

Chapter Two

Franz Brentano I

On Mind and Its Objects

1. *Intentionality*

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomena includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1924, p. 124, Eng. p. 88)

Much has been written about this so-called ‘intentionality passage’ from Brentano’s *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. The thesis here formulated has proved to be one of the most influential in all of contemporary philosophy. It gave rise, first of all, to Husserlian phenomenology, but it also lies at the root of much of the thinking of analytic philosophers on meaning and reference and on the relations of language and mind. In addition, the notion of intentionality, and Brentano’s use of this notion as a criterion for the demarcation of the psychological realm, pervades much contemporary philosophizing within the realm of cognitive science. Yet as becomes clear when we take into account the wider corpus of Brentano’s writings from the period leading up to the first edition of the *Psychology* (published in 1874), where the intentionality-passage was first formulated, Brentano’s own original thesis of intentionality has been repeatedly misunderstood.

2. *The Psychology of Aristotle*

Brentano, as we have seen, developed a view of science and knowledge which incorporates aspects of both Cartesianism and British empiricist philosophizing. The overarching context of all Brentano’s writings is, however, the psychology of Aristotle, together with the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. My present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, as seen through Brentano’s eyes. I shall be concerned only with the question as to how Aristotle was understood by Brentano; thus I shall not be concerned with the correctness of Brentano’s interpretation or with the coherence of the underlying ideas.

We are to imagine two realms, of soul or mind, and of matter, the two related by what we shall come to call ‘intentionality’. On both sides we are to distinguish further what we might call *raw* and *developed* forms of the entities populating the realms in question. The raw form of matter is called *materia prima*. This can become everything corporeal, and indeed it does not exist

except as something corporeal. In an analogous way, the soul can become everything sensible and intelligible, and does not exist except insofar as it receives the form of something sensible and intelligible. In each case what gets added is of a formal nature, and it is the fixed stock of forms or species which informs both the realm of thinking and that of extended (material, corporeal) substance: these two realms are, as it were, attuned to each other, and it is forms which mediate between them.

Forms or universals exist, accordingly, in two different ways: within the soul, and within corporeal substance.¹ Aristotle, one could say, conceived the link between mind and corporeal substance as a sort of spiritual nourishment. The sensory and intelligible parts of the soul *take in* sensory and intelligible forms, in something like the way in which the body, through the agency of the vegetative soul, takes in matter in the form of food. The basic psychic processes within, whether sensory or intellectual, result in an *extraction or abstraction of forms* from the substances without. ‘By a “sense”,’ Aristotle writes, ‘is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter.’² In accordance with Aristotle’s general theory of change as transfer of form, when the soul is affected by what is corporeal, then form is transferred from one to the other, so that agent and patient become to this extent alike. Two senses of affecting must however be distinguished. On the one hand there is affecting in the strict or proper sense, which involves a real alteration of the affected thing, as when a piece of wax takes on the impress of a seal. On the other hand there is affecting in an extended or improper sense, which involves no real action on the side of the agent and no real alteration on the side of the patient, but merely an actualization in the latter of something that is present there already in potency. Sensing and thinking are cases of affecting in this second, improper sense.

When the piece of wax takes on the form of the seal, it acquires a form that is merely *like* the form of the seal. The sense, in contrast, takes in the very same form as is present in the object sensed. Yet sensing red is different from being red, just as feeling warmth is different from having warmth in oneself ‘materially’ or ‘physically’. When I *am* warm, then I am changed, affected in the proper sense, by the thing that warms me. When I *feel* warmth, however – when, in the scholastic terminology, I have warmth in myself not materially but *objectively* or *as an object* – then I am affected only in an extended or ‘modified’ sense. As Brentano himself puts it:

It is not insofar as we become cold that we sense what is cold; otherwise plants and inorganic bodies would sense; rather it is only insofar as what is cold exists within us objectively, i.e. as known, that it is sensed, that is, insofar as we take coldness in, without ourselves being its physical subject. (1867, p. 80, Eng. pp. 54f.; cf. 425^b20)

This affecting in the improper sense involves a mere actualization of what is already present in potency. The reference to ‘potency’, here, reflects an attempt on Aristotle’s part to distance himself from Plato’s view that the soul

1. Soul (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the microcosm; matter (potential) plus forms (actual) yield the macrocosm. Cf. George 1978, p. 254. Brentano was to the end of his life impressed by Aristotle’s doctrine here. (See e.g. 1933, p. 158, Eng. p. 119f.; 1976, Part Two, V.)

2. See *De Anima*, 424^a18. All references to Aristotle in this chapter are to this work, unless otherwise specified.

has within itself the ideas themselves already at birth. For Aristotle, in contrast, the soul has (or is) merely the power (faculty, *Vermögen*) of sensing and thinking. It is, so to speak, only the *possibility* of the ideas. The intellectual soul is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable. When it is not thinking, it is at best merely the *power* or *capacity* to take on certain forms.³

Everything in external reality, as Aristotle conceives it, both form and matter, both what is sensible (sensible forms) and what is thinkable (intelligible forms), belongs to ‘sensible spatial magnitudes’: ‘the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things.’ (432^a4) The intelligible forms, insofar as they exist outside the soul, are, that is to say, locked away inside sensible matter. This implies, for Aristotle, that nothing can be thought or learned (no form can be actualized within the soul) except through the assistance of sense. This works, however, through the medium of imagination: thinking goes to work not on sensation directly but on ‘images’ or ‘phantasms’. Our sense experience leaves enduring traces in the sense organs, traces which constitute a new sort of power or disposition: they are able to become re-actualized when once they have been laid down. They can be stimulated through other sensory presentations in such a way that an earlier sensible form returns to sense as image.

Thinking, now, relates to such images or phantasms as sensing relates to the external sensible things:

Sense receives its images, in that it turns to the external objects; the intellect receives its ideas by gazing, as it were, upon images; and just as seeing and hearing are no longer possible when the seen or heard object disappears ..., so thinking is no longer possible when the appropriate images are no longer present in the senses. (Brentano 1867, p. 146, Eng. p. 96)

We acquire knowledge by extracting forms from images, and such knowledge can in turn be understood as a lasting endowment of the soul. Just as actual sensing leaves traces which make possible the actual having of images, so actual thinking leaves traces (what we call ‘learning’), which become actualized in subsequent active thinking.

