

# qjvmp

IDA反编译看一眼

```
1 int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     __int64 v3; // rbx
4     __int64 v4; // rbp
5
6     v3 = JS_NewRuntime(argc, argv, envp);
7     js_std_set_worker_new_context_func(JS_NewCustomContext);
8     js_std_init_handlers(v3);
9     JS_SetModuleLoaderFunc(v3, 0LL, js_module_loader, 0LL);
10    v4 = JS_NewCustomContext(v3);
11    js_std_add_helpers(v4, (unsigned int)argc, argv);
12    js_std_eval_binary(v4, &qjsc_ca, 7482LL, 0LL);
13    js_std_loop(v4);
14    js_std_free_handlers(v3);
15    JS_FreeContext(v4);
16    JS_FreeRuntime(v3);
17    return 0;
18 }
```

github搜索得知时quickjs的东西

Q js\_std\_eval\_binary

530 files (681 ms)

530

ies0

10

ests0

ns1

0

588

0

1

0

ace0

weolar/miniblink49 · quickjs/src/quickjs-libc.c

3900 }  
3901 }  
3902  
3903 void js\_std\_eval\_binary(JSContext \*ctx, const uint8\_t \*buf, size\_t buf\_len,  
3904 int load\_only)  
3905 {  
3906 JSValue obj, val;

second-state/wasmedge-quickjs · lib/binding.rs

1406 ) -> \*mut JSModuleDef;  
1407 }  
1408 extern "C" {  
1409 pub fn js\_std\_eval\_binary(  
1410 ctx: \*mut JSContext,  
1411 buf: \*const u8,  
1412 buf\_len: usize,

同时认为这段就是编译的字节码，程序加载在这一段字节码运行

rodata:	00000000004D7020	public qjsc_ca	db	43h,	18h,	0Ah,	63h,	61h,	2Eh
rodata:	00000000004D7020	qjsc_ca	db	43h,	18h,	0Ah,	63h,	61h,	2Eh
rodata:	00000000004D7020								
rodata:	00000000004D7026		db	6Ah,	73h,	6,	65h,	65h,	65h
rodata:	00000000004D702C		db	6,	67h,	67h,	67h,	6,	6Eh
rodata:	00000000004D7032		db	6Eh,	6Eh,	0Ah,	6Eh,	6Eh,	6Eh
rodata:	00000000004D7038		db	6Eh,	6Eh,	6,	74h,	74h,	74h
rodata:	00000000004D703E		db	6,	66h,	66h,	66h,	2,	69h
rodata:	00000000004D7044		db	6,	78h,	78h,	78h,	2,	78h
rodata:	00000000004D704A		db	4,	78h,	78h,	2,	65h,	14h
rodata:	00000000004D7050		db	73h,	63h,	72h,	69h,	70h,	74h
rodata:	00000000004D7056		db	41h,	72h,	67h,	73h,	14h,	63h
rodata:	00000000004D705C		db	68h,	61h,	72h,	43h,	6Fh,	64h
rodata:	00000000004D7062		db	65h,	41h,	74h,	0Eh,	63h,	6Fh
rodata:	00000000004D7068		db	6Eh,	73h,	6Fh,	6Ch,	65h,	6
rodata:	00000000004D706E		db	6Ch,	6Fh,	67h,	0Ah,	70h,	72h
rodata:	00000000004D7074		db	69h,	6Eh,	74h,	30h,	50h,	75h
rodata:	00000000004D707A		db	74h,	20h,	79h,	6Fh,	75h,	72h
rodata:	00000000004D7080		db	20h,	66h,	6Ch,	61h,	67h,	20h
rodata:	00000000004D7086		db	69h,	6Eh,	20h,	61h,	72h,	67h
rodata:	00000000004D708C		db	76h,	5Bh,	31h,	5Dh,	8,	67h
rodata:	00000000004D7092		db	67h,	67h,	67h,	6,	72h,	72h
rodata:	00000000004D7098		db	72h,	6,	63h,	63h,	63h,	6
rodata:	00000000004D709E		db	79h,	79h,	79h,	8,	6Eh,	6Eh
rodata:	00000000004D70A4		db	6Eh,	6Eh,	0Ch,	6Eh,	6Eh,	6Eh
rodata:	00000000004D70AA		db	6Eh,	6Eh,	6Eh,	0Ch,	0,	6
rodata:	00000000004D70B0		db	0,	0A2h,	1,	0,	1,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70B6		db	1,	0,	1,	5,	4,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70BC		db	0,	0,	0,	0,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70C2		db	1,	0A4h,	1,	0,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70C8		db	2,	0,	1,	1,	1,	58h
rodata:	00000000004D70CE		db	6,	43h,	0,	0,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70D4		db	0,	0,	0,	0,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70DA		db	0,	0,	0,	61h,	18h,	43h
rodata:	00000000004D70E0		db	0,	0,	0,	0,	0,	0E2h
rodata:	00000000004D70E6		db	39h,	43h,	0,	0,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70EC		db	0,	0B5h,	26h,	43h,	0,	0
rodata:	00000000004D70F2		db	0,	0,	0,	0C6h,	3,	1
rodata:	00000000004D70F8		db	4,	0,	0,	9Eh,	1,	0Ch
rodata:	00000000004D70FE		db	2,	6,	0,	0,	0,	0Bh
rodata:	00000000004D7104		db	0,	20h,	0,	2,	0E3h,	3

