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Secure Classification as a Service

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Abstract

Abstract of your thesis (at most one page)

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Goal:

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Basics of Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Homomorphic Encryption (HE) makes it possible to operate on data without knowing it. One can distinguish three flavors of it, Partial-, Somewhat- and **Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)**.

For **FHE**, there exist a few schemes in use today with existing implementations.

- Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme for integer arithmetic (Fan and Vercauteren 2012, Brakerski 2012).
- Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme for integer arithmetic (Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan 2012).
- Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme for real-number arithmetic (Cheon et al. 2017).
- Ducas-Micciancio (FHEW) and Chillotti-Gama-Georgieva-Izabachene (TFHE) schemes for Boolean circuit evaluation (Chillotti et al. 2019).

We will first introduce the BFV scheme (integer arithmetic) as it represents a fundamental building block behind CKKS. Due to the inherent applications, this thesis will focus on the CKKS scheme to perform homomorphic operations on (complex-valued) floating point numbers and vectors.

2.1.1 Mathematical Foundation

The following discussion of the homomorphic encryption schemes requires some mathematical background that will (at least partially) be introduced here.

Let \mathbb{N} denote the natural numbers without 0, i.e. $\mathbb{N} = \{n \in \mathbb{Z} | n > 0\}$. For a probability distribution χ over a set R , let sampling a value $x \in R$ from the probability distribution be denoted by $x \leftarrow \chi$. For $a \in \mathbb{R}$ a real number, denote rounding down (floor) a by $\lfloor a \rfloor \in \mathbb{Z}$, rounding up (ceil) by $\lceil a \rceil \in \mathbb{Z}$ and rounding to the nearest integer by $\lfloor a \rceil \in \mathbb{Z}$.

2.1.1 Definition (Ring)

A tuple $(R, +, \cdot)$ consisting of a set R , an addition operation $+$ and a multiplication operation \cdot is referred to as a ring, given that it satisfies the following *ring axioms*:

- Addition is closed: $a + b \in R \quad \forall a, b \in R$.
- Addition is commutative: $a + b = b + a \quad \forall a, b \in R$.
- Addition is associative: $(a + b) + c = a + (b + c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$.
- There exists an element $0 \in R$ such that $a + 0 = a \quad \forall a \in R$.
- An additive inverse $-a$ of each element a in R exists, such that $a + (-a) = 0$.
- Multiplication is associative: $(a \cdot b) \cdot c = a \cdot (b \cdot c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$.
- Multiplication is closed: $a \cdot b \in R \quad \forall a, b \in R$.
- There exists an element $1 \in R$, referred to as the identity element, or multiplicative identity of R , such that $a \cdot 1 = a \quad \forall a \in R$.
- Multiplication \cdot is distributive w.r.t. addition $+$,
i.e. $a \cdot (b + c) = (a \cdot b) + (a \cdot c) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$ from the left and
i.e. $(b + c) \cdot a = (b \cdot a) + (c \cdot a) \quad \forall a, b, c \in R$ from the right.

Where the first 5 properties can be summarised as $(R, +)$ forming an Abelian group. If multiplication is additionally commutative, we refer to the ring as commutative:

- Multiplication is commutative: $a \cdot b = b \cdot a \quad \forall a, b \in R$.

Acting as a logical extension of a group, a ring can be considered the intermediary step towards a field (which also defines subtraction and division). An example of a ring would be the integers modulo t : $\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$, sometimes also denoted as \mathbb{Z}_t .

2.1.2 Definition (Quotient Group / Ring)

A quotient group $(G/N, +)$ (pronounced ' $G \bmod N$ ') over the original group G and a normal subgroup N of G with a standard element operation $+$ can be defined using the left cosets

$$gN := \{gn \mid n \in N\} \subseteq G$$

of N in G . The corresponding set G/N is defined as

$$G/N := \{gN \mid g \in G\}$$

whereas the standard operation $+$: $G/N \times G/N \mapsto G/N$ can be extended from the original group G as follows:

$$(gN) + (hN) := (gh)N$$

2.1.3 Definition (Ring of Integers Modulo t : $\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$)

Using equivalence classes \bar{x}_t modulo t referred to as congruence classes, define the commutative quotient ring of integers modulo t as $(\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)$ with two operations $+$ and \cdot and

$$\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z} = \{\bar{x}_t \mid x \in \mathbb{Z}, 0 \leq x < t\}$$

where $t\mathbb{Z} \triangleleft \mathbb{Z}$ denotes the t^{th} coset^a of the integers and

$$\bar{x}_t = \{y \equiv x \pmod{t} \mid y \in \mathbb{Z}\}$$

is the set of all multiples of t with remainder x . Note that many operations that resulting groups, rings or fields are commonly equipped with, such as addition or multiplication, propagate to an equivalent definition in the ring of integers modulo t by considering their result as a congruence class instead of it, which in turn is an element of $\mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$.

^afrom the left and from the right, therefore $t\mathbb{Z}$ is called a normal subgroup of \mathbb{Z}

2.1.4 Definition (Polynomial Ring over \mathbb{Z})

On the set of all complex-valued polynomials with integer coefficients (a function space)

$$\mathbb{Z}[X] = \left\{ p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(X) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} a_k X^k, a_k \in \mathbb{Z} \forall k \geq 0 \right\},$$

we can define a commutative ring $(\mathbb{Z}[X], +, \cdot)$ equipped with the standard addition $+$ and multiplication \cdot operations (as an extension over the field \mathbb{C}) of polynomials.

