

# FPGA-based High-Performance Parallel Architecture for Homomorphic Computing on Encrypted Data

Sujoy Sinha Roy<sup>\*†</sup>, Furkan Turan<sup>\*</sup>, Kimmo Järvinen<sup>‡</sup>, Frederik Vercauteren<sup>\*</sup> and Ingrid Verbauwhede<sup>\*</sup>

<sup>\*</sup>KU Leuven, imec-COSIC, Belgium

<sup>†</sup>University of Birmingham, School of Computer Science, United Kingdom

<sup>‡</sup>University of Helsinki, Department of Computer Science, Finland

<sup>\*</sup>firstname.lastname@esat.kuleuven.be <sup>†</sup>s.sinharoy@cs.bham.ac.uk <sup>‡</sup>kimmo.u.jarvinen@helsinki.fi

**Abstract**—Homomorphic encryption is a tool that enables computation on encrypted data and thus has applications in privacy-preserving cloud computing. Though conceptually amazing, implementation of homomorphic encryption is very challenging and typically software implementations on general purpose computers are extremely slow. In this paper we present our year long effort to design a domain specific architecture in a heterogeneous Arm+FPGA platform to accelerate homomorphic computing on encrypted data. We design a custom co-processor for the computationally expensive operations of the well-known Fan-Vercauteren (FV) homomorphic encryption scheme on the FPGA, and make the Arm processor a server for executing different homomorphic applications in the cloud, using this FPGA-based co-processor. We use the most recent arithmetic and algorithmic optimization techniques and perform design-space exploration on different levels of the implementation hierarchy. In particular we apply circuit-level and block-level pipeline strategies to boost the clock frequency and increase the throughput respectively. To reduce computation latency, we use parallel processing at all levels. Starting from the highly optimized building blocks, we gradually build our multi-core multi-processor architecture for computing. We implemented and tested our optimized domain specific programmable architecture on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit. At 200 MHz FPGA-clock, our implementation achieves over 13x speedup with respect to a highly optimized software implementation of the FV homomorphic encryption scheme on an Intel i5 processor running at 1.8 GHz.

**Keywords**—Cloud computing, privacy in cloud computing, homomorphic encryption, FV homomorphic encryption, lattice-based cryptography, polynomial multiplication, number theoretic transform, domain specific accelerator, hardware accelerator

## I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud services play an important role in our everyday life. When we update our Facebook status, check bank balance or upload photos on Instagram, we use cloud computers. In business applications, cloud services can be used for storing and processing information, analyzing big-data, providing an environment for test and development, supporting cost-effective disaster recovery, backing up files and so on [1]. However, cloud computing raises privacy issues. To compute on the data using cloud services, we need to deliver our data unencrypted. Since a cloud computer is a third-party

resource, the owner of the cloud can see, use or abuse the unencrypted data. For instance, our internet search engine shows advertisements for cheap hotels or car rental just after searching for a flight. A cloud service provider may analyze business data of its clients for its own gain! Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a tool to prevent invasion of users' privacy while keeping the conveniences offered by the cloud services. HE enables computation on encrypted data: users can upload their encrypted data to the cloud, and yet perform computations while it is kept encrypted (hidden from cloud owner). Some of the many interesting HE applications are: privacy-preserving services for information storage and processing in business and health-care applications [2], encrypted web-search engine [3], electronic voting, and privacy-preserving prediction from consumption data in smart electricity meters [4], machine learning on encrypted data [5] etc.

**State of the art:** Though, HE was conceptualized by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [6] almost 40 years ago in 1977, the construction of a HE scheme that can compute 'complex' operations on encrypted data was an open problem until 2009 when Gentry came up with the first construction of such a scheme [7]. The first generation of HE schemes including Gentry's were extremely slow, hence did not provide a practical solution. Current generation HE schemes [8], [9] increased the performance by orders of magnitude; however, their software implementations are still very slow. Recent implementation in a high-end GPU [10] reduce the computation time by several factors. Hardware accelerators offer parallel processing capabilities to achieve fast computation time. In the literature there are several reported hardware implementation that try to speedup performance of HE schemes [11]–[21]. Several of these reported implementations report only simulation based results. An actual hardware implementation requires additional building blocks to perform memory management, synchronization of parallel cores, and reliable interfacing with a host processor, etc. This makes implementation of complex HE schemes in hardware very challenging.

## Our contributions:

During the Turing 2018 Award Ceremony, Hennessy and Patterson pointed out that domain-specific architectures are going to be the computer architectures of the future as the performances of general-purpose computers are touching their limits. As HE is so complex, such general-purpose devices fail to satisfy a practical application. Therefore, we propose a domain-specific architecture for HE, implemented on an Arm+FPGA heterogeneous platform, that could accelerate homomorphic computations on encrypted data in cloud installations.

The hardware is used to accelerate the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) scheme which is a popular HE scheme and has been implemented in several software libraries, e.g. FV-NFLlib from CryptoExperts [22] and SEAL from Microsoft [23]. Its hardware implementation poses unique challenges as it depends on dozens of modules in the design-hierarchy and their careful integration. High performance is obtained by minimizing the number of clock cycles with the help of parallel processing, and at the same time boosting the clock frequency with a pipelined datapath design. In addition, multiple processors are instantiated at the higher level to distribute the computation.

We study the mathematical steps used in the sub-routines, analyze data dependencies and apply circuit-level pipeline strategy when constructing the building blocks for the complex sub-routines. At the higher level where the building blocks are connected, we apply a block-level pipeline strategy and an optimized task-scheduling to increase the throughput. To reduce the number of cycles, we instantiate multiple processing elements inside the building blocks after taking care of the data dependencies. Starting from these fast building blocks, we gradually construct our multi-core processor architecture and implement it in FPGA to compute homomorphic operations on encrypted data.

We designed the hardware and its software counterpart in a Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit [24] and verified its correctness. With these optimization, our domain specific hardware architecture achieves 400 homomorphic multiplications per second at 200 MHz FPGA-clock, including hardware-software communication overhead. This is over 13x faster than a FV-NFLlib based highly optimized software running on an Intel i5 processor at 1.8 GHz clock frequency.

Last but not least, we make the source codes of our domain-specific accelerator architecture and documentation available on <https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/HEAT>.

The organization of this paper is as follows: A mathematical background on homomorphic encryption is provided in Sec. II. The parameters for the system are presented in Sec. III. Sec. IV discusses the design decisions, approaches and algorithms used. Architecture details are provided in Sec. V and the implementation results shown in Sec. VI. The final section draws the conclusions.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. Homomorphic encryption

A homomorphic encryption scheme is an augmented encryption scheme with two additional routines `HE.Add()` and `HE.Mult()` to perform add or multiply on encrypted data. Due to its mathematical *homomorphism*, the result is still an encrypted data (called *ciphertext*) encrypting the sum or respectively the product of the plaintexts. Users can upload their ciphertext in an untrusted cloud and still perform computations on their ciphertext without the need for decryption.

