Sticky Expectations and Consumption Dynamics

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Macro: Representative Agent Models

- Theory (With Separable Utility):
 - C responds instantly, completely to shock
 - Consequences of uncertainty are trivial
- Evidence: Consumption is too smooth (Campbell & Deaton, 1989)
- Solution: "Habits" parameter $\chi^{\text{Macro}} \approx 0.6 \sim 0.8$

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \epsilon$$

- Uninsurable risk is essential, changes everything
- ullet Var of micro income shocks much larger than of macro shocks ${
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


Persistence of Consumption Growth: Macro vs Micro

 New paper in EER, Havranek, Rusnak, and Sokolova (2017) Meta analysis of 597 estimates of χ

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


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
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Macro

Our Setup

- Income Has Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Components
- Idiosyncratic Component Is Perfectly Observed
- Aggregate Component Is Stochastically Observed
 - Updating à la Calvo (1983)

- Identical: Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll (2003)
- Similar: Reis (2006), Sims (2003)

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Idiosyncratic Variability Is $\sim 100 \times$ Bigger

- If Same Specification Estimated on Micro vs Macro Data
- Pervasive Lesson of All Micro Data

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- Inattention: Mankiw and Reis (2002); Reis (2006); Sims (2003)
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Quadratic Utility Frictionless Benchmark

Hall (1978) Random Walk

• Total Wealth (Human + Nonhuman):

$$\mathbf{o}_{t+1} = (\mathbf{o}_t - \mathbf{c}_t) \mathbf{R} + \zeta_{t+1}$$

• C Euler Equation:

$$\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_t) = \mathbf{R}\beta \mathbb{E}_t[\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_{t+1})]$$

• \Rightarrow Random Walk (for R $\beta = 1$):

$$\Delta \mathbf{c}_{t+1} = \epsilon_{t+1}$$

Expected Wealth:

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Sticky Expectations—Individual c

• Consumer who happens to update at t and t + n

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 \vdots
 $\mathbf{c}_{t+n-1} = \mathbf{c}_t$

- Implies that $\Delta^n \mathbf{o}_{t+n} \equiv \mathbf{o}_{t+n} \mathbf{o}_t$ is white noise
- So individual c is RW across updating periods:

$$\mathbf{c}_{t+n} - \mathbf{c}_t = (r/R) \underbrace{(\mathbf{o}_{t+n} - \mathbf{o}_t)}_{\Delta^n \mathbf{o}_{t+n}}$$



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- Pop normed to one, uniformly dist on [0,1]: $\mathbf{C}_t = \int_0^1 \mathbf{c}_{t,i} \, \mathrm{d}i$
- Calvo (1983)-Type Updating of Expectations:
 - Probability $\Pi = 0.25$ (per quarter)
- ullet Economy composed of many sticky- ${\mathbb E}$ consumers:

$$\mathbf{C}_{t+1} = (1 - \Pi)\underbrace{\mathbf{C}_{t+1}^{\not t}}_{=\mathbf{C}_t} + \Pi \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^{\pi}$$

$$\Delta \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \underbrace{(1 - \Pi)}_{=\gamma=0.75} \Delta \mathbf{C}_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

ullet Substantial persistence ($\chi=0.75$) in aggregate C growth

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Differences: Idiosyncratic vs Aggregate shocks

- Idiosyncratic shocks: Frictionless observation
 - I notice if I am fired, promoted, somebody steals my wallet
 - True RW with respect to these
- Aggregate shocks: Sticky observation
 - May not instantly notice changes in aggregate productivity

Result:

- Idiosyncratic Δc: dominated by frictionless RW part
- Aggregate ΔC: highly serially correlated
 Law of large numbers ⇒ idiosyncratic part vanishes

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Partial Equilibrium/Small Open Economy

- CRRA Utility
- Idiosyncratic Shocks Calibrated From Micro Data
- Aggregate Shocks Calibrated From Macro Data
- Markov Process (Discrete RW) for Aggr Income Growth
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$$\boldsymbol{\ell}_{t,i} = \overbrace{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{t,i} \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{t}}^{\equiv \boldsymbol{\theta}_{t,i}} \overbrace{\boldsymbol{\rho}_{t,i} \boldsymbol{P}_{t}}^{\equiv \boldsymbol{\rho}_{t,i}}$$

$$p_{t+1,i} = p_{t,i}\psi_{t+1,i}$$

 $P_{t+1} = \Phi_{t+1}P_t \ \Psi_{t+1}$

- - Discrete (bounded) random walk
 - Calibrated to match postwar US pty growth variation
 - Generates predictability in income growth (for IV regressions)