To further elaborate on the polynomial ring operations:

- In their coefficient representations $(\mathbf{p})_i = p_0, p_1, p_2, \dots$ (which are sequences) and $\mathbf{q} = \{q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots\}$, an addition of two polynomials $p, q \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ is equivalent to the addition of their coefficients

$$\begin{aligned} (p + q)(X) &= \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k X^k + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} q_k X^k = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (p_k + q_k) X^k \\ &= \langle (\mathbf{p} + \mathbf{q}), \{X^0, X^1, X^2, \dots\}^T \rangle \end{aligned}$$

which indeed satisfies the additive **ring axioms** due to the existing structure of the underlying field \mathbb{C} .

- The multiplication operation can be defined using a discrete convolution of the coefficient vectors

$$r(X) = (p \cdot q)(X) = \left(\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k X^k \right) \cdot \left(\sum_{l=0}^{\infty} q_l X^l \right) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} p_k q_l X^{k+l} = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} r_k X^k$$

with the arising coefficients $\{r_k\}$ determined by the discrete convolution

$$r_k = \sum_{l=0}^k p_l q_{k-l} \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{p} * \mathbf{q}$$

in this context also referred to as the CAUCHY-product. Therefore,

$$(p \cdot q)(X) = \langle (\mathbf{p} * \mathbf{q}), \{X^0, X^1, X^2, \dots\}^T \rangle.$$

Again, this generally applicable approach satisfies the multiplicative **ring axioms** and even satisfies commutativity due to the existing structure of the underlying field \mathbb{C} and the symmetry of convolutions.

Where $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ denotes the dot (scalar) product between two vectors.

2.1.5 Definition (Irreducible Polynomials)

A polynomial is called irreducible **iff** it cannot be written as a product of other polynomials *while staying in the same coefficient space*.

Polynomials with degree ≥ 1 over the complex numbers can always be factorised using their roots due to the fundamental theorem of algebra.

2.1.2 Cyclotomic Polynomials

Due to their interesting structure and efficient computability, in the following schemes, polynomials modulo an irreducible form (Corollary 2.1.1) are chosen as representations of plaintexts and ciphertexts. An important concept is that of cyclotomic ('circle-cutting') polynomials, which we will discuss in a bit more detail here.

An important polynomial is

$$p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(x) = x^n - 1$$

. Its roots, found by solving $p(x) = 0$ for x , yielding $x^n = 1 \leftrightarrow x_k = \sqrt[n]{1}$ are referred to as the n^{th} roots of unity, of which there are multiple for each n .

2.1.1 Lemma (The n^{th} roots of unity)

For some integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$, the n complex roots $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \mathbb{C}$ of unity can be found as

$$x_k = e^{2\pi i \frac{k}{n}} \quad k \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$$

with i the imaginary unit. Using EULER's identity, their real and imaginary components can be explicitly found as $x_k = \cos\left(2\pi \frac{k}{n}\right) + i \sin\left(2\pi \frac{k}{n}\right)$.

An n^{th} root of unity y is referred to as *primitive*, iff there exists no $m < n$ for which that root y is also an m^{th} root of unity, i.e. $y^m \neq 1$. An equivalent indicator is when $\gcd(m, n) = 1$.

Due to the fact that for any $k, l \in \mathbb{Z}$, their product $x_k \cdot x_l$ is also a root of unity, and $x_{k+jn} = x_k \forall j \in \mathbb{Z}$, they clearly comprise a cyclic Abelian group over the complex numbers \mathbb{C} under multiplication with (for instance) the first root $x_1 = e^{2\pi i \frac{1}{n}}$ as its generator.

2.1.6 Definition (Cyclotomic Polynomial)

Given the n^{th} roots of unity $\{x_k\}$, we can define the n^{th} cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_n \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ as the product over all primitive roots of unity

$$\Phi_n(x) = \prod_{\substack{k=1 \\ x_k \text{ primitive}}}^n (x - x_k)$$

It is unique for each given $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

The number of primitive roots of unity is given by $\varphi(n)$, denoting Euler's totient function which counts the natural numbers m less than n who do not share a common divisor $\neq 1$, i.e. $\gcd(m, n) = 1$. $\varphi(n)$ therefore also counts the number of primitive roots of unity for n , consequently also yielding the degree of the n^{th} cyclotomic polynomial.

2.1.1 Theorem (2^k th cyclotomic polynomial)

The n^{th} cyclotomic polynomial, where $n = 2^k$ ($k \in \mathbb{N}$) is a power of 2, can be identified as

$$\Phi_n(x) = x^{n/2} + 1.$$

Its degree is $n/2$, consistent with $\varphi(2^k) = 2^{k-1} \forall k \in \mathbb{N}$.

Find a short but illustrative proof of [Theorem 2.1.1](#) in the [Appendix](#).

2.1.1 Corollary (Polynomials Modulo an Irreducible Form)

One can construct the interesting quotient ring

$$\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$$

where $(X^N + 1)$ denotes the set of all polynomial multiples of the polynomial $p \in \mathbb{Z}[X], p(x) = x^n + 1$, so

$$(X^N + 1) = \{q : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, q(x) = r(x) \cdot (x^n + 1) \mid r \in \mathbb{Z}[X]\}$$

The elements of R are n polynomials with integer coefficients of degree $N - 1$.

2.1.2 Corollary (Polynomial Ring modulo q)

Further modifying $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$ to only take coefficients mod q , we obtain two equivalent definitions for the same ring:

$$R/qR = (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[X]/(X^N + 1) = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$$

which contains polynomials with integer coefficients modulo q of degree $N - 1$. Explicitly stated, the set can be written as:

$$R/qR = \{p : \mathbb{C} \mapsto \mathbb{C}, p(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} a_k x^k \mid a_k \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}\}$$

2.1.1 Remark (Irreducibility of Cyclotomic Polynomials)

Cyclotomic polynomials are always irreducible.

