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Master's Thesis

Implementation of an IoT based Electronic Voting Machine

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Abstract

Eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Ausarbeitung.

List of Abbreviations

BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

E2E End-to-end

VVSG Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

1. Introduction

In the introduction the author motivates the work and explains the relevance of the work.

1.1. Ziele dieser Arbeit

Die Ziele der Arbeit werden hier erläutert.

1.2. Überblick

Der Autor führt einen potentiellen Leser durch die Arbeit und beschreibt kurz, was den Leser in den folgenden Kapiteln erwartet.

2. Background

2.1. Cryptography

Cryptography is the science of securing information through encryption. Encryption, also referred to as ciphering, involves transforming a message into an incomprehensible format [Ert07, p. 18]. The security of all cryptographic methods fundamentally relies on the difficulty of guessing a secret key or obtaining it through unauthorized means. While it is possible to guess a key, the likelihood diminishes as the length of the key increases. It should be noted that there is no absolute security in cryptography [Ert07, p. 25].

Practically all cryptographic methods aim to achieve one or more of the following properties [Ert07, p. 18]:

- **Confidentiality** The aim of confidentiality is to make it impossible or difficult for unauthorized persons to read a message [Ert07, p. 18].
- **Authenticity** This property ensures that the recipient can verify the identity of the sender, ensuring that the message is not from an unauthorized sender [Ert07, p. 18].
- **Integrity** This denotes that the message has not been altered during transmission [Ert07, p. 18].
- **Non-repudiation** This means that the sender cannot later deny having sent a message [Ert07, p. 18].

Cryptographic algorithms are mathematical functions used for encryption and decryption [Ert07, p. 19]. A given cryptographic algorithm can be applied in various ways across different applications. To ensure that an application operates consistently and correctly, cryptographic protocols are defined. Cryptographic protocols are procedures that govern the flow of transactions within specific applications [Ert07, p. 22].

2.2. Cryptography in Voting Systems

The integration of cryptographic methods into voting systems has been a topic of discussion for several decades [Mos+24, p. 6]. In 1981, David Chaum introduced a cryptographic technique based on public key cryptography that effectively conceals both the identity of participants and the content of their communication. The untracable mail system requires messages to pass through a cascade of mixes (also known as a decryption mix nets) [Cha81, p. 86] [Mos+24, p. 84]. Chaum proposes that these cryptographic techniques can be adapted for use in elections. In this model, individual voters communicate with a record-keeping organization or an authorized party under a unique pseudonym, provided that this pseudonym appears in a roster of approved clients. This allows the organisation to verify that the message was sent by a registered voter while ensuring that the message was not altered during transmission [Cha81, p. 84].

The application of Chaum's method adheres to the four fundamental properties of cryptographic security:

- **Confidentiality** Ensures that the voter's communication remains private from unauthorized entities.
- **Authenticity** Confirms that the message indeed originated from a registered voter.
- **Integrity** Guarantees that the message content was not modified during transmission.
- **Non-repudiation** Provides assurance that the sender cannot deny having sent the message.

2.3. Building Public Trust in Electronic Elections

For a voting process to be deemed trustworthy, it is essential to provide voters and observers with compelling evidence that the election has been conducted properly while maintaining confidentiality (e.g. ballot secrecy). This aspect of public trust is further complicated by the necessity of trusting not only election officials but also the software and hardware utilized in the election process. Fortunately, modern cryptographic techniques provide viable solutions for ensuring both verifiability and confidentiality [Mos+24, p. 6]. The objective of employing such methods is to minimize reliance on individual components of the voting system. Independent auditors

should be able to verify the correctness of the final election results without compromising the confidentiality of individual votes. Essentially, the goal is to reveal no more information about the votes than what can be inferred from the final tally [Mos+24, pp. 6, 10].

2.4. End-to-End Verifiability

A study conducted by the German Federal Office for Information Security Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) highlighted that **end-to-end** **End-to-end (E2E) verifiability** is regarded as the gold standard for achieving the aforementioned goal in electronic voting systems [Mos+24, p. 10]. Furthermore, the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSg) 2.0, adopted by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, mandates that voting systems must be software-independent. These guidelines are designed for designers and manufacturers developing voting systems [Com17]. The VVSg 2.0 outlines two primary methods for achieving software independence - the use of independent voter-verifiable paper records and E2E verifiable voting systems [Com21b, p. 181].

End-to-end verifiability has two principal components [Ben+14, p. 2]:

- **Cast As Intended** voters can verify that their selections (whether indicated electronically, on paper, or by other means) are correctly recorded, and [Ben+14, p. 2].
- **Tallied As Cast** any member of the public can verify that every recorded vote is correctly included in the tally. [Ben+14, p. 2].

All E2E Verifiable Voting Systems have cryptographic building blocks at their core. The most important recurring cryptographic building blocks are [Mos+24, p. 13]:

All verifiable voting systems have cryptographic building blocks at their core. The most important recurring cryptographic building blocks are:

- Public-key encryption is used in most verifiable voting systems to encrypt sensitive data, such as votes, with a public key so that only selected parties who know the corresponding secret key can read it
- Commitments are often used for similar purposes, with the difference that the sensitive data cannot be read with a message-independent secret key, but only with specific information that is generated during the individual commit process and then shared with selected parties

- Digital signatures are commonly used in voting systems so that different parties can verify that the messages they receive are from the indicated party.
- Zero-knowledge proofs allow a party to prove that it performed a certain computational step correctly, without having to reveal any further information (such as the secret key used in the computation). These building blocks are central to combine the competing but desirable properties of public verifiability and secrecy of votes.
- Threshold secret sharing can be used to distribute information about a secret (e.g., a secret key) among multiple parties. A certain threshold of them must cooperate to recover the secret from their individual shares.

2.5. E2E Verifiable Software Libraries

Implementing a E2E Verifiable Voting System is a complex task. It requires a person or a group of persons implementing the voting system to have skills cryptography in addition to a "standard" background of a software engineer. The person or group must understand the particular algorithm or to implement it correctly. Luckily, there are several high-quality and well-maintained software libraries that implement the cryptographic building blocks at the core of E2E Verifiable Voting Systems. For example, CHVote, ElectionGuard, Verificatum, Belenios, and Swiss Post [Mos+24, p. 26]. These libraries can greatly increase the implementability of a voting system. [Mos+24, p. 11]. All of these libraries rely on the ElGamal's malleable public-key encryption (PKE) scheme. Elgamal's PKE is the most common implementation in today's systems. [Mos+24, p. 40]. ElGamal's original scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic. Often, an exponential version of the scheme is used, which is additively homomorphic. [Mos+24, p. 40].