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Blanchard (1985) Mortality and Insurance

• Household survives from t to t+1 with probability (1-D):

$$p_{t+1,i} = egin{cases} 1 & ext{for newborns} \ p_{t,i} \psi_{t+1,i} & ext{for survivors} \end{cases}$$

Blanchardian scheme:

$$\mathbf{k}_{t+1,i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if HH } i \text{ dies, is replaced by newborn} \\ \mathbf{a}_{t,i}/(1-D) & \text{if household } i \text{ survives} \end{cases}$$

Implies for aggregate:

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Resources

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$$\mathbf{m}_{t,i} = \underbrace{\mathbf{W}_{t}\boldsymbol{\ell}_{t,i}}_{\equiv \mathbf{y}_{t}} + \underbrace{\mathscr{R}_{t}}_{\mathsf{T}+\mathsf{r}_{t}} \mathbf{k}_{t,i}$$

End-of-Period 'Assets'—Unspent resources:

$$\mathbf{a}_{t,i} = \mathbf{m}_{t,i} - \mathbf{c}_{t,i}$$

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- Normalize everything by $\mathbf{p}_{t,i} \equiv p_{t,i}P_t$, e.g. $m_{t,i} = \mathbf{m}_{t,i}/(p_{t,i}P_t)$
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Calvo Updating of Perceptions of Aggregate Shocks

- True Permanent income: $P_{t+1} = \Phi_{t+1} P_t \Psi_{t+1}$
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- ② Updating shocks realized: i observes true P_t , Φ_t w/ prob Π; forms perceptions of her normalized market resources $\widetilde{m}_{t,i}$
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$$\begin{array}{rcl} \widetilde{c}_{t,i} & = & \mathrm{c}(\widetilde{m}_{t,i},\widetilde{\Phi}_{t,i}) \\ \mathbf{c}_{t,i} & = & \widetilde{c}_{t,i} \times p_{t,i}\widetilde{P}_{t,i} \end{array}$$



- Normalized resources:
 - $m_{t,i} \equiv \mathbf{m}_{t,i}/(p_{t,i}P_t)$ is actual
 - $\widetilde{m}_{t,i} \equiv \mathbf{m}_{t,i}/(p_{t,i}\widetilde{P}_{t,i})$ is perceived
- Usually $\widetilde{m}_{t,i} \neq m_{t,i}$ because P_t not perfectly observed
 - in levels: $\widetilde{\mathbf{m}}_{t,i} = \mathbf{m}_{t,i}$; but normalized: $\widetilde{m}_{t,i} \neq m_{t,i}$
- Consumers behave according to frictionless consumption function
- But **based on** $\widetilde{m}_{t,i}$ (not $m_{t,i}$):

$$\widetilde{c}_{t,i} = c(\widetilde{m}_{t,i}, \widetilde{\Phi}_{t,i})$$

 $\mathbf{c}_{t,i} = \widetilde{c}_{t,i} \times p_{t,i} \widetilde{P}_{t,i}$

ullet Correctly perceive level of their own spending $oldsymbol{c}_{t,i}$



- Idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks same as PE/SOE
- Endogenous W_t and \mathcal{R}_t
- Aggregate market resources M_t is a state variable

$$v(m_{t,i}, M_t, \Phi_t) = \max_c u(c) + (1 - D)\beta \mathbb{E}_t [(\Phi_{t+1} \psi_{t+1,i})^{1-\rho} v(m_{t+1,i}, M_{t+1}, \Phi_t)]$$

- Solved using Krusell and Smith (1998)
- Perception dynamics identical to sticky PE/SOE:

$$\mathbf{c}_{t,i} = \mathrm{c}(\widetilde{m}_{t,i}, \widetilde{M}_{t,i}, \widetilde{\Phi}_{t,i}) \times p_{t,i} \widetilde{P}_{t,i}$$

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Regressions on Simulated and Actual Data

Dynan (2000)/Sommer (2007) Specification:

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \chi \mathbb{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbb{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

• χ : Extent of habits

```
Data: Micro: \chi^{\text{Micro}} = 0.1 (EER 2017 paper)
Macro: \chi^{\text{Macro}} = 0.6
```

- η : Fraction of Y going to 'rule-of-thumb' C = Y types Data: Micro: $0 < \eta^{\text{Micro}} < 1$ (Depends ...)