好！开找decompiler！好！没有！

那么去原始仓库找字节码对应的指令总行吧，好！没有明确的对应！那么我们不得不采取一些原始的办法。尝试使用gdb辨认执行流程。

由于程序会在check失败时输出一个false，于是在write下断点，观察调用栈

```
0x7ffff7d1b29c <write+28>    ret
0x7ffff7d1b29d <write+29>    nop    dword ptr [rax]
0x7ffff7d1b2a0 <write+32>    sub    rsp, 0x28
0x7ffff7d1b2a4 <write+36>    mov    qword ptr [rsp + 0x18], rdx

[ STACK ]
0:0000    rsp 0x7fffffa818 → 0x7ffff7c8eefd (_IO_file_write+45) ← test rax, rax
1:0000    0x7fffffa820 → 0x50c070 ← 0x65736c6166 /* 'false' */
2:0010    0x7fffffa828 → 0x7ffff7dff7a0 (_IO_2_1_stdout_) ← 0xfbad2a84
3:0018    0x7fffffa830 ← 6
4:0020    0x7fffffa838 → 0x52bae0 ← 0xa65736c6166 /* 'false\n' */
5:0028    0x7fffffa840 → 0x7ffff7dfd270 (_IO_file_jumps) ← 0
6:0030    0x7fffffa848 → 0x7ffff7c8dbc8 (_IO_do_write+168) ← mov r13, rax
7:0038    0x7fffffa850 → 0x7ffff7dff7a0 (_IO_2_1_stdout_) ← 0xfbad2a84

[ BACKTRACE ]
➤ 0 0x7ffff7d1b280 write
1 0x7ffff7c8eefd _IO_file_write+45
2 0x7ffff7c8dbc8 _IO_do_write+168
3 0x7ffff7c8e4f3 _IO_file_overflow+227
4 0x7ffff7c85796 putchar+230
5 0x4bf95c js_print+211
6 0x42f44d js_call_c_function+758
7 0x42fe0c JS_CallInternal+623

wdbg> backtrace
0 0x00007ffff7d1b280 in write () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
1 0x00007ffff7c8eefd in _IO_file_write () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
2 0x00007ffff7c8dbc8 in _IO_do_write () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
3 0x00007ffff7c8e4f3 in _IO_file_overflow () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
4 0x00007ffff7c85796 in putchar () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
5 0x0000000004bf95c in js_print ()
6 0x00000000042f44d in js_call_c_function ()
7 0x00000000042fe0c in JS_CallInternal ()
8 0x00000000043224c in JS_CallInternal ()
9 0x000000000431902 in JS_CallInternal ()
10 0x00000000043ae59 in JS_CallFree ()
11 0x0000000004621a2 in JS_EvalFunctionInternal ()
12 0x0000000004622eb in JS_EvalFunction ()
13 0x0000000004c02a6 in js_std_eval_binary ()
14 0x000000000403938 in main ()
15 0x00007ffff7c28150 in ?? () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
16 0x00007ffff7c28209 in _libc_start_main () from /home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.38-1ubuntu6.3_amd64/libc.so.6
17 0x000000000403991 in _start ()
wdbg>
```