2.6. ElectionGuard

One of the first pilots to see how E2E verifiable elections works in a real election took place in a district of Preston, Idaho, United States, on November 8, 2022. The Verity scanner from Hart InterCivic was used in this pilot, which was integrated with Microsoft's ElectionGuard [23a]. ElectionGuard is a toolkit that encapsulates cryptographic functionality and provides simple interfaces that can be used without cryptographic expertise. [Ben+24, pp. 1–2]. The cryptographic design is largely inspired by the cryptographic voting protocol by Cohen (now Benaloh) and Fischer

in 1985 and the voting protocol by Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers in 1997 [Ben+24, p. 5].

The principal innovation of ElectionGuard is the separation of the cryptographic tools from the core mechanics and user interfaces of voting systems. In its preferred deployment, ElectionGuard doesn't replace the existing vote counting infrastructure but instead runs alongside and produces its own independently-verifiable tallies [Ben+24, pp. 1–2]. In all applications, an election using ElectionGuard begins with a key-generation ceremony in which an election administrator works with guardians to form election keys. Later, usually at the conclusion, the administrator will again work with guardians to produce verifiable tallies. What happens in between, however, can vary widely. [Ben+24, p. 20]. The flexibility of ElectionGuard is novel and is one of its primary benefits [Ben+24, p. 22].

2.6.1. Cryptographic Design and Structure

An election in electionguard comprises of Pre-election, Intra-election and Post-election phases. In the following sections, we will discuss the cryptographic design and the overall structure of ElectionGuard in each of these phases.

Pre-election

. The pre-election phase contains the administrative task of configuring the election followed by the key generation ceremony. The election is defined using an election manifest [Ben+24, p. 7]. The manifest defines common elements when conducting an election, such as locations, candidates, parties, contests, and ballot styles. The election terms and the manifest structure are largely based on the NIST SP-1500-100 Election Results Common Data Format Specification and the Civics Common Standard Data Specification.]. The manifest guarantees that ElectionGuard software records ballots properly. [Ben+24, p. 7]. Each election also has to define cryptographic parameters. One set of cryptographic parameters are the mathematical constants that will be used in the cryptographic operations. The ElectionGuard specification specifies baseline and alternative values for these mathematical constants [BN22, pp. 21, 36–38]. Further cryptographic parameters are the number of guardians and the quorum count which play an important role in the key generation ceremony. [Ben+24, pp. 8–9].

To avoid a single party being responsible for the property of ballot secrecy, it is useful to distribute the role of that part among several entities, so that only some of these parties need to be trusted with respect to that property. One should keep in

mind that it is impossible to completely avoid trusting any system component. For the distribution of trust to be effective in practice, it must be ensured that these parties are truly independent of each other. [Mos+24, p. 92].

The key generation ceremony is a process in which independent and trustworthy individuals called guardians work together to generate a joint key. The joint key is created by simple multiplication of the individual public keys of the guardians. When the joint key is used to encrypt data, the data can only be decrypted by all guardians applying their private key. A quorum count of guardians can be specified to compensate for guardians missing at the time of decryption. To compensate for missing guardians, the guardians can distribute "backups" of their private key to each other, such that a quorum of guardians can reconstruct the missing private key. [Ben+24, p. 8] [].

The last pre-election step is to load the manifest, cryptographic parameters and the joint key into an encryption device. The encryption device is then used to encrypt the ballots during the election [Ben+24, p. 8].

2.6.2. Intra-election

. Encrypted ballots consist entirely of exponential ElGamal encryptions of ones and zeroes. A one indicates voter supports the choice, a zero indicates the voter does not support the corresponding choice. [Ben+24, p. 11] [BN22, p. 12]. If a voter has four options in a single contest, the encrypted ballot will consist of four encrypted bits. The exponential form of ElGamal has an additive homomorphic property the product of the encrypted ballot indicates the number of options that are encryptions of one. This can be used to show that the ballot does not include excessive votes. [BN22, p. 5].

While encrypting the contents of a ballot is a relatively simple operation. most of the work of ElectionGuard is the process of creating externally-verifiable artifacts that prove that each encryption is well-formed. [BN22, p. 3]. In order to prove that the encryptions are encryptions of ones and zeroes, zero knowledge proofs are used. [Ben+24, p. 11]. A Chaum-Pedersen is a zero-knowledge proof that demonstrates that an encryption is of a specified value. These proofs are combined with the Cramer-Damgård-Schoenmakers technique to show that an encryption is that of one of a specified set of values— particularly that a value is an encryption of either zero or one. The proofs are made non-interactive through the use of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. [BN22, pp. 6, 13].

Upon completion of the encryption of a ballot a confirmation code is prepared for the voter.[BN22, p. 17]. The confirmation code is a cryptographic hash derived

entirely from the encryption of the ballot.[Ben+24, p. 14]. Once the voter is in possession of a confirmation code, the voter can either cast the associated ballot or spoil it and restart the ballot preparation process. [BN22, p. 17]. The casting and spoiling mechanism is an interactive proof aimed to give voters confidence that their selections have been correctly encrypted. [].

2.6.3. Post-election

At the conclusion of voting, all encrypted ballots that are intended to be tallied i.e. submitted ballots are homomorphically combined to form an encrypted tally. [BN22, p. 5] [BN22, p. 18] [Ben+24, p. 15]. Decrypting the individual spoiled ballots is not necessary for the election outcome. They can optionally be decrypted in order to support cast-as-intended verifiability. [Ben+24, p. 17]. To decrypt an encrypted tally or a spoiled ballot each available guardian uses its secret key to compute a decryption share which is a partial decryption of each given encrypted tally or spoiled ballot [BN22, p. 18] [Ben+24, p. 15]. Each guardian also publishes a Chaum-Pedersen proof of the correctness of the decryption share. [BN22, p. 18]. The partial decryptions can be combined using ordinary multiplication to form the full decryption []. If Guardians are missing during a decryption, the quorum of guardians can use the backups to reconstruct the missing decryption shares. [].

The final step of the election is to publish the election record. The value of a verifiable election is only fully realized, when the election is actually verified, for example by voters, election observers, or news organisations. [BN22, p. 17]. The election record is a full accounting of all the election artifacts it includes items like the manifest, cryptographic parameters, decrypted tally etc. [BN22, p. 24]. The election record is published in a public bulletin board. [BN22, p. 17].

The election record is a full accounting of all the election artifacts. To confirm the election's integrity, independent verification software can be used at any time after the completion of an election. [Ben+24, p. 6]

2.7. ESP32-WROOM-32

Unless otherwise specified, “ESP32” used in this document refers to the series of chips, instead of a specific chip variant.

