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Audit Report

ERC-721 TOKEN, PAYMENT AND REFERRAL

CONTRACTS

AUTHOR:

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DISCLAIMER

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

The author of this report has been engaged to perform an audit of the ERC-721 token, payout and reward smart contracts for the

The objectives of the audit are as follows:

1. Determine correct functioning of the contract, in accordance with the ERC-721 specification.
2. Determine possible vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by an attacker.
3. Determine contract bugs, which might lead to unexpected behavior.
4. Analyze, whether best practices have been applied during development.
5. Make recommendations to improve code safety and readability.

This report represents the summary of the findings.

As with any code audit, there is a limit to which vulnerabilities can be found, and unexpected execution paths may still be possible. The author of this report does not guarantee complete coverage (see disclaimer).

CODEBASE SUBMITTED TO THE AUDIT

The smart contract code has been provided by the developers in form of access to the projects private source code repository:

<https://github.com/>

Commit number _____ was the latest version
and has been analyzed in this audit.

UPDATE: The _____ team has submitted an additional commit fixing the overflow issues reported in the initial version of this report. Commit number:

METHODOLOGY

The audit has been performed in the following steps:

1. Gaining an understanding of the contract's intended purpose by reading the available documentation.
2. Automated scanning of the contract with static code analysis tools for security vulnerabilities and use of best practice guidelines.

3. Manual line by line analysis of the contracts source code for security vulnerabilities and use of best practice guidelines, including but not limited to:
 - Reentrancy analysis
 - Race condition analysis
 - Front-running issues and transaction order dependencies
 - Time dependencies
 - Under- / overflow issues
 - Function visibility Issues
 - Possible denial of service attacks
 - Storage Layout Vulnerabilities
4. Report preparation

SMART CONTRACT OVERVIEW

HERO TOKEN

The submitted token contract is a non-fungible token following the ERC-721 specification standardized in [EIP-721](#). The aim of the contract is to represent the game characters of the

The token contract extends the functionality of the ERC-721 standard by adding the following additional functionality:

- Permissioned access to some functionality (see below)
- Token contract ownership
- A token sales price
- A token sales facility

The token implementation uses the [Open Zeppelin ERC-721 reference implementation](#).

PERMISSION SYSTEM

The contracts include *Managed* contract which implements various modifier permissioned access to extending tokens' functionalities.

A register of permissioned addresses is maintained in a related *Management* contract.

The *Management* contract extends [Open Zeppelin's Pausable lifecycle contract](#). This is used by the *Managed* contract to provide a modifier allowing certain functionalities of the extending functions to be also paused. This is used by the ERC-721 Hero token to pause creating new heroes.

PAYMENT AND REFERRAL SYSTEM

The payment system allows users to acquire a token. This is closely linked to a referral system, which allows assigning a percentage of the sales to a referrer.

The combined payment and referral system consist in the following contracts:

- a Cashier contract which is called from the Token to process purchases
- a Referral contract calculating payouts as a percentage of referred amounts

The payment system also makes use of the permission system by extending *Managed*.

REWARD SYSTEM

The reward systems is an ERC-721 token implementing a reward chest. Each individual reward consists in a certain amount of units of a particular ERC-20 token (representing items).

Again, [Open Zeppelin's ERC-721 reference implementation](#) is for the ERC-721 token.

Furthermore, the ERC-20 rewards are designed to use [Open Zeppelin's ERC-20 implementation](#).

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The contracts provided for this audit are of exceptional quality.

Analysis with the aid of static code analysis tools has found no issues.

Community audited code has been reused whenever possible. A safe math library is used throughout the code to prevent overflow and underflow issues (one potential overflow has been identified, see low severity issues → **update: fixed in latest commit**).

No reentrancy attack vectors have been found and precautions have been taken to avoid uninitialized storage pointers that may lead to overwriting storage.

For payouts, a pull pattern is used, and best practice guidelines have been followed throughout the code.

No attack vectors for Denial of Service attacks have been found and there are no potential block gas limit issues.

Gas usage is very reasonable for this type of contract.

AUDIT FINDING

REENTRANCY AND RACE CONDITIONS RESISTANCE

DESCRIPTION

Reentrancy vulnerabilities consist in unexpected behavior, if a function is called various times before execution has completed.

