### Sticky Expectations and Consumption Dynamics

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### Macro: Representative Agent Models

- Theory (With Separable Utility):
  - C responds instantly, completely to shocked
  - Consequences of uncertainty are trivial
- Evidence: Consumption is too smooth (Campbell & Deaton, 1989)
- Solution: "Habits" parameter  $\chi^{
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$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \epsilon$$

- Uninsurable risk is essential, changes everything
- ullet Var of micro income shocks much larger than of macro shocks  ${\sf var}(\Delta \log {f p}) pprox 100 { imes {\sf var}}(\Delta \log {f P})$
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
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### Persistence of Consumption Growth: Macro vs Micro


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
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### **Our Setup**

- Income Has Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Components
- Idiosyncratic Component Is Perfectly Observed
- Aggregate Component Is Stochastically Observed
  - Updating à la Calvo (1983)

- Identical: Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll (2003)
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- If Same Specification Estimated on Micro vs Macro Data
- Pervasive Lesson of All Micro Data

- Micro: Critical (and Easy) To Notice You're Unemployed
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# Quadratic Utility Frictionless Benchmark

### Hall (1978) Random Walk

• Total Wealth (Human + Nonhuman):

$$\mathbf{o}_{t+1} = (\mathbf{o}_t - \mathbf{c}_t) \mathbf{R} + \zeta_{t+1}$$

• C Euler Equation:

$$\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_t) = \mathbf{R}\beta \mathbb{E}_t[\mathbf{u}'(\mathbf{c}_{t+1})]$$

•  $\Rightarrow$  Random Walk (for R $\beta = 1$ ):

$$\Delta \mathbf{c}_{t+1} = \epsilon_{t+1}$$

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## Sticky Expectations—Individual c

• Consumer who happens to update at t and t + n

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- Implies that  $\Delta^n \mathbf{o}_{t+n} \equiv \mathbf{o}_{t+n} \mathbf{o}_t$  is white noise
- So individual c is RW across updating periods:

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- Pop normed to one, uniformly dist on [0,1]:  $\mathbf{C}_t = \int_0^1 \mathbf{c}_{t,i} \, \mathrm{d}i$
- Calvo (1983)-Type Updating of Expectations:
   Probability ∏ = 0.25 (per quarter)
- Economy composed of many sticky- $\mathbb E$  consumers:

$$\mathbf{C}_{t+1} = (1 - \Pi) \underbrace{\mathbf{C}_{t+1}^{\neq}}_{=\mathbf{C}_t} + \Pi \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^{\pi}$$

$$\Delta \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \underbrace{(1 - \Pi)}_{=\gamma=0.75} \Delta \mathbf{C}_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$



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#### Differences: Idiosyncratic vs Aggregate shocks

- Idiosyncratic shocks: Frictionless observation
  - I notice if I am fired, promoted, somebody steals my wallet
  - True RW with respect to these
- Aggregate shocks: Sticky observation
  - May not instantly notice changes in aggregate productivity

#### Result:

- Idiosyncratic  $\Delta c$ : dominated by frictionless RW part
- Aggregate △C: highly serially correlated
   Law of large numbers ⇒ idiosyncratic part vanishes



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Idiosyncratic and aggregate p evolve according to

$$p_{t+1,i} = p_{t,i} \psi_{t+1,i}$$
  
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- Φ is Markov 'underlying' aggregate pty growth
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## Blanchard (1985) Mortality and Insurance

• Household survives from t to t+1 with probability (1-D):

$$p_{t+1,i} = egin{cases} 1 & ext{for newborns} \ p_{t,i} \psi_{t+1,i} & ext{for survivors} \end{cases}$$

Blanchardian scheme:

$$\mathbf{k}_{t+1,i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if HH } i \text{ dies, is replaced by newborn} \\ \mathbf{a}_{t,i}/(1-D) & \text{if household } i \text{ survives} \end{cases}$$

Implies for aggregate:

