



SECURE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING



Assignment – 2 (DVTA)



V NANDITHA
CB.SC.P2CYS23018



(2nd Year / 3rd Sem- MTech, CYBERSECURITY)

DVTA SET-UP















Password : P@ssw0rd



We also added the Current User (VN)









Creating a New DB




Got Created




Restarting Service






Open FileZilla > Start > Admin





Connected






1. Identify the Application architecture, languages, and frameworks used

- Start by running Dependency Walker on the executable to list all dependencies and get an overview of the architecture.
- Use PEiD to detect the compiler and possibly the language used.
- For .NET applications, use dotPeek to inspect assemblies.
- For Java applications, use JD-GUI to inspect JAR files.

Opening the .exe file in CFF-explorer, we can identify the following information

- Architecture 32bit & 2 tier (As it's communicating with the Database)
- Language used : .NET Assembly
- Frameworks : .NET Framework



POC:

Tools: Dependency Walker, PEiD, dotPeek (for .NET applications), JD-GUI (for Java applications), and manual inspection of installation directories.


Methodology: Use these tools to inspect the executable files and libraries to determine the architecture (e.g., client-server, microservices), languages (e.g., C#, Java), and frameworks (e.g., .NET, Spring).

2. Decompile and try to retrieve the source code of the application.

Also, check if any hardcoded sensitive information is found?

- Decompile the application binaries with appropriate tools (dotPeek for .NET, JD-GUI for Java).
- Search through the decompiled code for hardcoded credentials or sensitive information.

By Decompiling the Application using DNSpy or MS Visual Studio Tools, we can see the Source Code of the Application.



POC:

Tools: dotPeek (for .NET), JD-GUI (for Java), Ghidra, and Hex Editors.

Methodology: Decompile the application binaries to source code using the appropriate decompilers. Search the code for hardcoded sensitive information such as passwords, API keys, and connection strings.

3. Sniff the traffic between client and server. Identify which protocol is being used for communication?

- Capture network traffic using Wireshark or tcpdump while the application communicates with the server.
- Identify protocols and look for any unencrypted data transmissions.

With Wireshark we can sniff the client and server

Next inspect the contents of the packets to determine whether the app is using TCP/UDP protocol for its communication

In the packet inspection window, we can see that the protocol used by the DVTA is TCP Protocol.

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The top pane displays a list of packets. A red box highlights a sequence of packets (334-338) with the following details:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
334	2024/10/22 12:12:09.310603	2004::6000::0007:0013	2004::6000::0007:0013	TLSv1.3	113	Application Data
335	2024/10/22 12:12:09.310606	2004::6000::0007:0013	2004::6000::0007:0013	TLSv1.3	109	Application Data
336	2024/10/22 12:12:09.327032	2004::6000::0007:0013	2004::6000::0007:0013	TLSv1.3	106	Application Data
337	2024/10/22 12:12:09.327032	2004::6000::0007:0013	2004::6000::0007:0013	TLSv1.3	108	Application Data
338	2024/10/22 12:12:09.327032	2004::6000::0007:0013	2004::6000::0007:0013	TLSv1.3	107	Application Data

The bottom pane shows the detailed view of the selected packet (No. 334). It identifies the protocol as TLSv1.3 and shows the application data. A red box highlights the 'Information: connection incomplete, DATA [15]' message.

From 304, 148 bytes on wire (1194 bits), 148 bytes captured (1194 bits) on Interface Device\NPF...
Ethernet II, Src: Realtek, 78:00:00:00:00:00, Dst: Interface, 00:00:00:00:00:00
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 8080, Seq: 4405, Len: 1472, Win: 0
Source Port: 443
Destination Port: 8080
Source or Destination Port: 443
Source or Destination Port: 8080
(Stream index: 0)
[Information: connection incomplete, DATA [15]]
[RST Segment Len: 74]
Sequence Number: 4405 (relative sequence number)
Sequence Number (raw): 266081920
Next Sequence Number: 4556 (relative sequence number)
Acknowledgment Number: 2672 (relative ack number)

POC:

Tools: Wireshark, tcpdump.