进一步比对源代码可知，JS\_CallInternal为关键，我认为他代表了一个函数的调用结构。

JS\_CallInternal部分内容如以下程序片段所示（使用gcc -E去掉了宏）

```

735 |         goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
736 |
737 |
738 |     case OP_get_loc8: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, var_buf[*pc++]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
739 |     case OP_put_loc8: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[*pc++], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
740 |     case OP_set_loc8: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[*pc++], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
741 |     case OP_get_loc0: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, var_buf[0]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
742 |     case OP_get_loc1: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, var_buf[1]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
743 |     case OP_get_loc2: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, var_buf[2]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
744 |     case OP_get_loc3: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, var_buf[3]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
745 |     case OP_put_loc0: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[0], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
746 |     case OP_put_loc1: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[1], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
747 |     case OP_put_loc2: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[2], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
748 |     case OP_put_loc3: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[3], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
749 |     case OP_set_loc0: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[0], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
750 |     case OP_set_loc1: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[1], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
751 |     case OP_set_loc2: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[2], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
752 |     case OP_set_loc3: set_value(ctx, &var_buf[3], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
753 |     case OP_get_arg0: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, arg_buf[0]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
754 |     case OP_get_arg1: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, arg_buf[1]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
755 |     case OP_get_arg2: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, arg_buf[2]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
756 |     case OP_get_arg3: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, arg_buf[3]); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
757 |     case OP_put_arg0: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[0], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
758 |     case OP_put_arg1: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[1], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
759 |     case OP_put_arg2: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[2], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
760 |     case OP_put_arg3: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[3], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
761 |     case OP_set_arg0: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[0], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
762 |     case OP_set_arg1: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[1], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
763 |     case OP_set_arg2: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[2], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
764 |     case OP_set_arg3: set_value(ctx, &arg_buf[3], JS_DupValue(ctx, sp[-1])); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
765 |     case OP_get_var_ref0: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, *var_refs[0]->pvalue); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
766 |     case OP_get_var_ref1: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, *var_refs[1]->pvalue); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
767 |     case OP_get_var_ref2: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, *var_refs[2]->pvalue); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
768 |     case OP_get_var_ref3: *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, *var_refs[3]->pvalue); goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;

```

那么找到那些字节码对应的操作是关键

JS\_CallInternal下断，输入ni，然后按住回车，让他一直执行。最终观察到程序会在“某一段区域”循环。放慢速度找到最开始的部分在：0x43012d <JS\_CallInternal+1424>即下图部分

```

16155 | restart:
16156 |     for(;;) {
16157 |         int call_argc;
16158 |         JSValue *call_argv;
16159 |
16160 |         SWITCH(pc) {
16161 |         CASE(OP_push_i32):
16162 |             *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, get_u32(pc));
16163 |             pc += 4;
16164 |             BREAK;
16165 |         CASE(OP_push_const):
16166 |             *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, b->cpool[get_u32(pc)]);
16167 |             pc += 4;
16168 |             BREAK;
16169 |         #if SHORT_OPCODES
16170 |         CASE(OP_push_minus1):
16171 |         CASE(OP_push_0):
16172 |         CASE(OP_push_1):
16173 |         CASE(OP_push_2):
16174 |         CASE(OP_push_3):
16175 |         CASE(OP_push_4):
16176 |         CASE(OP_push_5):
16177 |         CASE(OP_push_6):
16178 |         CASE(OP_push_7):
16179 |             *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, opcode - OP_push_0);
16180 |             BREAK;
16181 |         CASE(OP_push_i8):
16182 |             *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, get_i8(pc));
16183 |             pc += 1;
16184 |             BREAK;
16185 |         CASE(OP_push_i16):
16186 |             *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, get_i16(pc));
16187 |             pc += 2;

```

下断在0x43012d <JS\_CallInternal+1424>，不断按c，pwndbg会告诉你RDX的变化

0x43012d <JS_CallInternal+1424>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002
0x430131 <JS_CallInternal+1428>	mov rcx, qword ptr [rax + 0x30]	RCX, [0x520600] => 0x52099b -> 0x430658 (JS_CallInternal+2747) <- mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]
0x430135 <JS_CallInternal+1432>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0xf3036302008803
0x430139 <JS_CallInternal+1436>	lea rdx, [rax + 1]	RDX => 0x5207cd <- 0x200f30363020088
0x43013d <JS_CallInternal+1440>	mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x58], rdx	[0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0x200f30363020088
0x430141 <JS_CallInternal+1444>	mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RDX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002
0x43012d <JS_CallInternal+1424>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002
0x430131 <JS_CallInternal+1428>	mov rcx, qword ptr [rax + 0x30]	RCX, [0x520600] => 0x52099b -> 0x430658 (JS_CallInternal+2747) <- mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]
0x430135 <JS_CallInternal+1432>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0x31b0200f3036302
0x430139 <JS_CallInternal+1436>	lea rdx, [rax + 1]	RDX => 0x5207cd <- 0xcfc031b0200f30363
0x43013d <JS_CallInternal+1440>	mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x58], rdx	[0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0xcfc031b0200f30363
0x430141 <JS_CallInternal+1444>	mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RDX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002
0x43012d <JS_CallInternal+1424>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002
0x430131 <JS_CallInternal+1428>	mov rcx, qword ptr [rax + 0x30]	RCX, [0x520600] => 0x52099b -> 0x430658 (JS_CallInternal+2747) <- mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]
0x430135 <JS_CallInternal+1432>	mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58]	RAX, [0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0xcfc031b0200f303
0x430139 <JS_CallInternal+1436>	lea rdx, [rax + 1]	RDX => 0x5207cd <- 0x200cf031b0200f3
0x43013d <JS_CallInternal+1440>	mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x58], rdx	[0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x5207cd <- 0x200cf031b0200f3
0x430141 <JS_CallInternal+1444>	mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x48]	RDX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x520650 <- 0x100000002