The thesis that everything in external reality belongs to sensible spatial magnitudes has far-reaching consequences. The world, we might say, is made up of realia (things) and non-realialia (forms): the proper objects of sensing and thinking, respectively. These do not, however, as on Plato’s view, constitute two distinct realms of objects. Non-realialia exist only as immanent to realia: they exist only *in* something else, either in what is mental or in what is material. Normally, as we have seen, non-realialia exist only as bound up with matter and their existence *as* non-realialia is then potential only. Sometimes however non-realialia exist as non-realialia actually, namely in the mind. For thinking *is* the actualization of forms as such. And when the mind is actively thinking, then it *is* the universals which it thinks.

This mental actualization is in a certain sense a separation of the forms from the things without. Again, however, it is not a real separation, but a separation in an improper or extended sense: thus for example ‘when thinking

3. Otherwise, Aristotle says, it has no nature of its own: ‘that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing.’ (429^a22)

the objects of mathematics, the mind thinks as separate elements which do not in fact exist in separation.’ (431^b17) As existing in the thing, forms or universals are tied to matter in what we might conceive as a sort of mutual pervasion. They may, however, exist also as freed or separated, and this either in a proper or in a modified sense. As actualized in sensation, they are separated only in an improper sense from their material complements and thus are still individuated thereby. The resultant actualized universals (the warmth of this fire, the redness of that rose) are still founded on their respective matters, and they are still experienced as *in* the respective things. As actualized in thought, on the other hand, universals are freed from their material complements in a double sense: they are separated *and* independent. Where sensation apprehends what is external and individual, knowledge apprehends free universals, and the latter exist entirely within the orbit of the soul. ‘That is why a man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself – a sensible object must be there.’ (417^b24)

But how, more precisely, are we to understand this talk of ‘free’ and ‘bound’ universals? When I see a red object, then I see something that is composed of matter and form. What I take in is the form alone, but it is in fact still connected to (and thus individuated by) its matter. What I know intellectually, on the other hand, is not the object, nor what is individuated by the object, but the form itself, for example the redness.

One must not, however, conclude that what is taken in by sense, and what is taken in by the intellect, relate to each other as numerically different objects. The view of Aristotle and Brentano is that they differ not as one thing from another thing, but as one thing from itself when it stands or behaves or is connected or situated differently (for example when a stick is pulled straight after having been bent).

Plato held that we know flesh and the being of flesh in that we take into ourselves two different things, indeed two things which are separated from each other in their substances, for the idea is for him a thing for itself and subsists in separation from what is material. (Brentano 1867, p. 133, Eng. p. 86)

For Aristotle, in contrast, the flesh which is grasped by the senses, and the being of this flesh, which is grasped by the intellect, are the same thing: merely, in the one case it is still tied to its matter; in the other case it is abstract, a free universal. But the universal that is here free is still the same universal as is there bound. When the universal *flesh* is taken up into the intellect, it is ‘the same sensory-corporeal flesh which is in the senses, but the condition is different in which it is in the one or in the other faculty.’ (Brentano 1867, p. 134, Eng. p. 87)

The job of the scientist is, after all, as Brentano insists, to get to know the crystals and plants and other bodies which he finds here on Earth. Thus, ‘if the intellect knows the being of flesh, then it is not something other and immaterial that is taken into him, but the very same object that is in the senses; only, in the intellect it is abstract, in sense concrete with individual matter.’ (1867, p. 135, Eng. p. 88) A line which was bent is, after having been made straight,

still the line which it was, only it is other, it has become simpler; and so the corporeal object that was in the senses is also in the intellect still one and the same, only its

condition is different. Like the line, it has become simpler, its individual differences have been evened out. (1867, p. 135, Eng. p. 88)

Even in the case of mathematical concepts, then, the intellect does not grasp something more immaterial than what is grasped by sense: it does not take into itself something incorporeal or non-sensory. For the very same thing that is in the intellect is also in the senses, merely, as Brentano puts it, standing now in this and now in that relation (*in anderer und anderer Weise sich verhaltend*).

The forms, then, exist originally as parts (in a modified sense) of of sensible spatial magnitudes. The mathematical concept of a curve is already in my sensory presentation of a snub-nosed thing and thus it is already in the snub-nosed thing itself. Mathematical concepts do not exist outside the mind in separation from sensory bodies. They are *in them*, as also are the physical concepts. The intellect, therefore, when it grasps mathematical concepts, does not know something that is separate from sensible matter: ‘it only knows *in a separated way* something not separated therefrom.’ (Brentano 1867, p. 150, Eng. p. 98) The corporeal thing itself remains something material when it is taken up into the intellect; but it is in the intellect in an immaterial way. Outside the intellect a thing is individually determined; for after all something general without its individual difference cannot exist.⁴ But in the intellect it has lost its individual determinateness. The broken line has been pulled straight, ‘and in this state, alien to its original state, what is bodily can now also be in the intellect.’ (1867, p. 138, Eng. p. 90)

Yet even in the intellect what is bodily retains forms pertaining to what is material; only such things as are free of matter in and of themselves could be free of materiality in the intellect. Only one sort of essence is, as far as Aristotle is concerned, of itself free of materiality in this sense and therefore also supersensory: the essence *mind* or *intellect*. Of this essence, and of the concepts abstracted therefrom, we can have knowledge other than via sensory images.⁵ The intellect is graspable just as it is. The general concept we have of our mind or intellect is also an individual consciousness of self. The essence *mind* or *intellect*, then, is a *haecceitas*, a form that is both intelligible and individuating. And something similar presumably holds of the essence *God*. Mind or intellect is, as Brentano puts it, ‘completely and with the highest intelligibility completely intelligible’. (1867, p. 136, Eng. p. 90) Psychology, accordingly (and in Cartesian vein), enjoys a peculiarly noble status within the system of the sciences.⁶

4. This idea was to remain with Brentano throughout his career. For Brentano’s ontology is from beginning to end an ontology of individuals only; everything that exists is completely determinate, down to lowest differences. Forms or universals exist only as immanent to what is in every case individual through and through.

5. Brentano initially goes along with Aristotle here, and in his later works he even generalizes Aristotle’s view, for example by admitting as non-sensible substances also topoids of four and more dimensions. (See Brentano 1976, where the view is also defended that the soul is a substance of zero dimension.) However he insists at the same time that we can have no positive knowledge of such topoids (just as, for the later Brentano, we can have no positive knowledge of the soul).

