and Naehrig 2014.

For two tuples  $(\cdot, \cdot)$  defined over the same ring, denote their element-wise addition as  $(\cdot, \cdot) + (\cdot, \cdot)$ , element-wise multiplication by a scalar  $u$  as  $u \cdot (\cdot, \cdot)$  and element-wise rounding as  $\lfloor (\cdot, \cdot) \rfloor$ .

#### 3.4.1 Definition (The BFV-Scheme)

Let  $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\Phi_d(X)$  be a polynomial ring with  $\Phi_d(X)$  the  $d^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial ( $\rightarrow d \in \mathbb{N}$ ) for ciphertexts  $c \in R \times R$ . Introduce  $R/qR$  the associated quotient ring of the  $q^{\text{th}}$  coset of  $R$  with the modulus  $q \in \mathbb{N}$ . Further let  $t \in \mathbb{N}$  denote the message modulus with  $1 < t < q$  for plain messages  $m \in R/tR$  and define  $\delta = \lfloor \frac{q}{t} \rfloor$ ,  $\delta^{-1} = \frac{t}{q}$ .

Introduce three bounded discrete probability distributions  $\chi_{key}$ ,  $\chi_{enc}$  and  $\chi_{error}$  over  $R/qR$ , one which is only used once for key generation, another used for **BFV.Encrypt** and another (usually Gaussian-like) error distribution for manually inserted error terms (confer the **LWE-problem**). For BFV, usually  $\chi_{key} = \chi_{enc}$ .

For a polynomial  $a \in R/qR$ , consider the decomposition  $a = \sum_{i=0}^{l-1} a_i w^i$  into base  $w \in \mathbb{N}$  obtained by **WordDecomp** :  $R \mapsto R^l$ , **WordDecomp**( $a$ ) =  $([a_i]_w)_{i=0}^{l-1}$ .

Further let **PowersOf** :  $R \mapsto R^l$  be defined as **PowersOf**( $a$ ) =  $([aw^i]_q)_{i=0}^{l-1}$ .

Let the parameters  $\mathbb{P} = (d, q, t, \chi_{key}, \chi_{error}, w)$  and  $l = \lfloor \log_w(q) \rfloor + 1$ .

**BFV.**

**ParamGen**( $\lambda$ ) Choose parameters as defined above, given the security parameter  $\lambda$ , such that  $1 < t < q$ ,  $w \geq 2$ , initialize distributions  $\chi_{key}$ ,  $\chi_{enc}$  and  $\chi_{error} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$

**KeyGen**( $\mathbb{P}$ ) Generate the secret key  $s \leftarrow \chi_{key}$ , sample  $\mu \in (R/qR)^l$  from  $\chi_{error}$  and choose some  $\mathbf{a} \in (R/qR)^l$  uniformly at random, compute the relinearization key  $\gamma = (\mathbf{PowersOf}(s^2) - (\mu + \mathbf{a} \cdot s), \mathbf{a})$  and finally output the public key for uniformly random  $a \in (R/qR)$  and  $\mu \leftarrow \chi_{error}$  with  $b = -(a \cdot s + \mu)$  as  $\mathbf{p} = (b, a) \rightarrow \mathbf{p}, s, \gamma$

**Encrypt**( $\mathbf{p}, m$ ) Let  $(b, a) = \mathbf{p}$ ,  $u \leftarrow \chi_{enc}$ ,  $\mu_1, \mu_2 \leftarrow \chi_{error}$ , then the ciphertext is  $\mathbf{c} = u \cdot \mathbf{p} + (\delta m + \mu_1, \mu_2) = (\delta m + bu + \mu_1, au + \mu_2) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$

**Decrypt**( $s, \mathbf{c}$ ) Decrypt  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1)$  as  $m = \lfloor \delta^{-1} [c_0 + c_1 s]_q \rfloor \in R/tR \rightarrow m$

**Add**( $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$ ) Let  $(c_0^1, c_1^1) = \mathbf{c}_1$  and  $(c_0^2, c_1^2) = \mathbf{c}_2$  then  $\mathbf{c}_3 = (c_0^1 + c_0^2, c_1^1 + c_1^2) = \mathbf{c}_1 + \mathbf{c}_2 \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_3$

**Mult**( $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$ ) Output  $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (\lfloor \delta^{-1} c_0^1 c_0^2 \rfloor, \lfloor \delta^{-1} (c_0^1 c_1^2 + c_1^1 c_0^2) \rfloor, \lfloor \delta^{-1} c_1^1 c_1^2 \rfloor) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{c}}$

**ReLin**( $\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \gamma$ ) Using the relin key  $\gamma = (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{a})$ , relinearize from  $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (c_0, c_1, c_2)$  as  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0 + \mathbf{WordDecomp}(c_2) \cdot \mathbf{b}, c_1 + \mathbf{WordDecomp}(c_2) \cdot \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$

(Fan and Vercauteren 2012; Brakerski 2012)

To summarise the parameters and variables, a brief overview of all used symbols is provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Summary of the parameters and symbols in BFV.