The proof for the above statement is quite cumbersome, but can be found in [Serge 2002](#).

2.1.3 HE using RSA

In order to illustrate the basic idea behind [HE](#), without distancing ourselves too far from the original goal of introducing basic [HE](#) operations used in practice, this short section aims to motivate the definition of ring homomorphisms (cf. [Definition 2.1.7](#)) behind a cryptographic background.

With unpadding RSA, some arithmetic can be performed on the ciphertext - looking at the encrypted ciphertext $\mathcal{E}(m_1) = (m_1)^r \bmod n$ of the message m_1 and m_2 respectively, the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(m_1) \cdot \mathcal{E}(m_2) &\equiv (m_1)^r (m_2)^r \bmod n \\ &\equiv (m_1 m_2)^r \bmod n \\ &\equiv \mathcal{E}(m_1 \cdot m_2) \end{aligned}$$

The encryption therefore partially fulfills the properties of a ring homomorphism, which in general terms is defined as follows:

2.1.7 Definition (Ring Homomorphism)

Given two rings $(R, +, \cdot)$ and (S, \oplus, \otimes) , we call a mapping $\varphi : R \rightarrow S$ a ring homomorphism when it satisfies the following conditions:

$$\forall a, b \in R : \varphi(a + b) = \varphi(a) \oplus \varphi(b) \wedge \varphi(a \cdot b) = \varphi(a) \otimes \varphi(b)$$

2.1.4 Lattice Cryptography**2.1.5 Learning with Errors (LWE)**

Next, we would like to consider **Learning With Errors (LWE)**, a computing problem that is believed to be sufficiently hard to be used in cryptography and, most notably, is not yet solvable in linear time by a quantum algorithm (c.f. [section 2.3](#)). Its hardness assumptions were first formally proven by Regev, for which he received the 2018 Gödel price.

2.1.8 Definition (LWE-Distribution $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$)

Given a prime $p \in \mathbb{N}$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we choose some secret $\mathbf{s} \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n$. In order to sample a value from the LWE distribution $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$:

- Draw a random vector $\mathbf{a} \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n$ from the multivariate uniform distribution with its domain in the integers up to p .
- Given another probability distribution χ_{error} over the integers modulo p , sample a scalar 'error term' $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ from it.
- Set $b = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{a} + \mu$, with \cdot denoting the standard vector product.
- Output the pair $(\mathbf{a}, b) \in (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n \times (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$.

The general approach useful to cryptography is to sample an element from the LWE-distribution and construct two problems out of it, *search*-LWE and *decision*-LWE.

2.1.9 Definition (LWE-Problem - Search Version)

Given m independent samples $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$ from $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$, find the secret \mathbf{s} .

2.1.10 Definition (LWE-Problem - Decision Version)

Given m samples $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$, distinguish (with non-negligible advantage) whether they were drawn from $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi_{\text{error}}}$ or from the uniform distribution u over $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^n \times (\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})$.

In their above definitions, Regev showed that the two problems are equivalent.

To illustrate the connection of these problems to lattices, we take a closer look at them before considering further details of LWE. Most notably, lattice problems are conjectured to be secure against quantum computers ([Corrigan-Gibbs, S. Kim and Wu 2018](#)).

2.1.11 Definition (Lattice)

A lattice $(\mathcal{L}, +, \cdot)$ is a vector field over the integers $(\mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)$, defined using a set of n basis vectors $\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n \in \mathbb{R}^n$, that can be introduced as a set

$$\mathcal{L} = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^m c_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid c_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$$

equipped with at least vector addition $+: \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathcal{L}$ and scalar multiplication $\cdot: \mathbb{Z} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathcal{L}$. As an extension of \mathbb{R}^n , the Euclidean norm $\|\cdot\|$ is also defined and the standard Euclidean metric $d: \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{L} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, yielding a metric space (\mathcal{L}, d) , can be obtained by the norm of a vector difference, denoted $\|(\cdot) - (\cdot)\|$.

Its *minimum distance* λ_{\min} is defined as the smallest Euclidean distance between two points \mathbf{p}_1 and $\mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}$

$$\lambda_{\min} = \min_{\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}} d(\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2) = \min_{\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2 \in \mathcal{L}} \|\mathbf{p}_1 - \mathbf{p}_2\|,$$

which can be equivalently thought of as the minimal length of any non-zero vector in the lattice \mathcal{L} , because of $\mathbf{0}$ always being an element of the lattice which can be chosen as \mathbf{p}_1 and the translational symmetry between fundamental lattice volumes (or regions).

2.1.12 Definition (Shortest Vector Problem (SVP))

Given a lattice \mathcal{L} constructed from n basis vectors, find the shortest non-zero lattice vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{L} \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, i.e. find \mathbf{x} such that $\|\mathbf{x}\| = \lambda_{\min}$ (Peikert 2016).

2.1.13 Definition (Decisional Approximate SVP (GapSVP))

Given a lattice \mathcal{L} and some pre-defined function $\gamma: \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ depending on the lattice dimension n (constant for a given \mathcal{L}) with $\gamma(n) \geq 1$, the decisional approximate shortest vector problem is distinguishing between $\lambda_{\min} \leq 1$ and $\lambda_{\min} > \gamma(n)$. For other cases, it is up to the algorithm what to return.

2.1.14 Definition (Short Integer Solution (SIS) Problem)

For m given vectors $(\mathbf{a}_i)_{0 < i \leq m} \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^n$ that comprise the columns of a matrix $A \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^{n \times n}$ and an upper bound β , find a solution vector $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that

$$A\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \quad \text{with} \quad \|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \beta.$$

Note that without the last requirement, the SIS problem can be easily solved through Gaussian elimination or similar algorithms, however they rarely yield a short (or *the* shortest) solution. It can be shown that solving SIS is at least as hard as solving GapSVP with appropriate parameters (Ajtai 1996).