6. Corporeal things, in contrast, ‘allow only an indefinite general knowledge and are not knowable equally in all their determinations. We know them the more certainly and the more clearly and thus have them in us the more intelligibly, the more they have become alienated through abstraction from their natural mode of existence. This is why mathematics is more intelligible than physics, and why metaphysics is more intelligible than mathematics; also the more general physical

3. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*

Sensing and thinking, for a (Brentanian sort of) Aristotelian, is to repeat, a form of taking in. We have reached the point where we are able properly to interpret Brentano's thesis in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* to the effect that every mental phenomenon is characterized by the 'intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object'. As Brentano himself puts it in the very next sentence: 'Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself'. This thesis is, I insist, to be taken literally – against the grain of a seemingly unshakeable tendency to twist Brentano's words at this point, a tendency manifested for example in the original version of Michael Dummett's book on the *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Brentano's 'most familiar positive thesis', Dummett tells us – the thesis that acts of consciousness are characterized by their intentionality – consists in the claim that all such acts are 'directed towards external objects'. Indeed, as Dummett initially reads Brentano, the object of a mental act is on the Brentanian account 'external in the full sense of being part of the objective world independent of the subject, rather than a constituent of his consciousness.' (Dummett 1988, p. 39) This interpretation is quite simply incompatible with Brentano's text (and it is no longer present in the revised English edition of Dummett's work). For one will find no coherent interpretation of Brentano's principle of intentionality so long as one remains within the framework of our usual, commonsensical notions of both the mind and its objects. This is not only because Brentano's principle operates with quite special, Aristotelian ideas. It is also because Brentano's very formulation of the principle was a response to what he saw as a hidden incoherence in these commonsensical notions themselves.

Brentano in fact appends a footnote to the intentionality passage in the *Psychology* to the effect that

Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. (1924, p. 124n, Eng. p. 88n.)⁷

It is not only classical sources which spark Brentano's immanentistic views however. Descartes also played a crucial role. But Brentano had been impressed also by Comte's critique of the metaphysics of transcendent substance and had sought, like Comte, a science of the 'phenomena' or

concept is more intelligible than the more special, the genus more than the species, and the higher genus more than the lower.' (1867, p. 136, Eng. p. 90)

7. As if this were not enough, Brentano goes on to remark that 'St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact.' On the classical sources of Brentano's terminology and thinking here, see Marras 1976, Hedwig 1978 and 1990/91 and Sorabji 1991.

In the light of what is said in the text it is clear also that Rolf George, the translator of Brentano's *Psychologie des Aristoteles*, has hit the nail on the head when he points out that it is in the context of the discussion of two ways of *taking in* (corresponding to the two senses of 'being affected') in this early work that the notion of intentional inexistence occurs for the first time in Brentano's writing. It is not yet used as a criterion for psychical phenomena, nor does he emphasize or perhaps even notice that one can here speak of an intentional *relation*. He prefers to follow Aristotle's terminology, saying that the intellect (or the organ of sense) *is* what it thinks (or senses). The relational mode of expression is eschewed in favour of qualified predication: 'is-physically', 'is-objectively'. (George 1978, pp. 252f.)

‘*Erscheinungen*’.⁸ He had been impressed also by corpuscular theories of the physical world and of sensation, theories which imply that what is in the act of sensation as object bears no similarity to the putative outer world by which, as we commonsensically suppose, sensation is caused. Brentano wanted to give a *true* description of what is involved in mental directedness, not a merely commonsensical one (which for him would be simply one that is based on prejudice). Colours and so on do not exist in the way we commonsensically suppose. They are more properly to be regarded after the fashion of Lockean secondary qualities: they are contributed by the mind and are such that their being is exhausted by their being in the mind. From this it follows that we can have no presentation of the world as it really is in the sense of a world transcendent to the mind. Certainly we may assume that there are physical objects which cause our sensations. But the thesis that there are such objects can never be a matter of evident knowledge, and such objects could never hope to serve as direct targets of our normal perceptual experiences.⁹ From this it follows, too, that the judgments involved in outer perception are always false. Only inner perception is a *Wahr-nehmung*.

It would equally be going too far, however, to assume that the being of immanent objects of ‘outer sense’ is no sort of being at all, that Brentano is simply employing a certain *façon de parler* in his talk of ‘immanent existence’. For at the time of the first edition of the *Psychology* Brentano conceives physical phenomena like experienced colours and sounds as existing in the mind as parts of consciousness, so that the intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed. The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, have a diminished sort of existence, an existence ‘in the mind’. Certainly they are not *real*, but this does not mean that they are merely nothing. Rather, they are *entia rationis*, non-real parts of a real, mental substance.

Brentano’s intentionality thesis at the time of the *Psychology* may now more properly be interpreted as follows: the mind or soul is windowless; our acts of thought and sensation are directed in every case to what exists immanently within it, i.e. to these acts themselves, or to immanent data of sense, or to immanent entities of other sorts (for example to concepts, the descendants of Aristotle’s forms). As far as the transcendent world is concerned we can have at best only probabilistic knowledge, though we can know with certainty that it bears no similarity to the world that is apparently given in perception. There are, it has to be admitted, similarities between Brentano’s doctrine here and that of Kant: both deny the validity of our normal everyday cognitions as cognitions of any transcendent reality. These similarities are how-

8. Cf. Münch 1989 on the influence on Brentano of Comte’s ‘positivistic’ conception of the development of science and philosophy. Brentano derived from Comte the methodological view according to which science should concern itself exclusively with ‘phenomena’ and not with any associated ‘metaphysical realities’. The view that psychology (and logic) are to be pursued without concern for metaphysics is defended also by Höfler (1890, ‘6). In his 1907, however, Höfler does go on to provide an account of the relation between mental phenomena and metaphysical realities, propounding a variant of the causal theory of perception.

9. As Philipse has rightly pointed out, ‘the idea of their existence is doomed forever to be a hypothesis for us (or a metaphysical assumption, as Brentano says)’ (Phlipse 1986/87, p. 298).

ever superficial only. Thus where for Brentano the link between inner activity and putative outer world is constituted by mere (probabilistically supported) hypotheses, Kant calls in aid synthetic *a priori* forms or categories which come down again – or so Brentano argues in his *Versuch über die Erkenntnis* – to nothing more than prejudices. Moreover, where Brentano is admirably clear about the opposition between act and (immanent) object – his doctrine of intentionality is, in the end, nothing other than an account of the relation between these two – Kant is in this respect still subject to just those unclarities, for example as between quality sensed and act of sensing, which had characterized the thinking of British empiricists such as Locke.

Notice further that Brentano's thesis leaves no room for non-veridical intentionality – i.e. for the sort of intentionality that is involved when I make an error, for example when I go searching for a golden mountain which does not exist, or when I seek to calculate the largest prime number. The acts involved in such cases enjoy, from Brentano's perspective, objects of exactly the same (immanent) sorts as are enjoyed by acts of more normal varieties (for example everyday perceptions). Veridical and non-veridical acts may after all, as the case of hallucination shows, be indistinguishable from the psychological perspective (the perspective of the subject). As we shall see in later chapters, Brentano's disciples adopted different approaches to the issue of non-veridical intentionality, seeking accounts of intentionality which would do justice to the phenomenological indistinguishability of veridical and non-veridical acts while at the same time leaving room for the existence of a real relation of correspondence between certain veridical acts and autonomous, transcendent objects.