ESP32-WROOM-32 is a powerful, generic Wi-Fi + Bluetooth + Bluetooth Low Energy microcontroller with 4MB of Integrated SPI flash. At the core of this module




Figure 2.1.: ESP32 Functional Block Diagram

is the ESP32-D0WDQ6 chip. [23b, p. 6]. ESP32-D0WDQ6 is a chip in the ESP32 series of chips. The ESP32 Series of chips are single 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi-and-Bluetooth combo chips designed to show robustness, versatility and reliability in a wide variety of applications and power scenarios. [25b, p. 2]. With low power consumption, ESP32 is an ideal choice for IoT devices in areas such as Smart Home, Industrial Automation, Consumer Electronics, Health Care, battery powered electronics and many more. [25b, p. 5] [23b, p. 6].

ESP32 chips are equipped with either a single or dual-core Xtensa® 32-bit LX6 microprocessor(s) with up to 240 MHz, 448 KB ROM for booting and core functions, 520 KB SRAM for data and instructions, 34 programmable GPIOs, and cryptographic hardware acceleration. [25b, pp. 4–5]. A functional block diagram of the ESP32 is shown in Figure 2.1.

The operating system of the ESP32 is freeRTOS [23b, p. 6]. To develop applications for ESP32, Espressif, the company behind ESP32, provides the ESP-IDF software development framework (ESP-IDF). ESP-IDF provides toolchain, API components and workflows to develop applications for ESP32. [source programming guide]. Applications and components are written in C

3. Implementation of an IoT based Electronic Voting Machine

3.1. Hardware Reference

Basic Component List	Number	Notes
NodeMCU ESP32	1	Development board for prototyping
1,8" LCD Display Module	1	128x160 Pixel, includes microSD Slot
Button module with 2 Buttons	1	For interacting
Jumper Wires Female to Male	22	For connecting components
Breadboard	1	For building circuits

Table 3.1.: Basic Component List for Guardian Prototype

As shown in Table 3.1, the hardware components used in our prototype include a ESP32 development board, an LCD display module, jumper wires, breadboard and a module with 2 Buttons. The connectivity of these components are shown in the schematic in Figure 3.1. The NodeMCU ESP32 development board is used as the Main Controller. The LCD display module is used to display information to the user. The button module is used to interact with the user. The jumper wires are used to connect the components. The breadboard is used to build the circuits.

3.1.1. NodeMCU ESP32 Development Board

The NodeMCU ESP32 development board is equipped with the ESP32-WROOM-32 module. The ESP32-WROOM-32 module could therefore be replaced by the newer ESP32-WROOM-32E module. The ESP32-WROOM-32E module uses a ESP32-D0WD-V3 or ESP32-D0WDR2-V3 chip which are based on chip revision v3.0 or v3.1 which fixes some Hardware bugs [24b, p. 1], [25b, p. 11], [24a, pp. 3–4].




Figure 3.1.: Schematic of the Guardian Prototype




Figure 3.2.:

3.2. Computation

ElectionGuard uses integer ElGamal within specific cryptographic equations. Four operations are performed - all on very large integer values. These operations are modular exponentiation, modular multiplication, modular addition, and SHA-256 hash computation. These operations can be performed by either importing specialized tools to perform these large integer operations, or by implementing these operations from scratch. When implementing the modular operations from scratch, intermediate values can get excessively large often times it is necessary to perform special methods such as modular reduction to keep the values within a reasonable range [BN22, pp. 21, 25–26]. The modular exponentiation operation imposes the highest computational cost among all computations and is the limiting factor in any performance analysis. [BN22, p. 22]. Using fast libraries for modular arithmetic is thus crucial to achieve good performance [Ben+24, p. 22].

3.2.1. Cryptographic constants

Most exponentiations in ElectionGuard have a fixed base, either the generator g or the election public key K . [Ben+24, p. 22]. Generator G is one of the cryptographic constants predefined in the ElectionGuard specification. With standard baseline we have a 4096-bit prime p , a 4096-bit generator g , and a 256-bit prime q . With reduced parameters we have a 3072-bit prime p , a 3072-bit generator g , and a 256-bit prime q . [BN22, pp. 21–23]. In this application we use the reduced parameters as they offer a better performance although at a lower security level [BN22, pp. 36–37].

3.2.2. Comparison of ElectionGuard Implementations

The Python reference implementation of ElectionGuard uses the C-code Gmpy2 library for large integer arithmetic. [25c] The C++ and Kotlin implementations of ElectionGuard uses HACLS* C library for cryptographic primitives. [25]. Furthermore, the C++ implementation also uses pre-computed tables to speed up some modular exponentiations [25]. This is possible because most exponentiations have a fixed base, either the constant generator or the election public key. The pre-computed tables contain certain powers of these bases. [25].

Feasability of the Python reference on ESP32

It could be possible to run the python reference on the ESP32 using Micropython. Micropython is an implementation of Python 3.x targetting microcontrollers and embedded systems. Functionalities of the python standard library are mirrored and "micro-ified" to fit with the limitations of microcontrollers such as memory and speed [Mic] [IE20, p. 234]. Apart from python the electionguard python reference requires the C-coded python library Gmpy2 for large integer arithmetic [Ini]. Disadvantages of this approach is that some needed modules, functions and classes may be missing from Micropython. [Mic]. Furthermore, MicroPython applications suffer from memory fragmentation and objects that grow in size [IE20, p. 234]. Depending on task complexity and memory allocation MicroPython performs lower than the C implementation [IE20, p. 237]. In a comparison of software based SHA-256 computation for the ESP32 the C implementation was faster than the MicroPython implementation by 45% [IE20, p. 237].

Feasability of the C++ reference on ESP32

ESP32 supports development of applications in C++. The ElectionGuard C++ implementation uses exception handling. C++ Exception handling has to be enabled in ESP-IDF. This will increase the application binary size by a few KB. Runtime Type Information (RTTI) can be left disabled as dynamic cast conversion and the typeid operator are not used in the ElectionGuard C++ implementation. ESP32 also supports C++ threads however these are wrappers around C pthreads which in turn wrap FreeRTOS tasks. [25a]. After porting the C++ implementation into an ESP32 component we test the component using the included C Unit Tests specifically the test for elgamal encryption. The test crashes after calling `pow_mod_p()`. `pow_mod_p()` is a function to speed up modular exponentiation by using a fixed-base lookup table.

Listing 3.1: FixedBaseTable Definition

```
|| typedef std::array<std::array<uint64_t[MAX_P_LEN], OrderBits>,
    TableLength> FixedBaseTable;
```

The FixedBaseTable is a 2d Array. `MAX_P_LEN` is the length of each `uint64_t` array. `OrderBits` is the number of `uint64_t` arrays in each inner array. `TableLength` is the number of inner arrays in the outer array.