Using the above problems, multiple cryptographic primitives can be constructed due to the proven hardness that also propagates to quantum computers. Examples include collision resistant hash functions, signatures, pseudorandom functions or even Regev's public-key cryptosystem (Peikert 2016).




Figure 2.1: Illustration of a standard lattice \mathcal{L} over the integers \mathbb{Z} with two basis vectors \mathbf{b}_1 and \mathbf{b}_2 , c.f. [Definition 2.1.11](#). The shortest vector problem in this case is solved by $\mathbf{x} = 0\mathbf{b}_1 \pm 1\mathbf{b}_2$.

2.1.2 Theorem (Hardness of LWE)

If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves either search-LWE or decision-LWE then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decision version of the shortest vector problem (GapSVP) in the worst case ([Regev 2010](#)).

He also provided a construction of a public-key cryptosystem based on them, i.e. an asymmetric cryptographic system for at least two parties that includes a public and corresponding private key.

Public-key cryptosystems are fundamentally different from symmetric systems, which only require one single key for encryption and decryption at the same time, known by all involved parties. Often times, public-key schemes (rather slow) are used to exchange keys for subsequent symmetric encryption (rather fast) of large plaintexts, for instance in the [Transport Layer Security \(TLS\)](#) protocol ([Rescorla 2018](#)).

2.1.6 Ring-LWE

[Learning With Errors on Rings \(RLWE\)](#) [Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev 2010](#)

Similar to [Definition 2.1.8](#), the Ring-LWE distribution can be derived as follows:

2.1.3 Corollary (RLWE-Distribution $B_{s, \chi_{\text{error}}}$)

Given a quotient ring $(R/qR, +, \cdot)$, we choose some secret $s \in R/qR$. In order to sample a value from the RLWE distribution $B_{s, \chi_{\text{error}}}$:

- Uniformly randomly draw an element $a \in R/qR$
- Given another probability distribution χ_{error} over the ring elements, sample an 'error term' $\mu \in R/qR$ from it.

- Set $b = s \cdot a + \mu$, with \cdot denoting the ring multiplication operation.
- Output the pair $(a, b) \in R/qR \times R/qR$.

In the exact same manner as [above](#), the search and decision problems can be constructed.

2.1.4 Corollary (RLWE-Search Problem)

Given m independent samples $(a_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$ from $B_{s, \chi_{\text{error}}}$, find the secret s .

2.1.5 Corollary (RLWE-Decision Problem)

Given m samples $(a_i, b_i)_{0 \leq i \leq m}$, distinguish (with non-negligible advantage) whether they were drawn from $B_{s, \chi_{\text{error}}}$ or from the uniform distribution u over $R/qR \times R/qR$.

2.1.7 Gentry's FHE-Scheme and BGV

[Gentry 2009](#)

2.1.8 The BFV scheme

Fan and Vercauteren 2012 Brakerski 2012 BFV is based on BGV and they are very similar in the core ideas, one can even convert a BFV ciphertext to an equivalent BGV ciphertext (A. Kim, Polyakov and Zucca 2021).

In this section, we will focus on a slightly altered implementation introduced in Lepoint and Naehrig 2014.

2.1.15 Definition (The BFV-Scheme)

Let $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\Phi_d(X)$ be a ring with $\Phi_d(X)$ the d^{th} cyclotomic polynomial ($\rightarrow d \in \mathbb{N}$) for ciphertexts $c \in R \times R$. Introduce R/qR the associated quotient ring of the q^{th} coset of R with the modulus $q \in \mathbb{N}$. Further let $t \in \mathbb{N}$ denote the message modulus with $1 < t < q$ for plain messages $m \in R/tR$ and define $\delta = \lfloor \frac{q}{t} \rfloor$, $\delta^{-1} = \frac{t}{q}$.

Introduce two bounded discrete probability distributions χ_{key} and χ_{error} over R/qR , one which is only used once for key generation and another (usually Gaussian-like) error distribution for the LWE-problem.

For a polynomial $a \in R/qR$, consider the decomposition $a = \sum_{i=0}^{l-1} a_i w^i$ into base $w \in \mathbb{N}$ obtained by $\text{WordDecomp} : R \mapsto R^l$, $\text{WordDecomp}(a) = ([a_i]_w)_{i=0}^{l-1}$.

Further let $\text{PowersOf} : R \mapsto R^l$ be defined as $\text{PowersOf}(a) = ([aw^i]_q)_{i=0}^{l-1}$.

Let the parameters $\mathbb{P} = (d, q, t, \chi_{key}, \chi_{error}, w)$ and $l = \lfloor \log_w(q) \rfloor + 1$.