4. *The Unity of the Soul*

A literal reading of Brentano's thesis to the effect that every mental phenomenon includes within itself something as object will help us to understand also Brentano's deliberations on the unity of the soul in Book II of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Here, too, Brentano is inspired by Aristotle. For while Aristotle recognizes that the soul has different kinds of parts¹⁰ – above all, it has a sensitive and an intellective part – he recognizes also that it is none the less a unity. Even though the soul is divisible in the sense that one part thinks and another senses, still, there must be something that holds these parts together. But what can this be?

To answer this question we must recall, first of all, that Brentano distinguishes three sorts of ways in which a subject may be conscious of an object in his mental acts (three sorts of intentionality, if one will), corresponding to three fundamental classes of 'psychical phenomena':

(i) *Presentations*.¹¹ Here the subject is conscious of the object, has it before his mind, without taking up any position with regard to it. The object is

10. Aristotle himself offers in different contexts different sorts of partition: metaphysical, functional, logical, ethical, and so on, though it would be unreasonable to see in this any conflict with Brentano's views (*pace* Ando 1965, pp. 91, 97).

11. This term translates the German '*Vorstellung*', more usually rendered into English as 'idea'. 'Presentation' has the advantage that it has convenient verbal and adjectival forms.

neither accepted as existing nor rejected as non-existing, neither loved as having value nor hated as having disvalue. Presentations may be either inner (a presentation of a seeing or a hearing), or outer (a presentation of a colour or a sound). Presentations may be intuitive or conceptual:¹² we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in the variant forms thereof in memory and imagination); or through concepts – for example when we think of colour or sound in general. Presentations may be either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex – a distinction recalling the British empiricists’ doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation is for example that of a red sense datum; a complex presentation that of a landscape, or of an array of differently coloured squares.¹³

Presentations almost never occur alone, and according to Brentano in some passages¹⁴ they are in fact necessarily accompanied by or exist only in the context of modes of mental directedness of other sorts, namely:

(ii) *Judgments*. A judgment arises when, to the simple manner of being related to an object in presentation, there is added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we might call acceptance and rejection or belief and disbelief. More precisely, a judgment is either the affirmation or the denial of existence of an object given in presentation. Brentano therefore embraces a theory of judgment according to which all judgments are reducible to judgments of existential form.¹⁵ Thus a positive judgment in relation to a presentation of falling rain might be rendered as: *falling rain exists* or *it’s raining*; a negative judgment in relation to the presentation *unicorn* as: *unicorns do not exist* or *there are no unicorns*. A predicative judgment such as *swans are white* turns out to be a negative judgment resting on the complex presentation of non-white swans, and may be rendered as: non-white swans do not exist. Perception, for Brentano, is a combination of sensory presentation and positive judgment.

(iii) *Phenomena of Interest*. Phenomena of interest arise when to the presentation of an object – particularly one that belongs to a positive existential judgment – there is added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we might call *positive and negative interest* or also ‘love’ and ‘hate’. The dichotomy in question is involved, according to Brentano, in all mental acts and attitudes across the entire gamut of feeling, emotion and will. As in judgment, so also in feeling and desire – which Brentano insists belong to the same basic class of psychic phenomena – the object is ‘present in consciousness in a two-fold way’, both as object of presentation and as object of some *pro* or *contra* attitude.¹⁶ Judgment and interest are analogous further in

12. This division corresponds broadly to Russell’s opposition between ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’ (1913), or to Husserl’s opposition between ‘fulfilled’ and ‘signitive’ or ‘empty’ intentions as propounded in the *Logische Untersuchungen*.

13. See 1924, vol. I, pp. 112, 124f., Eng. pp. 79f., 88f.

14. *Psychologie*, vol. II, pp. 127f., Eng. pp. 266f. Cf. Brandl 1987.

15. 1924, vol. II, pp. 56ff., Eng. pp. 213ff. (Brentano later adopted an amended version of this view: see his 1924, vol. II, pp. 164–72, Eng. pp. 295–301.) Cf. Simons 1987a and Mulligan 1988.

16. *Psychologie*, vol. II, p. 38, Eng. p. 201. Cf. Chisholm 1986.

that there is a notion of correctness applying to each: the correctness of a judgment (its truth) serves as the objective basis of logic; the correctness of feeling and desire (its objective rightness) serves as the objective basis of ethics, a view developed at length by Brentano in his *On the Origins of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*.

Return, now, to our question as to what it is which holds the different parts of consciousness together. Surely not the body, Aristotle argues:

on the contrary, it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together; at any rate, when the soul departs, the body disintegrates and decays. If, then, there is something else which makes the soul one, this unifying agency would have the best right to the name of soul, and we shall have to repeat for it the question: Is *it* one or multipartite? If it is one, why not at once admit that 'the soul' is one? And if it has parts, then once more the question must be put: What holds *its* parts together? And so *ad infinitum*.
(411^b8)

Brentano, too, accepts a version of this argument. And he, too, faces the problem of reconciling the complexity of consciousness with what he sees as its necessary unity.¹⁷ That the activities of mind are always manifold and complex is clear. But this, Brentano insists, should not mislead us into supposing that such activities constitute a mere plurality or heap – as is assumed by those who defend a 'bundle' theory of the mind of the Humean sort. Rather, Brentano insists, it is a quite special sort of unity which marks conscious experience in every instant, however complex such experience might be. Here, two sorts of complexity must be distinguished, with correspondingly different sorts of unifying mechanism. First, is the sort of complexity which arises where a number of psychic activities, for example presenting, judging and desiring, are directed towards a single object. Second, is that sort of complexity which arises where a number of psychic acts, directed toward distinct objects, occur simultaneously within a single consciousness. Both of these two sorts of complexity involve a certain sort of independence: in the one case, as Brentano says, we have a one-sided, in the other a mutual, independence.¹⁸ But neither, Brentano argues, leads to any breaking up of the real unity in which they are involved. If, then, as Brentano claims, these are the only ways in which complexification can occur (the only ways in which we can build up more complex experiences out of simple parts), then it will follow that no matter how complex a given experience is, its unity will be unaffected.