The `pow_mod_p()` implementation is tuned specifically for the following values: `b order_bits = 256`, `k window_size = 8`, `m table_length = 32`. Any changes to these values may impact the internal operation of the functions. The Window Size

determines to parse the exponent into groups of k bits. The Order Bits represents the number of possible values in each group. For an 8-bit windows size the orderbits would be $256 \cdot 2^8$ [BN22, p. 22]. The total size in bytes of the FixedBaseTable can be calculated as follows:

$$\text{FixedBaseTableSize} = \text{sizeof}(\text{uint64_t}) \times \text{MAX_P_LEN} \times \text{OrderBits} \times \text{TableLength} \quad (3.1)$$

MAX_P_LEN is defined as 64. Substituting the above equation with the actual values we get 4MB.

$$\text{FixedBaseTableSize} = 8 \times 64 \times 256 \times 32 = 4194304\text{bytes} = 4\text{MB} \quad (3.2)$$

If we calculate the size of the FixedBaseTable with the reduced baseline parameters

$$\text{FixedBaseTableSize} = 8 \times 48 \times 256 \times 32 = 3145728\text{bytes} = 3\text{MB} \quad (3.3)$$

The ESP32 has 320KB of DRAM to hold data. Due to a technical limitation the maximum memory available for dynamic allocation is 160KB. [25c]. This means that the FixedBaseTable is too large to be stored in the ESP32's memory. A decrease in window size k leads to smaller tables and thus less memory usage, but increases the number of multiplications. [BN22, p. 22]. The ElectionGuard C++ implementation assumes Intel Atom class processor level performance and Raspberry Pi3 types of operating systems []. Base on these assumptions and the memory usage of the FixedBaseTable the ElectionGuard C++ implementation is not feasible on the ESP32.

C Implementation

From the previous sections we know that running both the Python and C++ reference implementations on the ESP32 is not feasible. In the case of Python there is the issue of possible memory fragmentation and performance and in the case of the C++ implementation the high memory requirements. Furthermore, the C++ implementation only contains the encryption library and thus only contains the intra-election steps as outlined in the background chapter. Interestingly, both implementations use a C coded library for modular arithmetic. For these reasons the author opts for a pure C implementation on the ESP32.

3.2.3. Cryptographic Hardware Accelerators

ESP32 is equipped with hardware accelerators of general algorithms as seen in the figure 2.1. Hardware accelerators greatly improve operation speed and reduce software complexity. [25b, p. 32].

The implementation regarding the hardware cryptography is found in the `esp_rom` component. Unfortunately, the implementation seems to be proprietary, as there are only linker files with functions assignments to addresses. It is not recommended to call these functions directly [Espa]. ESP32 uses a fork of the `mbedtls` library for cryptographic primitives. The fork includes a few patches related to hardware routines of certain modules. A port of the `WolfSSL` library is also available [25c].

Random Number Generator

Random values are crucial in ElectionGuard. For example, the private key of a Guardian is derived from a random value and they are used as nonces in proofs. [BN22, pp. 9, 13].

The ESP32 contains a true random number generator (TRNG), which generates 32-bit random numbers that can be used for cryptographic operations. A true random number generator generates numbers from a physical process, rather than by means of an algorithm. The random numbers are generated based on the thermal noise in the system and the asynchronous clock mismatch. [25c, p. 604]

The `WolfSSL` library implements a Pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The PRNG is initialized with an initial seed. Initialising the PRNG with `wc_InitRNG` calls `wc_GenerateSeed` to seed the PRNG. Conditional Compilation blocks are used to run ESP32 specific code. The ESP32 system API `esp_random()` is called to obtain TRNG values. The TRNG value is then used to seed the PRNG. [25c]. `mbedtls` also includes software implementations of PRNG which can be initialised with a TRNG value. [25c]. For our usecase we can simply use the ESP32 API `esp_random()` in order to avoid overhead and lessen the implementation complexity. However, the `esp_random` function has a delay if the reading frequency exceeds 15-75 KHz depending on the specific chip. [25c]. In case the function busy-waits a PRNG might be a better option.

SHA Accelerator

The ESP32 includes a SHA Accelerator to speed up SHA hashing operations significantly, compared to SHA hashing algorithms implemented solely in software. [25c, p. 589] The SHA Accelerator supports the SHA-256 algorithm that is used in ElectionGuard. The Accelerator only accepts one message block at a time furthermore the accelerator is unable to perform padding operations. Thus User software is expected to divide longer messages into 512-bit blocks and perform padding operations if needed. [25b, p. 2]. The ESP32 rom functions for hardware SHA supports have a concurrency warning for multi-core ESP32 devices. The SHA Accelerator is not thread-safe and can only be used by one core at a time. Both libraries mbedTLS and WolfSSL use software implementation for failover when concurrent SHA operations are in use. Thus if multiple hashes may need to be computed concurrently a fall back to software calculation is used.

The SHA Accelerator requires 60 to 100 clock cycles to process a message block and 8 to 20 clock cycles to calculate the final hash. To calculate how fast the SHA Accelerator processes a message block and calculates the final digest with a 240 MHz processor, we can use the following steps:

Clock Cycle Duration: Determine the duration of one clock cycle.

$$\text{ClockCycleDuration} = \frac{1}{\text{ProcessorFrequency}} = \frac{1}{240\text{MHz}} = \frac{1}{240 \times 10^6\text{Hz}} \approx 4.17\text{ns} \quad (3.4)$$

Processing Time for a Message Block: Calculate the time required to process a message block.

$$\text{ProcessingTime} = \text{ClockCycles} \times \text{ClockCycleDuration} \quad (3.5)$$

For 60 to 100 clock cycles:

$$\text{MinProcessingTime} = 60 \times 4.17\text{ns} \approx 250\text{ns} \quad (3.6)$$

$$\text{MaxProcessingTime} = 100 \times 4.17\text{ns} \approx 417\text{ns} \quad (3.7)$$

Calculation Time for the Final Digest: Calculate the time required to calculate the final digest.

$$\text{CalculationTime} = \text{ClockCycles} \times \text{ClockCycleDuration} \quad (3.8)$$

For 8 to 20 clock cycles:

$$\text{MinCalculationTime} = 8 \times 4.17\text{ns} \approx 33.36\text{ns} \quad (3.9)$$

$$\text{MaxCalculationTime} = 20 \times 4.17\text{ns} \approx 83.4\text{ns} \quad (3.10)$$

The SHA Accelerator requires approximately 250 to 417 nanoseconds to process a message block and approximately additional 33.36 to 83.4 nanoseconds to calculate the final digest. In practice the throughput of SHA Acceleration with 240 MHz and using the mbedTLS library the performance of SHA-256 with the SHA Accelerator is 181.3% higher than without the SHA Accelerator. [Jin22, p. 41]. The performance is nearly 3 times faster with hardware acceleration compared to without. [Jin22, pp. 41–42]. WolfSSL benchmarks show that the SHA Accelerator is approximately 8.72 times faster than the software implementation when wolfSSL fastmath library is used. [Inca]. The SHA Accelerator is thus a viable option for the ESP32 to perform SHA-256 hashing operations.

