Delay – 2AC

Counterplan is slow

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• The State Department must be scaled up in order to gain the capacity to absorb the DOD's programs. Moving the DOD's vast assistance budget to the State Department would be one of the most significant realignments of the U.S. national security agencies since the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Such a bureaucratic change will require real reform and a significant expansion in the State Department's capacity to manage and administer the substantial increase in resources, as well as demand **significant internal reform** and **reorganization**. To be clear, **State Department bureaucracy has** often **been its own biggest enemy**; it is beset by **turf battles, inefficiency, lack of clear and timely decision-making**, and **tangled lines of authority**. As it currently stands, the State Department is **far from capable** of taking on the role this report suggests. However, these barriers should become the impetus for reform, not excuses to favor the status quo. Indeed, these efforts should be undertaken with other necessary reforms at the State Department to rebuild and improve U.S. diplomatic capacity.

Planning – 2AC

Only the DOD has a cohesive doctrine to outline the goals of security cooperation.

- USG = US Government

Zaccor 5 [Colonel Albert Zaccor, Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe, "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy," 2005, *The Atlantic Council of the United States*, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf, Accessed 05/17/22]

Part III of this paper offered a definition of Security Cooperation that could be common to the entire USG, not just the Department of Defense. The USG interagency has **no** such **common definition** because it lacks a common conceptual understanding of how to translate higher level strategic guidance into specific programs designed to accomplish strategic objectives. The Department of Defense, despite its size, its diversity, and the scope of its Security Cooperation activities, **has such a common understanding.** DOD's process is not without its flaws.113 During the late 1990s and the early 21st century, however, the department has successfully established a rational set of procedures for translating the strategic guidance in the National Security, Military, and, now, Defense Strategies, into specific programs executed by the military commands, services, and defense agencies.114 This process **promotes discipline** by forcing subordinate organizations to demonstrate that their Security Cooperation activities **directly support specific objectives** in the higher-level strategies. Efforts are under way to discipline the process further by **establishing an assessment mechanism** to provide feedback on the effectiveness of programs and activities.115 One reason for the success of the DOD program is OSD's publication of periodic Security Cooperation Guidance. This document, in addition to providing authority for subordinate organizations' Security Cooperation activities (see more below), serves the purpose of an informal doctrine, stipulating not only the "what," but the "how" and the "why" of Security Cooperation.116

State Department Bad – 2AC

Blinken is incompetent

Pavlich 22 [Katie Pavlich, editor for Townhall.com and a Fox News contributor, "Pavlich: Blinken's diplomatic failure," 03/02/22, *The Hill*, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/596428-pavlich-blinkens-diplomatic-failure/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Those words served as a warning, and eight years later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has proven true McCain's assertions about his capabilities to launch America and its allies into a more dangerous world.

With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine marking Europe's first major land war in decades, just six months after the catastrophic and chaotic exit from Afghanistan, Blinken is **clearly incapable**. His **diplomatic efforts** have **repeatedly failed** in **spectacular fashion**. While Russian President Vladimir Putin's actions to invade a sovereign country are his own, a failure to deter the situation through aggressive diplomacy and proper, prioritized deployment of U.S. policy, is **Blinken's responsibility**.

For weeks the State Department warned of a Russian invasion while claiming the door to diplomacy and lines of communication were still open. Out of caution, Blinken moved State Department personnel out of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, insisting it wasn't a retreat and that talks were ongoing.

On Feb. 22, 2022, Putin announced he was sending "peacekeepers" into eastern Ukraine. Shortly afterward, bombs started dropping over Ukraine, marking the failure of U.S. State Department diplomacy with Blinken at the helm. Making matters worse, Blinken **emboldened Putin** on his way into the crisis by focusing on the **wrong priorities**.

For over a year the State Department has engaged in a large-scale campaign to hinder domestic U.S. energy production in order to appease largely worthless and expensive global climate pacts. "As Secretary of State, my job is to make sure our foreign policy delivers for the American people — by taking on the biggest challenges they face and seizing the biggest opportunities that can improve their lives. No challenge more clearly captures the two sides of this coin than climate," Blinken said during remarks in April 2021, just a few months into the new administration. "We'll put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security, as President Biden instructed us to do in his first week in office. That means taking into account how every bilateral and multilateral engagement — every policy decision — will impact our goal of putting the world on a safer, more sustainable path."