Symbol	Space	Explanation
$\lambda$	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Security parameter
$d$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Index of the cyclotomic polynomial used in $R$
$q$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Modulus of the ciphertext space $R/qR$
$t$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Modulus of the plaintext message space $R/tR$
$\delta$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Ratio between ciphertext and plaintext modulus
$\delta^{-1}$	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Inversion coefficient of the effect of $\delta$
$w$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Word size used as basis, e.g. $w = 2$ for bits
$l$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Number of words of size $w$ required to encode $q$
$s$	$\in R$	Secret Key
$\mathbf{p}$	$\in R/qR \times R/qR$	Public Key $(b, a)$
$\gamma$	$\in (R/qR)^l \times (R/qR)^l$	Relinearization Key
$m$	$\in R/tR$	Plaintext Message
$\mathbf{c}$	$\in R \times R$	Ciphertext
$\bar{\mathbf{c}}$	$\in R \times R \times R$	Slightly larger ciphertext resulting from multiplication

Placeholder

### 3.4.1 Theorem (BFV encryption is homomorphic with respect to addition)

**BFV.Encrypt** should encrypt in such a way that the addition algebra can be retained even in the transformed space, showing that we can indeed refer to it as **homomorphic** encryption.

*Microsoft SEAL* implements the scheme, enabled using `seal::scheme_type::bfv`.

## 3.5 The CKKS scheme

The CKKS scheme allows us to perform approximate arithmetic on floating point numbers. Essentially, the idea is to extend BFV which allows us to operate on vectors  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_t^n$ , by

an embedding approach that allows us to encode a (complex) floating point number vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n(\mathbb{C}^n)$  as an integer vector. A naïve approach would be to use a fixed-point embedding:

$$\text{Embed}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x} \cdot F$$

with  $F \in \mathbb{Z}$ . In decimal form, for instance with  $F = 1000$ , we could effectively encode three decimal places of the original vector  $\mathbf{x}$ .

Introduce  $d, R, R/qR$  as in [Definition 3.4.1](#) and further define  $S = \mathbb{R}[X]/\Phi_d(X)$  a similar polynomial ring to  $R$ , but over the reals instead of the integers. Let  $N = \varphi(d)$  be the degree of the reducing cyclotomic polynomial of  $S$ , confer [Definition 2.1.6](#). For convenience, we usually choose  $d$  a power of 2 and then, by [Theorem 2.1.1](#),  $N = \varphi(d) = \frac{d}{2}$  which yields very efficiently multipliable polynomials because the homomorphic multiplication operation can be performed using a [Discrete Fourier Transform \(DFT\)](#) and further optimized using the [Fast Fourier Transform \(FFT\)](#), which in its unmodified form only accepts power-of-2 vector sizes ([Cheon et al. 2017](#)).

### 3.5.1 Definition (Canonical Embedding $\underline{\sigma}$ )

For a real-valued polynomial  $p \in S$ , define the canonical embedding of  $S$  in  $\mathbb{C}^N$  as a mapping  $\underline{\sigma} : S \mapsto \mathbb{C}^N$  with

$$\underline{\sigma}(p) := \left( p(e^{-2\pi i j/N}) \right)_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_d^*}$$

with  $\mathbb{Z}_d^* := \{x \in \mathbb{Z}/d\mathbb{Z} \mid \gcd(x, d) = 1\}$  the set of all integers smaller than  $d$  that do not share a factor  $> 1$  with  $d$ . The image of  $\underline{\sigma}$  given a set of inputs  $R$  shall be denoted as  $\underline{\sigma}(R) \subseteq \mathbb{C}^N$ . Let the inverse of  $\underline{\sigma}$  be denoted by  $\underline{\sigma}^{-1} : \mathbb{C}^N \mapsto S$ .

Note that evaluating a polynomial on the  $n^{\text{th}}$  roots of unity corresponds to performing a FOURIER-Transform.

Define the commutative subring  $(H, +, \cdot)$  of  $(\mathbb{C}^N, +, \cdot)$  on the set

$$H = \{\mathbf{z} = (z_j)_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_d^*} \in \mathbb{C}^N : z_j = \overline{z_{-j}} \forall j \in \mathbb{Z}_d^*\} \subseteq \mathbb{C}^N$$

of all complex-valued vectors  $\mathbf{z}$  where the first half equals the reversed complex-conjugated second half.

### 3.5.2 Definition (Natural Projection $\underline{\pi}$ )

Let  $T$  be a multiplicative subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*$  with  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*/T = \{\pm 1\} = \{1T, -1T\}$ , then the natural projection  $\underline{\pi} : H \mapsto \mathbb{C}^{N/2}$  is defined as

$$\underline{\pi}((z_j)_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_d^*}) = (z_j)_{j \in T}$$

Let its inverse be denoted by  $\underline{\pi}^{-1} : \mathbb{C}^{N/2} \mapsto H$  and consequently defined as

$$\underline{\pi}^{-1}((z_j)_{j \in T}) = (\nu(z_j))_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_d^*} \text{ with } \nu(z_j) = \begin{cases} z_j & \text{if } j \in T \\ \overline{z_j} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



The natural projection  $\pi$  simply halves a vector  $\mathbf{z} \in H$  to all elements where  $j \in T$  to only contain its essential information (the first half), since the second half can easily be reconstructed by element-wise conjugation using  $\nu$ . The exact structure of  $T$  is given by  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*/T = \{\pm 1T\}$  with  $+1T$  and  $-1T$  denoting multiplicative left cosets of  $T$ , together forming the **quotient group**  $(\mathbb{Z}_d^*/T, \cdot)$  over multiplication (denoted  $\cdot$  instead of  $+$  as in the quotient group definition in the previous chapter).