 Macro: $\eta^{\text{Macro}} \approx 0.5$ (Campbell and Mankiw (1989))
- α : Precautionary saving (micro) or IES (Macro) Data: Micro: $\alpha^{\text{Micro}} < 0$ (Zeldes (1989)) Macro: $\alpha^{\text{Macro}} < 0$ (but small) [In GE r depends roughly linearly on A]

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[In GE r depends roughly linearly on A]



Micro vs Macro: Theory and Empirics

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \ \approx \ \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

	χ	η	α
Micro (Separable)			
Theory	≈ 0	$0<\eta<1$	< 0
Data	≈ 0	$0 < \eta < 1$	< 0
Macro			
Theory: Separable	≈ 0	pprox 0	< 0
Theory: CampMan	≈ 0	pprox 0.5	< 0
Theory: Habits	≈ 0.75	≈ 0	< 0

Calibration I

Macroeconomic Parameters				
γ	0.36	Capital's Share of Income		
٦	$0.94^{1/4}$	Depreciation Factor		
$\sigma^2_{\Theta} \ \sigma^2_{\Psi}$	0.00001	Variance Aggregate Transitory Shocks		
σ_{Ψ}^2	0.00004	Variance Aggregate Permanent Shocks		
Steady State of Perfect Foresight DSGE Model				
$(\sigma_\Psi = \sigma_\Theta = \sigma_\psi = \sigma_ heta = \wp = D = 0, \ \Phi_t = 1)$				
$reve{K}/reve{K}^\gamma \ reve{K}$	12.0	SS Capital to Output Ratio		
K	48.55	SS Capital to Labor Productivity Ratio (= $12^{1/(1-\gamma)}$)		
W	2.59	SS Wage Rate $(=(1-\gamma)\breve{K}^{\gamma})$		
ř	0.03	SS Interest Rate $(=\gamma \breve{K}^{\gamma-1})$		
$reve{\mathscr{R}}$	1.015	SS Between-Period Return Factor (= $7 + \check{r}$)		

Calibration II

Preference Parameters					
ho	2.	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion			
β_{SOE}	0.970	SOE Discount Factor			
β_{DSGE}	0.986	HA-DSGE Discount Factor $(=ec{\mathscr{R}}^{-1})$			
П	0.25	Probability of Updating Expectations (if Sticky)			
Idiosyncratic Shock Parameters					
$\sigma_{ heta}^2$	0.120	Variance Idiosyncratic Tran Shocks (= $4 \times$ Annual)			
$\sigma_{ heta}^2 \ \sigma_{\psi}^2$	0.003	Variance Idiosyncratic Perm Shocks $(=\frac{1}{4} \times Annual)$			
Ø	0.050	Probability of Unemployment Spell			
D	0.005	Probability of Mortality			

Micro Regressions: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbb{E}_{t,i} [\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t+1,i}.$$

Model of Expectations	χ	η	α	$ar{R}^2$
Frictionless				
	0.019			0.000
	(-)			
		0.011		0.004
		(-)		
			-0.190	0.010
			(-)	
	0.061	0.016	-0.183	0.017
	(–)	(-)	(-)	

Micro Regressions: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} \quad = \quad \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbb{E}_{t,i} [\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t+1,i}.$$

Model of Expectations	χ	η	α	$ar{R}^2$
Sticky				
•	0.012			0.000
	(-)			
		0.011		0.004
		(-)		
			-0.191	0.010
			(-)	
	0.051	0.015	-0.185	0.016
	(-)	(-)	(-)	

Empirical Results for U.S.

$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$							
Expectations : Dep Var Independent Variables		OLS or IV	$2^{\sf nd}$ Stage $ar{R}^2$	KP <i>p</i> -val Hansen J <i>p</i> -val			
Nondurable	Nondurables and Services						
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^*$	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	A_t					
0.468***			OLS	0.216			
(0.076)							
0.830***			IV	0.278	0.222		
(0.098)					0.439		
	0.587***		IV	0.203	0.263		
	(0.110)				0.319		
		-0.17e-4	IV	-0.005	0.081		
		(5.71e-4)			0.181		
0.618^{***}	0.305^{*}	-4.96e-4*	IV	0.304	0.415		
(0.159)	(0.161)	(2.94e-4)			0.825		
Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.358$							

Notes: Data source is NIPA, 1960Q1-2016Q. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Instruments \mathbf{Z}_t $\{\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-3}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-3}, A_{t-2}, A_{t-3}, \Delta_8 \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta_8 \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \log \mathbf{Y}_{2}, \Delta_8 \log \mathbf{Y$ of differenced Fed funds rate, lags 2 and 3 of the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment Expectations }