- ParamGen**(λ) Choose parameters as defined above, given the security parameter λ , such that $1 < t < q$, $w \geq 2$, initialize distributions χ_{key} and $\chi_{error} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$
- KeyGen**(\mathbb{P}) Generate the secret key $s \leftarrow \chi_{key}$, sample $\mu \in (R/qR)^l$ from χ_{error} and choose some $\mathbf{a} \in (R/qR)^l$ uniformly at random, compute the relinearization key $\gamma = (\text{PowersOf}(s^2) - (\mu + \mathbf{a} \cdot s), \mathbf{a})$ and finally output the public key for uniformly random $a \in (R/qR)$ and $\mu \leftarrow \chi_{error}$ with $b = -(a \cdot s + \mu)$ as $\mathbf{p} = (b, a) \rightarrow \mathbf{p}, s, \gamma$
- Encrypt**(\mathbf{p}, m) Let $(b, a) = \mathbf{p}$, $u \leftarrow \chi_{key}$, $\mu_1, \mu_2 \leftarrow \chi_{error}$, then the ciphertext is $\mathbf{c} = (\delta m + bu + \mu_1, au + \mu_2) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$
- Add**($\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$) Let $(c_0^1, c_1^1) = \mathbf{c}_1$ and $(c_0^2, c_1^2) = \mathbf{c}_2$ then $\mathbf{c}_3 = (c_0^1 + c_0^2, c_1^1 + c_1^2) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_3$
- Mult**($\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2$) Output $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (\lfloor \delta^{-1} c_0^1 c_0^2 \rfloor, \lfloor \delta^{-1} (c_0^1 c_1^2 + c_1^1 c_0^2) \rfloor, \lfloor \delta^{-1} c_1^1 c_1^2 \rfloor) \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{c}}$
- Relin**($\bar{\mathbf{c}}, \gamma$) Using the relin key $\gamma = (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{a})$, relinearize from $\bar{\mathbf{c}} = (c_0, c_1, c_2)$ as $\mathbf{c} = (c_0 + \text{WordDecomp}(c_2) \cdot \mathbf{b}, c_1 + \text{WordDecomp}(c_2) \cdot \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}$
- Decrypt**(s, \mathbf{c}) And finally, decrypt $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1)$ as $m = \lfloor \delta^{-1} [c_0 + c_1 s]_q \rfloor \in R/tR \rightarrow m$

(Fan and Vercauteren 2012; Brakerski 2012)

To summarise the parameters and variables, a brief overview of all used symbols is provided in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Summary of the parameters and symbols in BFV.

Symbol	Space	Explanation
λ	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Security parameter
d	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Index of the cyclotomic polynomial over R
q	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Modulus of the ciphertext space R/qR
t	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Modulus of the plaintext message space R/tR
δ	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Ratio between ciphertext and plaintext modulus
δ^{-1}	$\in \mathbb{R}$	Inversion coefficient of the effect of δ
w	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Word size used as basis, e.g. $w = 2$ for bits
l	$\in \mathbb{N}$	Number of words of size w required to encode q
s	$\in R$	Secret Key
\mathbf{p}	$\in R/qR \times R/qR$	Public Key (b, a)
γ	$\in (R/qR)^l \times (R/qR)^l$	Relinearization Key
m	$\in R/tR$	Plaintext Message
\mathbf{c}	$\in R \times R$	Ciphertext
$\bar{\mathbf{c}}$	$\in R \times R \times R$	Slightly larger ciphertext resulting from multiplication

Figure 2.2: Overview of BFV, adapted from [Huynh 2020](#).

2.1.3 Theorem (BFV encryption is homomorphic with respect to addition)

BFV.Encrypt should encrypt in such a way that the addition algebra can be retained even in the transformed space, showing that we can indeed refer to it as homomorphic encryption.

2.1.9 The CKKS scheme

The CKKS scheme allows us to perform approximate arithmetic on floating point numbers. Essentially, the idea is to extend BFV which allows us to operate on vectors $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_t^n$, by an embedding approach that allows us to encode a (complex) floating point number vector

$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n(\mathbb{C}^n)$ as an integer vector. A naïve approach would be to use a fixed-point embedding:

$$\text{embed}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x} \cdot F$$

with $F \in \mathbb{Z}$. In decimal form, for instance with $F = 1000$, we could effectively encode three decimal places of the original vector \mathbf{x} .




Figure 2.3: Overview of CKKS, adapted from [Huynh 2020](#).

2.1.4 Theorem (CKKS encryption is homomorphic with respect to addition)

CKKS.Encrypt should encrypt in such a way that the addition algebra can be retained even in the transformed space, showing that we can indeed refer to it as homomorphic encryption.

Microsoft SEAL implements the scheme, enabled using `seal::scheme_type::ckks`.

2.2 Machine Learning

Undoubtedly one of the most prevalent concepts in today's computing world, [Machine Learning \(ML\)](#) has shaped how computers think and how we interact with them significantly. As Shafi GOLDWASSER puts it, 'Machine Learning is somewhere in the intersection of Artificial Intelligence, Statistics and Theoretical Computer Science' ([Goldwasser 2018](#)).

Within the scope of this thesis, the basics of neural networks and associated learning methods shall be covered, limited to the category of supervised learning problems (as opposed to unsupervised learning problems). Supervised learning refers to the machine *training* an algorithm to match some input data (features) with corresponding output data (targets), often related to pattern recognition. The trained algorithm can then be utilised to match fresh input data with a prediction of the targets.

A popular subset of applications to [ML](#) are classification problems, predominantly image classification, which was not as easily possible before without a human eye due to the lack of computing power. Classification problems can be formulated quickly, the goal is to computationally categorize input data (for instance, images) into a predefined set of classes (for instance, cats and dogs). The primary concept behind [Machine Learning](#) is not at all new, linear regression was already employed by GAUSS and LEGENDRE in the early 19th century; the term 'Neural Network' was first used by MCCULLOCH and PITTS in 1943. Much media attention was earned in the 2000-2010 decade when larger image classification problems became feasible with the increasing computational power of modern computers, up until the advent of Deep Learning ([Bishop and Nasrabadi 2007](#)).

2.2.1 Linear Regression

Given an input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the goal of linear regression is to predict the value of a target $t \in \mathbb{R}$, according to some model M .