3.2.4. HMAC-SHA-256

ElectionGuard encrypts non-vote data, such as cryptographic shares of a guardian’s private key or other auxiliary data using hashed ElGamal encryption. Hashed ElGamal encryption, deploys a key derivation function (KDF) to generate a key stream that is then XORed with the data. HMAC-SHA-256 is used for message authentication it is also used to implement the KDF. [BN22, p. 7]. HMAC-SHA-256 is instantiated with SHA-256 thus the SHA accelerator can be used to speed up the HMAC-SHA-256 computation.

Large Number Arithmetic

The large number arithmetic operations in ElectionGuard are modular exponentiation, modular multiplication, and modular addition. The RSA asymmetric cipher algorithm also uses multiple precision arithmetic operations. The RSA Accelerator supports modular exponentiation, modular multiplication and large-number multiplication. [25c, p. 598]. Modular addition can not be accelerated by the Cryptographic Hardware.

The RSA Accelerator for largenumber multiplication can handle four operand lengths 512, 1024, 1536, and 2048 bits. [25c, p. 598]. This is smaller compared to the accepted operand lengths in modular exponentiation and modular multiplication. This is due to the result of the largenumber multiplication operation being twice the size of the operand. For example, a 2048 bit operand will result in a 4096 bit result. [25c, pp. 598–599]. The wolfSSL library will fallback to the software implementation if operand lengths are too large for the hardware unit. If the result of the operation will fit into a 32-bit word normal math operations are used. The mbedTLS library

splits one operand in halve if the operands are too large for the hardware unit. The operation is then performed in two steps and may recurse.

The RSA Accelerator accepts eight different operand lengths for the modular exponentiation and modular multiplication operations. Our reduced 3072 bit constants and even the 4096 bit constants are supported. [25c, p. 598]. Large number modular exponentiation performs $Z = X^Y \bmod M$. The Large-number modular multiplication performs $Z = X * Y \bmod M$. Both operations are based on Montgomery multiplication. Aside from our arguments X , Y , and M , two additional arguments are needed to perform the operation - the Montgomery Inverse R and the inverse of M . The additional arguments are calculated in advance by software. [25c, pp. 598–599]. The wolfSSL library falls back to the software implementation if operand sizes are under 32 bits. The mbedTLS library does not have a fallback mechanism. Computing small values with hardware acceleration even has a disadvantage compared to a software implementation. The execution speed of the mbedTLS modular exponentiation function with hardware acceleration was 1.44 times slower than when running it in software in one test using small operands [Jin22, p. 51] but 12.84 times faster in another test using large operands [Jin22, p. 51]. The reason for this may be that to initialize the hardware acceleration requires a certain time and when the number is relatively small the software is then faster. Hardware acceleration becomes beneficial when the values become larger. The mbedTLS library additionally provides functions that allows the user to execute the modular exponentiation with a pre-calculate values for R inverse or both R inverse and M inverse. This can speed up the operation. [Jin22, p. 51]. Calculating the R -inverse is computationally expensive. Pre-calculating and caching the R -inverse and M -inverse can speed up the operation. [Jin22, p. 51].

3.3. Communication

3.3.1. Data Schema

3.3.2. Available Communication Protocols on the ESP32

The ESP32 supports the wireless communication protocols Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. The Bluetooth system can be divided into Classic Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy. Two hosts stacks are supported: Bluedroid and NimBLE. The Bluedroid based stack supports Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy. The NimBLE based stack supports Bluetooth Low Energy only. For Bluetooth Low Energy-only usecases, using NimBLE is recommended as it requires less heap and flash size. [25a] []. The



Figure 3.3.: ElectionKeyPair Message Definition




Figure 3.4.: ElectionKeyPairBackup Message Definition



Figure 3.5.: mElectionPartialKeyVerification Message Definition

Bluetooth Low Energy stack also supports Mesh Networking. Mesh networking enables many-to-many device communications and is optimized for creating large-scale device networks.[25a]

The Wi-Fi stack additionally supports Mesh Networking and Wi-Fi Neighbor Awareness Networking (NAN). NAN allows direct device-to-device communication and does not require any Internet or Access Point connection. [25a]. The ESP32 also supports the proprietary Wi-Fi communication protocol ESP-NOW which allows for connectionless communication between ESP32 devices. [25a]. Both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth can coexist but would require time sharing control. Thus one protocol should be chosen.

The throughput of the wireless communication protocols depend on various factors such as environmental interference, connection interval, MTU size. The maximum MTU size for ESP32 Bluetooth LE is 517 bytes, for Classic Bluetooth is almost double 1008 bytes, and for Wi-Fi is 1500 bytes. The actual amount of data transmitted by the application layer will be slightly less than the MTU size due to header information. []. The maximum throughput of ESP32 Bluetooth LE is about 90 KB/s, for Classic Bluetooth is about 200 KB/s, and for Wi-Fi is about 20 MBit/s TCP and 30 MBits/ UDP. [25a] [].

At the uppermost layer of each communication protocol is the application layer. Own applications can be built on top of the Bluetooth Classic, Bluetooth Low Energy, or Wi-Fi stack. ESP-IDF supports the Application Layer protocols MQTT, HTTP, HTTPS, and Websocket protocols. [25a].

Bluetooth Low Energy has a lower range than Bluetooth Classic. []. The ESP32 supports the following communication protocols: Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Classic, Bluetooth Low Energy, and ESP-NOW. The ESP32 supports the following application layer protocols: MQTT, HTTP, HTTPS, and Websocket. [25a].

3.3.3. serialization

For example, the Python implementation initially used a base-64 encoding of cryptographic values into JSON strings, which was problematic for the C++ implementation. This led to a less efficient hexadecimal encoding. Later on, the Kotlin implementation supported Google's Protocol Buffers, for an efficient binary representation, while the Rust code supported MongoDB's BSON (a binary variant of JSON).

The initial under-specification of how inputs to the cryptographic hash function should be serialized in the original version 1.0 specification has created unnecessary

complications for achieving compatible implementations

[Ben+24, pp. 23–24]

Communication: protobuf for serialization

3.4. Usability

Graphics Library: lvgl

4. Conclusions

Im Schlusskapitel wird die Arbeit und ihre Ergebnisse zusammengefasst sowie ein Ausblick gegeben.