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#### Resources

Market resources:

$$\mathbf{m}_{t,i} = \underbrace{\mathbf{W}_{t}\boldsymbol{\ell}_{t,i}}_{\equiv \mathbf{y}_{t}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}_{t}}_{\mathsf{T}+\mathsf{r}_{t}} \mathbf{k}_{t,i}$$

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$$\mathbf{a}_{t,i} = \mathbf{m}_{t,i} - \mathbf{c}_{t,i}$$

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- True Permanent income:  $P_{t+1} = \Phi_{t+1} P_t \Psi_{t+1}$
- Tilde (P) denotes perceived variables
- Perception for consumer who has not updated for *n* periods:

$$\widetilde{P}_{t,i} = \mathbb{E}_{t-n}[P_t | \Omega_{t-n}] = \Phi_{t-n}^n P_{t-n}$$

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$$egin{array}{lll} \widetilde{c}_{t,i} &=& \mathrm{c}(\widetilde{m}_{t,i},\widetilde{\Phi}_{t,i}) \ \mathbf{c}_{t,i} &=& \widetilde{c}_{t,i} imes p_{t,i}\widetilde{P}_{t,i} \end{array}$$

• Correctly perceive level of their own spending  $\mathbf{c}_{t,i}$ 



- Normalized resources:
  - $m_{t,i} \equiv \mathbf{m}_{t,i}/(p_{t,i}P_t)$  is actual
  - ullet  $\widetilde{m}_{t,i} \equiv \mathbf{m}_{t,i} / (p_{t,i} \widetilde{P}_{t,i})$  is perceived
- Usually  $\widetilde{m}_{t,i} \neq m_{t,i}$  because  $P_t$  not perfectly observed
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- Idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks same as PE/SOE
- Endogenous  $W_t$  and  $\mathcal{R}_t$
- Aggregate market resources  $M_t$  is a state variable

$$v(m_{t,i}, M_t, \Phi_t) = \max_{c} u(c) + \emptyset \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (\Phi_{t+1} \psi_{t+1,i})^{1-\rho} v(m_{t+1,i}, M_{t+1}, \Phi_{t+1}) \right]$$

- Solved using Krusell and Smith (1998)
- Perception dynamics identical to sticky PE/SOE:

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#### Regressions on Simulated and Actual Data

#### Dynan (2000)/Sommer (2007) Specification:

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \chi \mathbb{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t] + \eta \mathbb{E}[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

•  $\chi$ : Extent of habits

Data: Micro: 
$$\chi^{\text{Micro}} = 0.1$$
 (EER 2017 paper)  
Macro:  $\chi^{\text{Macro}} = 0.6$ 

- $\eta$ : Fraction of Y going to 'rule-of-thumb' C = Y types Data: Micro:  $0 < \eta^{\text{Micro}} < 1$  (Depends ...)
- Macro:  $\eta^{ ext{Macro}} pprox 0.5$  (Campbell and Mankiw (1989))
- $\alpha$ : Precautionary saving (micro) or IES (Macro)

  Data: Micro:  $\alpha^{\text{Micro}} < 0$  (Zeldes (1989))

  Macro:  $\alpha^{\text{Macro}} < 0$  (but small)

  [In GE r depends roughly linearly on A]



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### Micro vs Macro: Theory and Empirics

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \ \approx \ \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

	χ	$\eta$	$\alpha$
Micro (Separable)			
Theory	$\approx 0$	$0<\eta<1$	< 0
Data	$\approx 0$	$0 < \eta < 1$	< 0
Macro			
Theory: Separable	$\approx 0$	pprox 0	< 0
Theory: CampMan	$\approx 0$	$\approx 0.5$	< 0
Theory: Habits	$\approx 0.75$	$\approx 0$	< 0



