

ยินดีต้อนรับสู่ CYBER SECURITY WORKSHOP



The material in these slides is based on
OpenDNSSEC course material from Berry van Halderen

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```
$ORIGIN groupX.odslab.se.  
$TTL 60  
@      SOA nsX.odslab.se. test.odslab.se. (  
                                2011062100 ; serial  
                                360         ; refresh (6 minutes)  
                                360         ; retry (6 minutes)  
                                1800        ; expire (30 minutes)  
                                60          ; minimum (1 minute)  
                                )  
@      NS      nsX.odslab.se.  
www    CNAME   nsX.odslab.se.
```

Unsigned zone file

```

groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN SOA nax.odslab.se. test.odslab.se. {
    2011062145 ; serial
    340 ; refresh (6 minutes)
    340 ; retry (6 minutes)
    1800 ; expire (30 minutes)
    60 ; minimum (1 minute)
}
groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG SOA 8 3 60 20110628103724 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    MJ51Idcdw3TJ1g7d5W/Gk1Ccg2u2VEXAVTF49em/jdm
    pAlJne/jkw9Aft0TjdcK8G36cQ2XIHobjg8Jip88M9G/W
    W7DfJLzdo6o5Vr2HexTLC1LcQkeyjTp38Tfwvconu8N
    F1CK8rtqgH1yw0Teg9aw/180UVwGKqpd030v8Hw= }
groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN NS nax.odslab.se.
groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG NS 8 3 60 20110628103609 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    KTVacz25ovf8S2IDkh0YXPRz20+78vV7TPC4A9G29m
    3aIkpqrFz2/8ee+1qz2BGI.3WahFy8tcQ0cn7oCa2E9ae8
    L/D9WQzPz2b2C8rCoxG/uxS5+LhwYuN3b0W12B1hklj15
    F8Nfa8ayhw+h1V91hobzq8e5t8Wxaa9IF8MacV1c= }
groupX.odslab.se. 120 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 {
    AwEAAAsv0uywTp5kIaw/fwPyQncY06YHnJ701czC5SCa
    veINQELhltm+tv/1TvK6d5Gq/ehjTP8R6mgJ/gTuo7CH
    /1Nhprxdnh11VW7fjPc5t0FPIHyCM97q8A+4Inm184
    8Z3N1qQ9neolU2BP2uyT1v31K1FQm0GwePTT38f13L/
    } ; key id = 44494
groupX.odslab.se. 120 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 {
    AwEAAACwKt/OqaMkaytXKL2iy2510Z8UoutnkruzaJEE8w
    1z0bHaN8Mecp5t52075c86L70DU54658ba4k8bc8NPA
    V1DQVz1kP7TH-45XxYgTyoQJyobQdFtVq87XtaFP1FP
    57na7ga8/HVWVWqR64H51aJag4LCX+398cJX+rk613R
    tbn8Vv2P0U1u2NFq2L0K8u0tNRb14UvoRQ15q+ttjV/cw
    c0n8t1jQGP3e/ALJmJ7+MrftnYk8jyq0+qh42o/12
    6XScVbuId+OGchPo072HwKfQ8McCu28eW0c0ynP0DJ
    12ONKkqqz28Cu/4Kx44DHWt4q2ax078D0S78l9p8=
    } ; key id = 42246
groupX.odslab.se. 120 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 3 120 20110628103715 {
    20110628081352 62246 groupX.odslab.se.
    7w32PCW95e86q0FTxyku3nDQW7dAE1aVhq4Rv8a2R8R
    1AgkKk/XQ80forzj5/qHJrJA2+a9wvrv1Wok8R6cz3T8
    bwa199u8Xj8pQ8ChzCvxbGpT8qPgq6Mto5j1Ua3K4
    N19Wqy/qfLwkvxRpdK4g8Kac1b71TPu1Q5ovvAR8Dv
    4rJ4an8d0mQhYtwCuQ46wVtpqHqfCga88F8D20KzjK
    54a7rbe6UNt3H4MjQfym3Hfvu1FAdC7W08h1ks7YQW
    j6ama8G8Ej+11R8eku8KwFv8Wf/ca08fuz4Hty0G8RP
    2m8TlWk+Xcyr8k6vH5ofar8TC8G0J0t4q== }
groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN NSSEC3PARAM 1 0 5 3A58F749D1330E63
groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG NSSEC3PARAM 8 3 60 20110628103502 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    GvylA0rsw48Nv5/UkelCk3WajB5N1m8v1eFdw2p2MfEa
    nsgJ2bJ0aT6R3j1yR1vc+6T3jAD8H0pr61Ll8y5FRb
    8eZAn/2Dr0G0N3Y8U6ew51Ah/TP8o7q8UNt0kn1TAds
    5rZ18T0Do3yqQ05q82TVo8wCf1HG6+ht8c+vGs= }
www.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN CHAME nax.odslab.se.
www.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG CHAME 8 4 60 20110628103414 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    8Aa7KPVdwoPeC3lan/W0d4V20R62a5jbQd65rGh8EOGP
    7oRqd6wRpd8CHN88r3NntYc861m2j71W8D0F8dML176
    vx8WVc861e8+Vtpu4bgn883jq8f3Tf8a1R22bYH1+Y9Q
    Y7PHN8Fcm20Fm0vNl8mJdpm+YHjUJ5a+81woj0c= }
7orehlab9elhfgqP53bqqde6hcdm5eo3.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN NSSEC3 1 0 5 3A58F749D1330E63
