

# **ANTI – PIRACY TRAINING SEMINAR**

# Scope

This training seminar complies with POEA Memo Circular No. 05 of 2009.

The scope of the training is to provide:

- General information regarding Piracy
- Guidance and best industry practices for vessels passing through the gulf of Aden (GoA) and other known pirates infested areas.
- Training on how to avoid, react and cope with or surviving piracy/hostage situations and other related incidents

# Training Objectives

At the end of the training seminar you will have acquired:

- Adequate knowledge, guidance and skills on the Best Management Practices (BMP) in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks, delaying successful attacks and handling the situation with pirates on board, particularly when transiting the Gulf of Aden, off the Coast of Somalia and other pirates infested areas.
- Techniques how to survive piracy and hostage situation off the Coast of Somalia

- **Introduction**

# Introduction

All guidelines and instructions in this training are for your general understanding of the present situation (Jan/2010) in the piracy risk areas.

Circumstances can differ for each vessel and for each Ship-owner.


Please always refer to the specific situation on the ship you are assigned to, as per recommendations and instructions of the vessel's DOC holder, the instructions from the Master on board, the Ship Security Officer and the respective Ship Security Plan.

# Piracy

- term used to describe acts of armed robbery, hijacking and other malicious acts against ships in international waters.
- They are carried out with the intent of stealing valuable onboard and/or extorting money from ship owners and/or third party interests by holding the ship or the crew hostage for ransom.
- The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as *“the act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act”*.


## Piracy

Figure 1.1 shows the high risk area of the ocean near the Horn of Africa.



# ANTI - PIRACY TRAINING SEMINAR

New HIGH RISK AREA east coast off Somalia






# Pirates Prone Areas (Africa)





# Pirates Prone Areas (SE Asia & Indian Sub Continent)





# Pirates Prone Areas (South and Central America and the Caribbean Waters)



# Pirates Prone Areas

## Recent Piracy Attacks Areas










## 2008 - Gulf of Aden

Total number of reported incidents **92**.

*Of these, there were:*

-  **60** Attacks on merchant vessels  
(31 vessels were fired at) and
-  **32** Merchant vessels hijacked



*(Source IMB)*



## 2008 - Area to the south of the Horn of Africa - Associated with Somali Piracy

Total number of reported incidents 19.


*Of these, there were:*

-  9 Attacks on merchant vessels  
(of which 8 were fired at) and
-  10 Merchant vessels hijacked

*(Source IMB)*



Number of actual and the attempted attacks in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden




Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Report for the Period of January–30 June 2006, July 2006*. Figures correct as at 25 September 2008.



## Ship Type Piracy Attacks

Ship Types Involved in East Coast Africa Pirate Activity  
Dec 2008 onward



# **Security Information from NYK Line**

## Piracy related incidents from NYK Line Security Information

## SECURITY INFORMATION

## NYK LINE

Safety & Environmental Management Group

[ CATEGORY ] PIRACY

DATE : 08/04/2009

[ VESSEL ] OTHER LINE

SEQ.NO. : 2009 017

[ DATE ] 08/02/2009

[ AREA ] SOUTH CHINA SEA

Originator : Safety &  
Environmental  
Management Group

**SUBJECT: Piracy Incidents in the South China Sea**

Please be advised that a number of piracy attacks have been reported in the South China Sea. You are kindly requested to review the below piracy incidents.

<Incident>

Date and Time: August 2, 2009 / 0130 LT, Position: Lat. 02-51.65N / Long. 105-06.12E  
A tugboat was boarded by five robbers armed with parangs and machetes from a small boat. The master sustained a cut to his leg. The glass windows on the bridge were broken. The master mustered all crew and managed to repel the robbers from the tugboat.

<Comment>

This is the seventh incident reported in the South China Sea around Mangkai Island since January 2009, as informed by Security Information 2009 009/014. Please maintain vigilance at all times and take necessary antipiracy measures, especially during hours of darkness while sailing the South China Sea around Mangkai Island.



## Piracy related incidents from NYK Line Security Information

### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### NYK LINE

Safety & Environmental Management Group

[ CATEGORY ]	PIRACY	DATE :	09/15/2009
[ VESSEL ]	OTHER LINE	SEQ.NO. :	2009 020
[ DATE ]	09/14/2009		
[ AREA ]	MALACCA/SINGAPORE STRAIT	Originator :	Safety & Environmental Management Group

#### SUBJECT: Piracy Incidents near the Singapore Strait


Please be informed that the following piracy incidents have been reported near the Singapore Strait. You are kindly requested to review the below information.

##### <Incident 1>

Date and Time: September 14, 2009 / 0240 LT, Position: Lat. 01-18.5N / Long. 104-13.8E  
 Five men attempted to board an anchored tanker from a boat. The duty crew raised the alarm when he sighted two men using a stick with a hook attempting to board from the poop deck. The duty crew used the public address system to alert all crew. On hearing the alarm, the men aborted the boarding, jumped into the water, and fled in their boat. None of the crew were injured.

##### <Incident 2>

Date and Time: September 14, 2009 / 0445 LT, Position: Lat. 01-18.3N / Long. 104-12.6E  
 Two hours after the above incident (Incident 1), six men armed with long knives attempted to board an anchored chemical tanker from a speed boat. Two men attempted to board from the port quarter using a hook. The duty crew sighted the men, ran into the accommodation, and informed the duty officer. The duty officer raised the alarm, sounded the fog horn, and mustered all crew. Noting that the crew had been alerted, the men aborted the boarding, jumped overboard, and fled in their speed boat. None of the crew were injured.