#### Calibration I

Macroeconomic Parameters					
$\gamma$	0.36	Capital's Share of Income			
٦	$0.94^{1/4}$	Depreciation Factor			
$\sigma^2_{\Theta} \ \sigma^2_{\Psi}$	0.00001	Variance Aggregate Transitory Shocks			
$\sigma_{f \Psi}^2$	0.00004	Variance Aggregate Permanent Shocks			
Steady State of Perfect Foresight DSGE Model					
$\left(\sigma_{\Psi}=\sigma_{\Theta}=\sigma_{\psi}=\sigma_{ heta}=\wp=D=0, \Phi_t=1 ight)$					
$reve{K}/reve{K}^\gamma \ reve{K}$	12.0	SS Capital to Output Ratio			
K	48.55	SS Capital to Labor Productivity Ratio (= $12^{1/(1-\gamma)}$ )			
Ŭ	2.59	SS Wage Rate $(=(1-\gamma) reve{K}^\gamma)$			
ř	0.03	SS Interest Rate $(=\gamma \breve{\mathcal{K}}^{\gamma-1})$			
$reve{\mathscr{R}}$	1.015	SS Between-Period Return Factor $(= 7 + \check{r})$			



#### Calibration II

Preference Parameters					
ho	2.	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion			
$\beta_{SOE}$	0.970	SOE Discount Factor			
$\beta_{DSGE}$	0.986	HA-DSGE Discount Factor $(=ec{\mathscr{R}}^{-1})$			
П	0.25	Probability of Updating Expectations (if Sticky)			
Idiosyncratic Shock Parameters					
$\sigma_{ heta}^2 \ \sigma_{\psi}^2$	0.120	Variance Idiosyncratic Tran Shocks (= $4 \times$ Annual)			
$\sigma_{\psi}^2$	$\sigma_{\psi}^2$ 0.003 Variance Idiosyncratic Perm Shocks $(=\frac{1}{4} \times Annu$				
Ø	0.050	Probability of Unemployment Spell			
D	0.005	Probability of Mortality			



### Micro Regressions: Frictionless

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} \quad = \quad \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbb{E}_{t,i} [\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t+1,i}.$$

Model of Expectations	χ	η	α	$ar{R}^2$
Frictionless				
	0.019			0.000
	(-)			
		0.011		0.004
		(-)		
			-0.190	0.010
			(-)	
	0.061	0.016	-0.183	0.017
	(-)	(-)	(-)	

## Micro Regressions: Sticky

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t+1,i} \quad = \quad \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{c}_{t,i} + \eta \mathbb{E}_{t,i} [\Delta \log \mathbf{y}_{t+1,i}] + \alpha \bar{\mathbf{a}}_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t+1,i}.$$

Model of Expectations	χ	η	α	$ar{R}^2$
Sticky				
-	0.012			0.000
	(-)			
		0.011		0.004
		(-)		
			-0.191	0.010
			(-)	
	0.051	0.015	-0.185	0.016
	(-)	(-)	(-)	



## Empirical Results for U.S.

\( \Delta \) lo	$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$					
χ	$\eta$	$\alpha$	Method OLS/IV	$2^{\sf nd}$ Stage $ar{R}^2$	KP <i>p</i> -val Hansen J <i>p</i> val	
Nondurab	les and Se	rvices				
0.468***			OLS	0.216		
(0.076)						
0.830***			IV	0.278	0.222	
(0.098)					0.439	
	0.587***		IV	0.203	0.263	
	(0.110)				0.319	
		-0.17e-4	IV	-0.005	0.081	
		(5.71e-4)			0.181	
0.618***	$0.305^{*}$	-4.96e-4*	IV	0.304	0.415	
(0.159)	,	(2.94e-4)			0.825	
Memo: Fo	or instrume	ents $\mathbf{Z}_t, \Delta \log$	$\mathbf{C}_t = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta,$	$R^2 = 0.358$		



## Small Open Economy: Sticky

$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + r$	$\eta \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$