While the U.S. has cut its own domestic production and exports, it increased the amount of oil imported from Russia in 2021. The Europeans, who easily convinced President Biden and Secretary Blinken to rejoin the Paris climate agreement, furthered Russia's dominance over the continent by jumping on board with Nord Stream 2. The U.S. and Europe still need oil and gas, but to satisfy self-imposed virtue signaling emissions standards, they're buying it from hostile countries and funding war crimes. Putin is happy to sell oil that fuels his interests, especially to naive and academically driven Westerners willing to kneecap themselves along the way.

A **lack of pressure on NATO countries** to pay their committed shares to the alliance, on top of engaging in climate change alarmism and self-inflicted energy outsourcing to hostile actors, is **fueling Putin's war** against innocent Ukrainians. The European Union and U.N. are watching in

horror as civilian hospitals and maternity wards are bombed. But now, it could be too late, and direct energy sanctions haven't been deployed.

Blinken's decision to "put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security," has proven to be major and historic mistake. With one year down and two foreign policy crises already on the board, **Americans should be concerned about the diplomatic "leadership" running the State Department.**

AFF – Perm

Perm – General

Permutation do both – State Department alone fails to accomplish military objectives.

Diaz & Sadler 21 [Janae Diaz and Brent Sadler, ** Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Heritage Foundation, "Don't Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.," 06/28/21, *Breaking Defense*, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/dont-shift-security-cooperation-to-state-dept/]

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a **big mistake**, because it would minimize the Pentagon's role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program's **military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests**, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are **not** the **values** by which such security assistance programs should be s**olely judged.**

Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, **these programs should prioritize national security.** To this end, reforms should enhance **joint State and Defense authorities** so programs are evaluated in terms of America's national strategic goals.

In the existing system, State consults with Defense on its security assistance designs. Defense then implements State programs, as well as its own security cooperation programs, such as multinational military exercises and military training and advising.

The departments differ in the scope to which they apply security assistance. Defense programs target narrower national security objectives, such as the Maritime Security Initiative, launched in 2015 to expand maritime domain awareness. State's programs, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, emphasize broader regional stability and humanitarian goals. Assistance programs can be better tailored to their objectives when State shares directive authority and decision-making power with the entity most relevant to each program's purpose. For example, **when the objective is military capacity-building, the Defense Department should be an equal partner**; when the goal is justice system reform, the Department of Justice should be a full partner.

Consider how the Philippines used American-sourced coast guard cutters when responding to China's intrusions at Whitsun Reef earlier this year. Given President Biden's emphasis on strategic competition with China, strengthening partner nations to resist Beijing's maritime coercion should be a no-brainer. In this context, State should ensure it ties the objectives of its weapons sales program to Defense Department priorities, such as improving maritime domain awareness, by enabling the Philippines and, perhaps other countries, to increase patrols of exclusive economic zones.

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report's recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations.

Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging — or compelling — State to design its programs **in closer coordination with the Pentagon** and **in support of Defense Department's operational needs**, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

Congress should recognize and re-evaluate its role in these decision as well, as legislative earmarks can limit State's directive agility and responsiveness. But even the best-laid plans cannot succeed without follow-through.

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), for example, tried to catalyze cooperation between State and Defense, but it neglected assessment processes. As a result, it fell short. This pilot program required concurrence from each department on any GSCF project and offered more flexibility in program funding. But two years after the first seven projects were announced, none had materialized. State and Defense failed to clearly define timeframes and track GSCF projects against those benchmarks, only starting to implement these standards years into the program. By 2016, execution still lagged expectations, and a frustrated Congress stopped paying for the program.

Regular evaluation that prioritizes timely, tangible measures of success directly tied to U.S. strategic interests is crucial to ensuring that programs deliver on their objectives. But as the GSCF showed, implementing assessments only after problems arise is damage control, not effective program design.

In devising reforms to ensure that U.S. funds, arms, and training are directed to viable projects that serve our national strategy, it's critical to keep the main thing the main thing. State Department priorities for security assistance should emphasize specific national security objectives that enable better Defense Department forward presence, resilience and interoperability with our security partners.

Also critical is ongoing evaluation. Assessment processes should be implemented on the front end, not as an afterthought. Reforms must be carried out with the end in mind: **security assistance for security purposes.**

Perm – Cyber

Perm do both – diplomacy fails without deterrence.

Sulmeyer 18 [Michael Sulmeyer, Ph.D., director, Cyber Security Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (former Director for Plans and Operations for Cyber Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense), "U.S. Cyber Diplomacy in An Era of Growing Threats," 02/06/18, *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs No. 115-106*, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20180206/106830/HHRG-115-FA00-Transcript-20180206.pdf, Accessed: 05/19/22]

Under Chris Painter's leadership, the State Department pursued international efforts to promote norms of responsible State behavior. This effort gained momentum, especially during the latter years of the Obama administration, as did efforts to negotiate bilateral arrangements, like the U.S.-China agreement. The current administration has, thus far, for pursued more bilateral arrangements, like the one it announced with Israel last summer. Yet, my impression is that most **state behavior, not state rhetoric**, reflects a perception in international capitals that the benefits of unrestrained hacking outweigh the costs.