##### <Comment>

Please maintain vigilance and adopt precautionary measures because these are the fifth and sixth incidents that have occurred in the vicinity since January 2009. All the incidents occurred during hours of darkness while the ships were anchored. However, please also maintain vigilance while ships are sailing. Early detection of a possible boarding by suspicious personnel is the best deterrent and reduces the risk to the crew, as demonstrated in these incidents.



## Piracy related incidents from NYK Line Security Information

### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### NYK LINE

Safety & Environmental Management Group

[ CATEGORY ] PIRACY

DATE : 11/5/2009

[ VESSEL ] OTHER LINE

SEQ.NO. : 2009 024

[ DATE ] 10/25/2009

[ AREA ] Somalia

Originator : Safety &  
Environmental  
Management Group

**SUBJECT: Expansion of Area off the East Coast of Somalia Subjected to Piracy Incidents**

Please be advised that the following piracy incident has been reported south of the coast of Somalia. You are kindly requested to review the details of this incident.


#### <Incident>

Date and Time: October 25, 2009 / 0845 UTC; Position: Lat. 06-07.7S / Long. 045-10.0E

A container ship was chased by a speedboat that had a white plastic hull (six pirates with machine guns on board) while under way in the Indian Ocean, about 350 nautical miles off Mombasa, Kenya. The vessel sounded the alarm and began antipiracy measures, including an increase to maximum speed. At a distance of three cables, pirates started firing at the vessel. The pirates eventually aborted the attack and the vessel continued underway.

Date and Time: November 2, 2009 / 1213 UTC; Position: Lat. 07-55S / Long. 047-40E

A chemical tanker was attacked about 530 nautical miles off Mombasa, Kenya. Five pirates approached in a skiff and fired upon the vessel, whilst two more skiffs waited in the vicinity. The vessel increased speed and launched evasive maneuvers that prevented the pirates from boarding.



▼ : Attacked

<Comment>

In the above incidents, the pirate attacks occurred outside the prohibited navigational area for NYK-owned vessels off the Somalia coast. Recent incidents indicate that pirates are expanding the area in which they operate. Considering the above incident, all vessels calling ports along the southeast coast of Africa are requested to maintain a distance as far as possible from the coasts of Somalia and Seychelles, even when outside the prohibited area. We will review the prohibited area, if necessary, according to farther piracy incidents.

If navigating in the region, vessels are urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness, maintaining strict 24-hour antipiracy visual and radar watches, and collecting concerned information by NAVTEX, VHF, Inmarsat, etc.

Considering the heightened risk of piracy, you are requested to ensure the communication procedure in case of an emergency.

## Piracy related incidents from NYK Line Security Information

### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### NYK LINE

Safety & Environmental Management Group

[ CATEGORY ] PIRACY

DATE : 11/11/2009

[ VESSEL ] OTHER LINE

SEQ.NO. : 2009 025

[ DATE ] 11/10/2009

[ AREA ] Somalia

Originator : Safety & Environmental Management Group

#### SUBJECT: Hijack incident off the East Coast of Somalia

Please be advised that the following piracy incidents have been reported south of the coast of Somalia. You are kindly requested to review the details of these incidents.

##### <Incident 1>

Date and Time: November 5, 2009 / 0426 UTC; Position: Lat. 09-44S / Long. 045-25E

A bulk carrier(54,000DWT) was hijacked while under way 480nm off Mombasa, Kenya. The vessel was heading for Zanzibar and has a crew of 21 consisting of seven Ukrainians and 14 Filipinos.

##### <Incident 2>


Date and Time: November 9, 2009 / 0830 UTC; Position: Lat. 01-09S / Long. 061-35E

A VLCC(300,000DWT) was attacked by pirates about 1000 nm east from Mogadishu, Somalia. The pirates approached the vessel in at least two skiffs and fired assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades. The vessel conducted evasive maneuvers, deployed self-protection measures and successfully deterred being boarding and hijacked.

##### <Incident 3>

Date and Time: November 10, 2009 / 0200 UTC; Position: Lat. 00-43S / Long. 061-57E

A container vessel(30,000DWT, 2,200TEUs) was chased and fired on by pirates armed with a rocket propelled grenade and assault rifles in two skiffs about 1000nm east from Mogadishu, Somalia. The skiffs approached the vessel from the starboard side at approximately 25 – 30 knots and were spotted by extra bridge lookout at a distance of three nm. At that time, the skiffs were not yet picked up on radar. The vessel increased speed, took evasive maneuvers, deployed self-protection measures, and successfully deterred the attempted boarding after 30 min.



##### <Comment>

As you know, the area of piracy activity has recently been expanding (see Security information:SEQ.2009-024). And the above incidents occurred outside the prohibited navigational area for NYK-owned vessels. In fact, Incident 1 is the first reported hijacking outside the prohibited area.

Considering the heightened risk of piracy, vessels are requested to navigate as far from the East Africa coast as possible regardless of the prohibited area. Vessels are also urged to operate at a heightened state of readiness, maintaining strict 24-hour antipiracy visual and radar watches, and collecting concerned information by NAVTEX, VHF, Inmarsat, etc., while navigating off the east coast of Africa.



## Piracy related incidents from NYK Line Security Information

### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### NYK LINE

Safety & Environmental Management Group

[ CATEGORY ] PIRACY

DATE : 08/28/2009

[ VESSEL ] OTHER LINE

SEQ.NO. : 2009 018

[ DATE ] 08/27/2009



[ AREA ] Somalia

Originator : Safety &  
Environmental  
Management Group

#### SUBJECT: Increase of Piracy Incidents around Somalia

Please be informed that the following piracy incidents have occurred in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia for August.