Expectations : Dep Var Independent Variables	OLS or IV	$2^{\rm nd}$ Stage $\bar{R}^2$	KP <i>p</i> -val Hansen J <i>p</i> -val
--	--------------	--------------------------------	--

Sticky :  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^*$  (with measurement error  $\mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$ );  $\Delta \log C_t^*$  $\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$  $A_{t}$ 0.508 OLS 0.263 (0.058)0.802 IV 0.260 0.000 (0.104)0.554 0.859 IV 0.198 0.060 (0.182)0.233 -8.26e-4<sup>••</sup> IV 0.066 0.000 (3.99e-4)0.002 0.192 0.60e-4IV 0.660 0.2610.359 (0.187)(0.277) (5.03e-4)0.546

Memo: For instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t$ ,  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$ ,  $\bar{R}^2 = 0.260$ ;  $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 5.99\text{e}-6$ 

Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 Notes: simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t =$  $\{\Delta \log C_{t-2}, \Delta \log C_{t-3}, \Delta \log Y_{t-2}, \Delta \log Y_{t-3}, A_{t-2}, A_{t-3}, \Delta_8 \log C_{t-2}, \Delta_8 \log Y_{t-2}\}.$ 



# Small Open Economy: Frictionless

$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}$	$= \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t$	$+ \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}]$	$_{1}]+\alpha A_{t}+\epsilon _{t+1}$

Expectations : Dep Var OLS  $2^{\rm nd}$  Stage KP p-val Independent Variables or IV  $\bar{R}^2$  Hansen J p-val

Frictionless :  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^*$  (with measurement error  $\mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$ );  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t}^{*}$  $\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$  $A_{t}$ 0.295 OLS 0.087 (0.066)0.660 IV 0.040 0.237 (0.309)0.600 0.457 IV 0.035 0.059 (0.209)0.421-6.92e-4IV 0.026 0.000 (5.87e-4)0.365 0.258 0.45e-4IV 0.420 0.041 0.516 (0.428)(0.365) (9.51e-4)0.529 Memo: For instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t$ ,  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$ ,  $\bar{R}^2 = 0.039$ ;  $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 5.99\text{e}-6$ 

Notes: Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coeffi-

Similared quarters each. Similar indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t = \{\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t-3}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}, \Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-3}, A_{t-2}, A_{t-3}, \Delta_8 \log \mathbf{C}_{t-2}, \Delta_8 \log \mathbf{Y}_{t-2}\}.$ 



# Heterogeneous Agents DSGE: Sticky

$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} = \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}$	$\mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t[$	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	$\alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$
Expectations : Dep Var	OLS	2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage	KP <i>p</i> -val
Indopondent Variables	or IV	$\bar{R}^2$	Hansen I n-val

ınde	pendent varia	ibles	or IV	K-	Hansen J p-vai		
	Sticky : $\Delta \log C^*_{t+1}$ (with measurement error $C^*_t = C_t  imes \xi_t$ );						
٠ .	$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$	$A_t$					
0.467			OLS	0.223			
(0.061)							
0.773			IV	0.230	0.000		
(0.108)					0.542		
	0.912		IV	0.145	0.105		
	(0.245)				0.187		
		$-0.97e-4^{\bullet}$	IV	0.059	0.000		
		(0.56e-4)			0.002		
0.670	0.171	0.12e-4	IV	0.231	0.460		
(0.181)	(0.363)	(0.86e-4)			0.551		
Memo: For	instruments	$\mathbf{Z}_t$ , $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^*$	$= \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta,$	$\bar{R}^2 = 0.232;$	$var(log(\xi_t)) = 4.16e6$		



## Heterogeneous Agents DSGE: Frictionless

$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} =$	$\varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t +$	$-\eta \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_t]$	$[+1] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$
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Expectations : Dep Var	OLS	2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage	KP <i>p</i> -val
Independent Variables	or IV	$\bar{R}^2$	Hansen J <i>p</i> -val