Let's look at the following function, which can be used to withdraw the total balance of the caller from a contract:

```
1. mapping(address => uint) private balances;
2.
3. function payOut() {
4.     require(msg.sender.call.value(balances[msg.sender]))();
5.     balances[msg.sender] = 0;
6. }
```

The *call.value()* invocation causes contract external code to be executed. If the caller is another contract, this means that the contracts fallback method is executed. This may call *payOut()* again, before the balance is set to 0, thereby obtaining more funds than available.

AUDIT RESULT

No reentrancy issues have been found in the contract. The *transfer()* function is used for all ether transfers, imposing a gas limit and preventing recursive calls, and care has been taken in the order of calls.

UNDER-/OVERFLOW PROTECTION

DESCRIPTION

Balances are usually represented by unsigned integers, typically 256-bit numbers in Solidity. When unsigned integers overflow or underflow, their value changes dramatically. Let's look at the following example of a more common underflow (numbers shortened for readability):

```
0x0003
- 0x0004
-----
0xFFFF
```

It's easy to see the issue here. Subtracting 1 more than available balance causes an underflow. The resulting balance is now a large number.

Also note, that in integer arithmetic division is troublesome, due to rounding errors.

AUDIT RESULT

The contracts generally avoid overflow and underflow issues by employing the [SafeMath library by OpenZeppelin](#) for almost all arithmetic operations. In the few occasions where the library is not used, it is clear that there is no risk of overflows or underflows.

For example, the following code in *RewardChest.sol* is safe despite the potential underflow, because the function is private and only called from contract code that already checks that the reward removed exists. Therefore, *reward.length* will always be greater than 0 when this function is called:

```
146.     function removeReward(uint _id) private {
147.         uint lastRewardId = rewards.length - 1;
148.
149.         if (_id == lastRewardId) {
150.             delete rewards[_id];
151.         } else {
152.             // Keep storage array tightly packed
153.             rewards[_id] = rewards[lastRewardId];
154.
155.             delete rewards[lastRewardId];
156.         }
157.         rewards.length--;
158.     }
```

Omitting the use of safe math in this case is an acceptable gas optimization.

The exception of this is the multiplication in line 89 of *RewardChest.sol*, which introduces a slight chance of inconsistency due to a potential overflow (see low severity security issues → update: fixed in latest commit).

TRANSACTION ORDERING ASSUMPTIONS

DESCRIPTION

Transactions enter a pool of unconfirmed transactions and maybe included in blocks by miners in any order, depending on the miner's transaction selection criteria, which is probably some algorithm aimed at achieving maximum earnings from transaction fees, but could be anything. Hence, the order of transactions being included can be completely different to the order in which they are generated. Therefore, contract code cannot make any assumptions on transaction order.

Apart from unexpected results in contract execution, there is a possible attack vector in this, as transactions are visible in the mempool and their execution can be predicted. This maybe an

issue in trading, where delaying a transaction may be used for personal advantage by a rogue miner. In fact, simply being aware of certain transactions before they are executed can be used as advantage by anyone, not just miners.

AUDIT RESULT

transactions are kept as simple as possible and care has been taken not to assume a specific order of invocation.

TIMESTAMP DEPENDENCIES

DESCRIPTION

Timestamps are generated by the miners. Therefore, no contract should rely on the block timestamp for critical operations, such as using it as a seed for random number generation. [Consensys](#) give a 30 seconds and a 12 minutes rules in their [guidelines](#), which states that it is safe to use `block.timestamp`, if your time depending code can deal with a 30 second or 12 minute time variation, depending on the intended use.

AUDIT RESULT

There are no timestamp dependencies in the contract code.

DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK PREVENTION

DESCRIPTION

Denial of Service attacks can occur when a transaction depends on the outcome of an external call. A typical example of this some activity to be carried out after an Ether transfer. If the receiver is another contract, it can reject the transfer causing the whole transaction to fail.