#### <Piracy Incidents - Gulf of Aden - August>




#### <Comment>


A United States Navy intelligence agency (ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence) reported that "weather has shown signs of improvement in the GOA and the off East Coast of Somalia and continues to improve as the summer monsoon season draws to a close. An increase in aggressive small boat activity is expected." In fact, pirate attacks have been increasing particularly in the latter half of August. Therefore, please reinforce efforts to maintain an especially good lookout and operate at a heightened state of readiness, with all appropriate piracy-prevention measures in place.

# Best Management Practices



# PROFILE OF SOMALI PIRATES






**VIDEO CLIP FROM CBS NEWS “ WHO ARE  
THE PIRATES”**

# BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMP)

Typical Pirate attack profile:

- It is generally thought that from sighting, pirates boarded vessel takes approximately fifteen (15) minutes.



### Typical Pirate attack profile:

- Two or more small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats (skiffs) are commonly used, which often approach from astern or either quarter of the intended target.



### Typical Pirate attack profile:

- The use of a “mother ship,” often a large pirated fishing vessel carrying personnel, equipment and smaller assault craft, has enabled the attacks to be successfully undertaken at a greater range from shore.





### Typical Pirate attack profile:

- Pirates will probably board the vessel at the lowest point above the waterline or a ship with a low freeboard.
- May become successful in an attack on a vessel with a slow speed or proceeding at a low speed. No successful attack have occurred on ships at 15 knots or more
- Pirates operating from very small craft limit the capability to moderate weather conditions.



## Typical Pirate attack profile:

- Daylight attacks are more likely, which may take place during the early morning or early evening.



## Typical Pirate attack profile:

- Piracy attack appears to increase immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or following a period of poor weather.
- A ship's crew, who have carefully planned and trained for the passage, on high alert, responsive, and employed passive countermeasures to good effect, has a greater chance of repelling an attempted pirate attack.



## **Typical Pirate attack profile:**

**Factors that make a ship more vulnerable are:**

- **Low Freeboard**
- **Slow speed**
- **Inadequate planning and procedures**
- **Visibly low state of alert and/or evident self protective measures**
- **Where a slow response by the ship is evident**

# **GUIDELINE FROM NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT, PTE.**

- **NYK Shipmanagement, Inc., the in-house shipmanagement company of NYK Line issued also general guidance through their “General Instruction Letter”**

***(extract of above GI Letters shown on the following slide)***

## GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER FROM NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT, PTE, ON CONDUCT OF VESSELS IN GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA



NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT

### GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER

Ref No.: GI/FLT/022/09

Page: 1/7

Date: 11/05/2009

Appr By Chief of SMS Management

### Gulf of Aden and off Somalia Transit -Security Measures

Company has consolidated the Passage Planning, Security, Reporting and Contingency measures to be taken while transiting GoA and off Somalia.

#### 1. PRIOR TRANSIT- GENERAL PLANNING

- a) A risk assessment should be undertaken by the vessel. A standard template for risk assessment is attached, which shall be reviewed prior transit. If any additional hazards are identified, this shall be reviewed and control measures put in place. The outcome of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery of the situation. If the residual risk is Medium or High, RA shall be sent to Company for approval.
- b) Prepare a passage plan with maximum speed using the corridor area provided by UKMTO. Plan to be submitted to UKMTO and the Company (as per attached format) prior entering either GoA or passing the coast of Somalia.
- c) Family members of officers and crew are not to be on-board when the vessel transits GOA. Contractors may be carried on-board through GOA provided this has been discussed and

# OUTLINE OF NYKSM PTE., GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER



NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT

## GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER

Ref.No.: GI/FLT/037/09

Page: 1/8

Date:

Appr. By: Chief of SMS Management

### Gulf of Aden and Off Somalia Transit- Security Measures

- 1. Prior transit**
  - 1.1 General Planning**
  - 1.2 Voyage Planning**
  - 1.3 Outside the GoA**



NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT

## GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER

Ref.No.: GI/FLT/037/09

Page: 1/8

Date:

Appr. By: Chief of SMS Management

### Gulf of Aden and Off Somalia Transit- Security Measures

- 2. During the transit in the corridor**
  - 2.1 Training and Briefing**
  - 2.2 Communication**
  - 2.3 Status of Machinery and Equipment**
  - 2.4 Anti-Piracy Watches and Security Measures**
  - 2.5 Watch Keeping on the Bridge**

## GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER

Ref.No.: GI/FLT/037/09

Page: 1/8

Date:

Appr. By: Chief of SMS Management

### Gulf of Aden and Off Somalia Transit- Security Measures

## 3. Reporting

### 3.1 To UKMTO

### 3.2 To MSCHOA

## 4. Deviation from Corridor, Malfunction and/or Breakdown in machinery or Equipment

## 5. If Drifting to Join Convoy

## 6. Approach by Pirate/Suspicious Boat



## GENERAL INSTRUCTION LETTER

Ref.No.: GI/FLT/037/09

Page: 1/8

Date:

Appr.By: Chief of SMS Management

### Gulf of Aden and Off Somalia Transit- Security Measures

## 7. If a Vessel is Attack or Attack Is Imminent

### 7.1 Contingency

### 7.2 Notifications

## 8. If Boarded by Pirates

## 9. In the Event of Military Actions

## **1. PRIOR TRANSIT**

### **1.1 GENERAL PLANNING**

- **A risk assessment should be undertaken by the vessel. A standard template for risk assessment is attached, which shall be reviewed prior transit.**
- **If any additional hazards are identified, this shall be reviewed and control measures put in place.**
- **The outcome of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery of the situation.**
- **If the residual risk is Medium or High, RA shall be sent to Company for approval.**



## **1. PRIOR TRANSIT**

### **1.1 GENERAL PLANNING**

- **Master shall ensure that all navigational, communication and security equipment is in operation and that the transit can be carried out at maximum speed consistent with safe navigation.**
- **Confirm vessel fire pumps are operational.**
- **Master shall hold a meeting with all crew advising them of the voyage instructions and transit through the area.**

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.1 GENERAL PLANNING

- It shall be ensured that all crew is familiar with the procedures set down in the Ship Security Plan.
- Crew advised that once the pirates are onboard, they are to fully cooperate with them.
- The anti-piracy contingency plan has been shown to be the most effective when implemented in advance.



## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.1 GENERAL PLANNING

- A drill shall be conducted prior to the arrival in the area, the plan reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties; including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack.
- Establish a designated muster area within the accommodation (close to the centre line), where crew can muster in case of an attack.

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.1 GENERAL PLANNING

- OOWs and lookouts to be briefed regarding mother vessels and pirate boats, for proper identification. A copy of photo of mother ship/ piracy boats shall be kept on the bridge.
- Prepare and emergency communication plan including all essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the communications panel (e.g. MSCHOA, UKMTO, IMB PRC, CSO etc.)

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.1 GENERAL PLANNING

- A piracy attack muster point or "citadel" is designated and lock down procedures rehearsed in order to delay access control of the ship and buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes.

NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE LTD

<Rev: 2009-03-31>

<Z-043000-03FIG>

## STANDARD RISK ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE

### Standard Risk Assessment Template

Work Activity: of and Off	Record Number:		Date of Assessment:	
	Risk Assessor (s):		Total No. of Hazards	13

Section A Risk Assessment											
Hazard No.	Hazard	Effects of Hazard	Existing Control Measures and Safe Guards	Permit to Work(s)	Initial Risk			Additional Control Measures	Final Risk		
					(F) Freq	( C ) Consq	(F x C) Risk Level		(F) Freq	( C ) Consq	(F x C) Risk Level
1	Suspicious Craft / Piracy attack	Loss of business, ransom money, damage to ship, equipment, injury to crew	a. Designated prohibited areas i.e. 45 nm N coast of Somalia, between Socotora Is and Somalia mainland, within 50 nm of Socotra Is, 12 nm off S coast of Yemen unless calling port, 300 nm off E coast of Somalia b. Designated High Potential area between 47-51 N in GoA. c. Vessel to plan passage thru designated route as per UKMTO transit corridor unless in emergency. d. Vessel to proceed at full speed when within designated area. e. Maintain anti piracy watches and measures. f. Rig fire hoses and keep valve open and use water when suspicious craft approaching. g. Lock all doors in accommodation and maintain one access thru bridge door at night. h. Barricade the accesses to accommodation area and bridge. i. Use search and jack light effectively. j. Implement security measures as per level 2 k. Train and brief all crew		F3	C3	M	a. Vessel to raise security measures in transit area to MARSEC Level 2. (Liberia Flag vessels to raise security level to 2 and inform CSO) b. Vessel to keep poop deck lighting on if it does not interfere with safe navigation. c. Advise vessel to maintain VHF watch on Ch 16 & 08 as pirates may jam channel 16 and Coalition Forces are keeping watch on Ch-08. e. Masters to keep photographs of pirate "Mother ships" on bridge and report to UKMTO if sighted.	F2	C2	L

Sample :  
Risk  
Assessment  
Template

**Sample :  
Risk  
Assessment  
Template**

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.2 Voyage Planning

- Masters should report to UKMTO before entering the GoA or passing the coast of Somalia.
- Vessel shall conduct their passage within the (International Recommended Transit Corridor) IRTC.
- Westbound ships should bias themselves to the northern portion of the corridor,
- Eastbound ships to the southern portion.



## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.2 Voyage Planning

- **Ships may be asked to make adjustments to passage plans to conform to MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa) routing advice, which shall be complied with and informed to Company.**
  
- **Vessel should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters (TTWs) while on transit. This is for reasons of customary international law, as it is not possible for international military forces (non Yemeni) to be able to protect ships that are attacked inside the Yemeni TTW.**

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.2 Voyage Planning

- If required to arrange for Naval Escort, Company shall confirm this as per Owner's instructions. Vessel shall be informed in advance of such arrangement.

**Table 1.1 Prohibited and transit areas****GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA PROHIBITED AND TRANSIT  
AREAS****1. Designated Area**

**The Gulf of Aden, Somalia coast, and near Socotra Island  
(Yemen)**

**2. Prohibited Navigational Areas**

**No ship may enter the following waters:**

- 1) Waters out to 45 miles off the northern (Gulf of Aden) coast of Somalia**
- 2) Waters between Socotra Island and the Somalia mainland**

**Table 1.1 Prohibited and transit areas****GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA PROHIBITED AND TRANSIT AREAS****2. Prohibited Navigational Areas**

- 3) Waters within 50 miles of Socotra Island**
- 4) Waters out to 12 miles off the southern (Gulf of Aden) coast of Yemen, except for ships calling a port in Yemen**

***Remark: This prohibited area has been set based on the recommendation of the UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations) and other authorities.***

- 5) Waters out to 300 miles off the eastern (Indian Ocean) coast of Somalia. Recently there have been attacks at a distance of about 600 miles and vessels are advised to keep well clear.**

**Table 1.1 Prohibited and transit areas****GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA PROHIBITED AND****3. Areas That Have a High Potential for Piracy Attacks in the Gulf of Aden**

The waters between Longitude 47 degrees East and Longitude 51 degrees East in the Gulf of Aden have been categorized by the UKMTO and CTF150 as a “High potential area of piracy attack.”

Please note that piracy attacks and attempts have been reported in areas other than that above, and you are requested to take appropriate measures at all times.