Frictionless :  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1}^*$  (with measurement error  $\mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{C}_t \times \xi_t$ );  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t}^{*}$  $\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}$  $A_{t}$ 0.189 OLS 0.036 (0.072)0.476 IV 0.020 0.318 (0.354)0.556 0.368 IV 0.017 0.107 (0.321)0.457 -0.34e-4IV 0.015 0.000 (0.98e-4)0.433 0.289 0.214 0.01e-4IV 0.020 0.572 (0.463)(0.583) (1.87e-4)0.531 Memo: For instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t$ ,  $\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t^* = \mathbf{Z}_t \zeta$ ,  $\bar{R}^2 = 0.023$ ;  $\text{var}(\log(\xi_t)) = 4.16\text{e}-6$ 

Reported statistics are the average values for 100 samples of 200 Notes: simulated quarters each. Bullets indicate that the average sample coefficient divided by average sample standard error is outside of the inner 90%, 95%, and 99% of the standard normal distribution. Instruments  $\mathbf{Z}_t =$  $\{\Delta \log C_{t-2}, \Delta \log C_{t-3}, \Delta \log Y_{t-2}, \Delta \log Y_{t-3}, A_{t-2}, A_{t-3}, \Delta_8 \log C_{t-2}, \Delta_8 \log Y_{t-2}\}.$ 



 Simulate expected lifetime utility when market resources nonstochastically equal to W<sub>t</sub> at birth under frictionless

$$\overline{\mathrm{v}}_0 \equiv \mathbb{E}[\mathrm{v}(W_t,\cdot)]$$

and sticky expectations:  $\overline{\widetilde{v}}_0 \equiv \mathbb{E}[\widetilde{v}(W_t,\cdot)]$ 

- Expectations taken over state variables other than  $m_{t,i}$
- Newborn's willingness to pay (as fraction of permanent income) to avoid having sticky expectations:

$$\omega = 1 - \left(\frac{\overline{\widetilde{v}}_0}{\overline{v}_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

•  $\omega \approx 0.05\%$  of permanent income



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$$\omega = 1 - \left(\frac{\overline{\widetilde{v}}_0}{\overline{v}_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

•  $\omega \approx 0.05\%$  of permanent income  $\omega_{SOF} = 4.82e-4$ :  $\omega_{HA}$  psc = 4.510



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•  $\omega \approx 0.05\%$  of permanent income  $\omega_{SOE} = 4.82 \text{e-}4$ ;  $\omega_{HA-DSGE} = 4.51 \text{e-}$ 



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•  $\omega \approx 0.05\%$  of permanent income  $\omega_{SOE} = 4.82 \text{e-4}; \ \omega_{HA-DSGE} = 4.51 \text{e-4}$ 



#### Conclusion

# Model with 'Sticky Expectations' of aggregate variables can match both micro and macro consumption dynamics

$$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \varsigma + \chi \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_t + \eta \mathbb{E}_t [\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}_{t+1}] + \alpha A_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$$

	χ	η	$\alpha$
Micro			
Data	$\approx 0$	$0<\eta<1$	< 0
Theory: Habits	$\approx 0.75$	$0<\eta<1$	< 0
Theory: Sticky Expectations	$\approx 0$	$0 < \eta < 1$	< 0
Macro			
Data	$\approx 0.75$	pprox 0	< 0
Theory: Habits	$\approx 0.75$	pprox 0	< 0
Theory: Habits	$\approx 0.75$	pprox 0	< 0



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
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## Markov Process for Aggregate Productivity Growth Φ

$$\ell_{t,i} = \theta_{t,i} \Theta p_{t,i} P_t, \quad p_{t+1,i} = p_{t,i} \psi_{t+1,i}, \quad P_{t+1} = \Phi_{t+1} P_t \Psi_{t+1}$$

- $\Phi_t$  follows bounded (discrete) RW
- 11 states; average persistence 2 quarters
- Flexible way to match actual pty growth data