Existing HE schemes are ‘noisy’ in nature. Noise is used to hide the message during encryption. With every homomorphic evaluation on the ciphertext, the noise in the result-ciphertext increases. There is also a noise threshold beyond which further homomorphic evaluations would result in decryption failures. This threshold value is called the ‘depth’ of the homomorphic scheme and it is determined by the choice of parameter set (e.g. length of data structures and size of coefficients etc.). In a simplistic view, ‘depth’ of a homomorphic encryption scheme is analogous to ‘critical path’ of a circuit. An HE scheme that supports a limited number of evaluations on ciphertext is called ‘Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE).’ When an HE supports unlimited number of evaluations on ciphertext, it is called ‘Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)’ scheme. Existing constructions of FHE schemes start from a SHE scheme and use a complicated mechanism known as ‘bootstrapping’ on top to reduce the noise in the result. Though conceptually amazing, this bootstrapping mechanism requires a very large parameter set which adds a drastic performance penalty. In most real-life applications, the complexity (i.e., the depth) is bounded and hence application of SHE instead of FHE makes more sense. In the following sub-section, we briefly describe the well-known FV [9] SHE scheme for which we have constructed our domain-specific high-performance computer architecture.

### B. FV SHE scheme

The FV SHE scheme was introduced by Fan and Vercauteren [9] in 2012. Like all other SHE schemes, FV performs ‘complicated’ mathematical operations. In this paper, we only provide a high-level description of the scheme, while details can be found in the original FV paper [9]. The FV scheme augments a Ring Learning With Errors (ring-LWE) public-key encryption scheme with two additional functions `Add` and `Mult` to perform addition and multiplication respectively on ciphertext. The encryption and decryption operations are described using a block diagram in Fig. 1.

All computations are performed in a polynomial ring  $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle f(x) \rangle$  with reduction polynomial  $f(x) = \Phi_d(x)$ , the  $d$ -th cyclotomic polynomial of degree  $n = \varphi(d)$ . The ring is denoted as  $R_q$  when the coefficients of the polynomials reduced to modulo  $q$  which is an integer. All variables shown in Fig. 1 are degree  $n - 1$  polynomials. The public key is the pair  $(p_0, p_1)$  and the private is  $s$ . During encryption, the message  $m$  is encoded, three polynomials  $(u, e_1, e_2)$  are sampled from an error distribution (typically a discrete Gaussian




Fig. 1. FV encryption and decryption.

distribution) and then polynomial additions and multiplications are performed to generate the ciphertext  $c$  which consists of two polynomials  $(c_0, c_1) \in (R_q, R_q)$  with coefficients modulo  $q$ . In practice, the coefficients of  $u$  are uniformly random signed binary numbers. The decryption performs a polynomial multiplication followed by an addition and finally decoding. The security of the encryption scheme relies on the ring-LWE problem which states that, given many tuples  $(a_i, b_i) \in (R_q, R_q)$ , where  $b_i = a_i \cdot s + e_i$ ,  $a_i$  is uniformly random, and  $s$  and  $e_i$  are unknown polynomials sampled from a proper error distribution, it is computationally unfeasible to compute the secret  $s$ .

Now we describe the **Add** and **Mult** functions that enable computation on ciphertext. Note that these are the two functions that are executed in the cloud and our hardware accelerator targets them. Let us consider two ciphertexts  $c_0 = (c_{0,0}, c_{0,1})$  and  $c_1 = (c_{1,0}, c_{1,1})$ . **FV.Add** simply adds the polynomials of the two input ciphertexts and outputs the result ciphertext  $c = (c_{0,0} + c_{1,0}, c_{0,1} + c_{1,1})$ . **FV.Mult** is the most complicated operation and it determines the noise growth in the ciphertext. The steps are shown using a block diagram in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2. FV homomorphic multiplication.

The **FV.Mult** uses additional routines, namely  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$ ,  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$ , **WordDecomp** and **ReLin**, besides polynomial addition and multiplication.  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  is used to lift the polynomials to  $R_Q$  from  $R_q$  where  $Q$  is a much larger modulus than  $q$  and is in the order of  $\mathcal{O}(n \cdot q^2)$ .  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  works in the reverse way, i.e., it scales polynomials from  $R_Q$  to  $R_q$ . **WordDecomp** is used to decompose a polynomial, say  $a \in R_q$ , in base  $w$  by slicing each coefficient of  $a$ . It returns a vector of polynomials (as shown using ‘bold’ font in Fig. 2). A toy example of **WordDecomp** follows. If the polynomial  $a(x) = 43 + 39x + \dots$  with 6-bit coefficient

size is decomposed in base  $w = 2^4$ , then it outputs a vector consisting of two polynomials  $a_0(x) = -5 + 7x + \dots$  and  $a_1(x) = 3 + 2x + \dots$ , where  $a(x) = a_0(x) + 2^4 \cdot a_1(x)$ . Hence **WordDecomp** is a cheap operation as it requires only bit-level manipulation. **ReLin** takes the vector of polynomials generated by **WordDecomp** as input and uses a special ‘relinearization’ key  $\text{rlk} = (\text{rlk}_0, \text{rlk}_1)$  which is a fixed vector of polynomials, and computes a relinearised ciphertext  $\mathbf{c} = \{c_0, c_1\} \in \{R_q, R_q\}$ , where  $c_0 = \tilde{c}_0 + \text{SOP}(\tilde{\mathbf{c}}_2, \text{rlk}_0)$  and  $c_1 = \tilde{c}_1 + \text{SOP}(\tilde{\mathbf{c}}_2, \text{rlk}_1)$ . Here **SOP** stands for summation of products.

### III. SYSTEM SETUP

#### A. Parameter set

The multiplicative depth, i.e., the maximum number of homomorphic multiplications in the critical path that can be performed before the noise crosses the threshold value, is determined by the parameter set of the implementation. Larger parameter set implies greater multiplicative depth. In this paper we design our domain specific processor architecture to support applications with small multiplicative depth, say up to 4. This multiplicative depth is enough to support several statistical applications such as privacy-friendly forecasting for the smart grid [4], evaluation of low-complexity block cipher such as Rasta [25] on ciphertext, private information retrieval or encrypted search in a table of  $2^{16}$  entries, encrypted sorting etc. To achieve a multiplicative depth of four and at least 80-bit security [26], we set the size of modulus  $q$  to 180-bit, the length of polynomials to 4096 coefficients, the standard deviation of the error distribution to 102 and the width of the larger modulus  $Q$  to at least 372-bit.