**Further studying  $T$** , we first notice that by LAGRANGE's theorem on finite groups, the number of elements in  $T$  is exactly  $N/2$  since

$$\frac{|\mathbb{Z}_d^*|}{|T|} = |\{\pm 1\}| \Leftrightarrow \frac{N}{|T|} = 2 \Leftrightarrow |T| = \frac{N}{2}$$

leading to  $\pi(H) \subseteq \mathbb{C}^{N/2}$ . Rephrased, we seek a  $T \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_d^*$  with  $1 \in T$  such that we can fully construct  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*$  by the union of the cosets  $1T$  and  $-1T$ , i.e.  $\mathbb{Z}_d^* = (1T) \cup (-1T)$ . Note that  $T$  is not unique, we can find multiple sets  $T$  for which the above holds, for instance by brute force computation:

```

1 import itertools, math, numpy as np
2 d = 16; Zdstar = [z for z in range(d) if math.gcd(d, z) == 1]
3 possible_T = [T for T in itertools.combinations(Zdstar, len(Zdstar) // 2)
4               if 1 in T and list(np.unique(list(T) + [(-1*t) % d for t in T])) == Zdstar]
```

**Example.** Let  $d = 16$ , then  $\mathbb{Z}_d^* = \{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15\}$  and  $N = |\mathbb{Z}_d^*| = 8$  and by LAGRANGE's theorem,  $|T| = 4$ . Since  $(T, \cdot)$  forms a normal subgroup under multiplication, we must have that  $1 \in T$  and we can identify all possible subgroups  $T$  satisfying  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*/T = \{\pm 1T\}$  to be one of

$$\{1, 3, 5, 7\}, \{1, 3, 5, 9\}, \{1, 3, 7, 11\}, \{1, 3, 9, 11\}, \\ \{1, 5, 7, 13\}, \{1, 5, 9, 13\}, \{1, 7, 11, 13\}, \{1, 9, 11, 13\}$$

using the above Python code. An example of an invalid subset  $T$  that does cover the whole original set  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*$  would be  $T = \{1, 7, 9, 15\}$ .

For the purposes of CKKS, we simply choose a global  $T$  as above that is constant for our encoding and decoding procedure and a given  $d$ . The inverse natural projection  $\pi^{-1}$  then uniquely constructs a vector in  $H$  by filling in elements  $\bar{z}_j$  for  $j \notin T$  into  $\mathbf{z}$ . For simplicity, we commonly choose  $T$  as the 'first half' of  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*$  when sorting in an ascending manner as it is always a valid choice. <sup>1</sup>

### 3.5.3 Definition (Discretisation to an element of $\sigma(R)$ )

Using one of several round-off algorithms (c.f. Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev 2013), given an element of  $H$ , define a rounding operation  $\rho : H \mapsto \sigma(R)$  that maps an  $h \in H$  to

<sup>1</sup>This can be seen from the coset  $-1T$  which exactly equals the 'missing' half in  $\mathbb{Z}_d^*$  when the first half is covered by  $1T = T = \{1, 3, 5, \dots, N-1\}$  since  $-1T = \{-1, -3, -5, \dots, -(N-1)\} \equiv \{d-1, d-3, d-5, \dots, d-N+1\} \pmod{d}$  when  $d$  a power of 2. Then,  $(1T) \cup (-1T) = \{1, 3, 5, \dots, N-1\} \cup \{d-1, d-3, d-5, \dots, d-N+1\} = \{1, 3, 5, \dots, N-1, N+1, \dots, d-5, d-3, d-1\} = \mathbb{Z}_d^*$ .

its closest element in  $\underline{\sigma}(R)$ , also denoted as

$$\underline{\rho}(h) = \lfloor h \rfloor_{\underline{\sigma}(R)}.$$

Further let  $\underline{\rho}_\delta(h) = \lfloor \delta \cdot h \rfloor_{\underline{\sigma}(R)}$  denote the same rounding operation but with prior scaling by a scalar factor  $\delta$ . Note that  $\underline{\rho}^{-1}$  is given directly as the identity operation because all elements of its domain are already elements of its image. Similarly,  $\underline{\rho}_\delta^{-1}(\mathbf{y}) = \delta^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{y}$ .

Because it is not essential to understanding the encryption scheme, we will skip over concrete implementations of the rounding procedure  $\underline{\rho}$ . Note that for choosing a 'close' element  $g \in H$ , we must first introduce a sense of proximity, in this case done by the  $l_\infty$ -norm  $\|g - h\|_\infty$  of the difference between  $h \in H$  and  $g$ .

### 3.5.4 Definition (The CKKS Scheme)

Define  $R, R/q_L R$  as in [Definition 3.4.1](#).