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A. Appendix

A.1. Subset of Reference Implementation for the Guardian functionality

A.2. Model Component

A.2.1. Model.c

Listing A.1: Business logic

```
#include "model.h"
#include "esp_heap_caps.h"

/**
 * @brief Generates election key pair, proof, and polynomial
 * @param quorum: The number of guardians required to decrypt the
 *               election
 * @param key_pair: The election key pair
 * @return 0 on success, -1 on failure
 */
int generate_election_key_pair(int quorum, ElectionKeyPair *
key_pair) {
    key_pair->public_key = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(key_pair->public_key, 3072, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(key_pair->public_key, 3072);

    key_pair->private_key = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(key_pair->private_key, 256, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(key_pair->private_key, 256);

    key_pair->polynomial.num_coefficients = quorum;
    key_pair->polynomial.coefficients = (Coefficient*)XMALLOC(
        quorum * sizeof(Coefficient), NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    if (key_pair->polynomial.coefficients == NULL) {
```

```

        ESP_LOGE("Generate Election Key Pair", "Failed to allocate
            memory for coefficients");
        return -1;
    }
    generate_polynomial(&key_pair->polynomial);
    sp_copy(key_pair->polynomial.coefficients[0].value, key_pair->
        private_key);
    sp_copy(key_pair->polynomial.coefficients[0].commitment,
        key_pair->public_key);
    return 0;
}

/**
 * @brief Generate election partial key backup for sharing
 * @param sender_guardian_id: Owner of election key
 * @param sender_guardian_polynomial: The owner's Election
 *    polynomial
 * @param receiver_guardian_public_key: The receiving guardian's
 *    public key
 * @return PartialKeyBackup / Encrypted Coordinate
 */
int generate_election_partial_key_backup(ElectionKeyPair *sender,
    ElectionKeyPair *receiver, ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup)
{
    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 256);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 256, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 256);

    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(nonce, 256);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(nonce, 256, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(nonce, 256);

    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(seed, 256);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(seed, 256, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(seed, 256);

    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(id, 48);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(id, 48, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(id, 48);
    sp_read_unsigned_bin(id, receiver->guardian_id, sizeof(receiver
        ->guardian_id));

    memcpy(backup->sender, sender->guardian_id, sizeof(sender->
        guardian_id));
    memcpy(backup->receiver, receiver->guardian_id, sizeof(receiver
        ->guardian_id));

    backup->encrypted_coordinate.pad = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.pad, 3072, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.pad, 3072);

```

```

    backup->encrypted_coordinate.data = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.data, 256, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.data, 256);

    backup->encrypted_coordinate.mac = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.mac, 256, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(backup->encrypted_coordinate.mac, 256);

    compute_polynomial_coordinate(receiver->guardian_id, &sender->
        polynomial, coordinate);
    rand_q(nonce);
    hash(id, id, seed);
    hashed_elgamal_encrypt(coordinate, nonce, receiver->public_key,
        seed, &backup->encrypted_coordinate);
    sp_zero(nonce);
    sp_zero(seed);
    FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(nonce, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(seed, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(id, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    return 0;
}

/**
 * @brief Verify election partial key backup contain point on
 *        owners polynomial
 * @param guardian_id: Receiving guardian's identifier
 * @param sender_guardian_backup: Sender guardian's election
 *        partial key backup
 * @param sender_guardian_public_key: Sender guardian's election
 *        public key
 * @param receiver_guardian_keys: Receiving guardian's key pair
 */
int verify_election_partial_key_backup(ElectionKeyPair *receiver,
    ElectionKeyPair *sender, ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup,
    ElectionPartialKeyVerification *verification) {
    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(encryption_seed, 256);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(encryption_seed, 256, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT
    );
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(encryption_seed, 256);

    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 3072);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 3072, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, 3072);

    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(gid, 48);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(gid, 48, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(gid, 48);
    DECL_MP_INT_SIZE(bid, 48);
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(bid, 48, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);

```

```

INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(bid, 48);
sp_read_unsigned_bin(gid, receiver->guardian_id, sizeof(
    receiver->guardian_id));
sp_read_unsigned_bin(bid, backup->receiver, sizeof(backup->
    receiver));

memcpy(verification->sender, backup->sender, sizeof(backup->
    sender));
memcpy(verification->receiver, backup->receiver, sizeof(backup
    ->receiver));
memcpy(verification->verifier, receiver->guardian_id, sizeof(
    receiver->guardian_id));
verification->verified = false;
//get_backup_seed()
hash(gid, bid, encryption_seed);
// decrypt encrypted_coordinate
hashed_elgamal_decrypt(&backup->encrypted_coordinate, receiver
    ->private_key, encryption_seed, coordinate);
verification->verified = verify_polynomial_coordinate(backup->
    receiver, &sender->polynomial, coordinate);

sp_zero(encryption_seed);
FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(encryption_seed, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(coordinate, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(gid, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
FREE_MP_INT_SIZE(bid, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
return 0;
}

int combine_election_public_keys(ElectionKeyPair *guardian,
    ElectionKeyPair *pubkey_map, size_t count, ElectionJointKey *
    joint_key) {
    joint_key->joint_key = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(joint_key->joint_key, 3072, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(joint_key->joint_key, 3072);

    joint_key->commitment_hash = NULL;
    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(joint_key->commitment_hash, 256, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(joint_key->commitment_hash, 256);

    ElectionKeyPair *extend = (ElectionKeyPair*)XMALLOC((count + 1)
        * sizeof(ElectionKeyPair), NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    memcpy(extend, pubkey_map, count * sizeof(ElectionKeyPair));
    extend[count] = *guardian;

    elgamal_combine_public_keys(extend, count + 1, joint_key);
    hash_keys(extend, count + 1, joint_key);
    return 0;
}

```

```

int compute_decryption_share(ElectionKeyPair *guardian,
    CiphertextTally *ciphertally, DecryptionShare *share) {
    share->object_id = NULL;
    share->object_id = strdup(ciphertally->object_id);
    share->public_key = NULL;

    memcpy(share->guardian_id, guardian->guardian_id, sizeof(
        guardian->guardian_id));

    NEW_MP_INT_SIZE(share->public_key, 3072, NULL,
        DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    INIT_MP_INT_SIZE(share->public_key, 3072);
    sp_copy(guardian->public_key, share->public_key);

    share->num_contest = ciphertally->num_contest;
    share->contests = (CiphertextDecryptionContest*) XMALLOC(
        ciphertally->num_contest * sizeof(
            CiphertextDecryptionContest), NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_BIGINT);
    for (int i = 0; i < ciphertally->num_contest; i++) {
        compute_decryption_share_for_contest(guardian, &ciphertally
            ->contests[i], ciphertally->base_hash, &share->contests
                [i]);
    }

    return 0;
}

```

A.3. View Component

```

#include "view.h"

/*****
 *      DEFINES
 *****/
#define TAG "GUI"
#define LV_TICK_PERIOD_MS 1

void guiTask(void *pvParameter);

/* Creates a semaphore to handle concurrent call to lvgl stuff
 * If you wish to call *any* lvgl function from other threads/tasks
 * you should lock on the very same semaphore! */
SemaphoreHandle_t xGuiSemaphore;

void guiTask(void *pvParameter) {

    xGuiSemaphore = xSemaphoreCreateMutex();

    lv_init();