2.2.2 Gradient Descent

2.2.3 Multi-Layered Neural Networks

2.2.1 Theorem (Universal Approximation)

If the neural network has at least one hidden layer, proper nonlinear activation functions and enough data and hidden units, it can approximate any continuous function $y(x, w) : \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ arbitrarily well on a compact domain ([Hornik, Stinchcombe and White 1989](#)).

Matrix -> Activation Function

- Matrix Multiplication (Dense Layer)
- Convolutional Layer
- Sigmoid Activation
- Max Pooling

2.2.4 The Backpropagation Algorithm

2.3 Post-Quantum Security

2.3.1 Shor's Algorithm




Figure 2.4: Comparison of the Relu activation function vs. its Taylor expansion

Chapter 3

Homomorphic Encryption

Chapter 4

Implementation

4.1 Chosen Software Architecture

In the given setting, the most accessible frontend is commonly a JavaScript web application.

To still make the classification run as quickly and efficiently as possible, a C++ binary runs in the backend providing an HTTP API to the frontend application. In order to allow for more flexibility of the HTTP server, the initial approach was to pipe requests through a dedicated web application framework with database access that would allow, for instance, user management next to the basic classification. However, the resulting communication and computation overhead, even when running with very efficient protocols such as ZeroMQ, was too high.

Extending the accessibility argument to reproducibility, Docker is a very solid choice (Nüst et al. 2020). To run the attached demo project, simply execute

```
1  docker-compose build
2  docker-compose up
```

in the 'code' folder and point your browser to <https://localhost>.

4.1.1 Docker Multi-Stage Build

An enterprise-grade, scalable deployment is achieved by means of zero-dependency Alpine Linux images which contain nothing but compiled binaries and linked libraries.

4.2 The MNIST dataset

The MNIST dataset (LeCun and Cortes 1998) contains X train and Y test images with corresponding labels. In order to stick to the traditional feedforward technique with data represented in vector format, therefore it is common to reshape data from (28, 28) images (represented as grayscale values in a matrix) into a 784 element vector.

4.3 Matrix-Vector Multiplication

The dot product that is required as part of the neural network evaluation process needs to be implemented on SEAL ciphertexts as well.

There are multiple methods to achieve a syntactically correct dot product (matrix-vector multiplication) as described by [Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan \(2018\)](#) for (square) matrices.

1. **Naïve MatMul** - very simple to derive but impractical in practice due to the limited further applicability of the result consisting of multiple ciphertexts. Applicable to arbitrary matrix dimensions, i.e. matrices $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$, of course limited by the unreasonably high memory consumption and computation time of this approach.
2. **Diagonal MatMul** - a simple and practical solution applicable to square matrices $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$ that has a major advantage compared to the previous method as the computation yields a single ciphertext object instead of many which can be directly passed on to a following evaluation operation.
3. **Hybrid MatMul** - essentially extending the diagonal method by generalising the definition of the diagonal extraction mechanism to 'wrap around' in order to match the dimensionality of the input vector. Applicable to arbitrary matrix dimensions, i.e. matrices $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$ and favourable compared to the Naïve Method.
4. **Babystep-Giantstep MatMul** - a more sophisticated technique aiming to significantly reduce the number of Galois rotations as they are rather expensive to carry out, with a performance boost especially noticeable for higher matrix dimensions. Without further modification, applicable to square matrices.

For the following, define

$$\text{rot}_j : \mathbb{R}^t \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x})\}_i = x_{i+j} \quad (4.1)$$

$$\text{diag}_j : \mathbb{R}^{t \times t} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{diag}_j(M)\}_i = M_{i,(i+j)} \quad (4.2)$$

with all indices $i, j \in \mathbb{Z}_t$ member of the cyclic quotient group $\mathbb{Z}_t := \mathbb{Z}/t\mathbb{Z}$ of all integers modulo t , meaning that overflowing indices simply wrap around again starting at index 0 to simplify notation. For the sake of compactness, we stick to this notation for the rest of this section.

4.3.1 Adapting to non-square matrices

The weight matrices in the given classification setting are by no means square, on the contrary their output dimension tends to be much lower than the input dimension as the goal is to reduce it from $28^2 = 784$ to 10 overall.

However, that also means one cannot directly apply the diagonal method as described in the proceedings above. This 'flaw' can be mitigated by a simple zero-padding approach in order to make the matrix square, filling in zeroes until the lower dimension reaches the higher one.

4.3.2 The Naïve Method

Term by term, one can express a matrix-vector product of $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$ and $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^s$ as follows:

$$\{M\mathbf{x}\}_i = \sum_{j=1}^t M_{ij}x_j$$

Accordingly, a natural (or rather, naïve) way to model this multiplication in *Microsoft SEAL* would be to




Figure 4.1: Different techniques to compute a dot product between a matrix and a vector, each having their up- and downsides.

1. encode each i -th matrix row $(M_{i,1}, M_{i,2}, \dots, M_{i,t})$ using the **Encoder** with matching parameters to the ciphertext of the encoded vector \mathbf{x} .
2. multiply each encoded row with the encrypted vector using `Evaluator.multiply_plain()` to obtain the ciphertext vector $\mathbf{y}_i \in \mathbb{R}^s$ for row i .
3. perform the 'rotate-and-sum' algorithm (Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan 2018) on each resulting vector (ciphertext) \mathbf{y}_i to obtain the actual dot product of the matrix row with the vector \mathbf{x} :
 - (a) using Galois automorphisms, rotate the entries of \mathbf{y}_i by $\frac{s}{2}$ elements to obtain $\text{rot}_{\frac{s}{2}}(\mathbf{y}_i)$.
 - (b) perform an element-wise sum $\mathbf{y}_i + \text{rot}_{\frac{s}{2}}(\mathbf{y}_i)$ whose first (and also second) half now contains the sum of the two halves of \mathbf{y}_i .
 - (c) repeat the previous two steps $\log_2(s)$ times, halving the split parameter s each time until one obtains 1 element, which yields us the requested sum of all entries $\sum_{k=1}^s \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_k$ as the dot product of \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y}_i .
4. Given all the 'scalar' results of each row-vector dot product, we can construct the resulting matrix-vector product.