Methodology: Capture network traffic while the application is in use to identify the protocol (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, UDP) and analyze the data packets.

4. Identify if unencrypted communication is happening between client and server?

- Analyze the captured traffic in Wireshark to ensure sensitive data is transmitted over encrypted channels (e.g., HTTPS).

In this case we can use either ECHIMIRAGE / Wireshark.

We are using ECHIMIRAGE here.

From the Output we can see that when we login to DVTA, the data is sent as Plain Text format to the Database

Traffic Log																Rules																Intercept																				
Outbound TCP data to 192.168.56.110:1433																																																				
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	01	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F																					
0x0000	01	09	00	B2	00	00	01	00	16	00	00	00	12	00	00	00		
0x0010	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	73	00			
0x0020	65	00	6C	00	65	00	63	00	74	00	20	00	69	00	74	00	e		
0x0030	65	00	6D	00	2C	00	20	00	70	00	72	00	69	00	63	00	e		
0x0040	65	00	2C	00	20	00	64	00	61	00	74	00	65	00	2C	00	e		
0x0050	74	00	69	00	6D	00	65	00	20	00	66	00	72	00	6F	00	t		
0x0060	6D	00	20	00	65	00	78	00	70	00	65	00	6E	00	73	00	m		
0x0070	65	00	73	00	20	00	77	00	68	00	65	00	72	00	65	00	e	
0x0080	20	00	65	00	6D	00	61	00	69	00	6C	00	3D	00	27	00		
0x0090	72	00	61	00	79	00	6D	00	6F	00	6E	00	64	00	40	00	r	
0x00A0	74	00	65	00	73	00	74	00	2E	00	63	00	6F	00	6D	00	t
0x00B0	27	00																

POC:


Tools: Wireshark.

Methodology: Inspect the captured traffic to check if sensitive information is being sent over unencrypted protocols (e.g., HTTP instead of HTTPS).

5. Capture and analyze the communication using proxy tools (e.g., Burp Suite, Echo Mirage)

- Configure Burp Suite as a proxy and capture the HTTP/HTTPS traffic from the application.
- Examine the requests and responses for sensitive data being sent in plaintext.