OTANAR0W6.3005Q2C6GKZ1T2GU2864DCA CHAME RRSIG
7orehlab9elhfgqP53bqqde6hcdm5eo3.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG NSSEC3 8 4 60
20110628103552 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    asU2y8aLQ8KA8ey2xa14huf6jFVY3X0M4PtQnSpr8H
    eW8/sdG9Q8Hj1jqrFW82cV25Y17w0W8G4f8v8Nz1J34
    x8BwanjY57Gv8K/a0hyCnFVAH8oq41x75fLDFr8at/u
    vsvFa90vJ3H4C8Wb8N3J38G8aCaJ8ape/k0/a8+0w= }
otananomkjbo8qczg6k21c3u2ab4dca.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN NSSEC3 1 0 5 3A58F749D1330E63
70F8R18E9ELHfQFP53BQQD686C8M5E03 NS SOA RRSIG DNSKEY NSSEC3PARAM
otananomkjbo8qczg6k21c3u2ab4dca.groupX.odslab.se. 60 IN RRSIG NSSEC3 8 4 60
20110628103526 {
    20110628081352 44494 groupX.odslab.se.
    QLLN/6Cj1K0409P9/Antq8P8NAKJ8PUT233K0E8FN0GCP
    P2Ez/7dd+3lv2a8K8Tfx/0Vky8r48afg8+ko8wEO+3E
    7jmfK1UDG608DQq/Rq8tLp8W8F8TLM2a07V8F8v8E2ql
    5U1UQj1FT2+a8R3Dd4/QMq26Yn8Gq5q8qH/wk67Y= }

```

Signed zone file

DNSSEC EXTRA REQUIREMENTS

Procedure to make changes to key infrastructure

Add, remove, swap key usage

Signatures expire, and need refreshing

DNSSEC EXTRA STATUS

- X Insecure
- X Secure
- X BOGUS
- X ...

A WHOLE NEW DIMENSION

Past: Goofing up → your slaves would keep you up

DNSSEC: not doing in means going out of existence

Past: static

DNSSEC: constant maintaining the zone.



SIGNATURES EXPIRE !

OPENDNSSEC

OPENDNSSEC WHAT, WHY, WHO

OpenDNSSEC is a zone signer that automates the process of keeping track of DNSSEC keys and the signing of zones

- ✗ Many DNSSEC Tools missing
 - key management
 - policy handling
 - hardware acceleration
- ✗ DNSSEC should be easy to deploy
- ✗ Increase DNSSEC users and add experience from previous deployments

OPENDNSSEC – WHO



OPENDNSSEC GOALS

- ✗ Open Source software with BSD license
- ✗ Simple to integrate into existing infrastructure
- ✗ Key storage and hardware acceleration using PKCS#11
- ✗ Anticipate OpenDNSSEC deployed between hidden and public master invisible as bump-in-the-wire.



COMPONENTS OF OPENDNSSEC

- ✗ Key and Signing Policy (KASP)
- ✗ Enforcer (handling policy, key handling)
- ✗ Signing (signing the zone based on enforcer instructions)
- ✗ HSM (hardware accelerated PKCS#11 crypto, or SoftHSM)

KEY AND SIGNING POLICY (KASP)

- ✗ How to sign a zone is described by a policy
- ✗ Allows choice of key strengths, algorithm, key and signature lifetimes, NSEC/NSEC3, etc.
- ✗ One policy per zone, or some zones sharing policies

ENFORCER

- ✗ Management of Keys (manages creation, disposal)
- ✗ Keeps track of timing and key rolling
- ✗ Select which keys need to sign
- ✗ Handles changes in policy

SIGNER

- ✗ Automatic signing of the zones
 - can re-use signatures that are not too old
 - can spread signature expiration over time (jitter)
- ✗ Maintains NSEC/NSEC3 chain
- ✗ Updates SOA serial number

HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE

- ✗ Performs actual crypto
- ✗ Therefore keys only live inside HSM
- ✗ Often security must, but also a good abstraction

Everything can be rebuild – except your keys

INPUT AND OUTPUT ADAPTERS

- ✗ Acts as nameserver
- ✗ Both incoming and outgoing:
 - AXFR
 - IXFR
 - Notify
- ✗ Any nameserver can be used (BIND, NSD, ...))
- ✗ Automation to reload zone

CONFIGURATION AND PARAMETERS

CONFIGURATION OF OPENDNSSEC

Very configurable

- conf.xml -- used for overall configuration of the system
- kasp.xml -- defines the various policies for signing zones
- addns.xml -- defines In- and Output adapter parameters (e.g. TSIG).

TIME DEFINITION IN OPENDNSSEC

“P1M3DT1H30M10S”

ISO8601

P[n]Y[n]M[n]DT[n]H[n]M[n]S

- ✗ Configuration of OpenDNSSEC about durations (periods) not absolute times.
- ✗ No clue about Gregorian Calendar (P1Y == P365D)

Pitfall: P5M PT5M

A world of difference (actually 13391700s).

CONF.XML

Configuration contains

RepositoryList (which HSMs)

Common

Enforcer

Signer