**CKKS.**

- ParamGen**( $\lambda$ ) Choose parameters as defined above, given the security parameter  $\lambda$  and space modulus  $q_L$ , choose  $d \in \mathbb{N}$  a power of 2,  $P, h \in \mathbb{Z}$ ,  $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$  and initialize distributions  $\chi_{key}$ ,  $\chi_{enc}$  and  $\chi_{error}$ .  $\rightarrow \mathbb{P}$
- KeyGen**( $\mathbb{P}$ ) Sample the secret key  $s \leftarrow \chi_{key}$ ,  $a \in R_{q_L}$  uniformly at random,  $\mu \leftarrow \chi_{error}$  and obtain the public key  $\mathbf{p} = (b, a)$  with  $b = -a \cdot s + \mu$ . Sample  $a' \in R_{P \cdot q_L}$  uniformly at random,  $\mu' \leftarrow \chi_{error}$  and obtain the evaluation key  $\gamma = (b', a')$  with  $b' = -a' \cdot s + \mu' + P s^2$ .  $\rightarrow \mathbf{p}, s, \gamma$
- Encode**( $\mathbf{z}$ ) For a given input vector  $\mathbf{z}$ , output  $m = (\underline{\sigma}^{-1} \circ \underline{\rho}_\delta \circ \underline{\pi}^{-1})(\mathbf{z}) = \underline{\sigma}^{-1}(\lfloor \delta \cdot \underline{\pi}^{-1}(\mathbf{z}) \rfloor_{\underline{\sigma}(R)}) \rightarrow m$
- Decode**( $m$ ) Decode plaintext  $m$  as  $\mathbf{z} = (\underline{\pi} \circ \underline{\rho}_\delta^{-1} \circ \underline{\sigma})(m) = (\underline{\pi} \circ \underline{\sigma})(\delta^{-1} m) \rightarrow \mathbf{z}$
- Encrypt**( $\mathbf{p}, m$ ) Let  $(b, a) = \mathbf{p}$ ,  $u \leftarrow \chi_{enc}$ ,  $\mu_1, \mu_2 \leftarrow \chi_{error}$ , then the ciphertext is  $\mathbf{c} = u \cdot \mathbf{p} + (m + \mu_1, \mu_2) = (m + bu + \mu_1, au + \mu_2) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$
- Decrypt**( $s, \mathbf{c}$ ) Decrypt the ciphertext  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1)$  as  $m = [c_0 + c_1 s]_{q_L} \rightarrow m$
- Add**( $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$ ) Output  $\mathbf{c}_3 = \mathbf{c}_1 + \mathbf{c}_2 \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_3$
- Mult**( $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$ ) Output  $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (c_0^1 c_0^2, c_0^1 c_1^2 + c_1^1 c_0^2, c_1^1 c_1^2) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{c}}$
- ReLin**( $\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \gamma$ ) Using the evaluation key  $\gamma$ , relinearize from  $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (c_0, c_1, c_2)$  to  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1) + \lfloor P^{-1} c_2 \gamma \rfloor \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$
- ReScale**( $\mathbf{c}$ ) In order to rescale a ciphertext from level  $l_{old}$  to  $l_{new}$ , multiply by a factor  $\frac{q_{l_{new}}}{q_{l_{old}}} \in \mathbb{Q}$  and round to the nearest element of  $(R/q_{l_{new}} R) \times (R/q_{l_{new}} R)$ :  $\mathbf{c}_{new} = \lfloor \frac{q_{l_{new}}}{q_{l_{old}}} \mathbf{c} \rfloor \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{new}$

(Cheon et al. 2017)

For more details on the probability distributions, refer to the original CKKS paper (Cheon et al. 2017), with the following naming relations:  $\chi_{key} = \mathcal{HWT}(h)$  over  $\{0, \pm 1\}^N$ ,  $\chi_{error} = \mathcal{DG}(\sigma^2)$  over  $\mathbb{Z}^N$  and  $\chi_{enc} = \mathcal{ZO}(0.5)$  another distribution over  $\{0, \pm 1\}^N$ .

It should also be noted that the encoding procedure represents an isometric ring isomorphism between its domain and image, as does the decoding procedure. This reflects in the observation that the plaintext sizes and errors are preserved under the transformations (Cheon et al. 2017).

To summarise the parameters and variables, a brief overview of all used symbols is provided in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Summary of the parameters and symbols in CKKS.

Symbol	Space	Explanation
$\lambda$	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Security parameter
$d$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Index of the cyclotomic polynomial used in $R$
$P$	$\in \mathbb{Z}$	Hmm...
$h$	$\in \mathbb{Z}$	Hamming weight of the secret key (used by $\chi_{key}$ )
$\sigma$	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Standard deviation of the Gaussian $\chi_{error}$
$q_L$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Modulus of $R/q_L R$ at level $L$
$\delta$	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Scaling factor used when encoding
$\delta^{-1}$	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Inversion coefficient of the effect of $\delta$
$s$	$\in \{0, \pm 1\}^N$	Secret Key
$\mathbf{p}$	$\in R/q_L R \times R/q_L R$	Public Key $(b, a)$
$\gamma$	$\in R/(P \cdot q_L)R \times R/(P \cdot q_L)R$	Relinearization Key
$m$	$\in R$	Plaintext Message
$\mathbf{c}$	$\in R/q_L R \times R/q_L R$	Ciphertext Message
$\bar{\mathbf{c}}$	$\in R/q_L R \times R/q_L R \times R/q_L R$	Slightly larger ciphertext from multiplication

Placeholder

### 3.5.1 Theorem (CKKS encryption is homomorphic with respect to addition)

**CKKS.Encrypt** should encrypt in such a way that the addition algebra can be retained even in the transformed space, showing that we can indeed refer to it as **homomorphic** encryption.