From the below, we can observe that using Wireshark we are able to capture and analyse the requests that are being sent to the Database and to the server.



```
264 2024/10/22 22:13:58.829715 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8170 [ACK] Seq=3887 Ack=1055 Win=76800 Len=0
267 2024/10/22 22:13:58.829715 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 113 Application Data
268 2024/10/22 22:13:58.850302 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8173 [ACK] Seq=3887 Ack=3310 Win=75800 Len=0
269 2024/10/22 22:13:58.850302 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8170 [ACK] Seq=3887 Ack=3813 Win=79516 Len=0
270 2024/10/22 22:13:58.871549 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15 78 8770 + 445 [ACK] Seq=3813 Ack=3482 Win=5536 Len=0
271 2024/10/22 22:13:58.880646 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 139 Application Data
272 2024/10/22 22:13:58.880646 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 145 Application Data
273 2024/10/22 22:13:58.880646 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 113 Application Data
274 2024/10/22 22:13:58.890013 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15 78 8270 + 443 [ACK] Seq=3813 Ack=3817 Win=5536 Len=0
275 2024/10/22 22:13:58.892728 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15v1.1 113 Application Data
276 2024/10/22 22:13:58.892987 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15v1.1 145 Application Data
277 2024/10/22 22:13:58.894675 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8170 [ACK] Seq=3817 Ack=3887 Win=79516 Len=0
278 2024/10/22 22:13:58.901968 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 144 Application Data
279 2024/10/22 22:13:58.901968 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 145 Application Data
280 2024/10/22 22:13:58.902025 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15 78 8273 + 443 [ACK] Seq=3310 Ack=2887 Win=5536 Len=0
281 2024/10/22 22:13:58.909968 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15 1444 8883 + 443 [ACK] Seq=3880 Ack=597 Win=254 Len=1370 [TCP segment of a reset (RST)]
282 2024/10/22 22:13:58.909968 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15v1.1 553 Application Data
283 2024/10/22 22:13:58.909968 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15v1.1 114 Application Data
284 2024/10/22 22:13:58.909968 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15v1.1 113 Application Data
285 2024/10/22 22:13:58.939116 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8883 [ACK] Seq=597 Ack=2370 Win=488 Len=0
286 2024/10/22 22:13:58.942512 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8883 [ACK] Seq=597 Ack=2857 Win=488 Len=0
287 2024/10/22 22:13:58.948042 2004::6000::8007:8201... 2004::6072::6057:6754... T15 78 443 + 8175 [ACK] Seq=8826 Ack=1587 Win=76800 Len=0
288 2024/10/22 22:13:58.953168 2004::6072::6057:6754... 2004::6000::8007:8201... T15 43 1444 8883 + 443 [ACK] Seq=3887 Ack=1587 Win=76800 Len=0

Frame 282: 553 bytes on wire (4424 bits) captured (4424 bits) on interface DeviceNPF_{FA16BAC-4589-43BC-A2A4-279C}
Ethernet II, Src: IntelCorporation_88:6f:41:6c:16:83:88:6f:41, Dst: Shenzhen_25:00:02:7c:43:00:15:00:02
Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: 2004::6072::6057:6754, Dst: 2004::6000::8007:8201
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 8883, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 2370, Ack: 567, Len: 475
Destination Port: 443
Source or Destination Port: 8883
Source or Destination Port: 443
[Stream index: 7]
[Conversation completeness: Incomplete (12)]
[TCP Segment Len: 475]
Sequence Number: 2370 (relative sequence number)
Sequence Number (raw): 332386888
Next Sequence Number: 2857 (relative sequence number)
Acknowledgment Number: 597 (relative ack number)
```

POC:


Tools: Burp Suite, Echo Mirage.

Methodology: Set up a proxy to intercept and analyze the application's HTTP/HTTPS traffic. Look for sensitive data being transmitted in plaintext.

6. Analyze the application workflow and observe which all files/folders are being used by the application using Process Monitor

- Run Process Monitor to track all file and registry operations by the application.
- Analyze the logs to identify which files and directories are being accessed and modified.

With the help of tool called Process-Monitor can see that there are several files and folders being retrieved during the process of DVTA.exe.



Time s...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
22:51:08...	MsMpEng.exe	5900	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\sihost.exe	SUCCESS	
22:51:08...	Code.exe	16116	TCP TCPCopy	LAPTOP-ADCLFDJP-8543 -> 2a04:4e42...	SUCCESS	Length: 2740, seqn...
22:51:08...	Code.exe	16116	TCP Receive	LAPTOP-ADCLFDJP-8543 -> 2a04:4e42...	SUCCESS	Length: 2740, seqn...
22:51:08...	dumpcap.exe	17768	WriteFile	C:\Temp\wireshark_Wi-FiX5UQ02.pca...	SUCCESS	Offset: 164500328, L...
22:51:08...	DVTA.exe	7572	Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 17312
22:51:08...	DVTA.exe	7572	Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 13696

POC:

Tools: Process Monitor (ProcMon).

Methodology: Run ProcMon while using the application to log file system activity. Identify files and folders accessed by the application and analyze for sensitive information.

7. Exploit DLL Hijacking vulnerability (You can use a simple legitimate “Hello World” printing DLL)


- Identify DLLs loaded by the application using Dependency Walker.
- Replace a vulnerable DLL with a crafted DLL to test if the application loads it, demonstrating hijacking.