AUDIT RESULT

avoids DoS attacks of this type, using a pull payment pattern and isolating Ether transfers into their own withdrawal transactions, such as the following function in *Cashier.sol*:

```
47. function claim() public {
48.     uint balance = payoutBalances[msg.sender];
49.
50.     require(balance > 0);
51.
52.     allocatedEther = allocatedEther.sub(balance);
53.     payoutBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
54.     msg.sender.transfer(balance);
55.
56.     emit Claim(msg.sender, balance);
57. }
```

BLOCK GAS LIMIT

DESCRIPTION

Contract transactions can sometimes be forced to always fail by making them exceed the maximum amount of gas that can be included in a block. The classic example can be found in [this explanation](#). Forcing the contract to pay out many small amounts, will bump up the gas used and, if this exceeds the block gas limit, the whole transaction will fail.

The solution to this problem is avoiding situations in which many transaction calls can be caused by the same function invocation, especially if the number of calls can be influenced externally.

AUDIT RESULT

The contracts use pull payment patterns and, in general, avoid looping over variable-sized arrays.

The only instance of loop of this kind is the following code in *RewardChest.sol*:

```
50. for (uint i = 0; i < rewards.length; i++) {  
51.     selectedReward = i;  
52.  
53.     if (accumulator + rewards[i].balance > rndReward) {  
54.         break;  
55.     }  
56.  
57.     accumulator = accumulator.add(rewards[i].balance);  
58. }
```

Since, the length of the reward array is controlled by the software (probably the off-chain part) it is very unlikely for this array grows too large. Furthermore, the code has a very low gas usage, meaning it would need a very large array to cause the block gas limit to be exceeded.

STORAGE ALLOCATION PROTECTION

DESCRIPTION

Storage management in Solidity can be complicated. Declarations of structs inside the scope of a function default to storage pointers. It is therefore easy to end up with an uninitialized storage pointer, pointing to address 0, instead of declaring a new struct.

Writing to this pointer then causes storage to be overwritten unintentionally.

AUDIT RESULT

The contracts avoid storage allocation issues by declaring storage types explicitly. No issues related to this have been found during the audit.

COMMUNITY AUDITED CODE

DESCRIPTION

It is always best to re-use community audited code when available, such as the [code provided by Open Zeppelin](#).

AUDIT RESULT

The contracts are based on Open Zeppelin whenever possible. The ERC-721 tokens, ERC-20 tokens, facilities to pause contracts and the Ownable contract functionalities are re-used.

GAS USAGE ANALYSIS

DESCRIPTION

Gas usage of smart contracts is very important. Gas is charged for each operation that alters state, i.e. a write transaction. In contrast, read-only queries can be processed by local nodes and therefore do not have an associated cost.

Excessive gas usage may make contracts unusable in practice, in particular in times of network congestion when the gas price has to be increased to incentivize miners to prioritize transactions.

Furthermore, issues with excessive gas usage can lead to exceeding the block gas limit preventing transactions from completing. This is particularly dangerous in the case of executing code in unbounded loops, for example iterating over a variable size array. If the size of the array can be influenced by a public contract call, this can be used to create Denial of Service Attacks.

For these reasons, the present smart contract audit includes a gas usage analysis performed in two steps:

1. The code has been analyzed using automated gas estimation tools that return a relatively accurate estimate of the gas usage of each function.
2. As automated, gas estimation has its limits, a manual line by line analysis for gas related issues has also been performed.

