


Pset 5 Analytical

Mohammad Bashir



Q-2(a)

The problem in sequence form is

$$V_{i,0} = \max_{\{c_{i,t}\}_{t \geq 0}} E_0 \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_{i,t}) dt$$

s.t

$$\dot{R}_{i,t} = r_t R_{i,t} + Z_{i,t} w_t - c_{i,t}$$

$$Z_{i,t} \in \{Z^L, Z^H\} \text{ with poisson intensities } \lambda$$

$$R_{i,t} \geq 0$$

$R_{i,0}, y_{i,0}$ as given

Q-1(b)

our state variables are capital R , employment status Z , and calendar time t which captures r_t, w_t .

Because of this, our value function will depend on time t .

We no longer care about 'i' because for the sake of model, a household is determined by its capital stock and employment status. Once we know these two variables, household identity does not matter anymore.

The HJB will be,

$$J V_t(a, z) = \max_c \{ u(c) + E dV \}$$

To get $E dV$, we need generator which is

$$EdV = \frac{\partial V_t(a, z)}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial R} \dot{R} + \lambda [V_t(a, \bar{z}) - V_t(a, z)]$$

or

$$PV_t(a, z) = \max_c \left\{ u(c) + (s_t R + zw_t - c) \frac{\partial V}{\partial R} + \lambda [V_t(R, \bar{z}) - V_t(R, z)] + \frac{\partial V}{\partial t} \right\}$$

(c)

The shortsale constraint shows up in boundary of value function and hence,

$$\frac{\partial V_t(0, z)}{\partial R} \geq u'(w_t z)$$

(d)

FoC:

$$u'(c(a, z)) = \frac{\partial V(a, z)}{\partial R}$$

Aggregation :-

$$\begin{aligned} \partial_t g_t(a, z_i) = & -\partial_a [(x_t R - w_t z_i - c_t(a, z_i)) \\ & g_t(a, z_i) \\ & - h g_t(a, z_i) + h g_t(a, z_{-i})] \end{aligned}$$

(e)

The Kolmogorov Forward Equation gives evolution of density function $g_t(R, z)$.

So, define capital accumulation function $I_t(R, y)$. Then,

$$\partial_t S_t(R, z_i) = -\partial_a [I_t(R, z_i) g_t(R, z_i)] \\ - \lambda [g_t(R, z_i)] + h[g_t(R, z_i)]$$

(f)

$$\max_{K_t, L_t} A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} - w_t L_t - r_t^k K_t$$

$$\Rightarrow \alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha} = w_t \\ \alpha A_t \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t} \right)^{\alpha-1} = w_t$$

Similarly,

$$(1-\alpha) A_t \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t} \right)^\alpha = r_t^k$$

The profits will be zero when there are constant returns to scale i.e. $0 < \alpha < 1$.

(g)

We have market for capital, labor, output good and a technology for

transfer of capital from current

period to next period at rate r_t .

The return to holding capital is

$r_t^k - \delta$ as capital depreciates at rate

δ and you get a return of r_t^k on it.

Hence,

Labor Market:-
$$L_t = \int z g_t(k, z) dk dz$$
$$= \sum_i z_i g_t(k, z_i) dk$$

Capital Market:-
$$K_t = \int k g_t(k, z) dk dz$$
$$K_t = \sum_i k g_t(k, z_i) dz$$

Goods Market:-

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t$$

where C_t is aggregate consumption

$$C_t = \int c_t(k, z) dk dz$$

and

$$\bar{L}_t = \int L_t(R, z) d\mu dz$$

(h)

Taking as given initial distribution $g_0(R, z)$ and exogenous path of TFP $\{A_t\}$, a competitive equilibrium

comprises functions

$$\{V_t(R, z), C_t(R, z), g_t(R, z)\}$$

and aggregates

$$\{Y_t, K_t, L_t, x_t, w_t, r_t^k\}$$

such that households optimize,

② firms optimize

and ③ markets clear and

that joint density $g_t(k, z)$ evolves according to household expectation/choices.

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(1)

FOC:

$$u'(C_t(k, z)) = v_k(k, z)$$

Law of motion of capital \therefore

$$\dot{K}_t(k, z) = r_t^k K + z w_t - C_t(k, z)$$

Borrowing constraint:-

$$k \geq 0 \quad \text{or}$$

Kormogov Forward Equation:-

$$\frac{\partial S_t(k, z_j)}{\partial t} = - \frac{\partial}{\partial n} \left[[r_t k - 2w_t - c_t(k, z)] g_t(k, z) \right] \\ - \lambda S_t(k, z_j) + \lambda S_t(k, z_j)$$

Firm Optimization:-

$$w_t = (1-\alpha) A_t \left(\frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^\alpha \\ r_t^k = \alpha A_t \left(\frac{k_t}{z_t} \right)^{1-\alpha}$$

and $\dot{z}_t = \dot{z}_t^p - \delta$

Market clearing condition:-

$$K_t = \int \sum_{z \in \{z_L, z_H\}} R \vartheta_t(R, z) dR$$

$$L_t = \int \sum_{z \in \{z_L, z_H\}} z \vartheta_t(R, z) dR$$

$$Y_t = C_t + I_t$$

$$C_t = \int \sum_{z \in \{z_L, z_H\}} c_t(R, z) dR$$

$$I_t = \dot{K}_t - \delta K_t$$

However, we will drop goods

market clearing by Walras' law.

(1)

Stationary Competitive Equilibrium :-

At stationary competitive equilibrium,

$$\begin{aligned} pV(R, z_i) = u(c(R, z_i)) + R(R, z_i) \frac{\partial V(R, z_i)}{\partial R} \\ + \lambda (V(a, z_i) - V(a, z_i)) \end{aligned}$$

$$u'(c(R, z)) = \frac{\partial V(R, z)}{\partial R} \quad \text{--- FOC}$$

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial n}(0, z_i) \geq u'(a(0, z_i))$$

$$0 = -\frac{\partial}{\partial R} \left([\sigma R + 2w - c(R, z)] S(R, z) \right) \\ - \lambda [g(R, z) + hS(R, z)]$$

i.e the distribution does not change

$$w = (1-\alpha) A \left(\frac{\kappa}{z}\right)^\alpha$$

$$r^k = \alpha A \left(\frac{\kappa}{z}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$r = r^k - \delta$$