*Microsoft SEAL* implements the scheme, enabled using `seal::scheme_type::ckks`.

# Chapter 4

## Implementation

### 4.1 Chosen Software Architecture

In the given setting, the most accessible frontend is commonly a JavaScript web application.

To still make the classification run as quickly and efficiently as possible, a C++ binary runs in the backend providing an HTTP API to the frontend application. In order to allow for more flexibility of the HTTP server, the initial approach was to pipe requests through a dedicated web application framework with database access that would allow, for instance, user management next to the basic classification. However, the resulting communication and computation overhead, even when running with very efficient protocols such as ZeroMQ, was too high.

Extending the accessibility argument to reproducibility, Docker is a very solid choice (Nüst et al. 2020). To run the attached demo project, simply execute

```
1  docker-compose build
2  docker-compose up
```

in the 'code' folder and point your browser to <https://localhost>.

#### 4.1.1 Docker Multi-Stage Build

An enterprise-grade, scalable deployment is achieved by means of zero-dependency Alpine Linux images which contain nothing but compiled binaries and linked libraries.

### 4.2 The MNIST dataset

The MNIST dataset (LeCun and Cortes 1998) contains X train and Y test images with corresponding labels. In order to stick to the traditional feedforward technique with data represented in vector format, therefore it is common to reshape data from (28, 28) images (represented as grayscale values in a matrix) into a 784 element vector.

### 4.3 Matrix-Vector Multiplication

The dot product that is required as part of the neural network evaluation process needs to be implemented on SEAL ciphertexts as well.

There are multiple methods to achieve a syntactically correct dot product (matrix-vector multiplication) as described by [Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan \(2018\)](#) for (square) matrices.

1. **Naïve MatMul** - very simple to derive but impractical in practice due to the limited further applicability of the result consisting of multiple ciphertexts. Applicable to arbitrary matrix dimensions, i.e. matrices  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$ , of course limited by the unreasonably high memory consumption and computation time of this approach.
2. **Diagonal MatMul** - a simple and practical solution applicable to square matrices  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$  that has a major advantage compared to the previous method as the computation yields a single ciphertext object instead of many which can be directly passed on to a following evaluation operation.
3. **Hybrid MatMul** - essentially extending the diagonal method by generalising the definition of the diagonal extraction mechanism to 'wrap around' in order to match the dimensionality of the input vector. Applicable to arbitrary matrix dimensions, i.e. matrices  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$  and favourable compared to the Naïve Method.
4. **Babystep-Giantstep MatMul** - a more sophisticated technique aiming to significantly reduce the number of Galois rotations as they are rather expensive to carry out, with a performance boost especially noticeable for higher matrix dimensions. Without further modification, applicable to square matrices.

For the following, define

$$\text{rot}_j : \mathbb{R}^t \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x})\}_i = x_{i+j} \quad (4.1)$$

$$\text{diag}_j : \mathbb{R}^{t \times t} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{diag}_j(M)\}_i = M_{i,(i+j)} \quad (4.2)$$

with all indices  $i, j \in \mathbb{Z}_t$  member of the cyclic quotient group  $\mathbb{Z}_t := \mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$  of all integers modulo  $t$ , meaning that overflowing indices simply wrap around again starting at index 0 to simplify notation. For the sake of compactness, we stick to this notation for the rest of this section.

### 4.3.1 Adapting to non-square matrices

The weight matrices in the given classification setting are by no means square, on the contrary their output dimension tends to be much lower than the input dimension as the goal is to reduce it from  $28^2 = 784$  to 10 overall.

However, that also means one cannot directly apply the diagonal method as described in the proceedings above. This 'flaw' can be mitigated by a simple zero-padding approach in order to make the matrix square, filling in zeroes until the lower dimension reaches the higher one.

### 4.3.2 The Naïve Method

Placeholder

Figure 4.1: The naïve method to multiply a square matrix with a vector.

Term by term, one can express a matrix-vector product of  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$  and  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^s$  as follows:

$$\{M\mathbf{x}\}_i = \sum_{j=1}^t M_{ij}x_j$$

Accordingly, a natural (or rather, naïve) way to model this multiplication in *Microsoft SEAL* would be to

1. encode each  $i$ -th matrix row  $(M_{i,1}, M_{i,2}, \dots, M_{i,t})$  using the **Encoder** with matching parameters to the ciphertext of the encoded vector  $\mathbf{x}$ .
2. multiply each encoded row with the encrypted vector using **Evaluator.multiply\_plain()** to obtain the ciphertext vector  $\mathbf{y}_i \in \mathbb{R}^s$  for row  $i$ .
3. perform the 'rotate-and-sum' algorithm ([Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan 2018](#)) on each resulting vector (ciphertext)  $\mathbf{y}_i$  to obtain the actual dot product of the matrix row with the vector  $\mathbf{x}$ :
  - (a) using Galois automorphisms, rotate the entries of  $\mathbf{y}_i$  by  $\frac{s}{2}$  elements to obtain  $\text{rot}_{\frac{s}{2}}(\mathbf{y}_i)$ .
  - (b) perform an element-wise sum  $\mathbf{y}_i + \text{rot}_{\frac{s}{2}}(\mathbf{y}_i)$  whose first (and also second) half now contains the sum of the two halves of  $\mathbf{y}_i$ .
  - (c) repeat the previous two steps  $\log_2(s)$  times, halving the split parameter  $s$  each time until one obtains 1 element, which yields us the requested sum of all entries  $\sum_{k=1}^s \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_k$  as the dot product of  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{y}_i$ .
4. Given all the 'scalar' results of each row-vector dot product, we can construct the resulting matrix-vector product.

