Role of NAD

 \wedge Di' := new()

end role

 \land SND(Quj'.Tu'.Dj')

 \land PIDrprime' := xor(H(IDu.Ss), H(Ss.Bbprime')) \land Tu' := xor(PIDrprime',H(PIDr'.H(IDu.Ss).Xu'))

 \land Quj' :=H(H(IDu.Ss).Tu'.Cu'.Dj'.Xu'.IDj)

%%% Send request message M2 to ED publicly

∧ witness(ED, NAD, dj, Dj')

State' := $6 \land Cu' := new()$

%%% Freshly generated Random number b' and Di

∧ witness(ED, NAD, bprime, Bbprime') %%% Receive request message M3 to ED publicly 3. State = $4 \land RCV(Quiprime') = |>$

 \land SKuj' := H(H(IDu.Ss). Cu'. Dj. Xu. IDj) \land Qujprime' := H(SKuj.H(IDu.Ss).Dj.Xu.IDj)

%%% NAD acceptance of value Cu generated by ED for NAD

∧ request(ED, NAD, cu, Cu')

role networkdevice (ED, NAD: agent, SKus: symmetric_key, SND,RCV: channel(dy)) played_by NAD def= local State:nat, IDu, PWu, Bu, Aa, Bb, Cu, M, AB, TW: text, Lu, Xu, Yu, Fu, Zu, PIDr, Bbprime, Du: text, Buj, IDj, Quj, PIDrprime, Qujprime, Dj, Tu, SKuj, Ss, DIDu: text, H: hash func const sp1,sp2, sp3, a, b, bprime, dj, cu : protocol_id init State := 0transition %%% User Registration Phase 1. State = $0 \land RCV(\{IDu.M.TW\}_SKus) = |>$ %%% Identity IDu is shared between ED and NAD State' := $2 \land secret(\{IDu\}, sp1, \{ED,NAD\})$ %%% Password and Biometric are only know to ED \land secret({PWu,Bu}, sp2, {ED}) %%% Computation \wedge Lu' := H(M.Ss) \land Bb' := new() $\land Xu' := H(Lu'.H(Ss.Bb))$ $\land Yu' := xor(Xu', H(M.TW))$ \wedge Zu' := xor(xor(Lu',H(Ss . Bb)),TW) \wedge Fu' := H(H(IDu.TW)) \land PIDr' :={IDu.Ss.Bb}_SKus \wedge Du' := xor(H(IDu.Ss), H(IDu.TW)) ∧ SND(PIDr'. Du'. Yu'.Fu'.Zu') %%% Mutual Authentication %%% Receive login request Message M1 from ED 2. State = $2 \land RCV(PIDr. DIDu. Buj.Cu') = >$ %%% We decrytp PIDr by using master key of CCS State' := $4 \land PIDr'$:= IDu.Ss.Bb \land Lu' := xor(xor(xor(Buj,H(H(IDj.Cu'))),H(PIDr.H(IDu.Ss))),H(Ss.Bb)) $\wedge Xu' := H(Lu'.H(Ss.Bb))$ \land DIDu' := H(PIDr'.Xu'.Cu') \land Bbprime' := new()