#### B. Residue number system

Designing a high-performance domain specific processor architecture that supports polynomial arithmetic having 4096 coefficients, each of size 180 or 372-bit is indeed very challenging. The best performance can be achieved in hardware if we could leverage the hardware’s inherent parallelism. Among different levels of abstractions, parallelism at the algorithm-level leads to the best performance and eases the implementation of a parallel architecture. A Residue Number System (RNS) offers algorithm-level parallelism in long modular arithmetic. Let the modulus  $q$  a product of coprimes  $q = \prod q_i$ . RNS represents a large integer modulo  $q$  using a set of smaller integers modulo  $q_i$ . Arithmetic on the large integer gets mapped into multiple smaller arithmetic operations modulo  $q_i$  which can be computed in parallel. RNS relies on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) which follows.

**Theorem 1:** Given pairwise coprime positive integers  $q_i$  and arbitrary integers  $a_i$ , the system of simultaneous congruences  $\{x \equiv a_i \pmod{q_i}\}$  has a solution, and the solution is unique modulo  $q = \prod q_i$ .

The general way to construct the solution is to compute  $x \equiv \sum a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \cdot q_i^* \pmod{q}$ , where  $q_i^* = \frac{q}{q_i}$  and  $\tilde{q}_i = (q_i^*)^{-1} \pmod{q_i}$  are constants. On the other hand, given an integer  $a \pmod{q}$ , we can get a representation in RNS just by computing

the residues  $a \bmod q_i$ . We use 30-bit primes to construct the RNS for our implementation. The modulus  $q$  is taken as a product of six 30-bit primes, thus  $q$  is 180-bit. The larger modulus  $Q$  is taken as a product of  $q$  and additional seven 30-bit primes and thus  $Q$  is a 390-bit integer. Let  $p = Q/q$  is the product of the last seven primes. A polynomial in  $R_q$  (or  $R_Q$ ) is represented using six (or 13) residue polynomials in  $R_{q_i}$ . In the FV scheme, polynomial arithmetic operations such as additions or multiplications can be performed efficiently by processing the residue polynomials in parallel.

Though the application of RNS speeds up computation, it has a major bottleneck. In the FV scheme,  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  operations require switching from one RNS to another as the coefficients are moved from modulo  $q$  to modulo  $Q$  or vice versa. This requires ‘merging’ of the parallel residue polynomials using the general method described for Theorem 1.

#### IV. APPROACH AND ALGORITHMS

The unique challenges that we faced while constructing the high-performance architecture and the design decisions that we took to address them are described here. As described in Sec. II, an application computes on encrypted data using homomorphic addition (**Add**) and multiplication (**Mult**) operations. Implementation of **Add** is easy as it requires only coefficient-wise addition of the ciphertexts. The actual challenge lies in the implementation of **Mult** which performs a set of costly modular arithmetic operations as shown in Fig. 2.

##### A. HW/SW codesign and task partition.

To design our domain specific architecture, we follow a hardware-software (HW/SW) codesign approach since it offers the flexibility of software and the efficiency of hardware. As the target platform, we chose the heterogeneous Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit which has an FPGA coupled with Arm processors. HW/SW partitioning is performed after analyzing the requirement of flexibility, cost of computation and overhead of communication. We introduced domain-specific programmability in the FPGA to accelerate costly polynomial operations. This gives flexibility to the Arm processor to support various cloud computing applications. In [4] it was shown that the maximum time is spent on computing **Mult** in the privacy-friendly prediction application for smart grids. Hence, we focused on accelerating the **Mult** using the FPGA. **Add** can be implemented in either software or hardware since it is both a basic and fixed operation. We actually implement the **Add** in hardware as we found the software to be slow by an order of magnitude.

##### B. Polynomial multiplication.

In our parameter set, the polynomials consist of 4096 coefficients. For such large polynomials, computation time is significantly determined by the complexity of the polynomial multiplication algorithm. A survey of fast polynomial multiplication algorithms can be found in [27]. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) based polynomial multiplication has the lowest time

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#### Algorithm 1 Iterative NTT [28]

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**Input:** Polynomial  $a(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$  of degree  $n - 1$  and  $n$ -th primitive root  $\omega_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q$  of unity

**Output:** Polynomial  $A(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x] = \text{NTT}(a)$

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1:  $A \leftarrow \text{BitReverse}(a)$  ▷ permutation of coefficients
2: for  $m = 2$  to  $n$  by  $m = 2m$  do
3:    $\omega_m \leftarrow \omega_n^{n/m}$ 
4:    $\omega \leftarrow 1$ 
5:   for  $j = 0$  to  $m/2 - 1$  do ▷ butterfly loop
6:     for  $k = 0$  to  $n - 1$  by  $m$  do
7:        $t \leftarrow \omega \cdot A[k + j + m/2]$ 
8:        $u \leftarrow A[k + j]$ 
9:        $A[k + j] \leftarrow u + t$ 
10:       $A[k + j + m/2] \leftarrow u - t$ 
11:     end for
12:      $\omega \leftarrow \omega \cdot \omega_m$ 
13:   end for
14: end for
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complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ . During a polynomial multiplication, Fourier transform is applied on the input polynomials to bring them to the Fourier domain. In the Fourier domain, multiplication is a coefficient-wise operation. Finally, an inverse Fourier transform is required to bring the result back to polynomial representation. FFT and inverse-FFT are fast methods that compute the transformations in  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ . More information about FFT-based polynomial multiplication can be found in [28]. However, FFT and inverse-FFT perform arithmetic using real numbers and thus suffer from approximation errors, which are not desired in cryptographic applications. Instead of FFT, we use the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) which is a generalization of FFT and performs only integer arithmetic. An iterative version of the NTT algorithm is shown in Alg. 1. The coefficients of the input polynomial are permuted first using the  $\text{BitReverse}()$  function; then there are three nested loops. Inside the inner-most loop, the ‘butterfly operation’, which consists of a modular multiplication by constants  $\omega$  followed by modular addition and subtraction, is performed.

##### C. $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$

In this step a polynomial in  $R_q$  is lifted to the ring  $R_Q$  with the larger modulus  $Q$ . If RNS is not used, i.e., if traditional 180-bit big-integer representation is used, then this lifting is free of cost as a coefficient which is in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is also in  $\mathbb{Z}_Q$ . However, we use the RNS representation and represent each coefficient using six 30-bit residues (as described in Sec. III-B) to leverage parallel processing. The RNS basis of  $Q$  is an extension of the RNS basis of  $q$  by seven more primes. Thus, to lift a coefficient from the RNS of  $q$  to the RNS of  $Q$ , we need to compute the additional residues. In the following we describe two ways to compute  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$ . We design hardware architectures for both methods and compare performances.