### 4.3.3 The Diagonal Method

Placeholder

Figure 4.2: The diagonal method to multiply a square matrix with a vector.

#### 4.3.1 Theorem (Diagonal Method)

Given a matrix  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$  and a vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^t$ , the dot product between the two can be expressed as

$$M\mathbf{x} = \sum_{i=0}^t \text{diag}_i(M) \text{rot}_i(\mathbf{x}) \quad (4.3)$$

Placeholder

Figure 4.3: Diagonal Method error development after each rotation of the input vector

### 4.3.4 The Hybrid Method

Placeholder

Figure 4.4: The hybrid method to multiply an arbitrarily sized matrix with a vector.

To further extend the previous matrix multiplication method to solve the problem (cf. [subsection 4.3.1](#)), it is first necessary to extend the definition of the diag operator to non-square matrices  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$ . For the following, extending the above definition:

$$\text{diag}_j : \mathbb{R}^{s \times t} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{diag}_j(M)\}_i = M_{i,(i+j)}$$

To exemplarily describe an implementation of an [HE](#) algorithm, we break down the following matrix multiplication using the method described above.

```

1 void DenseLayer::matmulHybrid(seal::Ciphertext &in_out, const Matrix &mat,
   ↪ seal::GaloisKeys &galois_keys,
2     seal::CKKSEncoder &encoder, seal::Evaluator &evaluator) {
3     size_t in_dim = mat.shape(0);
4     size_t out_dim = mat.shape(1);
5
6     // diagonal method preparation
7     std::vector<seal::Plaintext> diagonals = encodeMatrixDiagonals(mat,
   ↪ encoder);
8
9     // perform the actual multiplication
10    seal::Ciphertext original_input = in_out; // makes a copy
11    seal::Ciphertext sum = in_out; // makes another copy
12    evaluator.multiply_plain_inplace(sum, diagonals[0]);
13    for (auto offset = 1ULL; offset < in_dim; offset++) {
14        seal::Ciphertext tmp;
15        evaluator.rotate_vector(original_input, offset, galois_keys, in_out);
16        evaluator.multiply_plain(in_out, diagonals[offset], tmp);
17        evaluator.add_inplace(sum, tmp);
18    }
19    in_out = sum;
20    evaluator.rescale_to_next_inplace(in_out); // scale down once
21 }
```

### 4.3.5 The Babystep-Giantstep Optimization

Since Galois rotations are the most computationally intensive operations in most cryptographic schemes used today ([Dobraunig et al. 2021](#)), they take a large toll on the efficiency. In order to reduce the number of rotations required, one can make use of the *Babystep-Giantstep* optimization as described in [Halevi and Shoup 2018](#), which works as follows:

#### 4.3.2 Theorem (Babystep-Giantstep Optimization)

Given a matrix  $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$  and a vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^t$ , with  $t = t_1 \cdot t_2$  split into two BSGS parameters  $t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{N}$  and

$$\text{diag}'_p(M) = \text{rot}_{-\lfloor p/t_1 \rfloor \cdot t_1}(\text{diag}_p(M)),$$



one can express a matrix-vector multiplication as follows:

$$M\mathbf{x} = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \text{rot}_{(kt_1)} \left( \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} \text{diag}'_{(kt_1+j)}(M) \cdot \text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x}) \right) \quad (4.4)$$

where  $\cdot$  denotes an element-wise multiplication of two vectors.

A proof of the above theorem can be found in the [Appendix](#).

Note that the optimized matrix-vector multiplication only requires  $t_1 + t_2$  as we can store the  $t_1$  inner rotations of the vector  $x$  for the upcoming evaluations. For larger matrices and vectors (larger  $t$ ),  $t_1 + t_2$  are indeed much smaller than the conventional number of required rotations in the Diagonal or Hybrid method for instance which was the point of this modification in the first place.

## 4.4 Polynomial Evaluation

From the implementation perspective, there are three properties to watch out for when working with SEAL ciphertexts:

1. Scale (retrieved using `x.scale()`)

Scale has nothing to do with noise. "Scale out of bounds" can appear even if noise is extremely low. Although repeated multiplication of a ciphertext by a plaintext will slowly increase the noise, it is not the reason why you see "scale out of bounds". "Scale out of bounds" error specifically means that the scale of a ciphertext or plaintext is larger than the product of all elements in `coeff_modulus`. If you perform multiplications without rescaling, you can quickly see this error. The more rescaling you perform, the less elements will be left in `coeff_modulus`. Even if you managed to have the same scale in a ciphertext after every multiplication and rescale, eventually the `coeff_modulus` can be too small to accommodate another multiplication.