AUDIT RESULT

AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

The following is the output of the automated gas usage analysis:

```
===== CFConstants.sol:CFConstants =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
  238 + 197800 = 198038
external:
  CAN_ALTER_REWARDS(): 206
  CAN_ALTER_STATS(): 250
  CAN_ALTER_XP(): 316
  CAN_MINT_CHEST(): 492
  CAN_RECORD_PURCHASE(): 272
  CASHIER(): 370
  DWARF(): 338
  ELF(): 470
  HERO(): 216
  HERO_PROMO(): 414
  HERO_VALIDATOR(): 282
  HUMAN(): 448
  IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN(): 360
  REFERRAL(): 392

===== Cashier.sol:Cashier =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
  82451 + 1243000 = 1325451
external:
  CAN_ALTER_REWARDS(): 228
  CAN_ALTER_STATS(): 316
  CAN_ALTER_XP(): 448
  CAN_MINT_CHEST(): 800
  CAN_RECORD_PURCHASE(): 360
  CASHIER(): 590
  DWARF(): 470
  ELF(): 778
  HERO(): 282
  HERO_PROMO(): 700
  HERO_VALIDATOR(): 370
  HUMAN(): 734
  IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN(): 580
  REFERRAL(): 678
  allocatedEther(): 702
  claim(): infinite
  etherHolder(): 508
  management(): 882
  owner(): 904
  payoutBalances(address): 664
  recordPurchase(address,address): infinite
  referredContracts(address): 1119
  referrers(address): 767
  renounceOwnership(): 22425
  setEtherHolder(address): 21114
  setManagementContract(address): 20828
  totalReferred(address): 532
  transferOwnership(address): 23181
  withdrawBalance(): infinite

===== .sol: =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
  infinite + 2924400 = infinite
```

```

external:
  CAN_ALTER_REWARDS():      294
  CAN_ALTER_STATS():      426
  CAN_ALTER_XP():          558
  CAN_MINT_CHEST():       1064
  CAN_RECORD_PURCHASE():   470
  CASHIER():              722
  DWARF():                580
  ELF():                  1020
  HERO():                 392
  HERO_PROMO():           964
  HERO_VALIDATOR():       480
  HUMAN():                998
  IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN():     712
  REFERRAL():             920
  approve(address,uint256): 23887
  balanceOf(address):     1065
  createHero(string,string,uint16[4],address): infinite
  exists(uint256):        931
  getApproved(uint256):   611
  getHero(uint256):       2300
  heroes(uint256):        2813
  isApprovedForAll(address,address): 1568
  management():           992
  name():                 infinite
  owner():                1014
  ownerOf(uint256):       1064
  price():                1032
  renounceOwnership():    22557
  safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
  safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes): infinite
  setApprovalForAll(address,bool): 23227
  setManagementContract(address): 20894
  setPrice(uint256):      21075
  symbol():               infinite
  tokenByIndex(uint256):   1351
  tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256): 1456
  tokenURI(uint256):      infinite
  totalSupply():          476
  transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
  transferOwnership(address): 23445
  updateStats(uint256,uint16,uint16,uint16): infinite
  updateXP(uint256,uint64): infinite

```

===== HeroBase.sol:HeroBase =====

Gas estimation:

construction:

190 + 142600 = 142790

external:

```

  getHero(uint256): 2168
  heroes(uint256): 2153

```

===== HeroValidator.sol:HeroValidator =====

Gas estimation:

construction:

244966 + 475000 = 719966

external:

```

  CAN_ALTER_REWARDS():      228
  CAN_ALTER_STATS():      272
  CAN_ALTER_XP():          360
  CAN_MINT_CHEST():       558
  CAN_RECORD_PURCHASE():   316
  CASHIER():              414
  DWARF():                382

```



```

    ELF(): 536
    HERO(): 238
    HERO_PROMO(): 480
    HERO_VALIDATOR(): 326
    HUMAN(): 514
    IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN(): 404
    REFERRAL(): 458
    abilityScores(uint16): 1672
    calculateScoreWeights(uint16,uint16,uint16): 1813
    isHeroValid(uint16,uint16,uint16,uint16): infinite

===== Managed.sol:Managed =====
Gas estimation:

===== Management.sol:Management =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    81722 + 519400 = 601122
external:
    contractRegistry(uint256): 673
    owner(): 530
    pause(): 21881
    paused(): 514
    permissions(address,uint256): 821
    registerContract(uint256,address): 22403
    renounceOwnership(): 22117
    setPermission(address,uint256,bool): 22753
    transferOwnership(address): 22741
    unpause(): 21812

===== Migrations.sol:Migrations =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    20462 + 152000 = 172462
external:
    last_completed_migration(): 416
    owner(): 486
    setCompleted(uint256): 20544
    upgrade(address): infinite

===== Referral.sol:Referral =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    135 + 85600 = 85735
external:
    calculatePayoutAmount(uint256,uint256): infinite

===== RewardChest.sol:RewardChest =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    infinite + 2968800 = infinite
external:
    CAN_ALTER_REWARDS(): 294
    CAN_ALTER_STATS(): 426
    CAN_ALTER_XP(): 580
    CAN_MINT_CHEST(): 1064
    CAN_RECORD_PURCHASE(): 492
    CASHIER(): 766
    DWARF(): 602
    ELF(): 1020
    HERO(): 392
    HERO_PROMO(): 964
    HERO_VALIDATOR(): 502
    HUMAN(): 998