## **Table 1.1 Prohibited and transit areas**

### **GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA PROHIBITED AND**

#### **4. Areas That Have a High Potential for Piracy Attacks in the East Coast of Somalia**

**NYK Line has banned the navigation in waters out to 300 miles off eastern coast of Somalia in view of sporadic attacks taking place.**

**In addition to this restriction, vessel shall inform NYKSM and the operator (NYK or NYK Group Companies) when planning a passage in this area.**

**Table 1.1 Prohibited and transit areas****GULF OF ADEN AND OFF SOMALIA PROHIBITED AND****5. Gulf of Aden (“UKMTO Transit Corridor”)**

This came into effect from 01 Feb 2009, at 0001Z. This corridor includes the creation of separate east bound and west bound transit lanes. Each lane will be 5 nm wide and will be separated by a 2 nm buffer zone.

**Coordinates:**

**<Westbound> 12 00N 45E 14 30N 53E**

**11 55N 45E 14 25N 53E**

**<Eastbound> 11 53N 45E 14 23N 53E**

**11 48N 45E 14 18N 53E**

**All ships shall navigate through this corridor regardless of their destinations.**

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.3 OUTSIDE THE GoA

- Ships transiting South and East of the Coast of Somalia to ports outside of East Africa should consider navigating to the east of Madagascar or maintain a distance of more than 600 nautical miles from the coastline.
- When routing North /South corridor, keep East of 060E Longitude until east of Seychelles.
- Masters should still update UKMTO in the usual manner with their ship course and details.

## 1. PRIOR TRANSIT

### 1.3 OUTSIDE THE GoA

- Inform Company when sailing instructions are received and vessel is likely to transit off East Coast of Somalia.
- The Company shall review the passage plan and confirm safe passing off distance.

## 2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR

### 2.1 Training and Briefing

- Taking into account the manning levels, ensure that ships routines are adjusted sufficiently in advance to ensure well rested and well briefed crew are on watch. Advise crew to not to consume any alcohol during the transit.



## 2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR

### 2.2 Communication

- **Minimize external communications (VHF radio, handsets etc.) to essential safety and security related communication and SOLAS information only.**
- **The VHF watch to be maintained on CH16 & CH08. The Coalition forces maintain watch on CH 08 and pirates are known to jam CH16 by playing loud music.**
- **Iridium phone placed on the bridge.**

## 2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR

### 2.2 Communication

- Immediately if sighted to UKMTO and IMB PRC.
- Ensure AIS data is correctly transmitted. If possible change AIS settings to transmit minimum information.
- Stay away from any vessel without an AIS signal.
- Keep photographs of pirate "mother ships" on bridge.

## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.3 Status of Machinery and Equipment**

- **The Engine Room is to be manned and off UMS.**
- **Keep at least 2 generators on.**
- **Steering tested in all modes and both steering motors are kept on.**
- **As far as practical, no routine maintenance, which requires stopping or disabling of Critical Equipment,/ Machinery, shall be performed during Transit.**

## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.4 Anti-Piracy Watches and Security Measures**

- **Vessel to implement security measures to level 2 of Ship Security Plan.**
- **Rig and lash the fire hoses around the stern and other vulnerable areas of the vessel with hydrants open.**
- **Fire pump and hoses should be pressurized and ready for discharge overboard.**

## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.4 Anti-Piracy Watches and Security Measures**

- **Vessel may rig several "Dummies" around the stern and other vulnerable areas. These dummies shall be removed and stored when outside the transit area.**
- **Secure and control access to bridge, engine room, steering gear room and crew quarters.**
- **Keep accommodation locked down and open only one bridge wing door for entering or exit. If this is not practicable (e.g. PCTC Vessels) due to ship lay out or for safety reasons, a minimum designated number of doors shall be kept open.**



## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.4 Anti-Piracy Watches and Security Measures**

- **Protect the crew from exposure to undue risk.**
- **Nobody shall be allowed on deck unless for essential work/look out/piracy watch and crew advised to stay away from bulkheads and windows, in the high risk area.**

## 2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR

### 2.4 Anti-Piracy Watches and Security Measures

- Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck.
- Provide adequate lighting on the poop deck, as this is the most vulnerable area but as long as it does not interfere with safe navigation.
- All search lights and jacklight available for use.

# **NYKSM PTE MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF DUMMY**



**DUMMY  
WEAPONS  
NOT  
ALLOWED**

## Dummies with Weapons should not be used

To: Master(s) of all fleet vessels  
Fm: NYK SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE LTD / HSEQ Dept.  
(Please reply to [audit@nyksm.com.sg](mailto:audit@nyksm.com.sg))

Ref : QA/SEC/021/09

Dear Captains,  
Good Day,

This message cancels and supersedes QA/ALL/178/08 "Dummy scarecrow with dummy weapons removal".

**Gist:**

Usage of dummies as a deterrent, in High Risk (piracy) areas is allowed, however use of dummy weapons is strictly prohibited.

**Background:**

- a) Recently issued "Best practice" (BLT/019/09), included a photo of a dummy holding a dummy weapon.
- b) The dummy in the photo was to be used "only" for the duration of transit through the Gulf of Aden.
- c) Some vessels queried the instructions referring to instructions issued under QA/ALL/178/08.

**Supplementary Explanation**

- a) Local laws of some countries prohibit the use of weapons including dummy weapons.