```

```

    /* Initialize SPI or I2C bus used by the drivers */
    lvgl_driver_init();
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "OK so far!");

    while(1) {
        vTaskDelay(100 / portTICK_RATE_MS);
    }
}

```

A.4. Adapter Component

```

#include "adapter.h"

static const char *TAG = "Adapter";
uint8_t mac[6] = {0};

int pubkey_count = 0;
int backup_count = 0;
//int verification_count = 0;
int max_guardians;
int quorum;

ElectionKeyPair guardian;

ElectionKeyPair *pubkey_map;
ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup_map;

void publish_public_key(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char
    *data, int data_len);
void handle_pubkeys(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
    data, int data_len);
void handle_backups(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
    data, int data_len);
void handle_challenge(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
    data, int data_len);
void handle_ciphertext_tally(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const
    char *data, int data_len);

void add_key_pair(ElectionKeyPair *key_pair);
ElectionKeyPair* find_key_pair(uint8_t *guardian_id);
void delete_key_pair(uint8_t *guardian_id);

void add_backup(ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup);
ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup* find_backup(uint8_t *guardian_id);
void delete_backup(uint8_t *guardian_id);

void log_error_if_nonzero(const char *message, int error_code)
{
    if (error_code != 0)
    {

```



```

        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Last error %s: 0x%x", message, error_code);
    }
}

void log_heap_info() {
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Heap summary:");
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "  Free heap size: %d", heap_caps_get_free_size(
        MALLOC_CAP_8BIT));
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "  Minimum free heap size: %d",
        heap_caps_get_minimum_free_size(MALLOC_CAP_8BIT));
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "  Largest free block: %d",
        heap_caps_get_largest_free_block(MALLOC_CAP_8BIT));
}

/*
 * @brief Event handler registered to receive MQTT events
 *
 * This function is called by the MQTT client event loop.
 *
 * @param handler_args user data registered to the event.
 * @param base Event base for the handler(always MQTT Base in this
 *   example).
 * @param event_id The id for the received event.
 * @param event_data The data for the event,
 *   esp_mqtt_event_handle_t.
 */
void mqtt_event_handler(void *handler_args, esp_event_base_t base,
    int32_t event_id, void *event_data)
{
    ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Event dispatched from event loop base=%s,
        event_id=%" PRIi32 "", base, event_id);
    esp_mqtt_event_handle_t event = event_data;
    esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client = event->client;
    //int msg_id;
    switch ((esp_mqtt_event_id_t)event_id)
    {
    case MQTT_EVENT_BEFORE_CONNECT:
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_BEFORE_CONNECT");
        // Get the MAC address of the device and set it as the
        guardian_id
        esp_efuse_mac_get_default(mac);
        memcpy(guardian.guardian_id, mac, 6);
        break;
    case MQTT_EVENT_CONNECTED:
        esp_mqtt_client_subscribe(client, "ceremony_details", 1);
        break;
    case MQTT_EVENT_DISCONNECTED:
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_DISCONNECTED");
        break;
    case MQTT_EVENT_SUBSCRIBED:
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_SUBSCRIBED, msg_id=%d", event->

```

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        msg_id);
    break;
case MQTT_EVENT_UNSUBSCRIBED:
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_UNSUBSCRIBED, msg_id=%d", event->
        msg_id);
    if (strncmp(event->topic, "pub_keys", event->topic_len) ==
        0) {
        // Generate all backups and publish them
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Unsubscribed from pub_keys topic");
        for (int i = 0; i < max_guardians; i++) {
            ElectionKeyPair *sender = &pubkey_map[i];
            ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup backup;
            void *buffer;
            size_t len;

            generate_election_partial_key_backup(sender, &
                guardian, &backup);
            buffer = serialize_election_partial_key_backup(&
                backup, &len);
            esp_mqtt_client_publish(client, "backups", buffer,
                len, 2, 0);

            free(buffer);
            free_ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup(&backup);
        }
    } else if (strncmp(event->topic, "backups", event->topic_len
        ) == 0) {
        // Verify all backups. If verify fails send challenge
        bool all_verified = true;
        for (int i = 0; i < max_guardians; i++) {
            ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup = &backup_map[
                i];
            ElectionPartialKeyVerification verification;
            void *buffer;
            size_t len;

            verify_election_partial_key_backup(&guardian,
                find_key_pair(backup->sender), backup, &
                verification);
            if (verification.verified == 0)
            {
                ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Proof failed");
                // send challenge
                buffer =
                    serialize_election_partial_key_verification
                        (&verification, &len);
                esp_mqtt_client_publish(client, "challenge",
                    buffer, len, 2, 0);
                free(buffer);
                all_verified = false;
            } else {
                ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Proof verified");
            }
        }
    }
}

```

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    }
}
if(all_verified)
{
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "All backups verified");
    ElectionJointKey joint_key;
    combine_election_public_keys(&guardian, pubkey_map,
        pubkey_count, &joint_key);
    int size = sp_unsigned_bin_size(joint_key.joint_key
        ) + sp_unsigned_bin_size(joint_key.
        commitment_hash);
    byte *buffer = malloc(size);
    sp_to_unsigned_bin(joint_key.joint_key, buffer);
    sp_to_unsigned_bin_at_pos(sp_unsigned_bin_size(
        joint_key.joint_key), joint_key.commitment_hash,
        buffer);
    esp_mqtt_client_publish(client, "joint_key", (char
        *)buffer, size, 2, 0);
    esp_mqtt_client_subscribe(client, "ciphertally", 1)
        ;
    free(buffer);
}

}
break;
case MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISHED:
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_PUBLISHED, msg_id=%d", event->
        msg_id);
    break;
case MQTT_EVENT_DATA:
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_DATA");
    char topic[20];
    snprintf(topic, event->topic_len + 1, "%.s", event->
        topic_len, event->topic);
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Topic: %s", topic);
    if(strncmp(topic, "ceremony_details", event->topic_len) ==
        0)
    {
        if(sscanf(event->data, "%d,%d", &quorum, &max_guardians
            ) == 2) {
            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received Ceremony Details");
            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Quorum: %d, Max Guardians: %d",
                quorum, max_guardians);
            // Exclude self from guardian count
            max_guardians--;
            pubkey_map = (ElectionKeyPair*)malloc(max_guardians
                * sizeof(ElectionKeyPair));
            backup_map = (ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup*)malloc(
                max_guardians * sizeof(
                    ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup));
            esp_mqtt_client_unsubscribe(client, "
                ceremony_details");

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        esp_mqtt_client_subscribe(client, "pub_keys", 1);
        esp_mqtt_client_subscribe(client, "backups", 1);
        esp_mqtt_client_subscribe(client, "challenge", 1);
        publish_public_key(client, event->data, event->
            data_len);
    }
}
else if(strncmp(topic, "pub_keys", event->topic_len) == 0)
{
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received Public Key");
    handle_pubkeys(client, event->data, event->data_len);
}
else if(strncmp(topic, "backups", event->topic_len) == 0)
{
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received Backup");
    handle_backups(client, event->data, event->data_len);
}
else if(strncmp(topic, "challenge", event->topic_len) == 0)
{
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received Challenge");
    handle_challenge(client, event->data, event->data_len);
} else if (strncmp(topic, "ciphertally", event->topic_len)
    == 0)
{
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received ciphertext tally");
    handle_ciphertext_tally(client, event->data, event->
        data_len);
}
else {
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Unknown topic");
}
break;
case MQTT_EVENT_ERROR:
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "MQTT_EVENT_ERROR");
    if (event->error_handle->error_type ==
        MQTT_ERROR_TYPE_TCP_TRANSPORT)
    {
        log_error_if_nonzero("reported from esp-tls", event->
            error_handle->esp_tls_last_esp_err);
        log_error_if_nonzero("reported from tls stack", event->
            error_handle->esp_tls_stack_err);
        log_error_if_nonzero("captured as transport's socket
            errno", event->error_handle->
            esp_transport_sock_errno);
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Last errno string (%s)", strerror(event
            ->error_handle->esp_transport_sock_errno));
    }
    break;
default:
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Other event id:%d", event->event_id);
    break;
}

