

# Variant I Pseudocode: Adam Can play any strategy

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## 1 Introduction

Algorithm 1 computes the *Reg* of a Game  $G$  for a given value of  $b$  and a payoff function  $Val$ . The construction of  $\hat{G}$  depends on computing  $W'$  which is primarily computing  $cVal$  for each edge  $\{e = (u, v) \in G \mid u \in V_\exists\}$  such that Eve plays an alternate strategy  $\sigma'$  and  $\tau$  for Adam that maximizes the payoff for any of the alternative strategy  $\sigma'$  except the original strategy  $\sigma$ .

We then use values( $b \in W'$ ) to construct  $G^b$  with the new weight function  $\hat{w} = w(e) - b$  to construct  $\hat{G}$ . On this game it is sufficient to play a memoryless/positional strategies for either players to ensure an antagonistic value of at least(resp. at most)  $aVal(\hat{G})$ . From **Section 3 Claim 1.** we conclude that  $Reg(G) = -aVal(\hat{G})$ . Algorithm 4 initially computes the memoryless strategy for Eve and Adam where Eve looks for the edge with the highest weight and Adam plays adversarially looking for the edge with the minimum weight, to compute the  $aVal$  of the game  $\hat{G}$ . We then can compute  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$  for the game  $G$  as there is an one-to-one correspondence with strategies  $\hat{\sigma}$  and  $\hat{\tau}$  of the game  $\hat{G}$ .

## 2 Algorithms

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**Algorithm 1:** Compute Regret for Eve given Adam can play any strategy

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**Input :** A weighted game  $G = (V, V_\exists, v_I, E, w)$ ,  $b$ , and  $Val$  the payoff function  $\in \{\text{Sup, Inf, LimInf, LimSup, } \overline{MP}, \underline{MP}\}$

**Output:**  $Reg, \sigma, \tau$

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1 begin
2    $W' \leftarrow \text{ConstructWprime}(G)$ 
3    $\hat{G} \leftarrow \text{ConstructGhat}(G, W')$ 
4    $Reg, \sigma, \tau \leftarrow \text{ComputeAVal}(\hat{G}, b, Val)$ 
5 end
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**Algorithm 2:** ConstructWprime: Construct  $W'$  that represents the best value obtainable for a strategy of Eve that differs at the given edge

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**Input :** Weighted Game Arena  $G = (V, V_{\exists}, v_I, E, w)$   
**Output:** Weight function  $W'$

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1 begin
2   for  $e = (u, v) \in E$  do
3     if  $u \in V \setminus V_{\exists}$  then
4        $W'(e) \leftarrow -\infty$ 
5     end
6     else
7        $W'(e) \leftarrow \max\{cVal^{v'} \mid (u, v') \in E \setminus \{e\}\}$ 
8     end
9   end
10 end

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**Algorithm 3:** ConstructGhat: construct  $\hat{G}$

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**Input :** Weighted Game Arena  $G = (V, V_{\exists}, v_I, E, w)$  and weight function  $W'$   
**Output:**  $\hat{G}$

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1 Initialize  $v_o \in \hat{V} \setminus \hat{V}_{\exists}$ 
2 Initialize  $v_{\perp}, v_{\perp} \in \hat{V}_{\exists}$ 
3 for  $b \in \text{Range}(W') \setminus -\infty$  do
4   construct  $G^b = (V^b, V_{\exists}^b, v_I^b, E^b, \hat{w})$  |  $G^b$  is copy of  $G$  with edges  $e$ 
   restricted by  $W'(e) \leq b$ 
5 for  $e$  in  $\hat{G}$  do
6    $w(v_o, v_o) = 0$ 
7    $w(v_{\perp}, v_{\perp}) = -2w_{max} - 1$ 
8   for  $v_I^b$  in  $G^b$  do
9      $w(v_{\perp}, v_I^b) = 0$ 
10    Initialize weight function  $\hat{w}(e) \leftarrow w(e) - b$ 
11    for  $v^b \in V^b$  that don't have a successor do
12       $w(v^b, v_{\perp}) = 0$ 

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**Algorithm 4:** ComputeAVal: Compute the antagonistic value of  $\hat{G}$

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**Input :** An antagonistic game  $\hat{G}$ ,  $b$ , and  $Val$  the payoff function  
 $\in \{\text{Sup}, \text{Inf}, \text{LimInf}, \text{LimSup}, \overline{MP}, \underline{MP}\}$

**Output:**  $Reg, \sigma, \tau$

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1  $\hat{\sigma}(v_1) = v_I^b$  and avoids  $v_\perp$ 
2  $\hat{\tau}(v_o) = v_I$ 
3 for  $b \in \text{Range}(W') \setminus -\infty$  do
4   for  $u^b \in V^b$  do
5     if  $u^b \in V^b \setminus V_\exists^b$  then
6        $\hat{\tau}(u^b) = \{v^b \mid \min(\hat{w}(u^b, v^b)) \text{ and } (u^b, v^b) \in E^b\}$ 
7     end
8     else if  $u^b \in V_\exists^b$  then
9        $\hat{\sigma}(u^b) = \{v^b \mid \max(\hat{w}(u^b, v^b)) \text{ and } (u^b, v^b) \in E^b\}$ 
10    end
11  end
12 end
13  $Reg = Val_{\hat{G}}^v(\hat{\sigma}, \hat{\tau})$ 
14  $\sigma = \hat{\sigma} \setminus v_1$ 
15  $\tau = \hat{\tau} \setminus v_o$ 

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