- b)
- m
- c)

- A
- Th
- Al

**Usage of dummies as a deterrent, in High Risk (piracy) areas is allowed, however use of dummy weapons is strictly prohibited**

Thank you and best regards,

- Capt. R. Sood

## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.5 Watch Keeping on Bridge**

- **Watch level 2 shall be maintained in the "High Risk" area.**
- **Post additional lookouts with radios and torches.**
- **Vessel should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times and navigational lights should not be turned off at night.**
- **Vessel to transit the area at maximum speed, consistent with safe navigation.**

## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.5 Watch Keeping on Bridge**

- **Both radars in operation. (Keep in mind radar blind spots).**
- **In most cases the pirates have approached the vessel from the quarter**
- **Give as wide a berth as possible and alert UKMTO of any suspicious craft.**



## **2. DURING THE TRANSIT IN THE CORRIDOR**

### **2.5 Watch Keeping on Bridge**

- **Master should try to make as early assessment of a threat as possible.**
- **As soon as the Master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately call the UKMTO.**



**Remember to:**

- **Ensure sufficient watch keepers**
- **Increase lookouts**
- **Man the Engine Room**

## 3. REPORTING

### 3.1 TO UKMTO

#### UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact

All ships should send the following reports to the UKMTO, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations in Dubai, UAE, in timely manner.

These reports will help CTF151 (Combined Task Force) to monitor ship movement easily and properly. Further, rescue operations can be quick if ship movement is continuously monitored.

## **3. REPORTING**

### **3.1 TO UKMTO**

#### **UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact**

##### **1. Reporting Procedure**

**All reports should be sent by e-mail to [ukmtodubai@eim.ae](mailto:ukmtodubai@eim.ae) and/or [ukmto@eim.ae](mailto:ukmto@eim.ae). If e-mail cannot be accessed, reports can be sent by fax, using fax number +971 4 306 5710. The date and time in the report should be in UTC.**

## 3. REPORTING

### 3.1 TO UKMTO

#### UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact

##### 1. Reporting Procedure

##### 1.1 Initial Report

Please start reporting on passing the following reference points:

- a) Suez for vessels entering the region via the Red Sea
- b) 5S for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (south)
- c) 78E for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (east)

## **3. REPORTING**

### **3.1 TO UKMTO**

#### **UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact**

##### **1. Reporting Procedure**

##### **1.2 Format**

**The initial report should contain the following:**

- a) Ship name (please mention if the ship is in the NYK fleet)**

***Example: Ship name "XXXXXX" (NYK fleet)***

- b) IRCS (International Radio Call Sign)**
- c) Flag**
- d) IMO number**
- e) MMSI**



## **3. REPORTING**

### **3.1 TO UKMTO**

#### **UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact**

##### **1. Reporting Procedure**

##### **1.2 Format**

**The initial report should contain the following:**

- f) Inmarsat telephone number, included satellite prefix**
- g) Telex and fax number**
- h) E-mail address**
- i) Name of company doing day-to-day management**
- j) Type of ship**
- k) Current position (and date/time in UTC)**

## **3. REPORTING**

### **3.1 TO UKMTO**

#### **UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact**

##### **1. Reporting Procedure**

##### **1.2 Format**

**The initial report should contain the following:**

- l) Course and speed**
- m) Itinerary in the region with route way points and destination port(s)**
- n) British personnel onboard (if any)**

## 3. REPORTING

### 3.1 TO UKMTO

#### UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact

##### 1. Reporting Procedure

##### 1.3 Position Report

Every 8 hours after submission of the initial report, a Position Report should be submitted and should include the current position (and date/time in UTC) and speed.

If the port call is included, arrival/departure information (port name, date/time in UTC, destination) should also be included.

## **3. REPORTING**

### **3.1 TO UKMTO**

#### **UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Scheme and Emergency Contact**

##### **1. Reporting Procedure**

##### **1.4 Final Report**

**Please send the final report reporting on passing the following reference points:**

- a) Suez for vessels leaving the region via the Red Sea**
- b) 5S for ships leaving the region via the Indian Ocean (south)**
- c) 78E for ships leaving the region via the Indian Ocean (east)**

## **Emergency Contact**

### **UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations)**

- **Telephone (First): +971 50 552 3215**
- **Telephone (Second): +971 50 552 6007**
- **Telephone (Third): +971 50 559 3983**

***Remark: The first number will be transferred to the second and then to the third if there is no response to the first number.***

- **E-mail: ukmtodubai@eim.ae and/or  
ukmto@eim.ae**
- **Fax: +971 4 306 5710**
- **Telex: (51) 210473**

## Emergency Contact

### IMB (International Maritime Bureau)

- **IMB Maritime Security Hot Line**
- **Telephone: +60 3 2031 0014**
- **E-mail: [imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org.uk](mailto:imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org.uk)**



## 3. Reporting

### 3.2 To MSCHOA

**At least 96 hours prior entering transit corridor, vessel shall register the vessel movement with MSCHOA, as per attached format. *(next slide)***

***Note: Items marked with \* are compulsory***

## 3. Reporting

Message  
format for  
registration  
with  
MSCHOA 96  
hours  
before  
entering the  
transit  
corridor

Sr. No	Description	Status
1	Ship's Name	
2	at (Point A,B,12N,58E , 10S)	
3	ETD of (Transit Corridor/Indian Ocean	
4	Direction* (east/west/south/north bound) or others	
5	Next Port of call on leaving IRTC	
6	Do you intend to join a group transit?	Yes/No
7	Number*	
8	Number*	
9	*	
10	Ship Name*	
11	Call Sign*	
12	Primary email contact*	
13	Secondary email contact	
14	Crew numbers and nationalities	
15	Draft	
16	Freeboard of lowest accessible deck*	Meters

## 3. Reporting

Message  
format for  
registration  
with  
MSCHOA 96  
hours  
before  
entering the  
transit  
corridor

Sr. No	Description	Status
17	Planned Transit Speed*	Knots
18	Vessel's Maximum Speed*	Knots
19	Cargo*	
20	Hazardous cargo details (if applicable)	
21	Ship's Master	
22	Ship contact number	
23	Ship contact email	
24	Owner name	
25	Operator name	
26	Operator address	
27	Operator telephone no	
28	Operator email	
29	DPA name	
30	DPA telephone no	