For the time being, the United States will likely need to focus on discrete, bilateral arrangements, while protecting U.S. interests and existing international institutions. Having a dedicated office at the State Department is crucial to pursuing both objectives. But **for diplomacy to be successful**, the United States needs to **empower its diplomats with as much leverage as possible**. One approach to creating more leverage is to **improve our ability to deter adversaries from hacking us**. In an ideal world, it would be a tremendous help if these threats could be deterred by one common approach. But the **reality is** far more **complicated**. Not all hacks are the same, so **we should not expect a one-size-fits-all model of deterrence to be successful.**

PDCP – 2AC

Perm do the counterplan – security cooperation can be State Department security assistance.

Serafino 16 [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs at Congressional Research Service, "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense," 05/26/16, *Congressional Research Service*, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf, Accessed 05/20/22]

Terminology

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are "security assistance" and "security cooperation." Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading "International Security Assistance." These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department's security assistance portfolio.

DOD **formally defines security assistance** as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

DOD uses the overarching term **"security cooperation"** to **denote** the **State Department security assistance** administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, **as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments**. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to "build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."8

PDCP – Diplomacy

Statements from DOD officials agree that security cooperation can include State Department-led diplomacy.

Cronk 21 [Terri Moon Cronk, citing Dana Stroul, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East Policy, "Defense Official Outlines U.S. Security Assistance, Cooperation in Middle East," 08/10/21, *DOD News*, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2726563/defense-official-outlines-us-security-assistance-cooperation-in-middle-east/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The State Department's diplomacy is in the lead, she said, adding that DOD programs fall within a **whole-of-government approach** to the region.

"We utilize **security cooperation** authorities and programs to expand the capabilities of willing partners to respond to urgent security needs, and invest in the institutional growth of partner forces to share the responsibility for regional security," Stroul said.

Over time, the United States' goal is to partner with self-reliant, capable and accountable partner forces who will work alongside the nation to achieve mutual objectives based on shared threats and shared interests, she said. A long-term proposition, security cooperation programs are also designed to ensure that the United States maintains access to key areas and facilities to support the defense of its partners, respond to potential contingencies, and to protect U.S. personnel, she said.

Security cooperation comprises more than military sales and funding, Stroul noted.

PDCP – Implementation

Cooperation includes State-Planned but DOD-implemented security assistance.

Arabia 21 [Christina L. Arabia, Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade, "Defense Primer: DOD "Title 10" Security Cooperation," 05/17/21, *Congressional Research Service*, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf, Accessed: 05/17/22]

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

- the transfer of defense articles and services;
- military-to-military exercises;
- military education, training, and advising; and
- capacity building of partner security forces.

SC programs are intended to encourage and enable partner nations (PNs) to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. They are considered a key tool for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These activities are executed through **both DOD-administered SC programs** (authorized under Title 10, U.S.C.) and **DOD-implemented State Department (DOS) security assistance (SA) programs** (authorized under Title 22, U.S.C). Beyond grant-based programs, SC encompasses the Foreign Military Sales program and enables U.S. and PN collaboration on defense articles. The following sections focus on DOD "Title 10" activities.

AFF – INB

AT: Generic Diplomacy

Diplomacy fails without hard power.

Nossel 22 [Suzanne Nossel, CEO of PEN America and a member of Facebook's oversight board; formerly deputy assistant secretary of state for international organizations at the U.S. State Department, "When Diplomacy Fails," 02/28/22, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-biden-eu-when-diplomacy-fails/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

A deep antipathy to armed conflict is no doubt a good thing. But in saying on the eve of Russia's incursion that "there is no alternative to diplomacy," U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres spoke rhetorically. Those who are determined to avert war **don't always get to decide whether war will happen.** That prerogative rests with those who are eager, or even reluctantly willing, to risk military conflagration.

A government's steadfast refusal to go to war doesn't mean that war won't ensue. Calm talk and delaying tactics may sometimes dissuade a violent intruder, but they don't always work. While **diplomacy and** the use of **force** are sometimes juxtaposed as binary alternatives in the news media, they **are** often **intertwined**. **The threat of force can catalyze compromise.** Failed diplomacy can devolve into war. Once war begins, diplomacy doesn't end but often escalates, with a focus on containing conflict, curbing civilian casualties, and achieving a cease-fire.