4.3.3 The Diagonal Method

4.3.1 Theorem (Diagonal Method)

Given a matrix $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$ and a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^t$, the dot product between the two can be expressed as

$$M\mathbf{x} = \sum_{i=0}^t \text{diag}_i(M) \text{rot}_i(\mathbf{x}) \quad (4.3)$$

4.3.4 The Hybrid Method

To further extend the previous matrix multiplication method to solve the problem (cf. [subsection 4.3.1](#)), it is first necessary to extend the definition of the diag operator to non-square matrices $M \in \mathbb{R}^{s \times t}$. For the following, extending the above definition:

$$\text{diag}_j : \mathbb{R}^{s \times t} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^t, \{\text{diag}_j(M)\}_i = M_{i,(i+j)}$$

To exemplarily describe an implementation of an [HE](#) algorithm, we break down the following matrix multiplication using the method described above.

```

1 void DenseLayer::matmulHybrid(seal::Ciphertext &in_out, const Matrix &mat,
  ↪ seal::GaloisKeys &galois_keys,
2     seal::CKKSEncoder &encoder, seal::Evaluator &evaluator) {
3     size_t in_dim = mat.shape(0);
4     size_t out_dim = mat.shape(1);
5
6     // diagonal method preparation
7     std::vector<seal::Plaintext> diagonals = encodeMatrixDiagonals(mat,
  ↪ encoder);
8
9     // perform the actual multiplication
10    seal::Ciphertext original_input = in_out; // makes a copy
11    seal::Ciphertext sum = in_out; // makes another copy
12    evaluator.multiply_plain_inplace(sum, diagonals[0]);
13    for (auto offset = 1ULL; offset < in_dim; offset++) {
14        seal::Ciphertext tmp;
15        evaluator.rotate_vector(original_input, offset, galois_keys, in_out);
16        evaluator.multiply_plain(in_out, diagonals[offset], tmp);
17        evaluator.add_inplace(sum, tmp);
18    }
19    in_out = sum;
20    evaluator.rescale_to_next_inplace(in_out); // scale down once
21 }
```

4.3.5 The Babystep-Giantstep Optimization

Since Galois rotations are the most computationally intensive operations in most cryptographic schemes used today ([Dobraunig et al. 2021](#)), they take a large toll on the efficiency. In order

to reduce the number of rotations required, one can make use of the *Babystep-Giantstep* optimization as described in [Halevi and Shoup 2018](#), which works as follows:

4.3.2 Theorem (Babystep-Giantstep Optimization)

Given a matrix $M \in \mathbb{R}^{t \times t}$ and a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^t$, with $t = t_1 \cdot t_2$ split into two BSGS parameters $t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{N}$ and

$$\text{diag}'_p(M) = \text{rot}_{-\lfloor p/t_1 \rfloor \cdot t_1}(\text{diag}_p(M)),$$

one can express a matrix-vector multiplication as follows:

$$M\mathbf{x} = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \text{rot}_{(kt_1)} \left(\sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} \text{diag}'_{(kt_1+j)}(M) \cdot \text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x}) \right) \quad (4.4)$$

where \cdot denotes an element-wise multiplication of two vectors.

Proof. Starting from the adapted matrix-multiplication expression $P = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_t)^T \in \mathbb{R}^t$, we want to show that we indeed end up with an authentic matrix-vector product.

$$P = \left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \text{rot}_{(kt_1)} \left(\sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} \text{diag}'_{(kt_1+j)}(M) \cdot \text{rot}_j(\mathbf{x}) \right) \right\}_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} x_{(i+kt_1)+j}$$

with

$$m'_{p,i} = \left\{ \text{diag}'_p(M) \right\}_i = \left\{ \text{rot}_{-\lfloor p/t_1 \rfloor \cdot t_1}(\text{diag}_p(M)) \right\}_i = M_{i - \lfloor \frac{p}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - \lfloor \frac{p}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + p}$$

and therefore

$$\begin{aligned} m'_{kt_1+j,i} &= M_{i - \lfloor \frac{kt_1+j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - \lfloor \frac{kt_1+j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + kt_1 + j} \\ &= M_{i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1 + kt_1 + j} \\ &= M_{i - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \\ m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} &= M_{i + kt_1 - kt_1 - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i + kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \\ &= M_{i - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i + kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} \end{aligned}$$

leading to

$$P_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} m'_{kt_1+j, (i+kt_1)} x_{(i+kt_1)+j} = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1, i + kt_1 + j - \lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor t_1} x_{(i+kt_1)+j}$$

. Noticing that the downward rounded fraction $\lfloor \frac{j}{t_1} \rfloor$ vanishes in a sum with j running from 0 to $t_1 - 1$, we can simplify to

$$P_i = \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i, i + kt_1 + j} x_{i + kt_1 + j}$$

which contains two sums running to t_1 and t_2 respectively, containing an expression of the form $k \cdot t_1 + j$, which allows us to condense the nested sums into one single summation expression, as

$$\sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} f(kt_1 + j) = \sum_{l=0}^{t-1} f(l)$$

indeed catches every single value $l \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, t = t_1 \cdot t_2\}$ with $l = kt_1 + j$.
In summary, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} P_i &= \sum_{k=0}^{t_2-1} \sum_{j=0}^{t_1-1} M_{i, i+kt_1+j} x_{i+kt_1+j} \\ &= \sum_{l=0}^{t-1} M_{i, i+l} x_{i+l} = \sum_{\nu=0}^{t-1} M_{i, \nu} x_{\nu} \\ &= \{M\mathbf{x}\}_i \end{aligned}$$

which indeed equals the conventional definition of a matrix-vector product. \square

Note that the optimized matrix-vector multiplication only requires $t_1 + t_2$ as we can store the t_1 inner rotations of the vector x for the upcoming evaluations. For larger matrices and vectors (larger t), $t_1 + t_2$ are indeed much smaller than the conventional number of required rotations in the Diagonal or Hybrid method for instance which was the point of this modification in the first place.