那么pc就找到了: rdx

然后根据pc值来对应字节码，然后ida dump字节码，然后逆出指令序列，然后就接近成功力

然后就浪费了很多时间，得出结论没法内找到源代码的一个操作对应的字节码

但是！我们可以花点时间从gdb身上找到并对应上源代码中的switch结构。

如下图所示，通过jmp rax，执行不同的指令。我们可以把他的跳转后的地址记录下来，作为一个代码块的标志。然后利用call定位这个代码块块对应源代码的哪个case块


```
0x430145 <JS_CallInternal+1448> mov rdx, qword ptr [rdx + 0x20] RDX, [0x520978] => 0x5207b8 ← 0x103010102010002
0x430149 <JS_CallInternal+1452> sub rax, rdx RAX => 23 (0x5207cf - 0x5207b8)
0x43014c <JS_CallInternal+1455> shl rax, 3
0x430150 <JS_CallInternal+1459> add rax, rcx RAX => 0x520a53 (0xb8 + 0x52099b)
0x430153 <JS_CallInternal+1462> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] RAX, [0x520a53] => 0x43059d (JS_CallInternal+2560) ← mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58]
0x430156 <JS_CallInternal+1465> jmp rax <JS_CallInternal+2560>
↓
0x43059d <JS_CallInternal+2560> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x58] RAX, [0xffffffffcc58] => 0x5207d8 ← 0x200cf031b0200f3
0x4305a1 <JS_CallInternal+2564> mov rdi, rax RDI => 0x5207d0 ← 0x200cf031b0200f3
0x4305a4 <JS_CallInternal+2567> call get_i16 <get_i16>
↓
0x4305a9 <JS_CallInternal+2572> mov rcx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x88]
0x4305b0 <JS_CallInternal+2579> lea rdx, [rcx + 0x10]
```

这样一来，我们建立了映射，并可得知操作类型：

代码块<--->case块（操作类型）

下面详细叙述一下如何利用call来定位这个代码块块对应源代码的哪个case块：

IDA中找到对应地址代码段



可以看到，以jmp loc\_43012D分割为不同的代码块。上一个代码块call了一个get\_i8，本块call了一个get\_i16，下一个JS\_DupValue

在源代码中搜索这些函数，并确认上下case

```
case_OP_push_5:
case_OP_push_6:
case_OP_push_7:
    *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, opcode - OP_push_0);
    goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
case_OP_push_i8:
    *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, get_i8(pc));
    pc += 1;
    goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
case_OP_push_i16:
    *sp++ = JS_NewInt32(ctx, get_i16(pc));
    pc += 2;
    goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
case_OP_push_const8:
    *sp++ = JS_DupValue(ctx, b->cpool[*pc++]);
    goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
case_OP_fclosure8:
    *sp++ = js_closure(ctx, JS_DupValue(ctx, b->cpool[*pc++]), var_refs, sf);
    if (_builtin_expect(!(JS_IsException(sp[-1])), 0))
        goto exception;
    goto *dispatch_table[opcode = *pc++];;
case_OP_push_emtv_string:
```

最终找到地址0x43059d对应操作OP\_push\_i16。同时我们也可以确认上一块为OP\_push\_i8，下一块为OP\_push\_const8

叙述原理后，我们需要知道程序一共用了多少不同的代码块，来评估工作量（不然大约452个等着找吧）。

编写gdb脚本

```
set logging file disassembly_output.txt
set logging overwrite on
set logging on

break *0x43013d
break *0x430156

commands 1
    silent
    printf "rdx = 0x%x\n", $rdx
    continue
end

commands 2
    silent
    x/i $rax
    continue
end

start nex{123456}
continue

set logging off
```

1. 断点1确认pc
2. 断点2确认跳转地址（jmp rax，打印rax即可）

编写ida脚本，分离出所有代码块(0x43AAA6是后来发现的返回地址，即JS\_CallInternal跳转到done块然后返回)

```
import idutils
import idaapi

start = 0x430158
end = 0x43AAA6
target_jumps = ['loc_43AAA6', 'loc_43012D']

out = open('/home/ctf/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/tool/idaout.txt', 'w')

for addr in idutils.Heads(start, end):
    if idaapi.is_code(idaapi.get_full_flags(addr)):
        mnem = idc.generate_disasm_line(addr, 0)
        if mnem.startswith('jmp'):
            out.write(f'{hex(addr+5)}\n')

out.close()
```