**Using traditional CRT:** Let a coefficient  $a$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is represented in the RNS using the residues  $a_i$  where the RNS-base is composed of the primes  $q_i$ .

The first step is to construct the simultaneous solution modulo  $q$  from the RNS representation applying the CRT (Theorem 1) as shown below.

$$a \equiv \sum_{i=0}^5 a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \cdot q_i^* - v \cdot q \quad (1)$$

Here  $v$  is the rounded quotient after dividing the sum of products  $\sum a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \cdot q_i^*$  by  $q$ . This computation involves long-integer multiplications by  $q_i^*$ , followed by long integer additions, and finally one long-integer division. After this reconstruction, the extended RNS basis (in modulus  $Q$ ) is obtained by computing the additional residues  $a \bmod q_j$  for  $6 \leq j \leq 12$ . Again, these reductions by  $q_j$  require costly multi-precision arithmetic.

**Using approximate CRT:** This is a new algorithm proposed by Halevi, Polyakov and Shoup in 2018 [29]. From now on we refer this optimized method as the ‘HPS method’. The algorithm avoids long integer arithmetic by introducing approximation in the calculation of the quotient  $v$ . The algorithm computes the simultaneous solution in a way different than in Eq. 1.

$$a \equiv \sum (a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \bmod q_i) \cdot q_i^* - v' \cdot q \quad (2)$$

Here  $v' = \lceil (\sum (a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \bmod q_i) \cdot q_i^*) / q \rceil$  and after a simplification [29] it becomes  $v' = \lceil \sum \frac{a_i \cdot \tilde{q}_i \bmod q_i}{q_i} \rceil$ . Note that, each of  $a_i$ ,  $q_i$  and  $\tilde{q}_i$  is a 30-bit integer. The approximation is introduced during the division by  $q_i$ . Using IEEE 754 double floats data type, one can bound the approximation error to  $2^{-53}$  [29]. This negligible error has in practice no impact on the correctness of HE.

#### D. *Scale* $Q \rightarrow q$

In this step the coefficients of a polynomial in  $R_Q$  are scaled down and the result is a polynomial in  $R_q$  with smaller modulus  $q$ . This scaling down operation takes a coefficient, say  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_Q$ , and performs a division followed by a rounding operation to get an intermediate scaled coefficient  $\lceil \frac{t \cdot a}{q} \rceil$  where  $t$  is the plaintext modulus (e.g., 2 for binary messages). Finally a modular reduction by  $q$  is performed to get the corresponding coefficient of the result polynomial in  $R_q$ . As we represent the input coefficients using RNS, we need to compute the simultaneous solution modulo  $Q$  to perform the division operation. We have two approaches. The first approach uses long integer arithmetic to compute these steps. The second approach [29] shows an ingenious way to compute the result without using long integer arithmetic in the following two major steps.

- 1) First  $\lceil \frac{t \cdot a}{q} \rceil$  is computed in the RNS of  $p$  using arithmetic of small numbers. This step computes  $\lceil \frac{t \cdot a}{q} \rceil \bmod q_j = \lceil \sum_{i=0}^5 a_i \cdot \frac{t \cdot \tilde{Q}_i p}{q_i} \rceil + a_j \cdot t \tilde{Q}_j q_j^* \bmod q_j$  for  $6 \leq j \leq 12$ . Here  $\tilde{Q}_k = (Q/q_k)^{-1} \bmod q_k$  for  $k = i$  and  $k = j$ . In the actual computation, the constants are also 30-bit

integers as the computation is performed modulo 30-bit primes  $q_j$ .

- 2) Finally, a basis switching from the RNS of  $p$  to the RNS of  $q$  is performed using *Lift* $_{q \rightarrow Q}$ .

We design two architectures for the two approaches for computing *Scale* $_{Q \rightarrow q}$  and compare their performances.

### V. ARCHITECTURE DETAILS

At the highest level of abstraction, our architecture for computing on ciphertext is composed of two parts: a software part running on the multi-core Arm processor, and an instruction-set coprocessor on the FPGA. The coprocessor accelerates custom homomorphic operations. It is composed of three main components: polynomial arithmetic unit, lifting-and-scaling unit and memory file.

#### A. *Polynomial arithmetic unit*

This unit is responsible for computing addition, subtraction and multiplication on the residue polynomials. It has been designed to achieve maximum parallel processing capability. The first level of parallelism is achieved using dedicated ‘Residue Polynomial Arithmetic Unit’ (RPAUs) leveraging the parallelism inherently in the RNS representation. Another level of parallelism is obtained by instantiating multiple parallel residue arithmetic cores within each RPAU.

1) *Choice for number of RPAUs:* The RNS of  $q$  and  $Q$  are composed of six and thirteen primes respectively. If we keep one RPAU dedicated to each prime, then we achieve the maximum parallelism. But, computation is performed most of the time in the RNS of  $q$  and as a consequence the seven RPAUs for the last seven primes would remain idle most of the time. We keep only  $\lceil 13/2 \rceil = 7$  RPAUs in the architecture where each one (except the last) is resource-shared by two primes. E.g., the first RPAU is shared by  $q_0$  and  $q_6$ , the second by  $q_1$  and  $q_7$ , and so on. The last RPAU is used only by  $q_{12}$  as the total number of primes used in our implementation is 13 which is an odd integer. With this configuration, arithmetic in the RNS of  $q$  is computed in a single batch using the first six RPAUs. Arithmetic in the RNS of  $Q$  is computed in two batches: the first batch is for the primes  $q_0$  to  $q_5$  and the last batch is for the primes  $q_6$  to  $q_{12}$ .

2) *Choice for number of cores in RPAU:* It is easy to observe that the NTT computation in Alg. 1 is amiable to parallel processing. It appears that using  $c$  number of cores we could reduce the computation time roughly by a factor  $c$ . However, the algorithm level parallelism is bottlenecked by memory access. Block RAMs (BRAMs) are ideal for storing large arrays of coefficients in FPGAs. In our target Zynq FPGA [24], each BRAM36K slice can store an array of 1024 elements where each element is of size 36 bits. A BRAM36K comes with two ports for memory access and thus we can read/write two coefficients per cycle. In our implementation, a residue polynomial (4096 coefficients) is stored using four BRAM36K slices. During NTT, one port of a BRAM36K slice is used for reading and the another port is used for writing. Since a residue polynomial is distributed in

four BRAM36K slices, the maximum memory access rate is eight coefficients per cycle. In Alg. 1, the butterfly operation consumes a pair of coefficients and produces another pair of coefficients. Hence, we set the number of butterfly cores to two to achieve maximum efficiency in the read-compute-write stream: four coefficients (two pairs) are read, then they are processed using the two butterfly cores, and finally the output four coefficients are written back every cycle.