Small Open Economy: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

Expectations : Dep Var Independent Variables		OLS or IV	2 nd Stage $ar{R}^2$	KP <i>p</i> -val Hansen J <i>p</i> -val		
Sticky : $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}^*_{t+1}$ (with measurement error $\mathbf{C}^*_t = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$);						
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^*$ $0.508^{\bullet \bullet \bullet}$ (0.058)	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	A_t	OLS	0.263		
0.802			IV	0.260	0.000	
(0.104)					0.554	
	0.859		IV	0.198	0.060	
	(0.182)				0.233	
		-8.26e-4 ^{••}	IV	0.066	0.000	
		(3.99e-4)			0.002	
0.660	0.192	0.60e-4	IV	0.261	0.359	
(0.187)	(0.277)	(5.03e-4)			0.546	
Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.260$; $\operatorname{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 5.99e-6$						

Notes: Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments $\mathbf{Z}_t = \{\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-3}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}\}$.



Small Open Economy: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

Expectations : Dep Var	OLS	2^{nd} Stage \bar{R}^2	KP <i>p</i> -val
Independent Variables	or IV		Hansen J <i>p</i> -val
independent variables	Or IV	Λ-	nansen J p-vai

Frictionless : $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^*$ (with measurement error $\mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$); $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t}^{*}$ $\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$ A_t 0.295 OLS 0.087 (0.066)0.660 IV 0.040 0.237(0.309)0.600 0.457 IV 0.035 0.059 (0.209)0.421 -6.92e-4IV 0.026 0.000 (5.87e-4)0.365 0.420 0.258 0.45e-4IV 0.0410.516 (0.428)(0.365) (9.51e-4)0.529 Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.039$; $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 5.99\text{e}-6$

Notes: Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments $\mathbf{Z}_t = \{\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-3}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}\}$.



2nd Stage

Heterogeneous Agents DSGE: Sticky

Expectations · Den Var

$$\Delta \log C_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log C_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

•	endent Varia		or IV	\bar{R}^2	Hansen J <i>p</i> -val		
Sticky : Δ lo	Sticky : $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}^*_{t+1}$ (with measurement error $\mathbf{C}^*_t = \mathbf{C}_t imes \xi_t$);						
$\Delta \log C_t^*$	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	A_t					
0.467			OLS	0.223			
(0.061)							
0.773			IV	0.230	0.000		
(0.108)					0.542		
	0.912		IV	0.145	0.105		
	(0.245)				0.187		
		$-0.97e-4^{\bullet}$	IV	0.059	0.000		
		(0.56e-4)			0.002		
0.670	0.171	0.12e-4	IV	0.231	0.460		
(0.181)	(0.363)	(0.86e-4)			0.551		
Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.232$; $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 4.16\text{e}-6$							

Notes: Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments \mathbf{Z}_t $\{\Delta \log C_{t-2}, \Delta \log C_{t-3}, \Delta \log Y_{t-2}, \Delta \log Y_{t-3}, A_{t-2}, A_{t-3}, \Delta_8 \log C_{t-2}, \Delta_8 \log Y_{t-2}\}.$



KP p-val

Heterogeneous Agents DSGE: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

Expectations : Dep Var	OLS	2 nd Stage	KP <i>p</i> -val
Independent Variables	or IV	\bar{R}^2	Hansen J <i>p</i> -val

Frictionless : $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^*$ (with measurement error $\mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$); $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t}^{*}$ $\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$ $0.189^{\bullet \bullet \bullet}$ OLS 0.036 (0.072)0.476 IV 0.020 0.318 (0.354)0.556 0.368 IV 0.017 0.107(0.321)0.457 -0.34e-4IV 0.015 0.000 (0.98e-4)0.433 0.289 0.214 0.01e-4IV 0.020 0.572 (0.463)(0.583) (1.87e-4)0.531 Memo: For instruments \mathbf{Z}_t , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$, $\bar{R}^2 = 0.023$; $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 4.16\text{e}-6$

Notes: Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments $\mathbf{Z}_t = \{\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-3}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}\}$.



 Simulate expected lifetime utility when market resources nonstochastically equal to W_t at birth under frictionless

$$\overline{\mathbf{v}}_0 \equiv \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{v}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot)]$$

and sticky expectations: $\overline{\widetilde{v}}_0 \equiv \mathbb{E}[\widetilde{v}(W_t,\cdot)]$

- Expectations taken over state variables other than $m_{t,i}$
- Newborn's willingness to pay (as fraction of permanent income) to avoid having sticky expectations:

$$\omega = 1 - \left(\frac{\widetilde{v}_0}{\overline{v}_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

• $\omega \approx 0.05\%$ of permanent income



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• $\omega \approx 0.05\%$ of permanent income $\omega_{SOE} = 4.82 \text{e-4}; \ \omega_{HA-DSGE} = 4.51 \text{e-4}$