In order to hijack a DLL, we need to find which DLL's that are being loaded when the DVTA.exe run is not found


For this we need to open Promon & set the following 3 filters

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
DBAccess.dll	03-09-2023 14:49	Application extens...	8 KB
DBAccess.pdb	03-09-2023 14:49	PDB File	16 KB
DVTA.exe	03-09-2023 14:49	Application	218 KB
DVTA.exe.Config	03-09-2023 14:50	Configuration Sou...	3 KB
DVTA.pdb	03-09-2023 14:49	PDB File	54 KB
DVTA\Avshos.exe	03-09-2023 14:49	Application	23 KB
DVTA\Avshos.exe.config	03-09-2023 14:49	Configuration Sou...	2 KB
DVTA\Avshos.exe.manifest	03-09-2023 14:49	MANIFEST File	1 KB
EntityFramework.dll	03-09-2023 14:49	Application extens...	1,091 KB
EntityFramework.xml	03-09-2023 14:49	XML File	1,091 KB
ExcelLibrary.dll	03-09-2023 14:49	Application extens...	116 KB
hello-world-x64.dll	25-05-2024 22:51	Application extens...	11 KB

Now Start the Process Monitor Filter



When we click DVTA.exe automatically Hello World pops up and will appear with opening of the DVTA Login Page



As we can observe that now when the DVTA.exe runs, it loads our calc.dll along with the application. Thus we have hijacked the DLL.

POC:

Tools: Dependency Walker, Process Monitor.

Methodology: Identify DLLs loaded by the application. Replace a vulnerable DLL with a malicious one (e.g., a DLL that prints “Hello World”) to exploit the hijacking vulnerability.


8. Check for sensitive information in the configuration files of the thick client application?

- Locate and open all configuration files associated with the application.
- Manually or using scripts, search for sensitive information such as plaintext passwords and API keys.

In the folder of DVTA, we have few files.

One of the files is App.config

It contains the following sensitive information (Have to open Visual Studio and analyze DVTA.exe.config)



The screenshot shows the DVTA.exe.config file in Visual Studio. The file is an XML configuration file. A red box highlights the <appSettings> section, which contains several sensitive values:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" />
<configuration>
  <configSections>
    <!-- For more information on entity framework configuration, visit http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=214886 -->
    <section name="entity framework" type="System.Data.Entity.Internal.ConfigFile.EntityFrameworkSection, EntityFramework" />
  </configSections>
  <startup>
    <supportedRuntime version="v4.0" sku=".NETFramework,Version=v4.5" />
  </startup>
  <appSettings>
    <add key="DBSERVER" value="127.0.0.1\SQLEXPRESS" />
    <add key="DBNAME" value="DVTA" />
    <add key="DBUSERNAME" value="sa" />
    <add key="DBPASSWORD" value="CTsvjzejqd00M6SRcPxpQ==" />
    <add key="AESKEY" value="18LX0054051KZHEF7HahcXPufJBv8k8" />
    <add key="IV" value="f900a990Xagp1a" />
    <add key="ClientSettingProvider.ServiceUrl" value="" />
    <add key="FTPSERVER" value="127.0.0.1" />
  </appSettings>
  <entity framework>
    <defaultConnectionFactory type="System.Data.Entity.Infrastructure.LocalDbConnectionFactory, EntityFramework">
      <parameters>
        <parameter value="v11.0" />
      </parameters>
    </defaultConnectionFactory>
  </entity framework>
</configuration>
```

POC:

Tools: Text editors, Config file analyzers.

Methodology: Locate and inspect configuration files (e.g., .config, .ini, .xml) for sensitive information such as passwords, connection strings, and other credentials.


9. Identify sensitive information found in memory?

- Use Process Explorer to dump the memory of the running application.
- Analyze the memory dump with the Volatility Framework to find sensitive information like encryption keys and passwords.

From the Source code which we got from the DNSpy, we got to know that it stores the username and password in HKCU/dvta registry file

We can visit the registry to find the sensitive information which is stored in the memory

We have to open registry editor to analyze dvta username and password



POC:

Tools: Process Explorer, Volatility Framework.

Methodology: Use memory analysis tools to dump and inspect the application's memory while it is running. Look for sensitive information such as passwords, personal data, and encryption keys.