That unity obtains in the first sort of case turns precisely on the fact that presentation, judging and desiring share (and are experienced with evidence as sharing) a common object. This common object of presentation constitutes as it were an axis around which the acts of judging and desiring turn, and must necessarily turn, for it is in every case presentation that provides such acts with their objects. Clearly however the presence of a common object can serve in this way to unify experiences only if the object is immanent to those

17. Thus Brentano, commenting on the just-quoted passage, writes: 'far from it being possible to assume e.g. a plurality of souls in man which are bound into a certain unity as a result of their domicile in the same body. Rather, we must say that it is the human soul which gives unity to the parts of the body' (1867, pp. 54f., Eng. pp. 36f.). This makes explicable why 'it is always only bodies of a certain constitution which have a soul ... [for] it is the soul itself which determines the essence of its body' (1867, p. 47, Eng. p. 32).

18. 1924, p. 224, Eng. p. 158, which however has 'partial' for '*einseitig*'.

experiences. If Jules and Jim in some sense share an object, then this can by no means serve to unify their acts into a single consciousness. And if two experiences of mine are such as to be directed toward what is merely *per accidens* a single object (as when I see my neighbour and think about the murderer, in ignorance of the fact that they are one and the same), then this is clearly insufficient to guarantee that these experiences belong to the framework of a single consciousness. Rather, presentation, judgment and desire are unified because *the very same object* that is immanent to an act of presentation is judged to exist in an act of judgment and valued positively in an act of desire.

That unity obtains in the second sort of case is seen in the fact that, though the objects of the respective acts are not identical, they and the acts themselves are still in a very strong sense *comparable*. This comparability is not merely accidental; it does not rest for example on any contingent side-by-sideness or accessibility of the acts and objects concerned, for the act of comparison can take place in every case automatically and without further ado. A man can exercise such knowledge when he wishes, where a comparison of the more usual sort does not depend upon himself alone – the objects of comparison must first be sought after. Thus I can for example apprehend automatically that what I now see and what I now hear (the objects currently presented to me in these experiences) are non-identical, and again: this is conceivable only if the objects here are immanent to the act. Their necessary comparability is all of a piece with the necessary comparability of the relevant acts themselves. When, for example, I simultaneously see and hear, then I grasp this simultaneity immediately and automatically, in a way which, Brentano holds, would be impossible if the two acts constituted a mere plurality. This ability to move immediately from one act to another and back again is presupposed also by the making of complex plans, engaging in complex processes of deliberation, and so on. If the acts in such processes were mere parts of a plurality, were such as to exist merely side-by-side, then the given phenomena would be rendered inexplicable.¹⁹

How, against this background, is the unity of consciousness to be understood from the ontological point of view? Conscious phenomena, we can provisionally affirm, are mere ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’. (1924, p. 221, Eng. p. 155) A divisive is, simply, an entity that is not an entity in and of itself, but only as part of something else. A divisive is, we might say, the result of an abstract division of a whole, i.e. of a division ‘in the improper sense’, a division that is not in fact carried out. (Recall our treatment of ‘separation in an improper sense’ above.) A collective, similarly, is the result of an abstract or improper unification into a whole; and the early Brentano follows Aristotle in the thesis that a real thing and a collective of real things in this sense are never identical. Certainly a collective may become a thing (for example when one thing digests another); but then where there had been parts of a collective are now merely divisives. Similarly, a thing may become a collective through real division or dissolution or partition; but then where there had been mere divisives within a thing are now things in their own right. The latter take the place of the former.

19. Cf. Brentano 1924, p. 227, Eng. p. 159.

Divisives are distinguishable as it were abstractly *in* the thing of which they are divisives. And it is this common belongingness to a single actual thing of the results of merely abstract division that constitutes the unity of consciousness in Brentano's eyes. The case of simultaneous seeing and hearing shows that we may have a single actual consciousness whose divisives can in principle come to be really separated from each other in the sense that either can continue to exist when the other has ceased. But such mutual separability does not affect the unity of the original whole. This Brentano shows by means of a thought-experiment resting on the supposition that there are physical atoms (entities with no really separable parts) and that these atoms have some finite extension. Within such atoms we can distinguish 'quantitative parts': for example, any pair of hemispheres. Each atom comprehends such quantitative parts, but as divisives only. It comprehends as divisives also certain individual properties (moments, tropes). Many of these, too, may be necessary parts, i.e. they may be incapable of being lost. This holds of the atom's individual shape, for example.

Yet of others clearly this does not hold, although they themselves are not to be regarded as things. The atom goes, for example, from rest to motion and from motion to rest. Yet notwithstanding this, the motion which obtains in the thing is not itself a thing, otherwise it would be conceivable that it should survive in separation from the atom. (1924, p. 230, Eng. p. 162, trans. amended)

One is able to imagine here a plurality of parts which belong to a single actual thing in such a way that there obtain between these parts more and less intrinsic relations. This does not however mean that any of the given parts could exist outside the context of the given whole. For a motion and a rest are always individual properties of and distinguishable only in some specific individual thing. The thing can be separated e.g. from the motion (by being brought to rest). But the motion cannot be separated from the thing. And what holds of motion and rest holds of shape and colour, too.

So it is also, Brentano now argues, in the case of psychic acts and states. The relation of hearing to seeing is less intrinsic than, say, that between desire and presentation. But one cannot derive from this any argument against their belonging to a single real unity, any more than in relation to, say, the motion and temperature of the atom. To affirm the unity of consciousness is to affirm only that all the psychic phenomena that we experience, however different they may be, constitute merely partial phenomena or 'inseparable parts' within the framework of a single whole. Hence unity is guaranteed not by the presence of some extra unifying element: Brentano is at the time of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in fact sceptical of any such substantial 'carrier' or supporting substratum, just as he is sceptical of atomism as regards the outer world.

Brentano's view would even be consistent with the possibility that one consciousness might come to be split into two, for example as a result of certain sorts of surgical operations. For at any given time each single soul would still, under these circumstances, form a unity in Brentano's sense. From this it is clear that the unity of consciousness in which Brentano is interested is synchronic only: he is concerned with unity *at a time*. Certainly it is true that, 'as inner perception shows us only one really unified group of psychical

phenomena, so memory shows us directly not more than one such group for every moment of the past.’ (1924, p. 237, Eng. p. 167) That memory shows us always such unified groups is something that we know, Brentano claims, with evidence. But it is not evident that this succession of ‘groups’ – and Brentano’s repeated use of this word in the present context is significant – must have been part of the same unitary thing as that which comprehends our present psychic appearances.

