Implementing KMSAN on PowerPC

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How did I get here?

- PowerPC Kernel Developer at IBM
- Worked on other memory sanitizer(ish) tools
  - KFENCE
  - Arch specific harden user copy feature

Overview

- What is KMSAN
  - Kernel side
  - Compiler side
- Implementing KMSAN
- What has come of it

What is KMSAN

What is KMSAN

Big Idea:

Detect and report undefined uses of uninitialized memory and uninitialized memory copied to user.

What is KMSAN

What counts as undefined?

Ok

- `r = uninit + b`

Not Ok

- Conditions

```
if (uninit) ...
```

- Pointer Dereferences

```
*uninit
```

- Array Accesses

```
uninit[i]
```

```
buf[uninit]
```

Whats the problem?

```
void main() {
    int c;
    if (c)
        printf(“got here\n”);
    else
        printf(“got there\n”);
}
```

Possible outputs

```
$ main.c
got here

$ main.c
got there

$ main.c
got here
got there

$ main.c
```

What is KMSAN

- For every byte there is a shadow byte
  - Track whether each bit is initialized or not
- For every 4 bytes there are 4 origin bytes
  - Tracks where the 4 bytes were last written to

```
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in test_uninit_kmsan_check_memory+0x1be/0x380 [kmsan_test]
 test_uninit_kmsan_check_memory+0x1be/0x380 mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:273
 kunit_run_case_internal lib/kunit/test.c:333

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 do_uninit_local_array+0xfa/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:260
 test_uninit_kmsan_check_memory+0x1a2/0x380 mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:271

Local variable uninit created at:
 do_uninit_local_array+0x4a/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:256
 test_uninit_kmsan_check_memory+0x1a2/0x380 mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:271

Bytes 4-7 of 8 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 8 starts at ffff888083fe3da0
```

```
static void test_uninit_kmsan_check_memory(struct kunit *test) {
    volatile char local_array[8] = { 0 };

    do_uninit_local_array((char *)local_array, 4, 7);

    kmsan_check_memory((char *)local_array, 8);
}

static void do_uninit_local_array(char *array, int start, int stop) {
    volatile char uninit;

    for (int i = start; i < stop; i++)
        array[i] = uninit;
}
```

How it works

For every three pages:

- One is used as normal
- One becomes the shadow metadata
- One becomes the origin metadata

Stored in the page struct

```
struct page {
    ...
    struct page *shadow, *origin;
    ...
};
```

This association is made when pages are returned from the memblock allocator

How it works

For physical addresses or linear map



How it works

For vmalloc addresses

- vmalloc region is divided into four
- 1st quarter is the new vmalloc region
- 2nd quarter is shadow metadata
- 3rd quarter is origin metadata

- When a page is mapped into virtual memory it's shadow and origin pages are mapped into the right place





Everything Open 2024

Propagating metadata

```
struct shadow_origin_ptr {
    void *shadow, *origin
}

char val = *ptr
struct shadow_origin_ptr val_meta =
    __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_1(ptr)
...
```

```
r = a + b
r_shadow = a_shadow | b_shadow
```

Using metadata

```
void foo() {
    ...
    if (cond_var_shadow)
        __msan_warning();
    if (cond_var) {
        ...
    }
}
```

Compiler changes

```
-  if (IsX86_64)
+  if (IsX86_64 || IsPowerPC64)
     Res |= SanitizerKind::KernelMemory;
```

Skipping sanitization

Two ways:

1. `__no_sanitize_memory`
    - Don’t insert any instrumentation at all
2. `__no_kmsan_checks`
    - Don’t do any checks but mark return values as initialized

Implementing KMSAN

*For PowerPC64 guests

Getting it to compile

```
static inline void *arch_kmsan_get_meta_or_null(void *addr, bool is_origin)
{
    unsigned long addr64 = (unsigned long)addr, off;
    if (KERN_IO_START <= addr64 && addr64 < KERN_IO_END) {
        off = addr64 - KERN_IO_START;
        return (void *)off + (is_origin ? KERN_IO_ORIGIN_START : KERN_IO_SHADOW_START);
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
}

static inline bool kmsan_virt_addr_valid(void *addr)
{
    return (unsigned long)addr >= PAGE_OFFSET && pfn_valid(virt_to_pfn(addr));
}
```