编写python脚本处理数据，处理出[程序跳转到了第几个代码块]，方便在源代码中数数（call定不出来就挨个case数），再处理出不同的代码块数量

```
gdbout = open('disassembly_output.txt', 'r')
idaout = open('idaout.txt', 'r')

op_address = idaout.read().split('\n')
op_address = [int(_,16) for _ in op_address]

pc_list = []
inst_address_list = []
index_list = []
for i in range(2202220 // 2):
    context = []
    for j in range(2):
        context.append(gdbout.readline())

    pc = context[0].split(' ')[2]
    pc = int(pc, 16)
    pc_list.append(pc)

    inst = context[1].split(' ')[3]
    inst = int(inst, 16)
    inst_address_list.append(inst)

    try:
        index = op_address.index(inst)
        index_list.append(index)
    except:
        index_list.append(-1)

unique = list(set(index_list))
unique.sort()
print(unique)
print(len(unique))
```

pc\_inst\_index对应表:



```
qjvmp > tool > ≡ pc_inst_index3.txt
```

```
1 0x5156f9: 0x430658 at 14
2 0x5156fb: 0x431861 at 53
3 0x5207b9: 0x430658 at 14
4 0x5207bb: 0x43397e at 113
5 0x5207bc: 0x430658 at 14
6 0x5207be: 0x4339b0 at 114
7 0x5207bf: 0x43443a at 152
8 0x5207c2: 0x43443a at 152
9 0x5207c5: 0x430537 at 11
10 0x5207c7: 0x430537 at 11
11 0x5207c9: 0x430537 at 11
12 0x5207cb: 0x43059d at 12
13 0x5207ce: 0x430537 at 11
14 0x5207d0: 0x43059d at 12
15 0x5207d3: 0x430537 at 11
16 0x5207d5: 0x43059d at 12
17 0x5207d8: 0x430537 at 11
18 0x5207da: 0x430537 at 11
19 0x5207dc: 0x4304de at 10
20 0x5207dd: 0x430537 at 11
21 0x5207df: 0x430537 at 11
22 0x5207e1: 0x43059d at 12
23 0x5207e4: 0x430537 at 11
24 0x5207e6: 0x43059d at 12
25 0x5207e9: 0x430537 at 11
26 0x5207eb: 0x43059d at 12
```

```
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp/tools$ python bind.py
[-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 22, 23, 33, 36, 53, 55, 59, 65, 68, 71, 90, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 131, 152, 153, 157, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 196, 202, 212, 216, 223, 237, 245, 256, 273, 275, 277, 283, 285, 287, 299]
58
```

只需要手动找57个就好了呢。真是太好子

(-1是后来漏的，发现只出现了一次，就干脆不找了，标了个unknown)

然后我们就有了如下字典（第几个代码块对应什么操作）：

```
opdict = {
    -1: 'unknown',
    2: 'case_OP_push_minus1',
    3: 'case_OP_push_0',
    4: 'case_OP_push_1',
    5: 'case_OP_push_2',
    6: 'case_OP_push_3',
    7: 'case_OP_push_4',
    8: 'case_OP_push_5',
    9: 'case_OP_push_6',
    10: 'case_OP_push_7',
    11: 'case_OP_push_i8',
    12: 'case_OP_push_i16',
    14: 'case_OP_closure8',
    16: 'case_OP_get_length',
    17: 'case_OP_push_atom_value',
    22: 'case_OP_push_false',
    23: 'case_OP_push_true',
    33: 'case_OP_drop',
```

```
36: 'case_OP_dup',
53: 'case_OP_call0',
55: 'case_OP_call1',
57: 'case_OP_call2',
59: 'case_OP_call3',
65: 'case_OP_call_method',
68: 'case_OP_array_from',
71: 'case_OP_return',
90: 'case_OP_get_var',
104: 'case_OP_get_loc8',
105: 'case_OP_put_loc8',
106: 'case_OP_set_loc8',
107: 'case_OP_get_loc0',
108: 'case_OP_get_loc1',
109: 'case_OP_get_loc2',
110: 'case_OP_get_loc3',
111: 'case_OP_put_loc0',
112: 'case_OP_put_loc1',
113: 'case_OP_put_loc2',
114: 'case_OP_put_loc3',
115: 'case_OP_set_loc0',
116: 'case_OP_set_loc1',
117: 'case_OP_set_loc2',
118: 'case_OP_set_loc3',
119: 'case_OP_get_arg0',
120: 'case_OP_get_arg1',
121: 'case_OP_get_arg2',
122: 'case_OP_get_arg3',
123: 'case_OP_put_arg0',
124: 'case_OP_put_arg1',
125: 'case_OP_put_arg2',
126: 'case_OP_put_arg3',
127: 'case_OP_set_arg0',
128: 'case_OP_set_arg1',
129: 'case_OP_set_arg2',
130: 'case_OP_set_arg3',
131: 'case_OP_get_var_ref',
152: 'case_OP_get_var_ref_check?',
153: 'case_OP_put_var_ref_check?',
157: 'case_OP_get_loc_checkthis?',
172: 'case_OP_goto16',
173: 'case_OP_goto8',
175: 'case_OP_if_true',
176: 'case_OP_if_false',
177: 'case_OP_if_true8',
178: 'case_OP_if_false8',
196: 'case_OP_post_inc',
197: 'case_OP_post_dec',
202: 'case_OP_define_field',
212: 'case_OP_get_array_el',
216: 'case_OP_put_array_el',
223: 'case_OP_add',
237: 'case_OP_mul',
245: 'case_OP_pow',
256: 'case_OP_post_inc',
273: 'case_OP_xor',
```



```

275: 'case_OP_lt',
277: 'case_OP_lte',
279: 'case_OP_gt',
281: 'case_OP_gte',
283: 'case_OP_eq',
285: 'case_OP_neq',
287: 'case_OP_strict_eq',
289: 'case_OP_strict_neq',
291: 'case_OP_in',
299: 'case_OP_to_propkey2'
}