Conclusion

Model with 'Sticky Expectations' of aggregate variables can match both micro and macro consumption dynamics

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \ \approx \ \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\frac{\chi}{\chi} \qquad \eta \qquad \alpha$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\frac{\chi}{\chi} \qquad \eta \qquad \alpha$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\frac{\chi}{\chi} \qquad \eta \qquad \alpha$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\alpha \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\approx 0.75 \qquad 0 < \eta < 1 < 0$$
 Theory: Habits
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$
 Micro
$$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

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 Micro
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
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Markov Process for Aggregate Productivity Growth Φ

$$\ell_{t,i} = \theta_{t,i} \Theta p_{t,i} P_t, \quad p_{t+1,i} = p_{t,i} \psi_{t+1,i}, \quad P_{t+1} = \Phi_{t+1} P_t \Psi_{t+1}$$

Income Growth Implied by Mrkv State

- Φ_t follows bounded (discrete) RW
- 11 states; average persistence 2 quarters
- Flexible way to match actual pty growth data



Equilibrium

	SOE Mod	del	HA-DSGE	Model				
	Frictionless	Sticky	Frictionless	Sticky				
Means								
Α	7.49	7.43	56.85	56.72				
С	2.71	2.71	3.44	3.44				
Standard Deviations	Standard Deviations							
Aggregate Time S	eries ('Macro')							
log A	0.332	0.321	0.276	0.272				
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}$	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.005				
$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}$	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.007				
Individual Cross Sectional ('Micro')								
log a	0.926	0.927	1.015	1.014				
log c	0.790	0.791	0.598	0.599				
log p	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796				
$\log \mathbf{y} \mathbf{y} > 0$	0.863	0.863	0.863	0.863				
$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}$	0.098	0.098	0.054	0.055				
Cost of Stickiness	4.82e-4		4.51e-	-4				



Cost of Stickiness

Define (for given parameter values):

- $v(W_t, \cdot)$ Newborns' expected value for frictionless model
- $\grave{v}(\mathsf{W},\cdot)$ Newborns' expected value if $\sigma_{\psi}^2=0$
- $\widetilde{v}(W,\cdot)$ Newborns' expected value from sticky behavior

Fact suggested by theory (and confirmed numerically):

$$v(W_t, \cdot) \approx \dot{v}(W_t, \cdot) - \kappa \sigma_{\Psi}^2,$$


Guess (and verify) that:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) \approx \widetilde{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\Psi}^2.$$
 (1)



Cost of Stickiness: ω and Π

Costs of stickiness ω and prob of aggr info updating Π



Notes: The figure shows how the utility costs of updating ω depend on the probability of updating of aggregate information Π in the SOE model.

Cost of Stickiness: Solution

Suppose utility cost of attention is $\iota\Pi$.

• If Newborns Pick Optimal Π, they solve

$$\max_{\Pi} \ \dot{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\Psi}^2 - \iota \Pi.$$

Solution:

$$\Pi = (\kappa/\iota)^{0.5} \sigma_{\Psi}.$$

Optimal Π characteristics:

- ullet Increasing in κ ('importance' to value of perm shocks)
- Increasing in σ_{ψ} ('magnitude' of perm shocks)
- ullet Decreasing as attention becomes more costly: $\iota\uparrow$



Is Muth-Lucas-Pischke Kalman Filter Equivalent?

No.

Muth (1960)-Lucas (1973)-Pischke (1995) Kalman filter

- All you can see is Y
 - Lucas: Can't distinguish agg. from idio.
 - Muth-Pischke: Can't distinguish tran from perm
- Here: Can see own circumstances perfectly
- Only the (tiny) aggregate part is hard to see
- Signal extraction for aggregate \mathbf{Y}_t gives too little persistence in $\Delta \mathbf{C}_t$: $\chi \approx 0.17$

Muth-Pischke Perception Dynamics

- Optimal signal extraction problem (Kalman filter):
 Observe Y (aggregate income), estimate P, Θ
- Optimal estimate of P:

$$\hat{P}_{t+1} = \Pi \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + (1 - \Pi)\hat{P}_t,$$

where for signal-to-noise ratio $\varphi = \sigma_{\Psi}/\sigma_{\Theta}$:

$$\Pi = \varphi \sqrt{1 + \varphi^2/4} - \varphi^2/2, \tag{2}$$

- But if we calibrate φ using observed macro data
 - $\Rightarrow \Delta \log C_{t+1} \approx 0.17 \ \Delta \log C_t$
 - Too little persistence!