We like to remark that the number of parallel RPAUs and the number of butterfly cores are also dependent on the amount of resources available in the target hardware platform. In our FPGA we could fit the above mentioned numbers and thus achieve a heavily parallel coprocessor architecture.

3) *Memory access scheme for parallel NTT*: NTT has a complex memory access pattern due to loop-dependent index gap between the two coefficients that are processed in the butterfly steps (see Alg. 1). When parallel butterfly cores are used, memory access pattern becomes even more complex and this might lead to memory access conflicts; e.g., two cores are trying to read or write simultaneously in the same BRAM. Furthermore, if the two coefficients  $A[k+j]$  and  $A[k+j+m/2]$  in line 9 and 10 of Alg. 1 reside in the same BRAM, then their reads must be performed sequentially over the single read port. Hence, a special memory access scheme is needed to tackle these two issues. In [20] a single core memory-efficient NTT algorithm was constructed that overcomes the second bottleneck by keeping the two required coefficients ( $A[k+j]$  and  $A[k+j+m/2]$ ) together in a same word of the memory. Thus, a single read operation brings the paired coefficients to the arithmetic unit. In our implementation we store the paired coefficients in the same memory word [30] and construct a dual core NTT algorithm that overcomes the first bottleneck, i.e., access conflict.

As two coefficients are stored in the same word, the virtual depth of the memory becomes 2048 and the virtual word size becomes 60 bits. The memory unit is composed of two blocks (vertical brown rectangles in Fig. 3), each containing 1024 words of 60-bit size. The lower block is accessed for the address range 0 to 1023 and the upper block is accessed for the address range 1024 to 2047. Within each brown block, two BRAM36Ks are aligned, i.e., they have a common read address bus, a common write address bus and a common write enable signal. These brown blocks can be accessed in parallel.

The pattern of memory reads during the execution of our dual core NTT algorithm is shown in Fig. 3. Write operations during NTT have the same pattern, and hence they are not shown in the figure. Read requests by the first and the second butterfly cores are indicated using  $R$  and  $R'$  respectively with the sequence numbers. The access pattern changes depending on the outer-most loop variable  $m$  in Alg. 1.

From  $m = 2$  (start of NTT) till  $m = 1024$ , the maximum index-gap between two consecutive read/write addresses is 512. Hence, the memory addresses requested by the first and the second butterfly cores are exclusively within the ranges  $[0, 1023]$  and  $[1024, 2047]$  respectively. Naturally, the first core reads/writes the lower memory block and the other core




Fig. 3. Memory access during two-core NTT.

reads/writes the upper memory block without causing any conflict.

For  $m = 2048$ , the index-gap is 1024. As a consequence, each core now reads/writes both memory blocks. We eliminate memory access conflicts by inverting the order of address requests generated by the second core. This is explained as follows. The first core reads addresses in the sequence 0 (lower memory block), 1024 (upper memory block), 1 (lower memory block), 1025 (upper memory block), and so on; whereas the other core reads addresses in the sequence 1536 (upper memory block), 512 (lower memory block), 1537 (upper memory block), 513 (lower memory block), and so on. The first sequence accesses the lower memory first whereas the second sequence accesses the other. This allocation avoids memory access conflicts.

The last loop in the NTT ( $m = 4096$ ) is executed ‘one memory word at a time’ following [30] and hence the two cores exclusively read/write the lower and upper memory blocks respectively.

4) *Architecture of NTT core*: Our NTT algorithm applies parallel processing on top of the single thread memory-efficient NTT algorithm presented by Roy et al. [30], so our architecture for the NTT computation has some similarities with their architecture. One difference is that [30] designs the architecture for computing public-key encryption where the polynomials are typically 256 or 512 coefficients long. Since our target is to speedup homomorphic multiplications, where polynomials are much larger, instead of computing the constant twiddle factors, we store them using on-chip memory to save cycles. This decision also eliminates bubble-cycles in the pipeline data-path of NTT computation. Pipeline bubbles are caused due to the data dependencies of the butterfly steps on the twiddle factors. Previous work [20] reports that 20% cycles are lost as bubble-cycles during NTT computation. Hence, our choice of storing the twiddle factors is reasonable for speeding up the slow homomorphic multiplication.






Fig. 4. Architecture of NTT Core.

In Fig. 4 we show the architecture diagram of a single NTT arithmetic core. The integer multiplier is a 30x30 multiplier, implemented using DSP slices. The result from the multiplier, which is a 60 bit integer, is reduced by a prime  $q_i$  using the modular reduction block.

Among all the computation blocks in Fig. 4, the modular reduction circuit is the costliest one. It can be designed in several ways and selection of the right algorithm is a key to the best performance. In our implementation, each NTT core should support arithmetic modulo two primes as explained in Sec. V-A1. Hence, we need a ‘generic’ modular reduction algorithm. ‘Barrett reduction’ [31] is one such algorithm and is used in [20]. However a Barrett reduction circuit is costly as it requires computation of several multiplications.

In our implementation we use a sliding window method that reduces the input integer step-by-step. With a sliding window size of 6-bits, a table called ‘reduction table’ containing 64 integers  $w \cdot 2^{30} \bmod q_i$  for  $w = 0$  to  $w = 63$  is used. At a time, the sliding window selects the most significant 6 bits of operand integer and reduces them with the help of the reduction table. This iterative process continues until the intermediate result becomes a 31-bit integer. Obtaining the final reduced result might require a subtraction of  $q_i$  or  $2q_i$  from the intermediate result. In our implementation, these sequential steps are fully unrolled to achieve a bit-parallel modular reduction. Pipeline registers are inserted in between several of these steps to achieve a high clock frequency.

A pipeline strategy is also applied in the other arithmetic circuits (multiplier, adder and subtractor). The pipelined circuits are shown in green border in Fig. 4.

#### B. Architecture of $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$

In Sec. IV-C we described two ways to compute the  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$ . We implement architectures for both ways.

1) *Architecture for traditional  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$* : The first architecture uses long integer arithmetic and follows the design methodology presented in [20]. The flow of sequential and parallel computation steps is shown using block diagrams in




Fig. 5. Architecture of  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  using multi-precision arithmetic.