It is not to be denied that, leaving aside occasional gaps, memory shows us a continuum, a temporally progressing series of groups, between the successive phases of which there typically obtains a certain similarity. This makes it understandable that we tend to suppose that it is the same real unity which comprehends all the successive groups of appearances and brings about their similarity. But we cannot affirm this with evidence, as we can, for example, affirm with evidence that our present memories belong to the same real unity as our other present psychic acts, our evidence here resting on the peculiar immediate and automatic comparability discussed above.

Indeed, because in relation to any putative diachronic identity of or involving unified groups, evidence is unavailable, Brentano at the time of his *Psychology* sees it as ‘an open question whether the perseverance of the ego is the survival of one and the same unitary thing or the succession of different things, of which the one would connect itself to the other and as it were take its place.’ (1924, p. 239, Eng. p. 168) The self might even be a special bodily organ, and the stuff of this organ be continuously renewed, so that the unity of consciousness would be, as Brentano says, ‘like that of a river.’

5. *From Psychology to Ontology*

As his rather loose talk of ‘groups’ of psychic phenomena makes clear, Brentano is still at the time of the first edition of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) in possession of little more than the germ of an ontological theory of the different types of parts of consciousness and of the ways in which these join together to form larger unitary wholes of different sorts. Certainly he has seen that there are entities – ‘divisives’ or ‘partial phenomena’ – which can exist only in the context of a whole of determinate type. But he does not, at this stage, see the possibility of extending this insight to yield a general account of the relevant types of parts and wholes and of the relations between them.

A theory of this sort is, however, presented by Brentano in his *Deskriptive Psychologie*, a compilation of lectures delivered in Vienna University in 1889/90. Descriptive psychology, as Brentano here understands it, seems to consist precisely in a psychology that will issue in an ontologically sophisticated theory of the different types of parts, of such a sort that the specification of parts will be at the same time a specification of the ways in which these parts are fitted together into wholes.

Wherever there are parts, Brentano holds, there is also a form of separation, or separability.²⁰ As we can see by considering a case of

20. 1867, p. 55, Eng. p. 37; cf. *Met.*, 1023^b12.

simultaneous seeing and hearing, many of the parts of consciousness are really separable, i.e. they are such as to be able to ‘be cut loose or separated from one another, in that the part that earlier existed with the second part in the same real unity continues in existence when that other part has ceased to exist’ (1982, p. 12). Other examples are: a seeing and a remembering; the thinking of a premise and the thinking of a conclusion, and so on. Inspection now reveals that the relation expressed by ‘*a* is separable from *b*’ can be either one-sided or reciprocal. Seeing and hearing are reciprocally separable, as are the extended parts of a continuum existing side by side. Presentation and desire, in contrast, or presentation and judgment, as well as premise and inference, stand in a relation of one-sided separability only: a desire or judgment, according to Brentano, cannot as a matter of necessity exist without some underlying presentation of the object desired or affirmed as existent, and an inference cannot exist without the thinking of the premise.

The relation of one-sided separability hereby imposes upon consciousness a certain hierarchical order, with ultimate or fundamental acts constituting the ground floor. Such mental elements are one-sidedly separable from other parts of mind, but they are themselves not such as to have any separable parts. The ultimate acts, Brentano now insists, are always acts of sensation, and correspondingly the (primary) objects of ultimate or fundamental acts must be sensible phenomena (immanent objects derived from one or other of the various classes of sensory qualities). Acts of the given kind must ‘contain as their primary relation a presentation of a sensible concrete content’ (1982, p. 85).

Let us suppose, however, that we have in this way separated out as far as we can go, in such a way as to arrive at ultimate elements of consciousness. Then we can still, Brentano claims, in a certain sense speak of further parts:

If someone believes in atoms he believes in particles that cannot be dissolved into smaller bodies, but even in the case of such particles he may speak of halves, quarters, etc.: parts which, although not really separable, are yet distinguishable. We can call these latter distinctional [*distinktionelle*] parts. In human consciousness, too, there are also, apart from separable parts, mere distinctional parts. (1982, p. 13).

Another example of this phenomenon is to be found in Brentano’s later study of boundaries and the continuum.²¹ Imagine a disk with four perfectly symmetrical segments which are coloured, respectively, red, green, yellow and blue. What is the colour of that central point of the disk where these four segments meet? If (as we may assume) the disk is everywhere coloured, then the argument of symmetry will dictate that this point participates equally in all four colours, that it is a *beginning to be red* on one side, a *beginning to be green* on another side, and so on. Distinct parts can in this way be distinguished in what is after all an extensionless point; and there can be no talk of these very special sorts of parts being really separated from each other.

As we distinguished different varieties of separability, so we can distinguish also, and by parallel arguments, different varieties of distinctionality. In fact three sorts of distinctional part can be distinguished, the first of which are cases of distinctional inseparability in the fullest possible degree, the

21. See Brentano 1976.

remaining two being analogous, in a certain sense, to one-sided and mutual separability.

The first sort of distinctional part is illustrated by what Brentano calls mutually pervading parts or '*sich durchwohnende Teile*'. Consider, for the sake of example only, a blue patch, conceived, whether justifiably or not, as a constituent of external reality. Here a colour-determination and a spatial determination can be distinguished, not as separable, but precisely as distinctional parts and as parts which pervade each other mutually. But could not the blue patch be moved, resulting in a change of spatial determination, without its ceasing to be blue? And would it not then lose its particular spatial determination while its qualitative determination would remain unchanged? And could the blue patch not be transformed into a red patch while its spatial position remains the same? Brentano answers all such questions in the negative. He claims that when the position of an individual blue patch is changed we have an entirely new blue patch, i.e. a patch with a *new* blueness-determination, 'which is as different from the first as two spatially distinct but simultaneous blue patches are distinct from one another' (1982, p. 16). Certainly something remains identical when a colour moves. But to suppose that the colour-determination can remain identical *as an individual* through changes of location is to suppose that mutually pervading parts would exist in a merely side-by-side fashion, so that they could, as it were, exchange their partners. In reality, however, 'they are connected in a quite different way, they are as it were such as to reciprocally or mutually interpenetrate [*sich sozusagen wechselseitig durchdringen*]' (1982, p. 17). A blueness determination cannot exist without a spatial determination; but equally (for Brentano at this time) a spatial determination cannot exist without some colour-determination (or perhaps determinations of other sorts) that would fill it.