## 3. Reporting

Message  
format for  
registration  
with  
MSCHOA 96  
hours  
before  
entering the  
transit  
corridor

Sr. No	Description	Status
17	Planned Transit Speed*	Knots
18	Vessel's Maximum Speed*	Knots
19	Cargo*	
20	Hazardous cargo details (if applicable)	
21	Ship's Master	
22	Ship contact number	
23	Ship contact email	
24	Owner name	
25	Operator name	
26	Operator address	
27	Operator telephone no	
28	Operator email	
29	DPA name	
30	DPA telephone no	

#### **4. Deviation from Corridor, Malfunction and/or Breakdown of Machinery or Equipment**

**In case of any deviation from the corridor, malfunction/breakdown of any machinery/equipment or any other situation which is likely to affect safe transit through the corridor, vessel shall comply with following:**

**a. Make a telephone call to:**

- Company as per Emergency Communication System Diagram (ZZ-S-P-11.10.01)**
- UKMTO and request for assistance.**
- Inform IMB via Maritime Security hot line.**

### **4. Deviation from Corridor, Malfunction and/or Breakdown of Machinery or Equipment**

**In case of any deviation from the corridor, malfunction/breakdown of any machinery/equipment or any other situation which is likely to affect safe transit through the corridor, vessel shall comply with following:**

**b. Following details shall be advised:**

- Position of vessel ( Lat /Long)**
- Time of stopping /slowing down of Main Engine (UTC)**
- Time expected to resume normal passage**
- Nature of trouble**
- Any suspicious activity observed in the vicinity.**



#### **4. Deviation from Corridor, Malfunction and/or Breakdown of Machinery or Equipment**

**In case of any deviation from the corridor, malfunction/breakdown of any machinery/equipment or any other situation which is likely to affect safe transit through the corridor, vessel shall comply with following:**

- c. Send four (4) hourly position and situation update to Company, via email.**
- d. All the above parties as per a) shall be informed after resumption of normal passage.**

### 5. If Drifting to Join Convoy

- Inform UKMTO of the planned position of drifting, in the initial and position report.
- Remain vigilant and continue to maintain anti-piracy watches during the stay at the drifting position.
- Vessel shall continue to send position reports during this period.
- As far as practicable, immobilization of critical machinery (Main Engine, Generator Engine etc) shall be avoided. Vessel shall be ready to move at short notice, in case of any suspicious activity is sighted nearby.

## **5. If Drifting to Join Convoy**

- Vessel shall drift in a safe position and shall keep out of the "Prohibited Navigational Areas".**
- If any suspicious craft is seen to be approaching, vessel shall immediately start her engines and proceed away from the suspicious craft as soon as possible.**
- Send four (4) hourly position report to Company (Fleet and HSEQ)**

## 6. APPROACHED BY PIRATE / SUSPICIOUS BOAT

- Vessel without an AIS signal is likely to be a pirate skiff or a mother ship of pirates. Stay away from vessel that does not have an AIS signal.
- If approached by pirates / suspicious immediately contact the UKMTO by telephone, confirm the details e.g. ship's type, color, size, AIS information etc., and seek advice. This will allow coalition forces sufficient time to respond if vessel is attacked.
- Alert shipping in the vicinity on VHF.

## **6. APPROACHED BY PIRATE / SUSPICIOUS BOAT**

- Alter course to maximize CPA with the approaching vessel. Keep more than 10 miles from target as far as practicable. As the corridor is not controlled traffic route, do not hesitate to deviate from it in order to give sufficient berth.**
- Maneuver the vessel by giving helm orders to create sea/swell conditions alongside the vessel.**
- Use light, whistle, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been detected**

## **7. IF THE VESSEL IS ATTACKED OR ATTACK IS IMMINENT**

### **7.1 Contingency**

- **Activate the emergency alarm. Make announcement on the public address system of "Pirate Attack" for all crew (except watch-keepers) to assemble at the muster area / citadel. Blow ship's whistle.**
- **Activate fire pump defensive measures.**

# 7. IF THE VESSEL IS ATTACKED OR ATTACK IS IMMINENT

## 7.1 Contingency

- Prevent skiffs closing on the ship by altering course and increasing speed where possible. Pirates have great difficulty boarding a ship that is:
  - Making way at over 15 knots.
  - Maneuvering- it is suggested that as early as possible Master carry out continuous small zigzag maneuvers (not more than 7-10 degrees) whilst maintaining speed. However, in case the pirate skiffs come very close, do not hesitate to steer hard over to hard over.



## **7. IF THE VESSEL IS ATTACKED OR ATTACK IS IMMINENT**

### **7.1 Contingency**

- **Consider increasing the pirates' exposure to wind / waves and using bow wave and stern wash to restrict pirate craft coming alongside.**
- **Keep proceeding at maximum speed, making zigzag maneuver to prevent boarding. This will help in buying time until the military forces can arrive, this may lead the pirates to abort the attack**
- **Proceed as above even if fired upon as small caliber machine guns and RPGs used will have very limited effect on large vessels.**

# 7. IF THE VESSEL IS ATTACKED OR ATTACK IS IMMINENT

## 7.2 Notifications

- Activate the emergency communication plan/  
Call in order of priority:
- The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai
- The Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
- the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
- Company's 24 hours contact number, as per emergency communication diagram / CSO.