Diplomats sometimes use the metaphor of a toolbox. As Putin's troops encircled Ukraine, the Biden administration tried just about every hammer, vise, and scalpel within reach. It pursued high-level direct engagement between Biden and Putin; face-to-face negotiations with the Russians at varied levels and venues; written exchanges; packages of incentives; multilateral talks through the U.N. Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; an effort to resurrect four-party talks under the so-called Normandy Format; and diplomatic gambits by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The Biden administration spelled out the consequences of a Russian invasion explicitly in terms of punishing financial sanctions while leaving to the imagination what Biden called "swift and severe" reprisals that go well beyond that. U.S. officials worked assiduously to forge unity among Western nations, creating a remarkably united front. They made incisive use of intelligence, exposing Russia's alleged schemes to manufacture Ukrainian provocations as justification for attack and to install a pro-Kremlin Russian leader.

Normally low-key U.S. diplomats have summoned dramatic flair, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken making a last-ditch speech to the U.N. Security Council laying out Putin's purported plans in minute, riveting detail. During a Security Council meeting late last week the Indian delegation cynically abstained from a resolution deploring Russia's incursion saying, "it is a matter of regret that the path of diplomacy was given up." But, of course, the only party to give up on diplomacy was Putin himself when he ordered troops to cross the border. A majority of the Council understood that well, forcing Russia to exercise its veto in order to escape condemnation.

Timed just months after America's agonizing withdrawal from Afghanistan, Putin's march on Ukraine seemed premised on the conviction that neither Washington nor Western Europe would have the stomach to intervene militarily to defend Moscow's onetime client state. Back in December, Biden announced unequivocally that troop deployments to Ukraine were off the table.

Yet the United States continues to bulk up its military presence in Poland, Romania, and Germany, acknowledging that war isn't always easily contained. The administration has repeatedly now avowed that should Putin enter NATO territory, he will meet with the full military force of the alliance.

The Biden team rightly learned the lesson of former President Barack Obama's breached red line over chemical weapons use in Syria that once an explicit threat of force is made, failure to follow through **invites adversaries** ready to push and provoke without fear of consequences. Whether greater ambiguity on the West's part about the possibility of allied intervention to defend Ukraine's borders might have deterred Putin's designs—and perhaps pried open a diplomatic solution—is unknowable.

War has erupted in Ukraine not because diplomacy wasn't tried but because diplomacy couldn't deter a leader such as Putin, who saw advantage in an all-out invasion and is willing to tolerate the fallout. Signs that Putin is becoming unhinged and distanced from even his closest advisors underscore a risk that has loomed all along: that the Russian leader is beyond appeals to reason or logic. Nonetheless, the Biden administration and its allies now hold the moral high ground of having exhausted preventive efforts, short of preemptively trading away Ukrainian sovereignty.

AT: Democracy – IL

Security assistance backfires.

Sullivan 21 [Patricia Lynne Sullivan, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Does Security Assistance Work? Why It May Not Be the Answer for Fragile States," 11/15/21, *Modern War Institute*, https://mwi.usma.edu/does-security-assistance-work-why-it-may-not-be-the-answer-for-fragile-states/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Foreign military aid can unintentionally **tip** a post-conflict regime's **cost-benefit calculus away from** a **good governance** strategy in favor of a **restricting** and **repressing** strategy by **lowering the costs**, and **increasing the expected benefits, of repression.**

Like other types of foreign aid, military aid can **shield political leaders from the consequences of governing poorly.** Governments that rely on taxing domestic production to raise revenue have greater incentives to provide the public goods and services, including citizen security, that enable economic growth. And dependence on taxing citizens forces governments to prioritize the population's perceptions of the government's legitimacy. If the government can fund and equip state security forces with external resources, making it less dependent on taxation, **citizens have less leverage** to demand government accountability. Moreover, unlike development or humanitarian aid, military aid and arms transfers directly increase the capacity of state security forces to defend the regime against domestic threats to their survival—removing another means by which the public could hold the regime accountable.

In addition to lowering the costs and increasing the regime's capacity for repression, foreign military aid can **entrench interests hostile to political liberalization** in recipient countries. Leaders can use foreign military aid and weapons transfers to **buy the allegiance of a military elite**, ensuring their loyalty in the face of challenges from the wider citizenry. Aid thus reinforces the privileged position of the military, empowering it relative to other state institutions and giving it an incentive to work with the ruling regime to repress liberalization efforts that would redistribute power and resources away from the military. In Uganda, for instance, $2 billion a year in economic and military aid from the United States and other Western donors has enabled President Yoweri Museveni to buy the loyalty of military generals with big budgets and high-tech military equipment. In return, the country's security forces help the leader intimidate his political opposition with tactics including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and torture.