## Equilibrium

	SOE Mod	SOE Model		Model
	Frictionless	Sticky	Frictionless	Sticky
Means				
Α	7.49	7.43	56.85	56.72
С	2.71	2.71	3.44	3.44
Standard Deviations				
Aggregate Time Se	ries ('Macro')			
log A	0.332	0.321	0.276	0.272
$\Delta \log \mathbf{C}$	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.005
$\Delta \log \mathbf{Y}$	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.007
Individual Cross Se	ctional ('Micro')			
log <b>a</b>	0.926	0.927	1.015	1.014
log <b>c</b>	0.790	0.791	0.598	0.599
log p	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796
$\log \mathbf{y}   \mathbf{y} > 0$	0.863	0.863	0.863	0.863
$\Delta \log c$	0.098	0.098	0.054	0.055
Cost of Stickiness	4.82e-4		4.51e-	-4



### Cost of Stickiness

Define (for given parameter values):

- $v(W_t, \cdot)$  Newborns' expected value for frictionless model
- $\grave{v}(\mathsf{W},\cdot)$  Newborns' expected value if  $\sigma_{\psi}^2=0$
- $\widetilde{v}(W,\cdot)$  Newborns' expected value from sticky behavior

Fact suggested by theory (and confirmed numerically):

$$v(W_t, \cdot) \approx \dot{v}(W_t, \cdot) - \kappa \sigma_{\Psi}^2,$$
 (1)


Guess (and verify) that:

$$\widetilde{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) \approx \dot{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\mathbf{\Psi}}^2.$$
 (2)



## Cost of Stickiness: $\omega$ and $\Pi$

#### Costs of stickiness $\omega$ and prob of aggr info updating $\Pi$



Notes: The figure shows how the utility costs of updating  $\omega$  depend on the probability of updating of aggregate information  $\Pi$  in the SOE model.



## Cost of Stickiness: Solution

Suppose utility cost of attention is  $\iota\Pi$ .

If Newborns Pick Optimal Π, they solve

$$\max_{\Pi} \ \hat{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{W}_t, \cdot) - (\kappa/\Pi)\sigma_{\Psi}^2 - \iota \Pi. \tag{3}$$

Solution:

$$\Pi = (\kappa/\iota)^{0.5} \sigma_{\Psi}. \tag{4}$$

Optimal  $\Pi$  characteristics:

- ullet Increasing in  $\kappa$  ('importance' to value of perm shocks)
- Increasing in  $\sigma_{\psi}$  ('magnitude' of perm shocks)
- ullet Decreasing as attention becomes more costly:  $\iota\uparrow$



## Is Muth-Lucas-Pischke Kalman Filter Equivalent?

#### No.

Muth (1960)-Lucas (1973)-Pischke (1995) Kalman filter

- All you can see is Y
  - Lucas: Can't distinguish agg. from idio.
  - Muth-Pischke: Can't distinguish tran from perm
- Here: Can see own circumstances perfectly
- Only the (tiny) aggregate part is hard to see
- Signal extraction for aggregate  $\mathbf{Y}_t$  gives too little persistence in  $\Delta \mathbf{C}_t$ :  $\chi \approx 0.17$



# Muth-Pischke Perception Dynamics

- Optimal signal extraction problem (Kalman filter):
   Observe Y (aggregate income), estimate P, Θ
- Optimal estimate of P:

$$\hat{P}_{t+1} = \Pi \mathbf{Y}_{t+1} + (1 - \Pi)\hat{P}_t,$$

where for signal-to-noise ratio  $\varphi = \sigma_{\Psi}/\sigma_{\Theta}$ :

$$\Pi = \varphi \sqrt{1 + \varphi^2/4} - \varphi^2/2, \tag{5}$$

- ullet But if we calibrate  $\varphi$  using observed macro data
  - ullet  $\Rightarrow \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t+1} \approx \mathbf{0.17} \ \Delta \log \mathbf{C}_{t}$
  - Too little persistence!

