Enabling Internet-Scale DNS-Based measurements

Bachelor Thesis Final Talk

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http://comsys.rwth-aachen.de







The Internet

• Evolving to fulfill changing requirements



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 - IPv6



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 - Mobility, Security, QoS, . . .



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⇒ Use the Domain Name System to draw conclusions!





The Domain Name System

• Information about domains and their services



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Using the DNS: Not a new idea...



Studies on the Internet involving the $\ensuremath{\mathsf{DNS}}$



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Goals

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- Identifying misconfigured domains
- IPv6-capability study



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+ Multiple processes

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TDNS (TwistedDNS)

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TDNS (TwistedDNS)


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
cat domainlist.txt | ./tdns -ns 8.8.8.8 -t A

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


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
Performance: TDNS vs. ZDNS

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 $249 \frac{\mu s}{succQ}$ vs. $252 \frac{\mu s}{succQ}$ \Rightarrow Comparable performance

What can we do with this now?



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Use Cases

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Required: Storing and querying local DNS data efficiently



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• LevelDB, Radix Tree, Hashmap, SQLite, PostgreSQL, ...





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Solution

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






Don't we already know that?

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What about the Infrastructure?





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




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




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


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
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 Domain itself, Mail Exchangers, Name Servers, www-subdomain

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



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
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- Alexa Top 1M & complete org-zone











Misconfiguration or not IPv6-capable **infrastructure**...?

Is IPv6-capability linked to a domain's popularity?

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So the "big players" are v6-ready, right?

Global Top Sites

 Google, Facebook, MSN, Yahoo, Bing, Twitter, Wikipedia, Amazon, Linkedin, . . .

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Which aspects are affected? (NS, MX, ...) Is this just a **misconfiguration**?

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AAAA-record
AAAA-record for www
AAAA-record for any MX
AAAA-record for any NS



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ns3ds.google.com	216.239.36.10	Yes	15169

⇒ Configuration mistake? Fixable?

The domain google.com

AAAA-record ✓

AAAA-record for www 🗸

AAAA-record for any MX 🗸

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	IPv4 address	AAAA-record provided	ASN
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Worth repeating and improving these studies!





Conclusion

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Future Work

Improve TDNS

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 - Validate IPv6 addresses
 - Improve casual analysis of non-capable domains



Thank You!


Thank you for your attention!

Do you have any questions?


A: Reactive Queuing

```
"rules": [
        "desc": "AAAA for all A Records",
        "status": ["NOERROR"],
        "type": ["A"],
        "cont": [],
        "ncont": [],
        "format": [
            "{O} AAAA"
        ],
        "flags": [],
        "nflags": ["@ns", "@mx"]
    },
        "desc": "MX for all A Records".
        "status": ["NOERROR"],
        "type": ["A"],
        "cont": [].
        "ncont": ["www."].
        "format": [
            "{0} MX"
        "flags": [],
        "nflags": ["@mx", "@ns"]
    ٦.
. . .
```


A: DB Create Performance




A: DB Load Performance




A: DB Memory Requirements



A: DB Query Performance



A: IPv6 Lookup Tree



A: MX Distribution (Org)