Secondly, we have what we might call one-sided distinctional separability, illustrated most clearly by the case of what Brentano himself refers to as 'logical parts'. Consider a blue and a yellow patch, side by side. These two items share a common species: they are both *colours*. They are separate instances of species of a single common genus. How are we to characterize the nature of that in which they agree? In terms, Brentano holds, of part and whole. There obtains between the colouredness of the blue patch and its blueness-determination a relation of *logical part* to whole. The two individual colour determinations, which are instances of the species *blue* and *yellow*, each contain logical parts which are instances of the common species *colour*. The individual colouredness here is a proper part of the individual blueness. But there is nothing *in addition to* the former (the logical part), which would be needed to make individual instances of sheer *colour* into individual instances of *blue* or *yellow*, respectively. For there are no individual instances of sheer colour; colour exists *only* as a logical part of blue, or yellow, or red. Colour pervades red or yellow or blue. But this relation is one-sided only: the two determinations – *red* and *colour* – 'determine the thing as it were *from the same side* (the one more, the other less).' (1982, p. 20)

That the relation of logical parts to their wholes is analogous to that of one-sided separability can be seen more clearly by considering the relation between a presentation of red and the judging that red exists. The component of

presentation here can be really separated out: a judging can give way to a mere presentation; the former may cease to exist although the latter remains. Compare, in contrast, the relation between a presentation of red and that logical part of this presentation which makes it a *presentation*. There is no way in which the latter can be separated out. A presentation that is not a presentation of this or that is, as Brentano would say, an *Unding*, as would be a colour that was not red or green. And equally, there is no way that that logical part of a judgment which makes it a judgment can be separated out, for a judgment that is not a judgment of this or that is also an *Unding*, and the same applies to all species of conscious act. (This yields a variant, mereological form of Brentano's thesis of intentionality.)

Moreover, the story does not end here; for as the tradition, from Porphyry to W. E. Johnson, was able to take for granted, logical parts are such as to manifest an onion-type structure of successively distinguishable layers: as colour is a logical part of red, so quality is a logical part of colour, and so on, in a sequence which reflects the way in which the entities in reality are divided into species and genera of successively higher levels of generality. The character *mental act* is in this respect a logical part of every presentation and judgment (it is a logical part of second order, as it were).

As concerns the case of two-sided distinctional separability, Brentano's two standard examples are what he calls the 'parts of the intentional correlate-pair' and the 'parts of the intentional directedness'. Every mental phenomenon, Brentano insists, includes something as object within itself. Consciousness *is* an intentional relation (of presenting, judging, willing), and 'as with every relation so also here we have two correlates. The one correlate is the conscious act, the other that towards which it is directed.' (1982, p. 21) But what is the relation between act and object? The act, Brentano says, is real, its object (the horse insofar as it is thought, the redness insofar as it is seen) is non-real – and Brentano's explanations make it clear that he understands 'non-real' here as meaning 'not subject to causality'.²² The conscious act is caused; and then the immanent objectual correlate of this act is thereby of necessity co-present also.

'The two correlates are not separable from one another, except in the distinctional sense.' (1982, p. 21) The objectual correlate is, as Brentano says, 'immanent to' or 'resident in' the act; it need not correspond to anything in the outer world and it makes no claim to belong to the outer world. It pertains exclusively to the domain of consciousness.²³

As concerns the parts of the intentional directedness, Brentano notes that our mental life is a matter of energy²⁴ (it is, as one says, a stream of consciousness). This mental energy is, he claims, the only sort of energy of which we have evident knowledge. Mental energy has, Brentano claims, a two-fold structure. It is made up, first of all, of a *primary* stream of consciousness-of-the-object (i.e. of its immanent correlate, as described above). In addition,

22. See the detailed discussion of the opposition between the real and the non-real in Chapter Four below.

23. Cf. 1924, pp. 129ff., Eng. pp. 92ff.

24. Cf. 1982, pp. 80–83.

however, it is necessary to distinguish a *secondary* stream of consciousness, directed to this very primary consciousness itself; for Brentano holds, familiarly, that the consciousness of an object involves of necessity an accompanying self-consciousness ‘on the side’ (*en parergo*, as Aristotle says²⁵). It will not do to argue against this that we are often so deep in concentrated thinking that we, as it were, lose consciousness of the fact that we are thinking. Even in such circumstances, Brentano argues, we are conscious ‘on the side’ of the acts involved; it is simply that we do not *notice* the relevant acts – but then there are many cases, too, where we do not notice primary objects of which we are conscious, as for example when they fall on the fringes of our visual field. The secondary relatedness is in itself complex, involving both presentation and judgment, so that every consciousness is in fact such as to manifest (at the very least) a three-fold structure: primary energy directed towards an object, together with two sorts of secondary energy – *inner presentation* and *inner judgment* – directed to this primary energy itself.

But what is the ontological relation between the primary and secondary relatedness that is involved in every conscious act? This is clearly not a relation of logical part to whole, nor a relation of pervading parts (parallel to colour and extension). Rather it is to be understood as follows: since the two wings of directedness have different objects, the relation between them is similar, in some respects, to the mutual separability of a seeing and a hearing; because they are not really separable, however, it is most appropriate to speak here of a mutual distinctional separability, as contrasted with the mutual real separability of seeing and hearing.²⁶ The two wings of psychic energy (what Brentano calls the ‘psychic dienergy’) – corresponding to what are otherwise referred to as inner and outer perception – are *really inseparable*. Thus here, as in all other cases, Brentanian ‘distinctional separability’ is in fact always a form of real inseparability.

The types of parts distinguished above are parts in the strict and proper sense. Brentano points out, however, that we often speak of distinctional parts also in a loose or ‘modifying’ sense. Thus as we saw, when someone feels cold, then it might be said that cold is in the one who *feels*; but it is clearly in the one who feels in a different sense from the sense in which it is in that which *is* cold. Only in the latter case, according to Brentano, is cold a genuine distinctional part. In the former case we have to do merely with distinctional parts ‘in the modifying sense’ – which is to say with distinctional parts which are not really parts at all but reflect only a certain improper way of speaking.

We can now raise once more the question of interpretation of Brentano’s doctrine of the ‘intentional inexistence’ of the object of a conscious act. How is this intentionally in-existent object to be understood? What, in particular, is the relation between this object and ‘real’ objects? Suppose, even more particularly, that I see a colour. What is the relation between the seen colour on the one hand and any real colour, on the other? If I see red will I or my act *become* red; will I or my act acquire real redness as parts? Brentano answers all such questions in

25. *Met.*, 1074^b35f.; cf. 1982, pp. 136ff., George 1978, p. 253.

26. Cf. Brentano 1982, p. 25.

the negative. Rather, he tells us, the seen colour contains a real colour ‘not as a distinctional part in the proper sense, but only as a part that may be carved out by a modifying distinction’ (1982, p. 27).