```

```

IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN(): 734
REFERRAL(): 920
addReward(address,uint256,uint256): infinite
addRewardTokens(uint256,address,uint256,uint256): infinite
approve(address,uint256): 23887
balanceOf(address): 1065
chestCounter(): 548
exists(uint256): 953
getApproved(uint256): 611
isApprovedForAll(address,address): 1568
issue(address): infinite
management(): 1036
name(): infinite
open(uint256): infinite
owner(): 1058
ownerOf(uint256): 1064
renounceOwnership(): 22557
rewardCount(): 944
rewardLength(): 1114
rewards(uint256): 2232
safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes): infinite
setApprovalForAll(address,bool): 23227
setManagementContract(address): 20894
symbol(): infinite
tokenByIndex(uint256): 1373
tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256): 1456
tokenURI(uint256): infinite
totalSupply(): 476
transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
transferOwnership(address): 23489
withdrawReward(uint256,address,uint128,uint256): infinite
internal:
    removeReward(uint256): infinite

```

===== TestToken.sol:TestToken =====

Gas estimation:

construction:

62083 + 1187400 = 1249483

external:

```

allowance(address,address): 948
approve(address,uint256): 22353
balanceOf(address): 691
decreaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
finishMinting(): 22072
increaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
mint(address,uint256): infinite
mintingFinished(): 492
owner(): 640
renounceOwnership(): 22227
totalSupply(): 446
transfer(address,uint256): infinite
transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
transferOwnership(address): 22851

```

===== interfaces/ICashier.sol:ICashier =====

Gas estimation:

===== interfaces/IHeroValidator.sol:IHeroValidator =====

Gas estimation:

===== interfaces/IPromotion.sol:IPromotion =====

Gas estimation:

```

===== interfaces/IReferral.sol:IReferral =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/AddressUtils.sol:AddressUtils =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    116 + 15200 = 15316
internal:
    isContract(address):    infinite

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/lifecycle/Pausable.sol:Pausable =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    40896 + 295200 = 336096
external:
    owner(): 530
    pause(): 21881
    paused(): 514
    renounceOwnership(): 22117
    transferOwnership(address): 22675
    unpause(): 21812

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol:SafeMath =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    116 + 15200 = 15316
internal:
    add(uint256,uint256):    infinite
    div(uint256,uint256):    infinite
    mul(uint256,uint256):    infinite
    sub(uint256,uint256):    infinite

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/ownership/Ownable.sol:Ownable =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    20498 + 189800 = 210298
external:
    owner(): 464
    renounceOwnership(): 22073
    transferOwnership(address): 22609

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/BasicToken.sol:BasicToken =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    251 + 209000 = 209251
external:
    balanceOf(address): 581
    totalSupply(): 402
    transfer(address,uint256):    infinite

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol:ERC20 =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20Basic.sol:ERC20Basic =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/MintableToken.sol:MintableToken =====
=====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    41793 + 1187400 = 1229193
external:
    allowance(address,address): 948
    approve(address,uint256): 22353

```

```

balanceOf(address): 691
decreaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
finishMinting(): 22072
increaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
mint(address,uint256): infinite
mintingFinished(): 492
owner(): 640
renounceOwnership(): 22227
totalSupply(): 446
transfer(address,uint256): infinite
transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
transferOwnership(address): 22851

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/StandardToken.sol:StandardToken
=====
Gas estimation:
construction:
  864 + 830200 = 831064
external:
  allowance(address,address): 838
  approve(address,uint256): 22331
  balanceOf(address): 647
  decreaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
  increaseApproval(address,uint256): infinite
  totalSupply(): 424
  transfer(address,uint256): infinite
  transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol:ERC721 =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol:ERC721Enumerable =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol:ERC721Metadata =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Basic.sol:ERC721Basic =====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-
solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721BasicToken.sol:ERC721BasicToken =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
  981 + 946400 = 947381
external:
  approve(address,uint256): 23865
  balanceOf(address): 735
  exists(uint256): 711
  getApproved(uint256): 589
  isApprovedForAll(address,address): 930
  ownerOf(uint256): 756
  safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
  safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes): infinite
  setApprovalForAll(address,bool): 22721
  transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
internal:
  _burn(address,uint256): infinite
  _mint(address,uint256): infinite
  addTokenTo(address,uint256): infinite
  checkAndCallSafeTransfer(address,address,uint256,bytes memory): infinite
  clearApproval(address,uint256): infinite
  isApprovedOrOwner(address,uint256): 1364
  removeTokenFrom(address,uint256): infinite