```
<Configuration>
```

```
  <RepositoryList>
```

```
    ...
```

```
  </RepositoryList>
```

```
  <Common> ... </Common>
```

```
  <Enforcer> ... </Enforcer>
```

```
  <Signer> ... </Signer>
```

```
</Configuration>
```


REPOSITORY LIST

Defines where private keys live

- ✗ You need at least one but can have more (separate ZSK/KSK)
- ✗ HSM interface available
- ✗ Each private key repository is listed as an <repository> element
- ✗ SoftHSM if you do not have the money hardware

```
<RepositoryList>
```

```
  <Repository name="SoftHSM">
```

```
    <Module>/usr/lib/libsofthsm2.so</Module>
```

```
    <TokenLabel>OpenDNSSEC</TokenLabel>
```

```
    <PIN>1234</PIN>
```

```
  </Repository>
```

SIDELINE: SOFTHSM

- ✗ PKCS#11 is the industry API to HSMs;
- ✗ Private keys are assumed to be stored in HSM;
- ✗ The SoftHSM is distributed separately and independently from OpenDNSSEC (but in co-operation);
- ✗ for those who do not have HSM (most users);
- ✗ HSMs can be tricky, read documentation about capacity, backups, sessions;



PART 7: SOFTHSM

<http://bangkok.lol/>