Fig. 5. Long integer arithmetic is performed in the lower two blocks that compute  $sop$  and division by  $q$  respectively. Though shown in the flow diagram, the constant computations such as  $q_i \cdot q_i^*$  are not performed in the actual implementation as these values are stored in tables to minimize the time requirement. Following [20] the division by  $q$  is performed by multiplying  $sop$  with the reciprocal of  $q$ .

We apply a block-level pipeline strategy to improve throughput. In such an architecture, the maximum throughput is determined by the slowest component in the pipeline processing. The division block is the slowest among all blocks and hence it determines the throughput. Other blocks in the Fig. 5 have been designed to match the throughput of the division block.

2) *Architecture for new HPS [29]  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$* : We propose the first hardware implementation of  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  using the new HPS [29] method that does not perform long integer arithmetic. The flow of its sequential and parallel steps are identified in Fig. 6. From the flow diagram we see that the best processing time can be obtained if all the blocks are computed in pipeline. Hence, we implement a block-level pipeline architecture and achieve high-level parallel processing.

The HPS optimization replaces costly long-integer arithmetic by multiple small-integer operations. This gives us the opportunity to introduce additional *within-block* parallel processing. We design the individual blocks to have a processing time of seven cycles at most, since the output is a set of seven residues. ‘Block 2’ is the most expensive since it computes seven summation-of-products, where each summation involves six products. Hence to speedup ‘Block 2’, we keep seven parallel Multiply-and-Accumulate (MAC) circuits in it.

The other blocks have less computation load and hence they process the input operands sequentially. For e.g., ‘Block 1’ multiplies the input  $a_i$  by  $q_i$  one by one taking six cycles; the last block computing the result residues one by one in total seven cycles.

In ‘Block 3’ the divisions by  $q_i$  are performed. The original




Fig. 6. Architecture of  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  using small number arithmetic.

HPS paper [29] uses floating point divisions for this purpose. We do not use any costly floating point unit and compute the divisions as multiplications by the reciprocals  $1/q_i$ . This leads to simplified architecture and faster processing. The constant reciprocals are stored in the ROM memory with a precision of 89-bits after the decimal point. Actually the first 29 bits after the decimal point in each reciprocal  $1/q_i$  are all-zeros. Hence, the multiplications are actually computed between 30-bit  $a'_i$  and 60 non-zero bits of  $1/q_i$ . The probability of getting an approximation error in this way is less than  $2^{-80}$ , whereas it is  $2^{-53}$  in the original HPS paper [29].




Fig. 7. Generic architecture for multiplication based building blocks used in Fig. 6.

Fig. 7 shows a generic architecture for the building blocks used in Fig. 6 to multiply with or without accumulation. Two optional data-paths with or without accumulation are shown in blue and red color respectively. The constants are kept in on-chip memory. We also apply low-level pipeline strategy to improve the clock frequency of the basic arithmetic circuits namely, integer multiplier, modular reduction, modular adder/subtractor etc. In this way, two levels of pipeline strategies (i.e., block and low-level) are applied to achieve the best performance. Buffer registers are placed in between blocks when needed for synchronizing the flow of computation.

### C. Architecture of $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$

We describe two architectures to implement the  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  operation. The first architecture uses multi-precision arithmetic and follows the design methodology of [20]. The flow of sequential and parallel computation steps is shown in Fig. 8. ‘Block 3’ is the costliest, computing division by  $q$ . Here  $t$  is the plaintext modulus (e.g., 2 for binary messages). Again, the division is performed by multiplying the dividend by the reciprocal of  $q$ . Since,  $a$  is 390 bit large, the precision of the reciprocal should be larger than 571. Note that division by  $q$  is also performed in Fig. 5 during the  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  operation. Since  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  are not computed simultaneously, the division architecture is resource-shared by the both operations. The cycle count of the division operation during  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  is almost four times larger than the division operation during  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  as the precision of the reciprocal and the width of the dividend both are two times larger. The other blocks have been designed to have similar cycle count as Block 3. We apply block-level pipeline strategy to increase the throughput.

Now we propose the first hardware implementation of  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  using the HPS [29] method. The flow of its sequential and parallel steps are identified in Fig. 9. Similar to the previous optimized  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  architecture, we apply block-level pipeline strategy to achieve high-level parallelism. ‘Block 1’ and ‘Block 2’ compute summation of products using MAC




Fig. 8. Architecture of  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  using multi-precision arithmetic.




Fig. 9. Architecture of  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  using small number arithmetic.

circuits (without modular reduction in Fig. 7). The constants  $I_i$  and  $R_i$  in these two blocks stand for the integer and real parts of the constants  $\frac{tQ_i p}{q_i}$  respectively. The reals  $R_i$  are stored with 60-bit precision after the decimal point. ‘Block 3’ uses the circuit of Fig. 7 with the red data-path. The final block in the flow diagram receives seven residues in the RNS of  $p$ . It then reuses the  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  architecture of Fig. 6 to compute the residues in the RNS representation of  $q$ . As the block-level pipelined architecture of Fig. 6 computes in seven cycles, the remaining blocks of the  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  architecture in Fig. 9 have been designed to compute in seven cycles.

Since several of the building blocks in the  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  architectures use ‘multiplication and accumulation’ type operations, one design option is to realize a resource-shared architecture so that the similar or somewhat similar operations can be executed. This approach would reduce the area requirement and increase the computation time significantly. In our architecture we keep the building blocks separate to apply block-level pipeline processing.

Block diagram of the instruction-set coprocessor showing the connections of the seven RPAUs, two parallel cores for  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  and the memory file (shown using rectangles M) is shown in Fig. 10.




Fig. 10. Block diagram of coprocessor for computing homomorphic operations






Fig. 11. The high-level architecture and interfacing of hardware and software

#### D. Hardware Software Interface

The high-level architecture of our HW/SW codesign is shown in Fig. 11. We enable parallel processing with two coprocessor instances in the FPGA, and reserve one Arm core for each. We also used a third Arm core for managing the network connection to clients, and distributing the work load among the application cores.

Our software runs ‘baremetal’ i.e. without any operating system, and uses *light-weight IP stack* for client-server communication. For the data transfer between the DDR memory and hardware, it uses Direct Memory Access (DMA) placed between the memory and interfacing units shown in Fig. 11. The hardware could also access the DDR memory for intermediate computation results, but that would add a significant data transfer overhead. Hence, BRAM-based on-chip memory is used.

In the software side, we apply efficient memory management. The coefficients of a ciphertext are kept in contiguous memory locations. Using this strategy, we could transfer large data very fast in a continuous DMA. In Sec. VI we will show that the use of this strategy indeed reduces the data transfer overhead significantly.