```

自然，我们也能够处理出pc: 操作（因为每一个pc跳到什么地址，以及什么地址对应什么操作我们都已得知）

qjvmp > tool >  pc\_inst\_index.txt

```

1 0x5156f9: op_closure8
2 0x5156fb: op_call0
3 0x5207b9: op_closure8
4 0x5207bb: case_OP_put_loc2
5 0x5207bc: op_closure8
6 0x5207be: case_OP_put_loc3
7 0x5207bf: case_OP_get_var_ref_check?
8 0x5207c2: case_OP_get_var_ref_check?
9 0x5207c5: op_push_i8
10 0x5207c7: op_push_i8
11 0x5207c9: op_push_i8
12 0x5207cb: op_push_i16
13 0x5207ce: op_push_i8
14 0x5207d0: op_push_i16
15 0x5207d3: op_push_i8
16 0x5207d5: op_push_i16
17 0x5207d8: op_push_i8
18 0x5207da: op_push_i8
19 0x5207dc: case_OP_push_7
20 0x5207dd: op_push_i8
21 0x5207df: op_push_i8
22 0x5207e1: op_push_i16
23 0x5207e4: op_push_i8
24 0x5207e6: op_push_i16
25 0x5207e9: op_push_i8
26 0x5207eb: op_push_i16
27 0x5207ee: op_push_i8
28 0x5207f0: op_push_i8
29 0x5207f2: op_push_i8
30 0x5207f4: op_push_i16
31 0x5207f7: op_push_i8
32 0x5207f9: op_push_i8
33 0x5207fb: case_OP_push_2
34 0x5207fc: op_push_i8
35 0x5207fe: op_push_i8
36 0x520800: op_push_i8

```

master  0  3  0

下面分析这段指令序列并找出程序逻辑吧！—

找半天找不着，放弃了，栈机push来pop去的，具体操作什么数据也不知道(因为无法找到字节码与操作的——对应)。

开始歪门斜道，下面登场的是测时间，基于对这东西应该运行很慢的猜想，如果他运行时动态check flag并退出，那么用时就会不同。当你输入了正确的flag片段越多，程序运行就越慢。

代码如下：

```

import subprocess
import time
import sys

executable = './qjvmp'
argument = 'flag'

```

```

# 记录开始时间

time_list = []
out = open('/dev/null', 'w')
for _ in range(3000):
    start_time = time.perf_counter()
    # 执行可执行程序
    try:
        result = subprocess.run([executable, argument], check=True, stdout=out)
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
        print(f"执行失败: {e}")
        sys.exit(1)

# 记录结束时间
end_time = time.perf_counter()

# 计算运行时长
elapsed_time = end_time - start_time
time_list.append(elapsed_time)

print(f"程序运行时长: {sum(time_list)/len(time_list)} 秒")

```

```

ctf@ctf-virtual-machine: ~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015184 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015278 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015206 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015272 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015053 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.018895 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015234 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015969 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015323 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015319 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015211 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.015089 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.014935 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.014869 秒
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
程序运行时长: 0.014897 秒