Getting it to compile

… plus some macro definitions

```
#define VMALLOC_LEN ((__vmalloc_end - __vmalloc_start) >> 2)
#define VMALLOC_END (VMALLOC_START + VMALLOC_LEN)
#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_SHADOW_START VMALLOC_END
#define KMSAN_VMALLOC_ORIGIN_START (VMALLOC_END + VMALLOC_LEN)
```

Thank you

Piles of assembly

PowerPC has a lot of raw assembly

- Interrupt handling
  - Saving machine state into pt_regs
- memcpy, memmove, memset
  - For speed

Interrupt handling

PowerPC has a lot of raw assembly

- Interrupt handling
  - Saving machine state into pt_regs

Solution: use `kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs()`

Mem functions

- Solution: macros

```
#ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
void *__memcpy(void *to, const void *from, __kernel_size_t n);

#ifdef __SANITIZE_MEMORY__
#include <linux/kmsan_string.h>
#define memcpy __msan_memcpy
```

Walking the stack

- Some loads/stores are still invisible to KMSAN
  `%retval = call i32 @foo(i32 %arg)`
- Stack frame layout is arch specific so isn't represented in LLVM IR
- Some functions make use of arch specific parts of the stack



Walking the stack

- `perf_callchain_kernel()`
- `show_stack()`
- `arch_stack_walk()`

Solution: Mark functions as `__no_kmsan_checks`

Interfacing with other code

The kernel is not the only thing running in supervisor mode

We need to interact with the hypervisor to request resources

```
unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE];
ret = plpar_hcall(H_GET_TERM_CHAR, retbuf, vtermno);
```

Solution: `kmsan_unpoison_memory(retbuf, sizeof(retbuf))`

Subject: [PATCH 00/32] kmsan: Enable on s390

- Validated the work I had done
- Revealed issues I didn't know about
  - DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT

What about hash?

After successfully booting the kernel without warnings on radix how hard could it be on hash?

[0.000000] Booting Linux

…And it hangs

Static branches

Some conditional branches always go the same way e.g. MMU feature checks

Conditional branches can be replaced with static branches or nops

```
static bool mmu_has_feature(unsigned long feature) {
    ...
    i = __builtin_ctzl(feature);
    return static_branch_likely(&mmu_feature_keys[i]);
}
```

Back to hash

```
struct shadow_origin_ptr get_shadow_origin_ptr(...) {
    unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
    struct shadow_origin_ptr ret;

    ret = kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr(...);
    user_access_restore(ua_flags);
    return ret;
}
```

```
struct shadow_origin_ptr
kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr(...) {
    if (!kmsan_enabled)
        goto return_dummy;
    ...
}
```

Was it worth it?

“Bug” #1

```
static void udbg_hvc_putc(char c) {
    int count = -1;
    unsigned char bounce_buffer[16];

    do {
        bounce_buffer[0] = c;
        count = hvterm_raw_put_chars(0, bounce_buffer, 1);
    } while (count == 0 || count == -EAGAIN);
}
```

“Bug” #2

```
int rtc_read_alarm_internal(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) {
    int err;

    if (!rtc->ops)
        err = -ENODEV;
    else if (!test_bit(RTC_FEATURE_ALARM, rtc->features)
             || !rtc->ops->read_alarm)
        err = -EINVAL;
    else {
        alarm->enabled = 0;
        ...
        alarm->time.tm_isdst = -1;
        err = rtc->ops->read_alarm(rtc->dev.parent, alarm);
    }
    trace_rtc_read_alarm(rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time));
    return err;
}
```

Next Steps

- Get it working with hash MMU
  - There are still a number of false positives
- Run it in syzkaller
  - See the talk on Thursday by Andrew Donnellan

Thank you

Other Links

KMSAN Docs

KernelMemorySanitizer - a look under the hood

Presentation Slides:

github.com/NMiehlbradt/talks