Conditioning doesn't solve – circumvented and other aid.

Darden 19 [Jessica Trisko Darden, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the School of International Service at American University, "Aiding and Abetting: U.S. Foreign Assistance and State Violence," 2019, Stanford University Press, pp. 112-113]

Recognizing the link between U.S. military assistance and repressive behavior by foreign governments, Congress **decided to make military assistance conditional** on a military's human rights behavior. Specific units that violate human rights can be excluded from future foreign assistance, but other parts of that same military may continue to receive support. This has proven to be an **imperfect solution** to a **difficult problem**. Although there are many

reasons why the collective punishment of a military for one unit's abuses is not a practical way to resolve human rights concerns, the effectiveness of any restrictions on military assistance is limited by the ability of aid recipients to divert other forms of aid toward military spending. As a result, human rights conditionality **has not created** the expected **incentives for improved human rights behavior. Nor has the actual cutoff of aid been an effective tool for punishing repressive regimes**. Time and again, congressionally mandated foreign aid cuts or restrictions are either **circumvented by the executive branch through presidential waivers** or **undermined by the continued provision of other forms of foreign aid**, such as economic assistance. Other reasons for continuing foreign assistance—be they U.S. national security interests or supposed economic need—take precedence over human rights.

AT: Democracy!

Democracy is resilient but fails

Doorenspleet 19 [Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick, "Rethinking the Value of Democracy," 2019, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 239-243]

Key Findings: Rethinking the Value of Democracy

The value of democracy has been **taken for granted** until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy's claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of **an enormous academic database** for certain keywords,6 then pruned **the thousands of articles** down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which **statistically analysed** the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes.

The first finding is that **a reverse wave away from democracy** has **not happened** (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about 'stagnation', as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed.

Another finding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The field has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been **'no consensus'** in **the quantitative literature** on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some **beneficial general outcomes**. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring **a huge amount of literature** which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefits are **not** as **strong** as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena.

The overall evidence is **weak**. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a flourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. **Most statistical studies** have not found **a strong correlation** between democracy and **interstate war** at **the dyadic level**. They show that there are other—**more powerful**—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is **a spurious one** (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is **weak**, and the causal mechanisms are **unclear** (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily **more peaceful in general**, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at **the monadic level** is **inconclusive** (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is **dangerous**. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value.

Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a 'dark side' which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly difficult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is **no linear link**: civil wars are **just as unlikely** in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is

most likely in times of political change. Democratization is **a very unpredictable, dangerous process**, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifically, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is **not the decisive factor at all** (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would **even be a very dangerous idea**, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the conflict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4).

A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fighting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically significant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of 'corruption'. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are **the poorest performers** with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats).

The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is **clear**: there is **no direct impact** of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is **too much variation** in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-fits-all approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not sufficient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5).

Overall, **the instrumental value of democracy** is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—**simply non-existent**. Democracy is **not necessarily better** than **any alternative form of government**. With regard to many of the expected benefits—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy **does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems**. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefits, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

AT: Miscalc !

Miscalculation is theoretically and empirically denied – Cuban Missile Crisis proves.

Mueller 21 [John Mueller, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of political science at The Ohio State University, "The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency," 2021, Cambridge University Press]

There were also concerns at the time that the two contestants might somehow get into a war by accident. However, the **historical record** suggests that **wars simply do not begin that way.** In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a **single case** in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "**it is difficult**," he concludes, "**to find a war which on investigation fits this description**." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, **large military units do not fight by accident**." And, after investigating 40 crises with some sort of nuclear connection, analyst Bruno Tertrais concludes, "**solid command and control arrangements, sound procedures, constant vigilance, efficient training**, and **cool-headedness of leadership** have ensured – and can continue to ensure – that **nuclear weapons** will continue to **play only a deterrence role**." And then adds: "**'Luck' has very little to do with it.**" 70

Even if an accident takes place during a crisis**, it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is inevitable**, or even very likely. As Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-**nigh limitless concern with saving face**" and/or "**a great deal of** ground-in **automaticity of response and counterresponse**." 71 None of this was in evidence during the **Cuban missile crisis** when there were **accidents galore**. An American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union**.** These events were duly evaluated and then ignored**.** Actually, the Americans had specifically decided that if a U-2 plane were shot down over Cuba, they would retaliate by destroying the antiaircraft site responsible.72 When the event came to pass, however, **the policy was simply not carried out.**73