```

但是屁用没有，程序运行时间大致相同。考虑是统一check。

然后灵光一闪统计了一个不同操作类型调用的次数：

count: 1, op:unknown  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_push\_7  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_push\_atom\_value  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_push\_true  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_call0  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_set\_loc0  
count: 1, op:case\_OP\_if\_false8  
count: 2, op:case\_OP\_get\_var  
count: 3, op:case\_OP\_closure8  
count: 10, op:case\_OP\_define\_field  
count: 11, op:case\_OP\_push\_i16  
count: 29, op:case\_OP\_push\_i8  
count: 41, op:case\_OP\_push\_false  
count: 42, op:case\_OP\_call1  
count: 42, op:case\_OP\_get\_loc3  
count: 42, op:case\_OP\_goto16  
count: 42, op:case\_OP\_xor  
count: 42, op:case\_OP\_neq  
count: 43, op:case\_OP\_call\_method  
count: 43, op:case\_OP\_if\_true  
count: 43, op:case\_OP\_post\_inc  
count: 336, op:case\_OP\_mul  
count: 388, op:case\_OP\_array\_from  
count: 420, op:case\_OP\_push\_4  
count: 2352, op:case\_OP\_call3  
count: 2352, op:case\_OP\_get\_var\_ref  
count: 2352, op:case\_OP\_eq  
count: 2395, op:case\_OP\_return  
count: 2395, op:case\_OP\_put\_loc0  
count: 2395, op:case\_OP\_put\_loc1  
count: 2395, op:case\_OP\_put\_loc2  
count: 2395, op:case\_OP\_put\_loc3  
count: 2688, op:case\_OP\_put\_array\_el  
count: 2688, op:case\_OP\_to\_propkey2  
count: 3655, op:case\_OP\_lt  
count: 3943, op:case\_OP\_push\_2  
count: 4831, op:case\_OP\_get\_length  
count: 7056, op:case\_OP\_if\_false  
count: 9408, op:case\_OP\_push\_minus1  
count: 18816, op:case\_OP\_get\_arg1  
count: 18816, op:case\_OP\_get\_arg2  
count: 19235, op:case\_OP\_dup  
count: 28224, op:case\_OP\_strict\_eq  
count: 28308, op:case\_OP\_get\_arg0  
count: 31374, op:case\_OP\_post\_inc  
count: 32460, op:case\_OP\_goto8  
count: 33547, op:case\_OP\_push\_0  
count: 37632, op:case\_OP\_lte  
count: 41112, op:case\_OP\_pow  
count: 41139, op:case\_OP\_push\_1  
count: 47547, op:case\_OP\_put\_loc8  
count: 47797, op:case\_OP\_get\_array\_el  
count: 50609, op:case\_OP\_get\_loc\_checkthis?  
count: 50611, op:case\_OP\_drop  
count: 61829, op:case\_OP\_get\_var\_ref\_check?  
count: 64807, op:case\_OP\_if\_true8

```
count: 95544, op:case_OP_add
count: 296817, op:case_OP_put_var_ref_check?
```

发现了什么? 与加密和check相关的xor/eq/true/false在41,42,43这些数值

```
count: 41, op:case_OP_push_false
count: 42, op:case_OP_call1
count: 42, op:case_OP_get_loc3
count: 42, op:case_OP_goto16
count: 42, op:case_OP_xor
count: 42, op:case_OP_neq
count: 43, op:case_OP_call_method
count: 43, op:case_OP_if_true
count: 43, op:case_OP_post_inc
```

我们编写gdb脚本在case\_OP\_xor操作处下断, 找到xor指令

```
break *0x43013d if $rdx == 0x52093b

commands 1
    silent
    printf "rdx = 0x%x\n", $rdx
end

start abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
continue
```

```
0x438bc6 <JS_CallInternal+36905> movzx eax, al      EAX => 1
0x438bc9 <JS_CallInternal+36908> test rax, rax     1 & 1  EFLAGS => 0x202 [ cf pf af zf sf IF df of ]
0x438bcc <JS_CallInternal+36911> je JS_CallInternal+37013 <JS_CallInternal+37013>

0x438bce <JS_CallInternal+36913> mov edx, dword ptr [rbp - 0xd40] EDX, [0x7fffffffbf50] => 0x61
0x438bd4 <JS_CallInternal+36919> mov eax, dword ptr [rbp - 0xd50] EAX, [0x7fffffffbf40] => 0x35
0x438bda <JS_CallInternal+36925> xor edx, eax      EDX => 84 (0x61 ^ 0x35)
0x438bdc <JS_CallInternal+36927> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x88] RAX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x7fffffffbb30 ← 0
0x438be3 <JS_CallInternal+36934> lea rcx, [rax - 0x20] RCX => 0x7fffffffbb10 ← 0x61 /* 'a' */
0x438be7 <JS_CallInternal+36938> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38] RAX, [0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x50bd60 ← 0x5000001cb
0x438beb <JS_CallInternal+36942> mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x68], rax [0x7fffffffcc28] => 0x50bd60 ← 0x5000001cb
0x438bf2 <JS_CallInternal+36949> mov dword ptr [rbp - 0x6c], edx [0x7fffffffcc24] => 0x54
```