```

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}

void publish_public_key(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char
    *data, int data_len)
{
    void *buffer;
    size_t len;
    generate_election_key_pair(quorum, &guardian);
    buffer = serialize_election_key_pair(&guardian, &len);
    esp_mqtt_client_publish(client, "pub_keys", buffer, len, 2, 0);
    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Sent Public Key");
    free(buffer);
}

void handle_pubkeys(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
    data, int data_len)
{
    ElectionKeyPair sender;
    deserialize_election_key_pair((uint8_t*)data, data_len, &sender
        );

    if(memcmp(sender.guardian_id, mac, 6) == 0)
    {
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Received own public key");
        free_ElectionKeyPair(&sender);
        return;
    }

    if(find_key_pair(sender.guardian_id) == NULL)
    {
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Adding Public Key");
        add_key_pair(&sender);
        if(pubkey_count == max_guardians)
        {
            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "All Public Keys received");
            esp_mqtt_client_unsubscribe(client, "pub_keys");
        }
    }
    else {
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Public Key already exists");
        free_ElectionKeyPair(&sender);
    }
}

void handle_backups(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
    data, int data_len)
{
    ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup backup;
    deserialize_election_partial_key_backup((uint8_t*)data,
        data_len, &backup);

    if(memcmp(backup.receiver, mac, 6) != 0)
    {

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        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Backup not intended for this guardian");
        free_ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup(&backup);
        return;
    }

    if(find_backup(backup.sender) == NULL)
    {
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Adding Backup");
        add_backup(&backup);
        if(backup_count == max_guardians)
        {
            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "All Backups received");
            esp_mqtt_client_unsubscribe(client, "backups");
        }
    } else {
        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Backup already exists");
        free_ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup(&backup);
    }
}

void handle_challenge(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const char *
data, int data_len)
{
    return;
}

void handle_ciphertext_tally(esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client, const
char *data, int data_len)
{
    CiphertextTally tally;
    DecryptionShare share;
    deserialize_ciphertext_tally((uint8_t*)data, data_len, &tally);
    compute_decryption_share(&guardian, &tally, &share);
    void *buffer;
    size_t len;
    buffer = serialize_DecryptionShare(&share, &len);
    esp_mqtt_client_publish(client, "decryption_share", buffer, len
        , 2, 0);
}

// Function to add an entry to the key pair map
void add_key_pair(ElectionKeyPair *key_pair) {
    if (pubkey_count < max_guardians) {
        pubkey_map[pubkey_count++] = *key_pair;
    } else {
        printf("Key pair map is full\n");
    }
}

// Function to find an entry in the key pair map
ElectionKeyPair* find_key_pair(uint8_t *guardian_id) {
    for (int i = 0; i < max_guardians; i++) {

```

```

        if (memcmp(pubkey_map[i].guardian_id, guardian_id, 6) == 0)
        {
            return &pubkey_map[i];
        }
    }
    return NULL;
}

// Function to delete an entry from the key pair map
void delete_key_pair(uint8_t *guardian_id) {
    ElectionKeyPair *key_pair = find_key_pair(guardian_id);
    if (key_pair != NULL) {
        int index = key_pair - pubkey_map;
        free_ElectionKeyPair(&pubkey_map[index]);
        // Shift remaining elements to the left
        memmove(&pubkey_map[index], &pubkey_map[index + 1], (
            pubkey_count - index - 1) * sizeof(ElectionKeyPair));
        pubkey_count--;
    } else {
        printf("Guardian ID not found\n");
    }
}

// Function to add an entry to the key pair map
void add_backup(ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup) {
    if (backup_count < max_guardians) {
        backup_map[backup_count++] = *backup;
    } else {
        printf("Key pair map is full\n");
    }
}

ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup* find_backup(uint8_t *guardian_id) {
    for (int i = 0; i < max_guardians; i++) {
        if (memcmp(backup_map[i].sender, guardian_id, 6) == 0) {
            return &backup_map[i];
        }
    }
    return NULL;
}

void delete_backup(uint8_t *guardian_id) {
    ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup *backup = find_backup(guardian_id);
    ;
    if (backup != NULL) {
        int index = backup - backup_map;
        free_ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup(&backup_map[index]);
        // Shift remaining elements to the left
        memmove(&backup_map[index], &backup_map[index + 1], (
            backup_count - index - 1) * sizeof(
                ElectionPartialKeyPairBackup));
        backup_count--;
    }
}

```

```
    } else {  
        printf("Guardian ID not found\n");  
    }  
}  
  
void mqtt_app_start(void)  
{  
    esp_mqtt_client_config_t mqtt_cfg = {  
        .broker.address.uri = "mqtt://192.168.12.1:1883",  
        .session.last_will = {  
            .topic = "guardian_status",  
            .qos = 2,  
            .retain = 1,  
            .msg = "Guardian has disconnected",  
        },  
        .buffer.size = 4096,  
    };  
    esp_mqtt_client_handle_t client = esp_mqtt_client_init(&  
        mqtt_cfg);  
    /* The last argument may be used to pass data to the event  
       handler, in this example mqtt_event_handler */  
    esp_mqtt_client_register_event(client, ESP_EVENT_ANY_ID,  
        mqtt_event_handler, NULL);  
    esp_mqtt_client_start(client);  
}
```