POS	I	Name (SLD)	I	V6	I	V4	1	V6 A11	I	V4 A11	I	DNUM	1	NSNUM
0	 i	secureserver.net	ī	False	1	True	 I	False	 I	False	1	2617311		203
1	i	google.com	i	True	i	True	-i	False	i	False	i.	302777	i	518
2	Ť	ctmail.com	Ĺ	True	Ĺ	True	- İ	False	Ĺ	False	Ĺ	235980	Ĺ	3
3	i	googlemail.com	Ĺ	True	Ĺ	True	Ĺ	False	Ĺ	False	Ĺ	228364	Ĺ	161
4	İ	1and1.com	Ĺ	True	İ	True	Ĺ	False	i	False	Ĺ	167140	Ĺ	17
5	-	outlook.com	ı	True	1	True	- 1	False	1	False	- 1	127770	- [128052
6	-	GOOGLE.COM	ı	True	1	True	- 1	False	1	False	- 1	124513	- [294
7	-	registrar-servers.com	1	False	1	True	- 1	False	-	False	- [109200	- [19
8	-	ovh.net	1	True	1	True	- 1	False	-	False	- [97814	- [109
9	-	co.uk	1	True	1	True	- 1	False	-	False	- [94123	- [2115
10	-	localhost	1	False	1	True	- 1	False	-	True	- [84105	- [1
11	-	GOOGLEMAIL.COM	1	True	1	True	- 1	False	-	False	- [81705	- [95
12	-	kundenserver.de		False		True		False	-	True	- 1	79481	- 1	5
13	-	rzone.de	1	True	1	True	- 1	False		True	- [63592	- [5
14	-	hostedemail.com		False		True		False	-	False	- 1	63415	- 1	28803
15	-	gandi.net		True		True		False		False	- 1	48952	- 1	13
16	- 1	m1bp.com	1	False	1	True		False	-	True		39871	- 1	6
17	-	mb5p.com		False		True		False		True	- 1	39775	- 1	6
18	-	dreamhost.com		False		True		False	-	False	- 1	36432	- 1	48
19	- 1	yahoodns.net		False	-	True		False	- 1	False		34638	- 1	8
20	- 1	1and1.fr		True	-	True		False		True		31171	- 1	4
21	-	udag.de		False		True		False		True	- 1	30622	- 1	6
22	-	one.com	1	False		True	- 1	False	-	True	-	30072	- 1	15
23	-	h-email.net	1	False		True	- 1	False	-	True	-	28233	- 1	1
24	-	emailsrvr.com	1	False		True	- 1	False	-	False	-	27695	- 1	21

A: NS Distribution (Org)

POS	1	Name (SLD)	I	V6	ı	V4	1	V6 All	1	V4 A11	1	DNUM	I	NSNUM
0	ı	domaincontrol.com	l	True	ī	True	1	False	ı	False	1	2831306	-1	118
1	- 1	worldnic.com	ı	False	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	258121	- 1	105
2	- 1	co.uk		True	-	True	- 1	False		False	- 1	180370		6178
3	- 1	name-services.com	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	True	- 1	153477		7
4	- 1	registrar-servers.com		False	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	144099		184
5	- 1	1 and 1 - dns.com		True	-	True	- 1	True		True	- 1	140994		9
6	- 1	1 and 1 - dns.org	ı	True	-	True	- 1	True	-	True	- 1	140073	- 1	9
7	- 1	bluehost.com		False	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	131958		78
8	- 1	wixdns.net	ı	False	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	True	- 1	110342		24
9	- 1	cloudflare.com		True	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	105453		393
10	- 1	ovh.net	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	99184		840
11	- 1	register.com	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	98207	- 1	774
12	- 1	1and1.com	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	97133		18
13	- 1	1 and 1 - dns.de	ı	True	-	True	- 1	True	-	True	- 1	96183	- 1	2
14	- 1	hostgator.com		False	-	True	- 1	False	- 1	False	- 1	93570		5890
15	- 1	dreamhost.com	ı	False	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	91566	- 1	6
16	- 1	sedoparking.com	ı	False	-	True	- 1	False	-	True	- 1	83935	- 1	12
17	- 1	1 and 1 - dns.biz	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	73603	- 1	9
18	- 1	1 and 1 - dns.us	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	68904	- 1	2
19	- 1	wordpress.com	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	-	True	- 1	67070	- 1	16
20	- 1	gandi.net	ı	True	-	True	- 1	False	-	False	- 1	61120	- 1	146
21	- 1	name.com	ı	True	-	True	-1	False	-	True	-1	59780	- 1	135
22	- 1	cashparking.com	ı	False	-	True	- 1	False	-	True	- 1	59309	- 1	2
23	- 1	rzone.de	ı	True	-	True	-1	True	-	True	-1	55991	- 1	40
24	- 1	uniregistrymarket.link	ı	False	-	True	-1	False	-	True	-1	55705	- 1	4

Motivation



Motivation

Reserved IP address spaces



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 Reserved IP address spaces (127.0.0.1, 192.168.0.0/16, ...)



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Findings

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
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- ⇒ Misconfiguration does not just "disappear"







A: IPv6-Capability Study (Fixable Domains)



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