```

```

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Receiver.sol:ERC721Receiver
=====
Gas estimation:

===== zeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Token.sol:ERC721Token =====
Gas estimation:
construction:
    infinite + 1400400 = infinite
external:
    approve(address,uint256): 23887
    balanceOf(address): 823
    exists(uint256): 777
    getApproved(uint256): 611
    isApprovedForAll(address,address): 1062
    name(): infinite
    ownerOf(uint256): 844
    safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
    safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes): infinite
    setApprovalForAll(address,bool): 22831
    symbol(): infinite
    tokenByIndex(uint256): 1197
    tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256): 1390
    tokenURI(uint256): infinite
    totalSupply(): 476
    transferFrom(address,address,uint256): infinite
internal:
    _burn(address,uint256): infinite
    _mint(address,uint256): infinite
    _setTokenURI(uint256,string memory): infinite
    addTokenTo(address,uint256): infinite

    removeTokenFrom(address,uint256): infinite

```

As can be seen, gas usage of all functions for which a numerical result was return is very reasonable.

Infinite gas estimates are due to the limitations of automated gas analysis. These functions have been analyzed manually.

MANUAL ANALYSIS

It is obvious that care has been taken to implement all functions of the contracts as compact and gas efficiently as possible.

Gas usage is very reasonable.

SECURITY ISSUES

HIGH SEVERITY ISSUES

No high severity issues have been found.

MEDIUM SEVERITY ISSUES

No medium severity issues have been found.

LOW SEVERITY ISSUES

POTENTIAL OVERFLOW

The following code in *RewardChest.sol* exposes a small risk of introducing an inconsistency due to arithmetic overflow in line 89:

```
82. function addReward(  
83. ERC20 _token,  
84. uint _rewardAmount,  
85. uint _rewardCount  
86. ) public requirePermission(CAN_ALTER_REWARDS) {  
87.     require(hasPermission(address(_token), IS_TRUSTED_TOKEN), "NOT_TRUSTED");  
88.  
89.     _token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), uint(_rewardAmount * _rewardCount));  
90.  
91.     rewardCount = rewardCount.add(_rewardCount);  
92.  
93.     uint rewardId = rewards.push(Reward(_token, _rewardAmount, _rewardCount))  
94.     - 1;  
95.     emit RewardAdded(rewardId, _token, _rewardAmount, _rewardCount);  
96. }
```

Should the values of `_rewardAmount` and `_rewardCount` be very high due to an off-chain code error and overflow could occur, leading to an incorrect number of tokens to be transferred.

This is classed as low severity, as the function requires special permissions to be executed. However, an unintentional error in the calling code could cause this issue.

Recommendation: use the already included safe math library for this calculation.

UPDATE: The team has fixed the overflow issue by using the safe math library for this calculation, removing the potential issue.

RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION

The following code in *RewardChest.sol* is used provide a random number:

46.

```
uint rndReward = uint(keccak256(_tokenId, blockhash(block.number - 1))) % rewardCount  
;
```

This code could be called from another contract. Since all parameters in this calculation are easily obtainable, the calling contract could execute the same calculation in the same transaction before calling the function. The calculation could be repeated several times and the transaction reverted until the randomly chosen reward is of advantage to the user.

However, this issue is of very low severity because the reward of such an attack would be very minor and probably not result in an advantage.

The team may decide that random number generation in this way is acceptable in this particular case, as alternative solutions would be costly.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

DEPRECATED USE OF KECCAK256

The latest version of the Solidity compiler (version 0.4.24) warns about the usage of the function `keccak256` without a single bytes argument. In future versions this will throw an error. The following line in *RewardChest.sol* causes this warning:

```
47. uint rndReward = uint(keccak256(_tokenId, blockhash(block.number - 1))) % rewardCount  
    ;
```

It is recommended to make this code future proof.