## **7. IF THE VESSEL IS ATTACKED OR ATTACK IS IMMINENT**

### **7.2 Notifications**

- Make a 'Mayday' call on the VHF Ch 16 (and back up Ch 08, which is monitored by Naval warships). Send a distress message via the DSC (Digital selective Calling) system and Inmarsat-C, as applicable. Establish telephone communication with UKMTO, they will alert the resources nearby and law enforcement agencies. You may call coalition warship by VHF.**
- If the pirates are successful in boarding the vessel than all attempts of resistance should be ceased and all advised to cooperate fully with the pirates.**

## **8. IF BOARDED BY PIRATES**

- a. Before pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO, MSCHOA and if time permits the Company.**
- b. Offer no resistance; this could lead to unnecessary violence and harm to crew.**
- c. If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all way taken off if possible and the ship navigated clear of other ships.**

## **8. IF BOARDED BY PIRATES**

- d. Remain calm and cooperate fully with the pirates.**
- e. Ensure all crew, other than bridge team, stay together in one location.**
- f. If in a locked down “citadel” ensure internal protection/cover is available in case the pirates attempt to force entry.**

**Keep clear of entry point/doors and portholes/windows — do not resist entry.**

## 9. IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION

- a. Crew should be advised NOT to use cameras with flash at any time when any military action is underway
- b. In the event that naval personnel take action onboard the ship, all personnel should keep low to the deck, cover their head with both hands (always ensuring that hands are visible and not holding anything) and make no sudden movements unless directed to by friendly forces.

## 9. IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY ACTION

- c. Be prepared to answer questions on identity and status onboard
- d. Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region.





## ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

**The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.**

### **EUNAVFOR**

**Main coordinating authority which operates the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa).**

**All information and contact details are to be found within the MSCHOA website.**

## ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

**The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.**

### **MSC (HOA) Maritime Security Centre (Horn of )**

**Set up by the European Union (EU) as part of a European Security and Defence Policy initiative to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa.**

**This work commenced with the establishment of EU NAVCO in September 2008. This Coordination Cell working in established links with a broad cross section of the maritime community and provided coordination with EU forces operating in the region.**

## ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

**The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.**

### **MSC (HOA) Maritime Security Centre (Horn of )**

**In November 2008, the Council of the European Union took a major step further by setting up a naval mission — EU NAVFOR ATALANTA — to improve maritime security off the Somali coast by preventing and deterring pirate attacks and by helping to safeguard merchant shipping in the region.**

## ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

**The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.**

### **UKMTO - () Maritime Trade Operations**

**The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in acts as a point of contact for industry liaison with the Combined Military Forces (CMF).**

**UKMTO Dubai also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send daily reports, providing their position and ETA at their next port whilst transiting the region bound by , 78°E and 5°S.**

## ANNEX A: GLOSSARY

The roles and inter-relationship of the coordinating bodies involved.

### UKMTO - () Maritime Trade Operations

UKMTO Dubai subsequently tracks ships, and the positional information is passed to CMF and EU headquarters. Emerging and relevant information affecting commercial traffic can then be passed directly to ships, rather than by company offices, improving responsiveness to any incident and saving time.

**ANNEX B: USEFUL CONTACT DETAILS**

<b>UKMTO</b> Email Telephone Cell Fax Telex	<b>UKMTO@eim.ae</b> <b>+971 50 552 3215</b> ----- <b>+971 4 306 5710</b> <b>(51) 210473</b>
<b>MSCHOA</b> Via Website for reporting Telephone Fax Email	<b>www.mschoa.org</b> <b>+44 (0) 1923 958545</b> <b>+44 (0) 1923 958520</b> <b>postmaster@mschoa.org</b>
<b>IMB PRC</b> Email Telephone Cell Fax Telex	<b>piracy@icc-ccs.org</b> <b>+60 3 2078 5763</b> ----- <b>+60 3 2078 5769</b> <b>MA34199 IMBPC1</b>

## **10. Post incident actions and reporting**

**Once the attack has been repulsed or the pirates have broken off attack or have left the vessel:**

- **Make post incident reports to
  - UKMTO
  - MSCHOA
  - IMB PRC**
- **Carry out an internal debriefing of the ship's company.**
- **Offer professional counseling to those who may have been affected by events.**



## **10. Post incident actions and reporting**

**Once the attack has been repulsed or the pirates have broken off attack or have left the vessel:**

- **Make a post incident report to owners/operators**
- **Consider an appropriate mechanism for informing next of kin.**
- **Secure any evidence of the attack, including CCTV coverage.**

## 10. Post incident actions and reporting

- A debriefing should be conducted by the owner/master, SSO and CSO to learn from the attack and identify areas of improvement.
- Debriefing should be conducted immediately after the incident so that the events are fresh and should involve the entire crew.



## 10. Post incident actions and reporting

- Shipowner should be aware that seafarer may suffer from trauma or similar condition after being victimized under an attack from pirates or armed robbers.
- Shipowner should offer advice from professionals if the seafarer wishes such assistance.

## 10. Post incident actions and reporting

- To reduce the risk from trauma the master has to debrief the crew immediately after the attack or release of a vessel in order to get crew to confront their experiences.
- Counseling professionals debrief crew as soon as possible after the attack or release of the vessel in order to assist the crew to manage their experiences.

# **OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS**

- ☐ Demonstrate a willingness to defend yourself.
- ☐ Employ speed and maneuver to avoid attack.
- ☐ Maintain a full visual and radar watch.
- ☐ Adopt passive defense measures.
- ☐ Active defense measures should be considered.
- ☐ If a ship comes under attack, report immediately.



**If there is  
threat.....**

**RUN.....**

*You leave me breathless...*



©PAWS

**THANK YOU AND HAVE A NICE DAY**



**SEE YOU  
ALL IN  
GULF OF  
ADEN**



# ANTI - PIRACY TRAINING SEMINAR