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.rescale_inplace()`

2. Encryption Parameters (retrieved using `x.parms_id()`)

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.mod_switch_to_inplace()`

3. Ciphertext Size (retrieved using `x.size()`)

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.relinearize_inplace()`

**Multiplication** Each time one multiplies two ciphertexts, the scales multiply (logarithmically, they add up, i.e. the bits are added together). The chain index reduces by 1. The chain index of an encoded ciphertext depends on the `coeff_moduli`. There must be enough bits remaining to perform the multiplication, namely  $\log_2(\text{scale})$  bits.

**Addition** The scales must be the same, but luckily they will not change.

## 4.5 Transparent Ciphertext

The problem is that you are subtracting a ciphertext from itself. This kind of operation results in a ciphertext that is identically zero; this is called a transparent ciphertext. Such a transparent ciphertext is not considered to be valid because the ciphertext reveals its underlying plaintext to anyone who sees it, even if they don't have the secret key. By default SEAL throws an exception when such a situation is encountered to protect you from a problem you may not have noticed. If you truly know what you are doing and want to enable the creation of transparent ciphertexts, you can configure SEAL [...]. ([Laine 2020](#))

'transparent ciphertexts (a.k.a. ciphertexts whose second polynomial is zero) are malformed and do not need the secret key to decrypt'

## 4.6 Neural Network

The neural network was trained using the unencrypted standard MNIST dataset of 50,000 images, split into 90 % training and 10 % validation data.

Placeholder

Figure 4.5: First Layer Weights and Biases

Placeholder

Figure 4.6: Second Layer Weights and Biases

# Chapter 5

## Results

In order to visually demonstrate the encryption, visualisations of the ciphertext polynomial  $c_0$  (refer to [section 3.5](#)) were generated using a CRT decomposition of the RNS representation of  $c_0$ . Each pixel corresponds to a coefficient  $a \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$  scaled down by the modulus  $q$  to obtain a brightness value between 0 and 1.

Placeholder

Figure 5.1: Development of the classification accuracy and the mean squared error during training.

Placeholder

Figure 5.2: Confusion Matrix of the trained network.

Placeholder

Figure 5.3: Ciphertext Visualisation

## 5.1 Methodology

## 5.2 Accuracy, Precision, Recall

The network classifies 97.62 % of the 10,000 test images correctly.

For a binary classification, two further metrics of interest are

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{tp}}{\text{tp} + \text{fp}} \quad \text{Recall} = \frac{\text{tp}}{\text{tp} + \text{fn}}$$

with tp ... True Positives, fp ... False Positives, fn ... False Negatives.

Precision (also referred to as PPV, positive predictive value) refers to the ability of the network to classify positive samples correctly, while Recall explains the completeness of the classified samples (i.e. how few true positives have been left out).

Table 5.1: Precision and Recall of the trained network for each digit individually

Digit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<b>Precision</b>	0.978	0.990	0.959	0.960	0.985	0.968	0.977	0.976	0.963	0.978
<b>Recall</b>	0.986	0.989	0.975	0.977	0.975	0.964	0.980	0.964	0.967	0.955

Average Precision: 97.37 %

Average Recall: 97.36 %

## 5.3 Performance Benchmarks

This chapter includes runtime and communication overhead analysis.

The following benchmarks were accumulated on an Intel ®i7-5600U CPU running at 2.6 GHz as the average over 3 individual runs with different test vectors, consistent accross different parameter runs.

Table 5.2: Performance Benchmarks / Communication Overhead

$B_1$  ... Coefficient Moduli start bits (also equal to the last)

$B_2$  ... Coefficient Moduli middle bits

$N$  ... Polynomial Modulus Degree, found in the exponent of  $p(X) = X^N + 1$

$T$  ... Runtime of encryption, classification, decryption

$M$  ... Message Size

MRE ... Mean Max-Relative Error compared to the exact result, i.e.  $\langle \rangle$

SecLevel	MatMul	$B_1$	$B_2$	$N$	$T$ / s	$M$ / MiB	MRE / 1	Mode
none	BSGS	34	25	8192	2.9197	132.72	0.13616	Release
none	Hybrid	34	25	8192	10.6905	132.72	0.01408	Release
none	BSGS	60	40	16384	5.9881	286.50	0.13328	Release
none	Hybrid	60	40	16384	19.2554	286.50	0.00185	Release
tc128	BSGS	34	25	8192	2.8693	132.72	0.13662	Release
tc128	Hybrid	34	25	8192	9.0900	132.72	0.01359	Release
tc128	BSGS	60	40	16384	5.9848	286.50	0.13328	Release
tc128	Hybrid	60	40	16384	19.0962	286.50	0.00185	Release
tc256	BSGS	60	40	32768	13.9787	615.16	0.13328	Release
tc256	Hybrid	60	40	32768	41.8026	615.16	0.00185	Release
tc128	BSGS	34	25	8192	7.2043	132.72	0.13650	Debug
tc128	Hybrid	34	25	8192	13.2971	132.72	0.01369	Debug

TODO: Multi-row table for better overview?

Without any encryption, the neural network classifies the full 10,000 image dataset in 515 ms on the same machine.