4.4 Polynomial Evaluation

From the implementation perspective, there are three properties to watch out for when working with SEAL ciphertexts:

1. Scale (retrieved using `x.scale()`)

Scale has nothing to do with noise. "Scale out of bounds" can appear even if noise is extremely low. Although repeated multiplication of a ciphertext by a plaintext will slowly increase the noise, it is not the reason why you see "scale out of bounds". "Scale out of bounds" error specifically means that the scale of a ciphertext or plaintext is larger than the product of all elements in `coeff_modulus`. If you perform multiplications without rescaling, you can quickly see this error. The more rescaling you perform, the less elements will be left in `coeff_modulus`. Even if you managed to have the same scale in a ciphertext after every multiplication and rescale, eventually the `coeff_modulus` can be too small to accommodate another multiplication.

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.rescale_inplace()`

2. Encryption Parameters (retrieved using `x.parms_id()`)

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.mod_switch_to_inplace()`

3. Ciphertext Size (retrieved using `x.size()`)

Can be adjusted with: `evaluator.relinearize_inplace()`

Multiplication Each time one multiplies two ciphertexts, the scales multiply (logarithmically, they add up, i.e. the bits are added together). The chain index reduces by 1. The chain index of an encoded ciphertext depends on the `coeff_moduli`. There must be enough bits remaining to perform the multiplication, namely $\log_2(\text{scale})$ bits.

Addition The scales must be the same, but luckily they will not change.

4.5 Transparent Ciphertext

The problem is that you are subtracting a ciphertext from itself. This kind of operation results in a ciphertext that is identically zero; this is called a transparent ciphertext. Such a transparent ciphertext is not considered to be valid because the ciphertext reveals its underlying plaintext to anyone who sees it, even if they don't have the secret key. By default SEAL throws an exception when such a situation is encountered to protect you from a problem you may not have noticed. If you truly know what you are doing and want to enable the creation of transparent ciphertexts, you can configure SEAL [...]. ([Laine 2020](#))

'transparent ciphertexts (a.k.a. ciphertexts whose second polynomial is zero) are malformed and do not need the secret key to decrypt'

Chapter 5

Results

5.1 Methodology

5.2 Performance / Runtime Benchmarks

5.3 Communication Overhead

5.4 Accuracy, Precision, Recall

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Summary

6.2 Outlook

6.3 Related Works

Gazelle (inferred ML) as described by [Juvekar, Vaikuntanathan and Chandrakasan 2018](#).

Random Forests (RF) on HE as described by [Huynh 2020](#).

Acronyms

FHE	Fully Homomorphic Encryption	6
HE	Homomorphic Encryption	6, 10, 24
iff	if and only if	8, 9
LWE	Learning With Errors	11
ML	Machine Learning	18
RLWE	Learning With Errors on Rings	13
TLS	Transport Layer Security	13

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Appendix

Proof of Theorem 2.1.1. With $k \in \mathbb{N}$ a positive integer, we want to show that

$$\Phi_{2^k}(x) = x^{2^{k-1}} + 1.$$

A polynomial $p \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ with

$$p(x) = x^n - a$$

of degree n has n roots

$$\{x_j\} = \{a^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} \mid j \in \mathbb{N}, j \leq n\}$$

related by a factor $a^{\frac{1}{n}}$ to the n^{th} roots of unity given by powers of $\xi = e^{2\pi i \frac{1}{n}}$.

It is clear from the fundamental theorem of algebra that the polynomial p with roots $\{x_j\}$ can be factorised as

$$p(x) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - x_j) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - a^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}}).$$

Fixing $a = -1$, we obtain $p(x) = x^n + 1$ with roots given by

$$x_j = (-1)^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} = (e^{i\pi})^{\frac{1}{n}} e^{2\pi i \frac{j}{n}} = e^{\frac{i\pi(2j+1)}{n}}$$

and according factorisation

$$p(x) = \prod_{j=1}^n (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}(2j+1)}).$$

Further letting $n = 2^{k-1}$ and observing that

$$\gcd(2^k, l) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } l \text{ odd} \\ 2 & \text{if } l \text{ even} \end{cases} \quad l, k \in \mathbb{N}$$

since a number 2^k that can only be decomposed into multiples of 2 never shares a factor with an odd number, in accordance with Lemma 2.1.1 we can conclude that the set of all odd roots of unity is exactly the set of all primitive roots.

Following from above,

$$\begin{aligned}
 p(x) &= \prod_{j=1}^{2^{k-1}} (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}(2j+1)}) \\
 &= \prod_{\substack{l=1 \\ l \text{ odd}}}^{2^k} (x - e^{\frac{i\pi}{n}l}) \\
 &= \prod_{\substack{l=1 \\ \xi^l \text{ primitive}}}^{2^k} (x - \xi^l) = \Phi_{2^k}(x)
 \end{aligned}$$

we arrive exactly at the definition of a cyclotomic polynomial ([Definition 2.1.6](#)).
[\(ProofWiki 2020\)](#) □