Working with parallel executing cores increases the performance significantly in both software and hardware, but also requires a complex design as it requires access synchronization. The ‘Networking Arm Core’ in Fig. 11 is chosen to manage the DDR memory allocation. DMA access conflicts, i.e., two simultaneous DMA requests, are avoided using Xilinx’ mutual exclusion HW IP Core.

## VI. RESULTS

We implemented our domain specific programmable accelerator for homomorphic computations on ciphertext on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit [24]. We coded the software in C and compiled it

TABLE I  
PERFORMANCE OF HIGH-LEVEL OPERATIONS USING ONE COPROCESSOR.

Operation	Speed	
	(cycles)	(msec)
Mult in HW	5,349,567	4.458
Add in HW	31,339	0.026
Add in SW	54,680,467	45.567
Send two ciphertexts to HW	434,013	0.362
Receive result ciphertext from HW	215,697	0.180

with GCC (available through the Xilinx SDK). Our custom hardware modules were described with Verilog. During design-space exploration, we implemented two hardware architectures. One of them uses traditional CRT-based  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  operations, performing multi-precision integer arithmetic. The other applies the HPS optimization techniques [29] and achieves the best performance. From now on, if not exclusively mentioned, performance and area reports are presented only for the faster architecture. Results for the slower are presented briefly in a subsection.

#### A. Timing results

The hardware-based coprocessor runs at 200 MHz and the Arm processors run at 1.2 GHz. The DMA module is clocked at 250 MHz, aiming to minimize the data transfer overhead. Cycle counts for various operations are measured from the software side reading the Arm processors’ cycle-count register. As our coprocessor implements an instruction-set architecture, we report timing requirements for high-level operations and the low-level instructions used for them. In Table I performances of the high-level operations are presented. The timings for Add and Mult in HW exclude the overhead of transferring the operand and result ciphertexts. Computing the simple Add operation in SW using a single Arm core requires 80 times more time than the same computation in HW, including the overhead of sending and receiving ciphertexts. The computation time for Mult includes the overhead of intermediate data transfers (roughly 30%) during the relinearization steps. If larger FPGAs are used, this overhead could be reduced or eliminated by storing the relinearization keys in the HW at the cost of additional ROM memory.

In our FPGA we place two coprocessors in parallel and achieve 2x throughput. E.g, two Mult operations take roughly the same time as one Mult operation. We can compute 400 Mult operations per second.

The performance of each instruction of our instruction-set architecture is shown in Table II. The table also shows how many times each instruction is called for computing one Mult operation. The Add operation requires executing the Coefficient-wise-Addition instruction twice as a ciphertext in the FV scheme is composed of two polynomials in  $R_q$ . The  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  instruction lifts a polynomial from  $R_q$  to  $R_Q$  in less than 0.1ms, using two parallel cores. The  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  instruction first scales the input polynomial and computes the

TABLE II  
PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTIONS.

Instruction	# of Calls	Speed per Call (cycles) (μ sec)
NTT	14	87,582 73.0
Inverse-NTT	8	102,043 85.0
Coeff. wise Multiplication	20	15,662 13.1
Coeff. wise Addition	26	16,292 13.6
Memory Rearrange	22	25,006 20.8
Lift <sub>q→Q</sub> (2 cores)	4	99,137 82.6
Scale <sub>Q→q</sub> (2 cores)	3	99,274 82.7

TABLE III  
COMPARISON OF DATA TRANSFER TECHNIQUES.

Data Transfer Type	Speed (cycles) (μ sec)
Single Transfer of 98,304-bytes	90708 76
Transfers with 16,384-byte chunks	130686 109
Transfers with 1,024-byte chunks	242771 202

intermediate result in the RNS of  $p$ . Then it uses the datapath of Lift<sub>q→Q</sub> to map this result to the RNS representation of  $q$ . Hence, Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> performs more computation than Lift<sub>q→Q</sub>. But, benefiting the block-level pipeline strategy in the sequential execution of the two steps, the overall computation time for Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> remains almost equal to the computation time of Lift<sub>q→Q</sub>.

We put significant effort in minimizing the overhead of data transfer. The first decision we took was to keep enough internal memory to avoid frequent access to the external DDR memory during the execution of Mult. Only during the relinearization steps, data transfer is needed to load the large relinearization keys. The second decision is using the optimum data transfer size, as mentioned in Sec. V-D. In Table III costs for three types of data transfers are shown. In our implementation, we use single transfer to achieve the minimum overhead.

#### B. Resource Requirements

Table IV shows the resource utilization in the target FPGA. It shows that the design is constrained on memory size. Besides the two coprocessors, the DMA and Interfacing Unit contributes to utilization. On the software side, three Arm cores of the target Zynq are used.

#### C. Performance without HPS optimization

The other coprocessor architecture uses slower Lift<sub>q→Q</sub> and Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> architectures. At 225 MHz clock, using only one core we can compute the Lift<sub>q→Q</sub> and Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> operations in 1.68 and 4.3 msec respectively. To speedup computation, we keep four parallel cores for computing Lift<sub>q→Q</sub> and Scale<sub>Q→q</sub>. The polynomial arithmetic unit in the faster and slower architectures are similar. At 225 MHz clock frequency, this coprocessor architecture requires 8.3 msec (including all data transfer overhead) to compute one Mult operation. Though the Lift<sub>q→Q</sub> and Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> are much slower, the time

TABLE IV  
RESOURCE UTILIZATION.  
(FOR ZYNQ ULTRASCALE+ ZCU102 EVALUATION KIT)

	LUTs	Registers (# of used instances) (% utilization)	BRAMs	DSPs
Two coprocessors & interface	133692 49%	60312 11%	815 89%	416 16%
Single coprocessor	63522 23%	25622 5%	388 43%	208 8%

TABLE V  
ESTIMATED RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PARAMETER SETS  
CONSIDERING A SINGLE PROCESSOR.

Parameter ( $n, \log q$ )	Resources LUT/Reg./BRAM/DSP	Mult time Comp./Comm./Total
$2^{12}, 180$	64K/25K/0.4K/0.2K	4.46/0.54/5.0 msec
$2^{13}, 360$	128K/50K/1.6K/0.4K	9.68/2.16/11.9 msec
$2^{14}, 720$	256K/100K/6.4K/0.8K	21.0/8.64/29.6 msec
$2^{15}, 1,440$	512K/200K/25.6K/1.6K	45.6/34.6/80.2 msec

for Mult is less than 2x slower in comparison to the faster coprocessor architecture. This difference is due to a difference in the relinearization operation. In the faster architecture, each relinearization key is a vector of six polynomials. Traditional CRT-based Scale<sub>Q→q</sub> offers the flexibility to choosing the number of polynomials in the relinearization key. The slower coprocessor uses three times smaller relinearization key in comparison to the faster architecture. If both use relinearization keys of length six, then the slower processor would become another 30% slower.