# Chapter 6

## Conclusion

Considering the implications of mass surveillance, the importance of privacy-preserving/enhancing technologies should not be forgotten.

### 6.1 Summary

Placeholder

### 6.2 Outlook

### 6.3 Related Works

Gazelle (inferred ML) as described by [Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan 2018](#).

Random Forests (RF) on HE as described by [Huynh 2020](#).

# Acronyms

BFV	Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren	5, 20
BGV	Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan	5, 20
CKKS	Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song	5, 20
DFT	Discrete Fourier Transform	24
FFT	Fast Fourier Transform	24
FHE	Fully Homomorphic Encryption	20
HE	Homomorphic Encryption	5, 6, 11, 20, 32
iff	if and only if	10, 19
LWE	Learning With Errors	13, 14
ML	Machine Learning	17
RLWE	Learning With Errors on Rings	13
TLS	Transport Layer Security	15

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# Appendix

*Proof of Theorem 2.1.1.* With  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  a positive integer, we want to show that

$$\Phi_{2^k}(x) = x^{2^{k-1}} + 1.$$

A polynomial  $p \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$  with

$$p(x) = x^n - a$$

of degree  $n$  has  $n$  roots

$$\{x_j\} = \{a^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} \mid j \in \mathbb{N}, j \leq n\}$$

related by a factor  $a^{\frac{1}{n}}$  to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  roots of unity given by powers of  $\xi = e^{2\pi i \frac{1}{n}}$ .

It is clear from the fundamental theorem of algebra that the polynomial  $p$  with roots  $\{x_j\}$  can be factorised as

$$p(x) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - x_j) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - a^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}}).$$

Fixing  $a = -1$ , we obtain  $p(x) = x^n + 1$  with roots given by

$$x_j = (-1)^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} = (e^{i\pi})^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} = e^{\frac{i\pi(2j+1)}{n}}$$

and according factorisation

$$p(x) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}(2j+1)}).$$

Further letting  $n = 2^{k-1}$  and observing that

$$\gcd(2^k, l) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } l \text{ odd} \\ 2 & \text{if } l \text{ even} \end{cases} \quad l, k \in \mathbb{N}$$

since a number  $2^k$  that can only be decomposed into multiples of 2 never shares a factor with an odd number, in accordance with Lemma 2.1.2 we can conclude that the set of all odd roots of unity is exactly the set of all primitive roots (satisfying  $\gcd(2^k, l) = 1$ ).

Following from above,

$$p(x) = \prod_{j=1}^{2^{k-1}} (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}(2j+1)}) = \prod_{\substack{l=1 \\ l \text{ odd}}}^{2^k} (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}l}) = \prod_{\substack{l=1 \\ \xi^l \text{ primitive}}}^{2^k} (x - \xi^l) = \Phi_{2^k}(x)$$

we arrive exactly at the definition of a cyclotomic polynomial (Definition 2.1.5).  
(ProofWiki 2020)

□

*Proof.* Proof of [Theorem 4.3.2](#) Starting from the adapted matrix-multiplication expression  $P = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_t)^T \in \mathbb{R}^t$ , we want to show that we indeed end up with an authentic matrix-vector product.

$$P = \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \text{rot}_{(kt_1)} \left( \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} \text{diag}'_{(kt_1+j)}(M) \cdot \text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x}) \right) \right\}_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} x_{(i+kt_1)+j}$$

with

$$m'_{p,i} = \left\{ \text{diag}'_p(M) \right\}_i = \left\{ \text{rot}_{-\lfloor p/t_1 \rfloor \cdot t_1}(\text{diag}_p(M)) \right\}_i = M_{i - \lfloor \frac{p}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - \lfloor \frac{p}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + p}$$

and therefore

$$\begin{aligned} m'_{kt_1+j,i} &= M_{i - \lfloor \frac{kt_1+j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - \lfloor \frac{kt_1+j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + kt_1 + j} \\ &= M_{i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + kt_1 + j} \\ &= M_{i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \\ m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} &= M_{i+kt_1 - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i+kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \\ &= M_{i - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i+kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \end{aligned}$$

leading to

$$P_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} x_{(i+kt_1)+j} = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i+kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} x_{(i+kt_1)+j}$$

. Noticing that the downward rounded fraction  $\lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor$  vanishes in a sum with  $j$  running from 0 to  $t_1 - 1$ , we can simplify to

$$P_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i, i+kt_1+j} x_{i+kt_1+j}$$

which contains two sums running to  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  respectively, containing an expression of the form  $k \cdot t_1 + j$ , which allows us to condense the nested sums into one single summation expression, as

$$\sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} f(kt_1 + j) = \sum_{l=0}^{t-1} f(l)$$

indeed catches every single value  $l \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, t = t_1 \cdot t_2\}$  with  $l = kt_1 + j$ .

In summary, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} P_i &= \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i, i+kt_1+j} x_{i+kt_1+j} \\ &= \sum_{l=0}^{t-1} M_{i, i+l} x_{i+l} = \sum_{\nu=0}^{t-1} M_{i, \nu} x_{\nu} \\ &= \{M\mathbf{x}\}_i \end{aligned}$$

which indeed equals the conventional definition of a matrix-vector product.  $\square$