What he means here is that the distinction in question is not a real distinction, carving out *real parts*, not even real *distinctional parts*. As Aristotle expressed it: ‘the one who sees is [merely] in a sense coloured’ (425^b22) – in the sense, namely, in which one can say that a handshake is present in that sort of whole we call a declined handshake.²⁷ Note that this thesis is consistent with our earlier argument to the effect that mental experiences as Brentano conceives them have immanent objects as parts; merely, these immanent objects are not (except in a modifying sense) red or green or warm or cold. For this reason, too, there can be no literal talk of correspondence between the object of thought and objects in the world. Such correspondence could be at best a correspondence ‘in the modifying sense’. Brentano hopes, on the basis of the taxonomy of part-whole relations laid out above, to construct a directly depicting language, a psychological *characteristica universalis*, whose letters and words would reflect the different mental constituents or elements, and whose syntax would reflect the relations between these constituents in larger complex wholes.²⁸ His ideas in this connection can be seen to stand at the beginning of a tradition which results *inter alia* in Husserl’s development of the formal ontology of parts and wholes in the *Logical Investigations*, in the Graz and Berlin schools of Gestalt psychology, and in Leśniewskian mereology and categorial grammar. It is important to note that in the *Descriptive Psychology* – which is to say in a context where Brentano sought to develop explicitly and in detail the ontology underlying the ideas on intentionality presented in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* – there continues to prevail a resolutely immanentistic view of the objects of our mental acts. As we shall see, the tricky issue as to how mental acts are able, on occasions, to achieve a directedness to transcendent objects in the world was addressed primarily by Brentano’s students, and the fertility of Brentano’s philosophizing shows itself not least in the ways in which it led these students to try out new and interesting solutions to this very problem.

For where Brentano applied his descriptive realist method almost exclusively in the area of psychology, his students extended it in systematic ways to other domains of inquiry. We can in fact distinguish in their work three branches of what might be called ‘descriptive ontology’: the ontology of *things* (or objects in the narrow sense), the ontology of *states of affairs*, and the ontology of *values*, a tripartite division which flows in an obvious way from Brentano’s tripartite division of acts.

The ontology of things or objects arises when one turns from the psychology of presentation to an investigation of the non-psychological correlates of presenting acts. ‘Object’ is then understood as: ‘possible correlate of presentation’. Contributions to object-ontology in this sense were made by Stumpf, with his doctrine of the partial contents (objects) of presentation

27. On the notion of modification that is involved here see Chapter Five (Section 2) below.

28. See 1982, p. x.

(1873), by Ehrenfels and Meinong, with their doctrines of ‘Gestalt qualities’ and ‘higher-order objects’, by Husserl, with his analysis of the different kinds of unity and multiplicity among the objects given in experience (1891), by Marty, with his analysis of the opposition between real and non-real objects (1908), and by the later Brentano himself, with his investigations of the categories of substance and accident and with his work on spatial and temporal continua (1933, 1976).

The ontology of states of affairs arises, similarly, when one moves from the psychology of judgment to the investigation of the ontological correlates of judging acts, a step which was taken with increasing degrees of resoluteness by Marty, Twardowski, Meinong, Husserl and Stumpf, whose work will be subject to more detailed analysis in later chapters.

The ontology of values arises, finally, when one moves from the psychology of interest and preference to an investigation of the ontological correlates of the corresponding acts. Modern value theory is indeed to no small part a creation of the Brentanists, who were inspired to attempt the construction of a general theory of values by Brentano’s wide demarcation of the psychological category of ‘phenomena of interest’ – previous philosophers having tended to deal in terms of the two separate categories of ‘feeling’ and ‘will’.²⁹ Contributions to the ontology of values in Austrian philosophy were made, in particular, by Ehrenfels, as also by Meinong and his school in Graz, by Husserl, by Kreibitz,³⁰ by Kraus, and by a number of other thinkers within the Brentano tradition.

Brentano, too, can be seen retrospectively to have contributed something of his own to these more general ontological investigations, for example in his treatment of the Aristotelian distinction between ‘being in the sense of the categories’ and ‘being in the sense of being true’ in his dissertation of 1862. When not interpreting the views of other philosophers, however, the early Brentano seems to have been reluctant to formulate ontological theses of his own. Thus while he began by accepting a version of the correspondence theory of truth along Aristotelian lines, he has very little to say about the ontology of truth as such. To the question whether there are special entities – ‘judgment-contents’ or states of affairs – to which our judgments would correspond, Brentano responds by pointing out that talk of such entities would be of little use. For to elucidate the notion of *the truth of the judgment* through the notion of *the existence of the object* is to explain what is understood by appeal to something that is no better understood, and ‘nothing would be accomplished thereby’.³¹

29. See Fabian and Simons 1986, p. 39.

30. The Brentanists’ goal of producing a general theory of values was inspired in part also by work on economic value by contemporary economists in Austria. See Eaton 1930, Chisholm 1986, Husserl 1988, and Chapters Nine and Ten below. As is shown by Kraus (1937), the work of the Brentanists on value theory was to some extent paralleled by analogous work by Lotze and his disciples in Germany. One important difference between the Austrian and German axiological traditions is however the lack of any economic dimension in the latter.

31. 1889a, § 57. See also Srzednicki 1965, p. 25. Here we see the germ of Brentano’s later view according to which truth has to be elucidated epistemically. See parts III and IV of his 1930.

It was left to Brentano's students to take the additional step of using his analyses of judgment as the basis for an ontology of truth. The extent to which Brentano provoked this additional step through his lectures and discussions is not, as yet, capable of being ascertained with any certainty. The fact that so many of his most important students made a move of the given sort, just as they all used psychology as the basis of a more or less general ontology, seems, however, to support the assumption that the move in question was in some way anticipated by Brentano. Certainly it was fostered and encouraged by his discovery of the categorial difference between judgments and presentations, just as the Brentanists' work on the general theory of value had been fostered and encouraged by Brentano's wide demarcation of the sphere of phenomena of interest. It may, however, be that a crucial impetus to their work in this respect was provided by the direct or indirect influence of Bolzano, whose thinking on logic and metaphysics was communicated to important members of the Brentano school via the teaching of Robert Zimmermann in Vienna.

In summary, we can say that where, for the early Brentano, intentionality is understood as a relation between an act and an immanent content or 'object of thought' (above all as a relation between acts of sensation and immanent data of sense), in the hands of his students the notion of intentionality is allowed to blossom in such a way that the range of transcendent objects admitted as targets of the intentional relation comes to be conceived ever more widely, so that the discipline of ontology, too, is by degrees magnified in both scope and scientific significance.