发现了'a' ^ 0x35 (这个值是0x54)

同理检查case\_OP\_neq:

```
0x4391b8 <JS_CallInternal+38427> movzx eax, al      EAX => 1
0x4391bb <JS_CallInternal+38430> test rax, rax     1 & 1  EFLAGS => 0x202 [ cf pf af zf sf IF df of ]
0x4391be <JS_CallInternal+38433> je JS_CallInternal+38555 <JS_CallInternal+38555>

0x4391c0 <JS_CallInternal+38435> mov edx, dword ptr [rbp - 0xe00] EDX, [0x7fffffffbe90] => 0x54
0x4391c6 <JS_CallInternal+38441> mov eax, dword ptr [rbp - 0xe10] EAX, [0x7fffffffbe80] => 0x53
0x4391cc <JS_CallInternal+38447> cmp edx, eax      0x54 - 0x53  EFLAGS => 0x202 [ cf pf af zf sf IF df of ]
0x4391ce <JS_CallInternal+38449> setne al          EAX => 1
0x4391d1 <JS_CallInternal+38452> movzx eax, al      EAX => 1
0x4391d4 <JS_CallInternal+38455> mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x88] RDX, [0x7fffffffcc08] => 0x7fffffffbb30 ← 0
0x4391db <JS_CallInternal+38462> lea rcx, [rdx - 0x20] RCX => 0x7fffffffbb10 ← 0x54 /* 'T' */
0x4391df <JS_CallInternal+38466> mov rdx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38] RDX, [0x7fffffffcc58] => 0x50bd60 ← 0x5000001cb
```

这有个cmp 0x54 0x53 (正好就是检查刚刚异或出来的值)

检查指令序列很难不怀疑是在检查a0 ^ 0x35 == 0x53

```
0x52093b: case_OP_xor
0x52093c: case_OP_put_var_ref_check?
0x52093f: case_OP_put_var_ref_check?
0x520942: case_OP_get_array_e1
0x520943: case_OP_neq
0x520944: case_OP_if_true8
0x520946: case_OP_push_false
0x520947: case_OP_dup
```

```
0x520948: case_OP_get_loc_checkthis?
0x52094b: case_OP_drop
0x52094c: case_OP_put_var_ref_check?
0x52094f: case_OP_post_inc
0x520950: case_OP_get_loc_checkthis?
0x520953: case_OP_drop
0x520954: case_OP_goto16
```

编写gdb脚本，处理出所有的xor数据和cmp数据

```
break *0x438bda

commands 1
    silent
    printf "%c ^ %c, 0x%x\n", $edx, $eax, $eax
    continue
end

start abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
continue
```

```
break *0x4391cc

commands 1
    silent
    printf "0x%x\n", $eax
    continue
end

start abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
continue
```

整理后结果如下：

```
xordata =
[0x35,0x7a,0x42,0xef,0x18,0xc1,0x78,0xf6,0x55,0x2a,0x66,0x56,0x2d,0xbb,0x35,0xe9,
0x4d,0xeb,0x11,0x50,0x78,0x91,0x5c,0x4f,0x60,0x50,0x2b,0x49,0x35,0x7a,0x42,0xef,0
x18,0xc1,0x78,0xf6,0x55,0x2a,0x66,0x56,0x2d,0xbb]

neqdata =
[0x53,0x16,0x23,0x88,0x63,0xf3,0x1b,0xcf,0x67,0x1e,0x7,0x64,0x48,0x96,0x54,0xd8,0
x2c,0xd2,0x3c,0x64,0x1d,0xf4,0x6e,0x62,0x2,0x33,0x1b,0x28,0x18,0x1e,0x75,0x8e,0x7
a,0xf3,0x4f,0xce,0x60,0x4f,0x5e,0x60,0x4e,0xc6]
```

编写脚本得到flag

```
xor_data = [i^j for i,j in zip(xordata, neqdata)]
print(''.join([chr(_) for _ in xor_data]))
```

```
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$ python final.py
flag{2c924a2e-a1a9-4ee2-bc0a-d7ab2785e86c}
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$ ./qjvmp flag{2c924a2e-a1a9-4ee2-bc0a-d7ab2785e86c}
true
ctf@ctf-virtual-machine:~/Desktop/pwn/tmp/qjvmp$
```