We measure the power consumption of our design using the Power Advantage Tool. The static power consumption is 5.3 W. The continuous execution of a homomorphic multiplication operation including the input and output data transfers requires 2.2W dynamic power consumption on a single core execution. In the concurrent double core execution of the same, the dynamic power consumption reaches 3.4W.

#### D. Estimates for other parameter sets

For estimating performance for larger parameter sets, we assume that the sizes of target FPGAs also scale appropriately. We assume that for every doubling of both the polynomial degree and coefficient size ( $\approx 4.34\times$  increase in overall computation) in the parameter set, we double the number of RPAUs and Lift/Scale cores ( $\approx 2\times$  increase in logic-area). Consequently, the net computation increases by  $\approx 2.17\times$ . The overhead of off-chip data transfer increases by  $\approx 4\times$ . In Table V we apply this estimation model iteratively to estimate area, memory and performances for various parameter sets.

#### E. Comparisons with Related Works

In the literature there are several reported implementations of somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) schemes. A

totally fair comparison between the implementations is not always possible, firstly because there are several SHE schemes, secondly because there are differences in the choice of parameters, and finally because the implementation platforms vary. The most fair comparison is with the NFLlib [22] based software implementation of the FV scheme presented in [4]. The implementation uses a similar parameter set. The highly optimized single threaded software implementation spends 33 milliseconds and 0.1 milliseconds for computing one Mult and Add respectively on an Intel Core i5-3427 processor running at 1.8 GHz. Using two coprocessors in the FPGA, we achieve more than 13x throughput with respect to the NFLlib-based software implementation. Latest generation Intel i5 reaches up to 40W on heavy load operations [32]. In comparison, our processor has a peak power consumption of 8.7 W.

A very recent implementation [33] by Badawi et al. presents performances of the FV scheme for various parameter sets on CPUs and GPUs. They also use HPS optimization for faster  $\text{Lift}_{q \rightarrow Q}$  and  $\text{Scale}_{Q \rightarrow q}$  operations. Their single-threaded software implementation for a parameter set  $n = 4096$  and 60-bit  $q$  requires around 10 msec to compute one homomorphic multiplication for 30-bit moduli size (which we also use) on Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum running at 2.1 GHz. Using 26 threads in multi-threaded experiments, they could reduce the time to 4 msec only. Their highly optimized GPU implementations on Tesla K80 (2496 cores, 0.82 GHz, 12 GB RAM) and Tesla V100 (5120 cores, 1.38 GHz, 16 GB RAM) require 1.98 and 0.86 msec respectively at the cost of humongous power consumption. We estimate that for 180-bit  $q$ , computation times of their implementations would increase at least three times. In a fair comparison (i.e.,  $n = 4096$  and 180-bit  $q$ ), their fastest implementation on Tesla V100 performing 388 homomorphic multiplications per second is slower than our implementation achieving 400 multiplications.

Pöppelmann et al. [14] implemented the YASHE [8] scheme in the Catapult [34] architecture which is an FPGA-based domain specific accelerator for cloud computing applications. Their implementation for the parameter set with polynomial size of 4,096 (same as ours) and ciphertext coefficient size 128 bits (smaller than ours) run at 100 MHz clock frequency and require 6.75 msec. The YASHE scheme is computationally three to four times faster than the FV scheme and has roughly half memory requirement. Even with a faster SHE scheme and a smaller parameter set, their implementation is slower than ours. Achieving two times higher clock frequency (200 MHz) as well as computation using parallel coprocessor cores are major advancements towards making homomorphic encryption practical. The YASHE scheme is not considered secure anymore and hence is not used due to an attack by Albrecht et al. [35] in 2016.

Next we compare our results with the hardware implementation by Roy et al. [20]. They implement the FV scheme for a much larger parameter set (polynomial size 32,768 and ciphertext coefficient size 1,228 bits). Due to such a large parameter set, only one residue polynomial arithmetic unit could fit in their target platform that has a medium

size Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGA. Their architecture suffers from a massive data transfer overhead as they need to continuously read and write DDR memory. We designed our programmable architecture for supporting less complex cloud computing applications (thus smaller parameter set). We use sufficient on-chip memory (implemented using BRAMs) to store the two operand ciphertexts and in this way we minimize data transfer overhead. We estimate that a hypothetical architecture following our design steps (explained in Sec. VI-D) would be able to compute homomorphic multiplication in less than 0.1 sec (Table V) when implemented on a sufficiently large FPGA. This significant difference is mostly due to the fact that our design methodology avoids costly long integer arithmetic and frequent off-chip data transfer and at the same time applies more parallel processing.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we presented a programmable and high-performance domain specific architecture for computing homomorphic operations on ciphertext. We applied the recent arithmetic optimization techniques proposed by Halevi, Polyakov and Shoup to avoid costly multi-precision arithmetic, and designed a parallel polynomial multiplication algorithm with an efficient memory access scheme to speedup the homomorphic multiplication operation. In the hardware architecture, we used parallel computation cores to minimize cycle count, and applied circuit-level and block-level pipeline strategy to benefit parallel processing and reach a clock frequency of 200 MHz. Further, we utilized the on-chip memory optimally to avoid frequent off-chip data transfers. Using highly optimized building blocks, we constructed our multi-core multi-processor architecture. Finally we implemented our optimized domain specific programmable architecture on a single Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU102 Evaluation Kit and demonstrated that it can achieve a throughput of 400 homomorphic multiplications per second, which is 13x faster than a heavily optimized software implementation on an Intel i5 processor. Our results make homomorphic encryption practical in several cloud computing applications.

**Discussions.** FPGAs are becoming more and more popular in cloud computing applications. The Amazon offers FPGA-accelerated cloud for accelerating performance critical applications [36]. An Amazon EC2 F1 instance offers either one or eight Xilinx Virtex UltraScale+ FPGAs attached to a server-grade Intel Xeon processor. These FPGAs have five times more resources than our Zynq platform. Our instruction-set coprocessor architecture has a very modular structure. Most of the building blocks, excluding the IP Cores, have been described using behavioral Verilog. Hence, the source codes of our accelerator can be easily ported to these powerful FPGAs. We estimate that each Amazon F1 instance could run at least ten coprocessors in parallel.

Our coprocessor architecture offers trade-offs between hardware cost and performance. Therefore, we would like to

remark that the utilization and performance results reported in this paper are not the definite numbers, but only belongs to the configuration used in this paper. The design decisions can be tweaked to meet different requirements. For e.g., by using more computation cores we could achieve a lower latency or by reducing the number of memories we could lower the hardware cost.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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